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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis considers different groupings that have come together in their participation 
in the policy processes relating to tenure reform in post-apartheid South Africa.  It is 
methodologically and theoretically grounded in Bourdieu’s notion of cultural ‘fields’, 
spaces of ongoing contestation and struggle, but in which actors develop a shared 
‘habitus’, an embodied history.  In these land reform policies and law-making activities, 
individuals and groups from different fields – the bureaucratic, activist and legal – have 
interacted in their contestations relating to the legitimation of their forms of knowledge.  
The resulting compromises are illuminated by a case study of a village in the former 
Gazankulu ‘homeland’ – a fourth ‘cultural field’.  Rather than seeing these fields as 
bounded, the thesis recognises the influence of wider political discourses and 
materialities, or the wider ‘field of power’.  In each of the four very different fields, as a 
result of a shared history, actors within them have developed practices based upon 
particular shared discourses, institutions and values.  But such practices are constantly 
negotiated, with different individuals claiming the power and struggling for legitimacy to 
represent their version of a differentiated messy reality.  Interactions between the fields 
have resulted in contestations around the hierarchy of knowledge to produce particular 
readings of legitimate knowledge which have often squeezed out that messiness.  It 
concludes that, in the context of huge inequality and difference, there are limitations in 
consultation and participatory processes that assume particular individuals can be 
‘representatives’ of the whole.  Where such contexts contribute to contestations over 
the meanings, here of land, rights and tenure, it is necessary to interrogate the 
methodologies adopted for enabling ‘representative’ individuals to participate in such 
processes.  The assumed inclusivity of policy and law-making processes should therefore 
be challenged in order to emphasise the importance of conflicts in the production of 
meaning and knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 - Introducing CLARA 
The Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) was passed unanimously by the South African 
National Assembly in early February 2004, months before the country’s third democratic 
elections.  The then Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Land and 
Agriculture (the Portfolio Committee), Neo Masithela, who had overseen the Bill’s public 
Portfolio Committee hearings, gave a speech to Parliament in which he wholeheartedly 
endorsed the decision of all parties to support the passing of that legislation: 
 Madam Speaker; Honourable Members 
 The debate today is about what I regard as the most transformatory legislation 
in South Africa, the Communal Land Rights Bill.  This bill will contribute in 
changing the land ownership patterns in this country.  For the first time in the 
history of South Africa people living in the former homelands will no longer feel 
like outsiders in this country they will also be the owners of the land they use 
and occupy. … 
[discussion of objections to the Bill and how they have been resolved follows] 
Let me conclude by saying, through this bill the dignity of black people in 
communal areas would be restored.  Through this bill people will be proud 
owners of the land they occupy and use. …  The ANC support the bill. 
(Masithela - 12.3.04) 
Supporting such arguments, Advocate Patekile Holomisa, President of the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) since 1991 and also African National 
Congress (ANC) Member of Parliament (MP) on the Portfolio Committee, wrote in the 
national Business Day newspaper: 
 It would have been an unpardonable negation of the ideal of Africa’s renewal if 
government were to pass a law that sought to strip traditional leaders of SA of 
their rights, powers and responsibilities over the ancestral lands of the African 
people, the so-called communal lands. 
… 
The Communal Land Rights Act, therefore, is a hugely welcome development.  
… The bill confirms the long-standing historical fact that African land belongs to 
the African communities jointly with their African traditional leaders.  The three 
entities – land, people, traditional leaders – are inextricably bound together.  At 
present the land is legally owned by the state.  The bill seeks to effect the 
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transfer of legal ownership and administration of the land to its owners, the 
people and their traditional leaders, through land administration committees. 
(Holomisa – Business Day, 11.2.04) 
The passing of CLARA by Parliament, however, was met with an outcry by many of the 
non-governmental groupings that had participated critically in the Parliamentary 
Hearings and, as if we were reading about a completely different piece of legislation, 
another newspaper article in the Cape Times reads: 
 The Communal Land Rights Bill is fundamentally flawed.  It will undermine 
rather than strengthen the land rights of the 15 million people who live in the 
former homelands.  Its most controversial aspect is that it makes traditional 
councils the administrators of land rights in communal areas.  …  
 Numerous rural community groups and NGOs, the Human Rights Commission, 
the Commission for Gender Equality, the Legal Resources Centre, the SA Council 
of Churches, Cosatu, the National Land Committee and the Programme for Land 
and Agrarian Studies all called for the bill to be withdrawn.  The only support it 
received was from traditional leaders and their organisations. (Claassens – Cape 
Times, 10.2.04) 
The legislation pitted different groups against each other in the formal new participatory 
spaces of the democratic state: government bureaucrats, ANC politicians, traditional 
leaders in the former ‘homelands’ (see below)1, human rights lawyers, land sector and 
gender activists.  Other battles were fought, as seen here, through the media, but also 
in formal and informal consultation processes organised by the government and land 
sector activists.  A court case, expected to go to the Constitutional Court, is currently 
being brought against the government in relation to CLARA by a number of different 
‘communities’2 organised and represented by some of the same individuals who 
organised opposition to the Communal Land Rights Bill (CLRB, or the Bill)3.  The purpose 
of this doctorate, however, is not to analyse the merit of the legislation, or make a 
judgement as to which ‘side’ was or is still ‘right’.  Instead, in relation to such politicised 
issues, it considers the changing influence and different positionings of the groupings in 
those debates, the ways their knowledge has been constructed, and accepted or 
contested, and the inclusions and exclusions in such processes. 
When the CLRB was finally given the go-ahead by Cabinet in October 2003, those who 
had been organising opposition to the Bill since it was first leaked in late 2001, felt 
utterly betrayed.  The model of securing tenure adopted by the Bill, and opposed by 
them, was to transfer the ownership of land previously held by the state to “the 
community” 4 living on it.  Although many within the ranks of the opposition to the CLRB 
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opposed community ‘ownership’ of land, because it represented a form of privatisation 
and therefore foresaw the end of state support for its inhabitants, for those leading the 
opposition and those who have gone on to support the court case being brought against 
the government, this was not the main problem.  For them, the big problem with this 
model of reform was that, because the whole community could not be expected to then 
participate in the administration of the land, such administration would be undertaken 
by a “land administration committee” (LAC) which would include at least a number of 
traditional leaders from “the community”.  Prior to the Cabinet-approved version of the 
CLRB, previous versions envisaged that the composition of this committee could include 
a combination of individuals elected by the community and traditional leaders, subject to 
particular limitations (e.g. not less that 75% of the members of the committee were to 
be elected by the Community, at least a third of those elected were to be women and 
not more than 25% of the committee were to be traditional leaders5).  The Cabinet-
approved version, however, set out that if a community has a recognised “traditional 
council” then that must act as the LAC6, but if it did not, traditional leaders would not be 
entitled to be members of that committee.  This change was the reason for the uproar.  
The “recognised traditional council” referred to the recognition granted by the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill (TLGFB) that had provided for 
democratic changes to be made to the Tribal Authorities that had been set up under the 
detested Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (BAA). 
The changes to ‘Tribal’ Authorities (or ‘Traditional’ following the wording of the new 
dispensation in the Constitution)7 had been furiously contested by organised lobby 
groups of traditional leaders, such as CONTRALESA and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP).  But following ongoing negotiations between the ANC and high profile traditional 
leaders, there had been some kind of turnaround in September 2003, just prior to the 
approval of the CLRB by the Cabinet, when traditional leaders finally came round to 
seeing both the TLGFB and the CLRB as acceptable to them.  Holomisa, who had up to 
that point been vocally opposed to the TLGFB, finally spoke out in support of the TLGFB 
during its Portfolio Committee hearings in October 2003.  And then the Cabinet-
approved version of the CLRB was released for comment with its insistence that a 
recognised reformed “traditional council” must act as an LAC.  However, should a 
Traditional Authority (TA) not have reformed in line with the TLGFA and so be 
‘recognised’ under it, traditional leaders within it would not even be able to participate 
on such an LAC.  The opposition saw this as a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to politics, 
buying off the acquiescence of traditional leaders to such democratic reforms, with their 
control over land as the prize. 
Until these final changes to the Cabinet-approved version of the Bill, there were 
different strands of opposition to the Bill’s provisions.  The first version that was 
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released by the government was leaked just prior to the government convening a 
Tenure Conference in November 2001.  A number of lawyers and tenure experts pored 
over it, reacting with fury to the model adopted.  In terms of this model, the Bill had 
echoes of the approach to land reform legislation adopted by the National Party (NP) 
government in the early 1990s, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 1991, but now 
with the transfer of land not to ‘tribes’ but to an ‘African traditional community’ (Sibanda 
2004: 160).  This continued a long tradition of apartheid support and manipulation of 
the chieftaincy system and in a democracy, to progressive human rights lawyers and to 
former anti-apartheid activists who had both fought the divide and rule ‘bantustan’ 
policies of the apartheid government (see below), this was unacceptable (Ntsebeza 
2005).  Again, the transfer of private property to such communities which would then be 
administered by an LAC that would include the appointment of non-elected traditional 
leaders, would lead to their potential empowerment. 
The director of the government’s Tenure Directorate that was working on the Bill, 
presented the reforms embodied in the Bill to that conference.  He represented such a 
transfer of land as the state ‘divesting’ its land in favour of private ownership (Sibanda 
2004).  This chimes with the ‘anti-privatisation’ strand of opposition by leftwing land 
reform lobbies and could not fail to elicit a critical response.  However, privatisation in 
favour of ‘individuals, families or communities’, as this version of the Bill advocated, 
complicates an opposition that might otherwise pit the ‘“ideal-type” communal tenure 
model’ (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006: 346) in opposition to ‘individualisation’ (often 
considered in the same breath as ‘privatisation’).  In turn, the rhetoric of ‘privatisation’ 
that might align itself with ‘modernity’, as would ‘communal’ with ‘tradition’, becomes 
mixed up.  This had the potential to fracture the opposition.  But when the 
‘communities’ in question were referred to as ‘African traditional communities’, the 
discourse of privatisation becomes linked to another potentially more powerful political 
discourse, one that links with a ‘pro-chiefs – anti-chiefs’ dichotomy.  Separately, both 
privatisation of land and the empowerment of chiefs were opposed.   But together they 
were greeted with dismay by those who thought of themselves as representing a 
progressive, democratic ‘civil society’8. 
On the other side of the debate, however, were those lobbying for the protection and 
strengthening of traditional leaders – the traditional leaders represented by 
CONTRALESA and the IFP, as well as those lobbying for the protection and 
strengthening of land rights for the purposes of encouraging a market in land – the 
Banking Council, South Africa (BCSA) (BCSA -Comments to the [Department of Land 
Affairs (DLA)] on the CLRB – 14.10.02).  In the early 2000s, both represented a 
formidable front facing the government.  Until the Cabinet-approved version of the Bill, 
however, the traditional leaders lobby was also opposed to the ‘model’ adopted by 
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earlier versions of the Bill.  Without securing greater representation for themselves on 
the LAC, they were also opposed to the ‘privatisation’ of land, fearing that ‘their’ land 
would then be able to be parcelled up and sold off and so end their authority over land 
– so central to their political authority.  And so the cap laid down in the Bill on the 
number of traditional leaders entitled to be on the LAC was also opposed.  Nevertheless, 
they were obviously not aligned with the pro-rights, pro-democracy views of those 
lobbying as representatives from civil society.  After the change introduced in the 
Cabinet-approved version, however, that would enable them unlimited authority over 
the allocation and administration of land, privatisation would actually give them more 
power rather than less, provided they introduced the changes mandated in the TLGFB.  
From this critical moment then, the ‘pro-chiefs’ discourse is strengthened in its unlikely 
alliance with both ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’: ‘rural people should be entitled to own 
their land’ (just as white people have for so long) and this law not only enables this, but 
also enables a form of ownership that respects their ‘tradition’ in enabling the 
‘community’ or ‘African traditional community’ to own the land.  Moreover, by this time, 
traditional leaders had consciously and adeptly linked such calls for the support of 
‘tradition’ with wider powerful national discourses of the African Renaissance (Oomen 
2005).  Moreover, massaging relationships with influential traditional leaders who may 
have been inclined as a result to vote for the ANC, or at least not to remove their votes 
– CONTRALESA was traditionally ANC-aligned but was threatening disruption – is likely 
to have opened up spaces for such possibilities, particularly given that the ANC was 
going all out to secure a victory over the IFP in the country’s third democratic elections 
to take place in April 2004. 
When the Bill was released at the time of the Tenure Conference in 2001, part of the 
fury from civil society was directed at the DLA’s failure to formally release the Bill for 
comment – it had simply been ‘leaked’ by a DLA official – and its lack of prior 
consultation with civil society in relation to its approach.  This criticism related to a 
frustration with the DLA that had been festering for a while.  1999 saw President Mbeki 
replace the Minister of Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom, with Thoko Didiza, who in turn 
replaced the Director General (DG) of the DLA.  Along with the former DG, many other 
former employees of the Department left in solidarity, or were unceremoniously 
‘replaced’ by the new Minister – some by an unfilled post (Dolny 2001).  After 1999, 
many of the land reform programmes were put ‘on ice’ (Director, Tenure Directorate – 
Discussion paper for Land Reform Systems and Support Services Colloquium [LRSSS], 
2.3.02: 7) while the government undertook its own closed review.  From 1994, the start 
of South Africa’s democratic transition, the Minister and the DLA had been known for 
their openness to the inputs from the land sector – many of those who moved into 
government had formerly been employed by land sector NGOs and close relationships 
 
 
 
 
 13 
still existed between former colleagues.  The frustration and confusion instigated by the 
turnaround in the DLA in 1999 was particularly acute in relation to tenure reform.  In 
1998, after three years’ intense work, a Land Rights Bill (LRB) tackling the reform of 
tenure in the former homelands had been drafted and circulated.  After the 1999 
elections, however, it had been discarded by the new Minister.  Many of those who had 
been working on the LRB, either as employees in the Department, or as consultants or 
advisors to the team, were among those who left at that time.  And they did not keep 
their criticisms of such changes to themselves, calling into question the competence of 
those left behind in the Department, and of the Minister, through public criticism in the 
media and elsewhere (e.g. Cousins – Mail and Guardian, 18-24.8.00).  Until this leaked 
draft, they had been kept in the dark in relation to the government’s revised plans for 
tenure reform.  Not only did they object to the model adopted in the draft, but also that 
they had not been consulted and many of them no doubt smarted at their experience 
having been so roundly shunned. 
Over the next two years, civil society and the government both embarked on 
consultation exercises in relation to the Bill.  A number of civil society actors 
conceptualised a ‘community consultation, advocacy and lobbying project’ (the 
PLAAS/NLC Project), that also included a media strategy, in relation to the CLRB, to be 
undertaken by the Programme of Land And Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), a small centre of 
activist researchers based at the University of Western Cape (UWC), together with the 
National Land Committee (NLC), an umbrella organisation bringing together affiliated 
land sector NGOs from around the country, and a proposal for funding was drafted.  In 
July 2002, R1million (~£75,500) of funding was secured from the UK government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID).  Over the course of the next year, 
the PLAAS/NLC Project carried out a series of community meetings in ‘rural areas’9 
around the country, as well as two workshops for women, which led to ongoing 
participation for some attendees who went on to attend Provincial, and then National-
level meetings.  It culminated, in November 2003, with representatives from 
communities around the country being brought to Cape Town to make submissions to 
the Portfolio Committee hearings in November 2004.  At these hearings, at least 24 
submissions were directly or indirectly inspired by the Project, at least 12 of which were 
made to the Portfolio Committee by representatives from communities from rural areas 
who had participated in the workshops.  The government, however, criticised these 
consultations, and submissions, as being “unrepresentative”, as being organised by 
particular people who simply told other, more ‘representative’, people what to say in 
criticism of the Bill (DLA official, interview - 11.1.06). 
Over the same period, the government also held various consultation exercises.  After 
the Tenure Conference in late 2001, the draft Bill was not published officially in the 
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Government Gazette for public comment until August 2002, although further drafts had 
been circulated prior to that.  From May 2002, the government convened a number of 
Reference Group meetings that included the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), 
the Coalition of Traditional leaders, the Department of Agriculture (DOA), the 
Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), the National 
African Farmers’ Union, the National House of Traditional Leaders, the NLC, PLAAS and 
the South African Law Commission (DLA -Memorandum on the Objects of the CLRB, 
2003 - 22.9.03).  And after the Bill’s publication in August 2002, officials in the Tenure 
Directorate of the National office of the DLA took the issues to its Provincial Offices and 
together they held consultation ‘workshops’ in most of the provinces around the country 
(DLA official, interview - 11.1.06).  According to the Directorate:  
The workshops involved traditional leaders and their communities, the national 
House of Traditional Leaders with representation from the Provincial House of 
Traditional Leaders, the Coalition of Traditional Leaders and CONTRALESA and 
the Ingonyama Trust Board. (DLA - Memorandum on the Objects of the CLRB, 
2003 - 22.9.03) 
The Reference Group meetings, however, were criticised by a number of the civil society 
opposition for being a way for the government “to pretend to give a voice to civic 
groups” - “they listened and made some changes but never on the crucial, important 
issues – definitely not” (Informant, interview - 12.12.05).  The government’s holding of 
such workshops, meanwhile, was either disbelieved by critics, or dismissed as merely 
providing a “talking shop” for chiefs (Informant, personal communication - 12.1.06). 
This was therefore the highly politicised context for considering the evolution of CLARA, 
the contestations surrounding the Act and its interpretation by different groups.  These 
contestations took place a decade after the country’s first democratic elections, after the 
state had wholeheartedly endorsed economic and political liberalism with its emphasis 
on universality, and its masquerade of equality of opportunity.  The sobering reality of 
the extent of continuing inequality and difference, however, had by then become only 
too apparent (see Seekings and Nattrass 2006).  Such difference had been perniciously 
and zealously constructed by the former apartheid regime through the adoption of 
thousands of laws setting out the conditions of that difference.  Its policy of ‘separate 
development’ was pursued principally through the creation and (minimal) sustenance of 
the former homelands, with their powers of rule and administration of land delegated to 
chiefs with jurisdiction over particular areas (Hendricks 1990; Evans 1997).  Recognising 
the ‘construction’ of that difference (Spiegel and Boonzaier 1988), however, neither 
reduces its reality for the people living there, nor its ongoing political impact (Sharp 
1997; Alcoff and Mendieta 2003). Even though tenure in the former homelands could be 
 
 
 
 
 15 
easily contrasted with the starkly different tenure in the rest of the country, no one – or 
very few – were arguing that tenure reform should bring the former homelands in line 
with tenure in the rest of the country, that they should, or could, be ‘the same’.  
However, there was a danger that some would assume that tenure reform would be 
able simply to ‘deconstruct’ that difference, a danger that Sharp has recognised is 
peculiarly, albeit understandably, South African (Sharp 1997).  Many wanted such 
legislation to introduce ‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ to those areas, to release the people 
living there from their subjugated positions as ‘subjects’ of the chiefs they fell under, 
and to enable them to be full ‘citizens’ of the country (Mamdani 1996).  While at a 
political level, the ‘right to culture’ of those citizens was pitted against this (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2005; Oomen 2005), on the ground, everyday practices produced from 
their apartheid construction remained a day-to-day reality for millions.  Legislation to 
reform tenure in the former homelands was taking on a lot. 
2 - Why CLARA? 
Both sides had faith that this legislation could mark a significant step towards South 
Africa’s liberation from apartheid and transition to democracy.  But CLARA represented a 
legislative twist to that story.  According to both sides of the debate, the identities of 
people living within these areas were at stake.  CLARA would on the one hand, condemn 
such people to a life of continued oppression, unable as they are to exercise their 
human rights embodied in the Constitution.  On the other hand, according to Holomisa:  
[CLARA] is true to the constitutional recognition of the institution of traditional 
leadership, the customs and cultures of the land.  It is true also to the ethos of 
human rights and equality. (Holomisa – Business Day, 2004).   
How and why could these issues be seen so differently by different groupings?  
Exploring this leads to further questions: What assumptions was the knowledge brought 
to the debates based upon? How did the different groups legitimise, or try to legitimise 
their positions? How were the political spaces within which they were trying to achieve 
this, shaped? and, ultimately, What knowledge was excluded in these constructions?   
Many of those involved in the contestations were claiming to have ‘consulted’ with 
people living in such areas, to have enabled their voices to be heard, or otherwise, to be 
speaking on behalf of, or to be representing them.  Others based their arguments on 
their own knowledge and experience, based on a lived reality, or on academic veracity.  
International wisdom or best practice relating to tenure reform was also drawn upon.  
And discourses of human rights, privatisation and individualisation shaped the 
structuring of the debates.  CLARA was to reform the tenure of people living in the 
economically poorest and most marginalised areas of the country.  In the midst of so 
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many claims to representation, given that these people were to be the subjects of the 
reforms, could their voices be heard, or even articulated in those debates? 
This thesis asks: What have been the policy and law-making processes and practices in 
relation to CLARA in its evolution, contestation and interpretation?  It explores the 
extent to which the voices of people living in areas to be reformed by that legislation 
could be heard in those contestations taking place.  This raises questions relating to the 
hierarchy of knowledge, processes of legitimation and the fault lines between different 
forms of knowledge.  The thesis therefore goes beyond being simply an endeavour to 
answer the political question, ‘Why was CLARA introduced and passed by Parliament?’ 
considering the motivations and interests of the different parties, although it will 
contribute to painting a more complete picture of this from which an answer to that 
question may be drawn.  In turn, light is shed on the state’s proposed ‘solutions’ to 
particular issues – on the face of it ‘tenure’ – that it deems to be ‘problems’10 and the 
often antagonistic responses from various groups to those proposals.  But this study 
further considers the knowledge that different individuals and groupings brought to the 
debates, how that knowledge was shaped by their history and how that in turn was 
shaped by and shaped their changing influence and positionings in relation to others at 
a particular time in South Africa’s recent history. 
3 - CLARA and the homelands 
In order to do this, first, it is important to understand the context and history of these 
sites called homelands, which the democratic government was left to deal with in 1994.  
By 1994 there were ten so-called self-governing territories in South Africa, four of which 
had been granted ‘independence’.  The tenure system in the former homelands was 
shaped by the passing of laws dictating how much land people living in such rural areas 
were to be allocated, how they were to live on that land and who was to administer that 
land – namely chiefs.  While the Natives’ Land Act passed in 1913 formalised and 
legalised an inequality in tenure, this inequality has a much longer history (Hendricks 
1990).  That Act, however, institutionalised a distinction between exclusively white-
owned areas and ‘reserves’ – what became the bantustans or homelands – which today, 
after ‘consolidation’ that took place subsequently, make up just 13 percent of the land 
area of the country.  These were comprised of ‘a fragmented horseshoe comprising [in 
1972] eighty-one large and 200 smaller blocks of land’ (Lipton 1972: 3).  They were to 
be the ‘homes’ of the people who lived there, as well as all the other people living 
elsewhere in South Africa who were said to derive from the tribe whose ‘home’ it was – 
for 70% of the people of South Africa.  They also became a ‘dumping ground’ for the 
millions of people who were removed from ‘black spots’11 in the so-called white South 
Africa over many years (Hendricks 1990; Murray 1992; James 2007).  Others living on 
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land that was defined as being for a different tribe, that is, in the ‘wrong’ homeland, 
were also forcibly removed across the ‘border’, ‘back’ into their own proper homeland 
(Harries 1989).  It has been estimated that more than 3.5 million black people were 
forcibly removed and relocated to these homelands between 1960 and 1983 – this does 
not include those relocated for the implementation of ‘betterment’ schemes (see below) 
(Platzky and Walker 1985).  In 1997 it was estimated that more than 73% of those 
living in such areas were living in ‘poverty’ (Draft White Paper on Population Policy), and 
after the census in 2001, it was estimated that 19,050,159 million12 live in rural areas of 
the country (Statistics SA 2001)13.   
Land in these areas predominantly remained under the ownership of the state or was 
held in trust by the South African Development Trust (SADT), but was classified as 
‘communal’ by the apartheid authorities.  There were an assortment of reasons for the 
apartheid government to create, and perpetuate, these homelands or bantustans: they 
provided ‘homes’ for migrant workers to go back to, thereby both supporting the 
migrant labour system as well as quelling fears in relation to the large scale 
demographic shift to urban areas of the country (Evans 1997).  Evans describes the shift 
from the more laissez faire approach to the more centralised administration of these 
areas with the adoption of the ‘unabashedly tribalist’ Native Administration Act of 1927 
(NAA) (1997: 168).  The NAA extended the system of tribal courts and tribal law, 
institutionalising the system of customary law and granting chiefs jurisdiction over 
particular areas (Letsoalo 1987). This authority, however, was qualified with the 
appointment of the Minister for Native Affairs as the ‘Supreme Chief of All Natives’, 
empowering him to ‘declare pass areas, amalgamate or dissolve whole ‘tribes’, banish 
Africans and impose a variety of discretionary sanctions on Africans suspected of 
disturbing the peace’ (Evans 1997: 170).  He was supported by a cadre of ‘magistrates’ 
and/or Native Commissioners who acted as the ‘judge’ and ‘jury’ over such areas.  The 
1951 BAA with its ‘aggressively interventionist brief’ further ‘centralised control’ (ibid: 
233), but this time in the form of ‘indirect rule’ (Mamdani 1996).  ‘In a bastardized 
mimicry of tribal government in preconquest society … the act introduced a pyramidical 
structure’ (ibid: 251) reinforcing the power of the chiefs with the creation of ‘Tribal 
Authorities’ and ‘Regional’ and ‘Territorial Authorities’.  This was extended by the Bantu 
Self-Government Act 1959 that ushered in the separate development of the bantustans, 
creating nine Territorial Authorities for the then eight ethnic or tribal groups (Letsoalo 
1987).  The BAA, however, had already ‘magnified and politicised longstanding rivalries 
over the chieftaincy’ (Evans 1997: 254) through its extension of authority to a hierarchy 
of appointed chiefs and ‘headmen’ who were to have jurisdiction over a particular area 
and participate in these homeland legislatures. 
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This reinvigorated form of ‘indirect rule’, brought about by the passing of the BAA, also 
enabled many men, who were absent from home and their families due to the migrant 
labour system, to continue, also indirectly, to control their families, women and land, 
through the control exercised by the chief (Vail 1989).  Ethnicity, according to Vail, can 
be seen as a mechanism of such control and ‘may be interpreted, then, as a form of 
popular male resistance to the forces that were reshaping African lives’ (ibid: 24).  Other 
changes taking place beyond the rural areas also contributed to this ‘retribalisation’ and 
‘new ethnic consciousness’ of black South Africans, not least the forced removals of 
people back into their ‘proper’ homelands (Harries 1989). Given the small proportion of 
the country taken up by the homelands, and the growing numbers of people living 
there, these areas were overcrowded and have become increasingly so.  According to 
Evans (1997: 243), between 1955 and 1969, the population density increased from 60 
to 100 persons per square mile, due to removals from black spots, redundancies 
amongst labour tenants and unemployment.  Moreover, with such large numbers being 
moved into the homelands, the complexity of the jurisdictional and permit-based 
arrangements increased.   
Instead of recognising the fundamental problem of there being insufficient land, the 
government saw the problem as being one of ‘mismanagement’ – ‘overstocking’ and 
‘overgrazing’ – to be solved, in order that these areas continued to be ‘viable reserves’ 
so as to continue support the millions of people living there and quell the numbers 
moving to urban areas in the country, but without the financial support that would 
otherwise be required (Letsoalo 1987; Hendricks 1990; Evans 1997).  Betterment 
schemes were envisaged by the Tomlinson Commission to separate the population into 
two groups, of ‘landless’ and of ‘full-time’ farmers – the landless to occupy ‘betterment 
villages’ with just a dwelling plot with no farming rights, the farmers also to be entitled 
to an arable plot and/or grazing rights (Letsoalo 1987; Hendricks 1990).  Tomlinson also 
proposed the individualisation and ownership of land tenure.  While neither of these 
proposals were implemented, partly due to opposition from inhabitants towards such 
‘development’, moderated betterment schemes were implemented, often involving 
everyone being given a farming plot, but of a much smaller area than that initially 
proposed.  But resistance to such schemes, which led to many rural revolts, ‘went hand 
in hand with opposition to the establishment of Tribal Authorities, which were seen as 
the first step towards betterment planning’ (Letsoalo 1987: 55).14  
Given the chiefs’ mediation of access to land, it is unsurprising that many chiefs were 
extremely unpopular.  Their ‘room for manoeuvre’ for gaining popularity or acceptance 
by people living within their jurisdiction was circumscribed by their positions as 
mediators of the apartheid programmes for these areas.  For example, it was usually the 
chiefs who were charged with overseeing the acquiescence of ‘their people’ to the 
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betterment schemes introduced in so many areas across the country but which were so 
unpopular.  But, the power that was conferred by the indirect rule of Pretoria, provided 
opportunities to chiefs and headmen in the homelands, and to others through networks 
of support and patronage, to bolster their personal power (Vail 1989).  Moreover, as 
Berry (1992: 347) recognised, ‘indirect rule affected the management of resources by 
assigning property rights to social groups whose structures were subject to perennial 
contest’.  But, Beinart (1989: 187) argues:  
‘Legitimate’ chieftaincy did not necessarily die with the conquest of the great 
African polities of the nineteenth century.  The political processes surrounding 
the institution had always offered some scope for the articulation of popular 
demands.  
Nevertheless, there was an ambiguity in the position of the chief, embodying as they did 
“both the coercive powers of the state and the consensual authority that once held tribal 
civil society together” (Evans 1997: 212):  
Apartheid administrators looked upon chiefs in mythical terms, regarding them 
as the people’s only accredited and popular representatives.  Yet, when 
discontent swept the reserves, the chief’s hut was the first to be razed. (ibid: 
267)   
Evans draws attention to the invention of tradition and myth and the construction of 
nations on forgeries, but he warns against ignoring, in recognising this, ‘the institutional 
solidity of their effects’ (ibid 248, quoting Nixon 1993).  This is echoed by Vail (1989: 
26-7):  
Ignoring [‘ethnicity and parochial loyalties’] as embarrassing epiphenomena that 
should have long ago disappeared will do no good.  Condemning them as 
‘reactionary’ or ‘divisive’ will accomplish very little.   
Moreover, he recognises that:  
For many involved in this struggle, land, and access to land, came to stand at 
the very centre of their consciousness, being fixed there not only at the 
beginning of the process of undermining rural autonomy, but also in succeeding 
decades (ibid: 18). 
And it was the chiefs who mediated access to land.  What was to be reformed through 
the introduction of legislation further to s. 25(6) of South Africa’s new Constitution, that 
is CLARA, was the tenure, or property relations, of land in the former homelands. 
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4 - Theorising CLARA 
This thesis draws on and builds upon a number of theoretical areas.  First, and 
principally, it relates to the theorisation of policy processes (Clay and Schaffer 1984; 
Shore and Wright 1997; Fischer 2003; Hajer 2003).  While recognising the power of 
discourses influenced by traditional positivist approaches to policy-making (Lindblom 
1959; Simon 1976), I take as a starting point that the ‘advance of knowledge … cannot 
be understood as a linear process driven by the better experiment’ (Fischer 2003: 128).  
Therefore, this study reveals multifarious voices and representations of truth that have 
been included or excluded in and by particular processes and practices of reform.  The 
context for such processes is also important.  Policy processes are shaped by changing 
social, economic and political discourses and structures of power and the ‘space’ or 
‘room for manoeuvre’ in which such policies can be reformed is therefore limited, and is 
consistently changing (Clay and Schaffer 1984; Grindle and Thomas 1991; McGee 2004; 
Cornwall 2006).  In addition to changes taking place on a global scale that might affect 
such policy spaces (Kearney 1995: 549), in South Africa alternative or additional 
challenges may arise from ‘traditional’ power structures (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005).  
Theoretical and empirical insights often direct our attention towards the responses to 
such challenges in terms of policy outcomes (Habermas 1971; Fay 1975; Albrow 1979; 
Heller 2001).   For example, while Koelble and LiPuma (2005) point towards CLARA as 
being the direct result of both these changes, they rather explain it (away) in arguing 
that given the global economic constraints imposed on the state’s ability to fulfil 
democratic liberation, traditional leaders have been willingly supported and used to step 
into the breach.  This thesis, however, instead explores ‘the ‘real’ politics of politically 
constructed agreements’ (Von Lieres 2005: 24) that resulted in the ‘solution’ presented 
by CLARA. 
Debates over CLARA have been played out during a period in South Africa’s transition in 
which new rights and forms of political representation have been, and are still being 
forged (Morris 2006), but there is also a lot that has remained unchanged.  And with 
such change and constancy in unfolding but historicised trajectories, contestations over 
the meanings, here of land, rights and tenure, take place in spaces already constructed 
but still constantly shaped by changing power relations.  How do those contestations 
shape policy processes?   Responding to this has to take into account the increasing 
diversity in interactions between people in policy processes, and how this has shaped 
practice.  Individuals with different backgrounds, immersed in very different contexts of 
day-to-day reality, understanding different ‘rules of engagement’, came to interact in 
policy processes relating to CLARA, each of them differentially influenced by global 
changes and new power configurations.  It is therefore important to consider how the 
history that each one of them brings to such processes, shapes their interactions and 
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the practice that develops.  This moves beyond current theorisation of policy processes 
that demands an, albeit important, interrogation of the networks of actors, discourses 
and institutions shaping those processes (Keeley and Scoones 2003).  So while 
recognition of changing social, economic and political discourses and structures of 
power shaping policy spaces remains crucial, policy spaces will also have been shaped 
by those people who inhabit them and the history they bring with them. 
This brief discussion of the theorisation of policy processes relates also to theorisation of 
law-making processes and this thesis also draws upon sociolegal work in this area.  
Much has been written about the ‘fetishism of the law’ whereby a ‘culture of legality’ 
seems to be infusing the capillaries of everyday life’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 25) 
and this nowhere less so than ‘constitution-obsessed South Africa’ (ibid: 26), but this 
thesis interrogates the reality of such statements, shedding light on the contested 
autonomy of the law in South Africa that in turn raises questions over the 
appropriateness of legalised ‘solutions’ to such social ‘problems’ as those found in the 
former homelands.  What was being negotiated in relation to CLARA, as well as a piece 
of ‘law’, was a struggle for legitimacy for a particular version of the social world to be 
embodied in that legislation (see Chapter 2).  This builds upon Moore’s view of law: 
“the law” is a short term for a very complex aggregation of principles, norms, 
ideas, rules, practices, and the activities of agencies of legislation, 
administration, adjudication and enforcement, backed by political power and 
legitimacy (Moore 1973: 719). 
In law-making, in contestations over symbolic power, the ‘norms, ideas, rules, practices’ 
of different people participating in such debates may prove to be just as important as 
the activities of agencies of legislation and administration.  Again, considering the 
individuals participating in such processes, their histories, is significant, particularly in 
the light of South Africa’s emphasis on the law and rights in its transition despite the 
utter delegitimisation of the law under apartheid.  This approach is in the same vein as 
Moore’s influential interpretation of ‘law as process’ (Moore 1978; Moore 1987).  She 
recognised the importance of conflicts in the production of meaning and knowledge, and 
that the ‘persons they involve are interested persons’ (1978: 45).  Nader similarly 
considers the way wider processes shape power dynamics that in turn transform 
particular cultural ideas, and how ‘law’, in the wider sense, is connected to such change.  
She recognises that ‘law is often not a neutral regulator of power but instead the vehicle 
by which different parties attempt to gain and maintain control and legitimization of a 
given social unit’ (Nader 2002: 117).  This processual approach to law countered more 
rule-centred approaches of lawyers, inspiring recognition that ‘rules governing conflict 
behaviour were not internally consistent codes of actions … but were instead negotiable 
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and internally contradictory repertoires’ (Merry 1992: 360).  In turn, anthropologists of 
law came to recognise the centrality of culture in terms of: 
“the way legal institutions and actors create meanings, the impact of these 
meanings on surrounding social relationships, and the effect of the cultural 
framework on the nature of legal procedures” (ibid). 
This builds upon Geertz, who similarly saw law as a ‘cultural system of meanings’ 
(Geertz 1983) – it involves ‘an intellectual process of transforming the specific, or moral 
and relational, into the general, or legal and rule-governed’ (Fuller 1994: 12).  This 
thesis contributes directly to other studies that similarly consider how contestations over 
meanings and how discursive resources are used for particular purposes, that is those 
that see the law, or rights, as culture (Cowan, Dembour et al. 2001).  Contested 
discursive resources, some of them legal, were brought to bear on the policy and law-
making processes over CLARA, but wider political processes also affected those 
contestations and consequently, the waxing and waning symbolic capital of the law is 
revealed in interactions between individuals coming from diverse backgrounds (see 
Chapter 5). 
Recognising the importance of considering agency in policy and law-making has also 
been underlined by scholars working on ‘identity’.  In the context of South Africa’s 
negotiated transition, the passing of CLARA raises key questions as to the limits of 
democratic liberalism in relation to culture and citizenship.  Throughout the world, in the 
last twenty years or so, there has been an escalation in the politics of identity.  
Scholarship on ‘identity’ recognises the apparent paradox in modern liberalism: while it 
bestows citizenship based upon universality, it thereby masks difference (Alcoff and 
Mendieta 2003).  Moreover, in postcolonial states, their colonial forbears, founded on 
the subjection of the majority, actually promoted difference (Mamdani 1996; Comaroff 
2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006).  As recognised by Moore, on independence former 
colonial states had to ask themselves ‘To what extent should there be a unitary system, 
and to what extent should a multiplicity of local legal systems continue to operate?’, a 
question that ‘raises the profound political question of African identity at the national 
level’ (Moore 1992: 26).  Many postcolonial states, including South Africa, opted for 
legal uniformity and greater centralisation (Wilson 2000).  Nevertheless, recent 
scholarship has challenged assumptions about the post-apartheid state ushering in a 
multicultural ‘rainbow nation’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005; Oomen 2005; Robins 
2005).  In discussing the strategic deployment of ‘constellations’ of difference along a 
multitude of fractures (ethnicity, gender, generation, race, religion, class etc.), the 
Comaroffs see the ‘fractal nature of contemporary political personhood’, that calls for 
interrogation of the solidity of concepts such as ‘citizenship’ and ‘community’ (Comaroff 
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and Comaroff 2005: 43).  In this thesis, I have taken this call seriously and have 
emphasised the importance of recognising and taking into account of difference.  This 
has implications for the theorisation democracy. 
On the one hand, South Africa’s Constitution has been hailed by lawyers across the 
globe as representing a beacon for human rights standards, and one which promises to 
sort out the formal liberal ideal laying down that needs arising from differences in 
identity ‘cannot even be seen as rights so long as they flow from human difference 
rather than commonality’ (Alcoff and Mendieta 2003: 6).  On the other, the extent to 
which it manages to deal with such contradictions in practice is inconsistent (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2005).  Von Lieres sees a contradiction between South Africa’s attempt to 
construct a political unity at the same time as recognising difference and pluralism.  She 
draws upon the work of Connolly (1995) that attempts to sustain ‘the tension between 
“politics as general action to sustain the economic and cultural conditions of existing 
plurality and the dissonant politics of pluralisation”’ (Von Lieres 2005: 29, quoting 
Connolly 1995: 97).  That is, those dissonant politics, rather than being ‘resolved’ in a 
‘manufactured unanimity of consensus’ (ibid: 31), are brought to the fore and sustained.  
Similarly Mouffe argues that the consensual and harmonious ideal of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ denies the ‘inherently conflictual aspect of pluralism’ and that instead, it 
should be recognised that ‘every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional 
hegemony, as a stabilization of power and that always entails some form of exclusion’ 
(Mouffe 1999: 756).  In the Conclusion to the thesis, I engage with some of these 
issues in the light of the politics of CLARA’s policy process. 
Finally, in considering CLARA, the thesis also relates to a body of work relating to what 
is nebulously referred to as ‘tenure reform’, the technical words masking a great deal of 
disagreement over the formalisation of property rights.  Relating to arguments over the 
limits of the ‘social embeddedness’ of rights and the nature of customary tenure (Berry 
1992; Moore 1998; Juul and Lund 2002; Peters 2002; Peters 2004; Chimhowu and 
Woodhouse 2006), certain voices have come from within South Africa15, particularly in 
response to CLARA.  For some years, Cousins has written a considerable number of 
articles and papers published in international journals and presented at international 
conferences on the best way to secure the ‘negotiability’ of tenure in the former 
homelands of South Africa (Cousins 2002; Cousins 2005; Cousins 2005; Cousins 2007).  
Similarly to Chimhowu and Woodhouse, he recognises that ‘[i]n some key respects 
‘customary’ tenure was also a creation of colonial rule’ whereby ‘stereotyped versions of 
‘communal tenure’’ were encoded with a ‘rigidity and hierarchical character’ (Cousins 
2002: 69 quoting Chanock 1985).  Where he disagrees with them, however, is in 
arguing that although ‘this history has involved major modification and adaptation of 
indigenous land regimes’, ‘seldom [has it seen] their complete destruction and 
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replacement’ (Cousins 2007: 283).  He goes on to set out five ‘key underlying principles 
and characteristics’ of African tenure regimes, including first that ‘[l]and and resource 
rights are directly embedded in a range of social relationships and units, including 
households and kinship networks’ (ibid: 293).  While he admits that ‘contemporary 
processes of social, economic and political change’ may indicate that ‘the distinctive 
features … may no longer be present as ‘underlying principles’’, he maintains that ‘the 
underlying principles … have proved remarkably resilient in the South African context’ 
and he would like to find ‘a way to secure these distinctive forms of land rights without 
replicating problematic versions of ‘custom’’ (ibid: 308). 
For Cousins, the principal problem with CLARA is that it would replicate such a 
problematic version of ‘custom’: ‘the Act entrenches particular versions of ‘customary’ 
land tenure that resulted from colonial and apartheid policies’ (ibid: 290).  Drawing upon 
Peters (2002, 2004), he argues that the ‘social embeddedness’ of property should be 
recognised and secured through law only so far as doing so would not ‘replicate’ such 
‘problematic versions’.  Instead, the answer is ‘to vest land rights in individuals rather 
than in groups or institutions, and to make socially legitimate existing occupation and 
use, or de facto ‘rights’’ (ibid: 308), to be achieved through ‘legal recognition’ (ibid: 
308).  In his criticism of CLARA, however, it is not clear whether he sees such 
‘problematic versions’ of tenure to be embodied just in the legislation, or the extent to 
which they may actually already exist in practice, shaping and defining such de facto 
rights.  In either scenario, however, the power of such regressive legislation to change 
socially embedded practice may be uncertain – for that matter, as may the power of 
progressive legislation to make ‘rights’ ‘socially legitimate’ through granting ‘legal 
recognition’ to them, when they are de facto shaped and defined by practice.  Although 
Cousins indicates that he ‘make[s] use of Okoth-Ogendo’s conceptual framework’ (ibid: 
292), his solution appears ‘to associate tenure regimes with particular categories of 
rights or quantums of power’ (Okoth-Ogendo 1989: 12) rather than addressing the 
‘legal character which access to and control of power in respect of land take’ (ibid: 12).  
For example, he does not advocate ‘‘strengthening institutions for the mediation of … 
conflicting interests’’ which he deems ‘not a feasible option in South Africa’ (Cousins 
2002: 98).  The reason why may relate to the reason why transfer to ‘African traditional 
communities’ – effectively the course pursued by CLARA – ‘was not seen by the drafters 
of the [LRB] as a viable option for a law to secure tenure rights’, namely because it 
would effectively amount to a sanction, if not an endorsement, of ‘The Bifurcated State’ 
(68 - a reference to Mamdani's thesis of 'decentralised despotism' - Mamdani 1996).   
Ntsebeza has similarly drawn heavily upon Mamdani in arguing that the interests of 
traditional leaders and tribal authorities conflict with democracy (Ntsebeza 2003; 
Ntsebeza 2005).  Such leaders were appointed by the former apartheid governments 
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and seen as ‘an extended arm of the state’ (Lahiff 2002: 3), a state that was utterly 
illegitimate.  For Ntsebeza and others, the involvement of unelected traditional leaders 
in local decision-making in the new democratic dispensation, is completely unacceptable 
(Ntsebeza 2005).  Others, however, have argued that ‘tenure can only be secured by 
working with, and adapting, the practices and systems that people living in communal 
areas are already familiar with’ (Alcock and Hornby 2004: 18) and that: 
Critiques … that focus only on the ‘unelected’ nature of these institutions seem 
to serve very narrow interests, of establishing particular forms of political 
hegemony, rather than broader transformation objectives … (ibid: 20). 
However, given that tenure reform would change the structure of traditional leaders’ 
involvement with land in one way or another, such highly politicised issues could not be 
avoided. 
Contributing to each of these areas of theory, Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the ‘Logic of 
Practice’ has been remarkably enriching (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1990).  While I will 
discuss this further in Chapter 2, it is worth briefly indicating those aspects of his work 
which prove to be particularly useful in building upon some of the theoretical issues 
raised here.  First, in relation to policy and law-making, attention is directed not just to 
the networks or coalitions of influential individuals drawn together, in order to influence 
policy, as a result of shared discourses, but to the individuals themselves.  While not 
ignoring the power of discourses in producing disciplined subjects (Foucault 1980), such 
discourses are not disembodied; it is social actors who invoke such discourses and their 
meanings are constituted through them (Moore 1994).  In relation to questions of 
identity and citizenship, Foucault’s recognition of ‘the constructed, socially contingent 
and hence mutable elements of identity’ (McNay 1999: 96) has been extremely 
influential for post-colonialist and post-structuralist scholars considering questions of 
identity and difference.  McNay has warned, however, that it can lead to a ‘failure to 
consider fully the recalcitrance of embodied existence to self-fashioning’ (ibid: 97).  
Moreover, people invoke their social identities in negotiating their positionality in the 
world (ibid).  Bourdieu (1990: 56) conceptualises habitus as individuals’ ‘embodied 
history’ that shapes their dispositions and schemes of perception and resulting 
legitimate knowledge (or symbolic capital).  Habitus, is both structuring and structured 
of and by the ‘field’ – the objective social circumstances – within which it emerges and is 
generative of practical action and engagement with the world – thus, Bourdieu’s in-
depth understanding of ‘practice’ (Bourdieu 1990).  Therefore, materiality matters, and 
that materiality is embodied; the materiality of a person’s (social) existence is 
constitutive of their very subjectivity.  In considering the individuals who participated in 
the policy processes relating to CLARA, incorporating this recognition into the analysis of 
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such processes overcomes an overemphasis on disembodied discourses and the 
constructed nature of identity.  These insights are also pertinent to debates over the 
‘social embeddedness’ of tenure and its reform, particularly for those advocating the 
passing of legislation to ‘secure’ rights or property. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, in many different fields there has been an increasing 
diversity of individuals from different backgrounds coming together, bringing with them 
diverse life experiences and embodied histories.  In relation to CLARA, they came 
together to negotiate the policy of tenure reform for the former homelands.  In 
exploring contestations over knowledge, the importance of recognising the historical and 
located subjectivities of the different actors participating in such processes becomes 
clear.  Such individuals are positioned within specific and different social circumstances 
that shape their consciousness and the potentialities of action that they contemplate.  In 
this thesis, I explore the state of the different fields within which those people 
participating in the policy and law-making processes relating to CLARA were positioned 
and the role of knowledge constructed within and in interactions between them: the 
‘activist field’ made up principally of people working for land sector NGOs, the ‘legal 
field’ including those working for or connected to legal institutions, and the ‘bureaucratic 
field’ comprising those working for government, specifically the national and provincial 
offices of the DLA.  It also provides a rich case study of a village in the former 
Gazankulu that brings to the fore the contested nature of knowledge in the former 
homelands – the ‘rural field’16.  And this, in turn, illuminates the power of the knowledge 
produced within these different fields.  The purpose of all this is of course to interrogate 
the policy and law-making processes and practices in South Africa, what shapes them 
and the extent to which they are appropriate and answer to the needs of the country’s 
citizens. 
Insights from Bourdieu also contribute to a body of theory considering the implications 
of such diversity for South Africa’s democracy.  With the country’s massive inequality in 
terms of economic well-being, education, landholding etc., the historical legacy of 
apartheid is still very real.  In the context of such inequality and difference, similarly to 
Hendricks I argue that consultation and participatory processes assuming formal 
equality amongst individual rights-bearing citizens should question their assumed 
inclusivity (Hendricks 2003).  But it is also necessary to interrogate the methodologies 
adopted for enabling ‘representative’ individuals to participate in such processes.  If, as 
recognised by Moore, policies are developed apart from the reality of the social 
problems that they are to solve, they will simply be a waste of time (Moore 1978); in 
their implementation they will come up against a reality that is vastly different from its 
theoretical convenient summary on paper.  Such methodologies should bring to the fore 
not only the contested nature of knowledge but also the inequality of life-chances 
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brought to bear on the construction of that knowledge.17  This would have real 
implications in rethinking institutions of the state.  For example, South Africa’s 
‘participatory’ Portfolio Committee hearings are held at a time when proposed legislation 
has been drafted.  Although they are theoretically open to any stakeholder interested in 
providing their opinions or knowledge to the Parliamentarians tasked with signing off on 
that legislation, they inevitably privilege legalistic knowledge of that text and thereby 
adversarial interrogation. Instead, the importance of conflicts in the production of 
meaning and knowledge should be emphasised so as to enable and recognise the 
articulation of marginalised and contested voices.  The increase in diversity, and 
therefore complexity, is only likely to result in increased levels of conflict, and if 
‘participatory’ policy-making and consultation exercises – in relation to CLARA these 
included formal and informal, governmental and non-governmental exercises – are 
going to be anything more than strategies of legitimation (see Chapter 8), such conflict 
must be recognised. 
The theoretical contributions of the thesis have implications for what I can only hope 
will be its key contribution in South Africa.  Rather than making any kind of technical 
suggestions for the improvement of the legislation, or providing a solution to the 
complex issues relating to land and tenure reform in South Africa, the thesis has been 
written in a moment in these debates during which both sides are effectively holding 
their breaths.  The legislation has not yet been implemented, and the court case being 
taken against the government in relation to CLARA is not yet underway18.  There have 
been rumours of the government passing amendments to CLARA and there have been 
steps taken towards its implementation, but there is at this moment a ‘space’ which is 
ideal for enabling participants to be reflective over their roles in constructing the 
debates.  I hope that the criticisms I have sometimes made of the processes will be 
taken in this spirit and that my doctorate might once again open up a dialogue in which 
these issues can be debated.  In neither casting judgements nor providing solutions to 
the problems raised by tenure reform in South Africa, this thesis instead represents my 
own analysis of the often deep reflections that many informants shared with me in 
relation to their own involvement in the processes.  Participants in such processes may 
have significant insights in relation to the issues relating to tenure reform, and also 
sometimes in relation to their own positioning, but in the battles fought over CLARA, 
individuals’ positions were shaped not just as a response to the policies that were being 
proposed, but also by the ways other actors participating in debates were arguing about 
those policies, in mutual attempts to position themselves in positions of greater 
authority and legitimacy.  Therefore, different people had varying capacities for shaping 
the agendas – the spaces in which those agendas were shaped were also contested – 
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and in such contestations would adopt different strategies of legitimation, depending on 
their positioning and on their habitus. 
4 - Chapter overview 
This Introduction has discussed CLARA, the legislation that was introduced in February 
2004 and that is the subject of this thesis.  It has introduced the contested (mine)field 
into which I stepped in April 2005 when I embarked on a year’s fieldwork in South 
Africa.  Some of the sensitivities involved may already be clear to a South African 
reader, but the following chapter discusses my own positioning in that field, some of the 
problems that I encountered and issues that arose.  However, it first contextualises this 
further by elaborating on the theoretical positioning of the research, and the 
implications this had for methodology.  Before going on to this next chapter, a brief 
chapter overview follows. 
Chapter 3: ‘Historical and Contextual Overview’ further elaborates on this Introduction in 
considering how the debates in relation to CLARA, both at the level of the state and 
amongst civil society, were shaped and constrained by wider political and discursive 
change taking place, and how this also impacted upon the ‘new rural spaces’ to be 
created through the implementation of CLARA. 
Chapter 4: ‘Caught in the middle: politics, bureaucracy and the DLA’ is the first of five 
empirical chapters drawing upon my own research and considers the position of actors 
within the bureaucratic field.  It considers principally those years after 1999 in the 
government and discusses how government officials’ day-to-day practice, and therefore 
their ‘room for manoeuvre’, is constrained by the wider ‘field of power’19, by their 
relations with their critics as well as those within the Department. 
Chapter 5: ‘A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure …’ considers 
the involvement of actors within the legal field and their involvement with the reform of 
tenure.  Many of them were ‘insiders’ to government prior to 1999 and were involved in 
drafting legislation that was dropped when the new Minister of the DLA was then 
appointed.  It discusses their interpretation of the issues, shaped as it is by their history 
of involvement, often as legal activists in the ‘struggle’ and why to them CLARA 
represented an absolute betrayal of democracy. 
Chapter 6: ‘Struggles with activism: NGO relations and CLARA’ considers a particular 
juncture in NGO relations vis à vis the government, each other and their ‘clients’ or 
‘constituents’, at exactly the moment that CLARA was being formulated.  It recognises 
the disunity within the activist field at that time and the difficulties in their positioning 
and how these issues in many ways dislodged attention that should perhaps have been 
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directed towards CLARA.  Nevertheless, it discusses ‘the NGO take’ on the issues, but 
distinguishes it from the interpretation of those in ‘the legal field’. 
Chapter 7: ‘A ‘Rural Area’: Chavani, Limpopo Province’ moves on from discussing the 
‘brokers’ (James 2007) of rural knowledge – those intermediaries who figured in the 
preceding three chapters – to people living in such areas themselves.  It considers 
issues relating to a changing ‘chieftaincy’, tenure and local government relations and 
sheds light on the extent to which that knowledge is in itself negotiated and partial. 
Chapter 8: ‘Democratic consultation and participation: strategies of legitimation’ 
considers some of the criticism that have been made of both the government and its 
critics in relation to consultation exercises undertaken with respect to CLARA.  It 
considers the political difficulties of drawing upon such knowledge for the purposes of 
supporting or contesting political reform, without resorting to its use merely as various 
strategies of legitimation.  It goes on to discuss how in any case methodological 
approaches to researching that knowledge must take into account its negotiated and 
partial nature. 
Finally, the Conclusion draws together the varying insights of the thesis and argues that 
if we are to take seriously the aspirations of real participatory plural democracy, it is 
necessary to recognise and take into account the variety in the habitus of people within 
the country and also the diversity in views and opinions and the contested nature of 
knowledge.  It considers what this would mean for some of the formal participatory 
Parliamentary processes and how the adoption of a model of ‘agonistic democracy’ 
might have changed the way people participated in the debates over CLARA. 
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CHAPTER 2 – POSITIONING CLARA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
1 - Introduction 
While the Introduction considered the context in which CLARA was received and its 
protagonists and critics, this chapter goes on to discuss some of the sensitivities raised 
in researching such a highly politicised topic.  I discuss below other approaches to 
researching policy-making, those which in researching ‘how?’ policy is made, bring the 
processes and practices of policy-making to the fore.  I then go on to consider the 
contribution of Bourdieu’s theory to such research and particular concepts or notions in 
his theory that are useful for the analysis that follows in the thesis.  Such an approach 
builds upon ‘actor-oriented’ work that recognises that in its consumption or use, 
knowledge will be mediated and may even be transformed by different individuals with 
different ‘lifeworlds’.  Others who have centred their analysis on practice in explaining 
the ‘how?’ are then discussed.  Finally, the methodological implications of these 
theoretical approaches are considered before going on to reflect upon some of the 
issues and problems I encountered in undertaking the research. 
2 - Researching the processes and practices of policy-making 
CLARA involved highly politicised issues and ongoing contestations between and 
amongst individuals involved in the debates. Such contestations are shaped by the ways 
those individuals frame their knowledge (Laws and Rein 2003), the discourses that they 
are produced by and positioned within (Foucault 1980) and the coalitions that are built 
up around those discourses (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).  But they are also, importantly, 
shaped by those individuals’ historical and located positioning which produces particular 
readings of legitimate knowledge.  Recognising their historical and located subjectivities 
and how this in turn has shaped access to particular forms of power is particularly 
pertinent to South Africa.  While it has seen different groups of individuals coming 
together, the country’s transition has been marked by inequality and difference which 
has shaped identity and claims to citizenship.  How this has shaped the practice of such 
different groupings is key to this study. 
Recent approaches to considering policy within different disciplines, such as political 
science, sociology and anthropology, have moved away from any kind of linear 
interpretation of policy, recognising the processes and practices through which 
individuals have shaped policy (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Shore and Wright 1997; 
Fischer 2003).  While Hajer (2003) has recognised how particular individuals have 
combined to form coalitions based upon how their conceptualisation of the issues has 
been shaped by different discourses, Keeley and Scoones (2003) have integrated 
considerations of such discourses with tracing networks of actors and how those have 
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been perpetuated in particular institutions.  These theoretical approaches have built 
upon Foucault in directing attention to the discourses shaping policy and how these 
have in turn shaped particular representations of ‘truth’ while other voices have been 
excluded (Foucault 1980; Apthorpe 1997; Hall 1997).   
In relation to policy, as recognised by Fischer, the acceptance of knowledge as ‘fact’ 
‘depend[s] upon [its] underlying assumptions and meanings’ (Fischer 1998: 134).  But it 
also depends upon what assumptions and meanings are accepted as legitimate.   This is 
where Bourdieu comes in in arguing that such legitimacy will depend on the practices of 
different individuals and groupings of individuals.  Such practices will also be shaped by 
their personal and shared historical subjectivities.  The extent to which participants in 
policy processes manage to influence policy in turn shapes the accepted identities of 
those they claim to represent.  But rather than tracing different narratives and framings 
of ‘land’ and ‘land reform’ over the post-apartheid period and considering their influence 
on the processes and practices of policy-making, my research instead considers how 
and which individuals have been drawn together through shared practice, shaped by 
their personal and shared historical subjectivities, that in turn, shapes those narratives 
and framings.  In looking at this, while not excluding insights of others studying policy 
processes, I also draw upon Bourdieu’s theorisation of ‘practice’, combining recognition 
of the importance of history, as well as politics and power, in shaping such practice. 
3 - Policy, practice and Bourdieu: ‘What has Bourdieu got to do with South 
Africa?’ 
Bourdieu’s work has not been widely used for the purposes of empirical research 
because, wrongly, it has been considered to be principally the work of a theorist.  It has 
also been passed over by many as being overly dense, unclear or too complex.  
Nevertheless, given its aptness to the empirical research undertaken in this study, it is 
worth persevering to grasp its depth.  However, it is also worth emphasising here that 
this thesis is primarily about the politics of the policy process of CLARA – it is not a 
thesis about Bourdieu per se – but the extended discussion here of concepts elaborated 
in his work is for the purposes of understanding the ways that I have drawn upon such 
concepts in the analysis of the contestations that played out in relation to CLARA. Such 
analysis has cast new light on some of the irreconcilable faultlines between different 
groups participating in South Africa’s transition 
First, the concept of field referred to in the Introduction.  Bourdieu sees cultural fields as 
spaces of ongoing contestation and struggle, in which individuals develop a particular 
habitus (discussed below).  The concept of a field structures the space in which the 
habitus operates – it is: 
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a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions [that 
people occupy].  These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and 
in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, 
by their [those occupants’] present and potential situation (situs) in the 
structure of the distribution of species [or types] of power (or capital) whose 
possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field 
[Such positions are also defined …] by their objective relation to other positions 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97 - my italics). 
This excerpt reveals that the relationships between agents within a field will depend 
upon the possession of different types of power – that Bourdieu calls ‘capital’ – and will 
therefore be contested.  Specific types of power or capital will be different depending 
upon the different fields and the habitus of individuals, or agents, operating within 
them.  Possession of capital will determine the potential positions that such agents can 
occupy and perceive that they may occupy within the field. 
As indicated in the Introduction, this thesis recognises three fields structuring the 
positions of different individuals participating in such policy and law-making processes: 
the activist field, the legal field and the bureaucratic field.  Depending on the habitus of 
individuals operating within the fields, the forms of capital recognised as being 
legitimate, and that knowledge that is considered to be valid or legitimate, will be 
different within each of the three different fields.  Having said this, in the thesis I do not 
begin to look at the operation of the entirety of these fields in South Africa or attempt to 
delineate the extent of their inclusivity – such a task would be way beyond the 
ambitions of a doctorate – but consider those individuals interacting within these 
different fields (recognised through that knowledge considered to be legitimate and the 
forms of capital drawn upon by such individuals) specifically in relation to CLARA.  
Perspective is then shed on the capital and legitimate knowledge constructed within 
such fields by research carried out through a study of a community living in the former 
Gazankulu homeland.  When the purpose of the reforms embodied in CLARA was to 
change the property relations between people living there, this case study is important.  
My research of this rural field therefore throws into perspective the extent to which the 
experiences of people living in such homeland areas have shaped or influenced the 
contestations over tenure reform that have taken place in the interactions within and 
between the activist, bureaucratic and legal fields. 
In South Africa, the period post 1994 has been a time of turbulence as well as 
dynamism, characterised by much fluidity as people move across fields.  This created a 
‘space’ or potential for influencing and changing the ‘distribution of species of power’ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 97) and challenging directly or indirectly the autonomy of the different 
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fields.  In the country’s transition, many of the interactions and contestations taking 
place between those in these different fields with others outside those fields will 
contribute to what Bourdieu calls, a wider ‘field of power’.  But Bourdieu gives very few 
pointers in relation to analysing the relationship between fields or considering their 
unstable autonomy, that is likely particularly in times of crisis, volatility and change 
(Naidoo 1999).  However, exploring this is important here and, rather than seeing these 
spaces as bounded or taking for granted the pre-eminence of the land sector in South 
African politics, my research recognises the influence of wider political power, shaped in 
turn by its proximity to financial power – both determined by the holding of particular 
forms of capital, both symbolic and real – and also explores how such interrelationships 
themselves shape new forms of interaction (see Chapter 3). 
People will also struggle against each other within these fields, for hierarchical positions 
and for the power to construct knowledge that is considered to be legitimate within that 
field.  As Bourdieu recognised, those within a field will ‘have in common their knowledge 
and their acceptance of the rules of the … game, that is, the written and unwritten laws 
of the field itself’ (Bourdieu 1987: 831).  Policy and law-making activities, however, will 
involve interactions between individuals who participate in different ‘games’, between 
those within different fields.  While an agent may be excluded from one field – the 
activist field, for instance, because of their lack of activist credentials based on their past 
actions or current views – they will nevertheless participate in another field and possess 
other forms of power, or capital.  Moreover, the fluidity and dynamism that 
characterised South Africa’s transition involved people moving into government from 
former banned groups and with concurrent changes in civil society (see Chapter 3).  At 
the same time, the change that played out was negotiated and contested, and such 
contestations shape ‘new spaces for change’ that may both enable and constrain the 
substantive realisation of democratic citizenship (Cornwall 2006).  These struggles 
within and between the different fields are therefore explored in this thesis.   
Bourdieu’s ‘generative structuralism’ thus presents an attempt ‘to describe, analyse and 
to take account of the genesis of the person, and of social structures and groups’ 
(Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 3).  It is specifically concerned with exploring the ‘struggles 
between symbolic systems to impose a view of the social world’ through the use of 
instruments of knowledge and domination that in turn ‘define.. the social space within 
which people construct their lives’ (ibid: 5).  In turn strategies are employed by people, 
but according to the rules of the game, as an ‘intuitive product of ‘knowing’ [them]’ 
(ibid: 17).  The ‘symbolic’ relates to the process whereby ‘that which is material is not 
recognised as being such’ (ibid: 17, see Bourdieu 1990: 112-121) and so legitimises the 
perpetuation of a particular form of domination.  Bourdieu (1990: 126) also sees 
‘symbolic violence’ being perpetrated, and perpetuated, through the denial of power to 
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particular individuals or groups to define figuratively and practically that social space.  
Others have argued similarly: ‘[i]ndividuals and groups struggle for the freedom to 
define themselves and their relationships with others on their own terms’ but that 
‘[c]hanging the self and changing society both require a rejection of the representation 
of self imposed by relationships with others’ (Fisher 1997: 457).  This is particularly 
pertinent to this thesis that involves a study of law-making activities whereby the 
outcome of contestations over particular readings of reality have determined that which 
will be raised up and made concrete through legislation to ‘reform’ that reality.  
Bourdieu sees the denial of such power being perpetrated through the processes and 
practices whereby a certain state of affairs gains ‘symbolic legitimacy’, achieved through 
wielding ‘symbolic capital’.  This will come about through the interaction between 
different fields and, as indicated above, the relationship between them constructing a 
‘social space’ or ‘fields of forces’ or field of power. 
People within the game will have a feel for the game, a competence and mastery of the 
game that relates to their habitus and possession of capital.  So if the field is the game, 
the trump cards – or losing cards – are habitus and capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992).  With his conceptualisation of capital, Bourdieu has sometimes been criticised for 
his ‘economism’, comparing his approach with that of ‘rational choice’ economists and 
political scientists (Calhoun 1993).  But for Bourdieu, resources that function as capital 
are not only economic and material resources but include cultural, social and symbolic 
‘goods’ that are considered to be valuable within the field.  That is, they only become 
forms of capital when they are the objects of social struggles and create relations of 
power within a field, structured by habitus (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992).  So, capital is not something that individuals can possess per se, but is relational.  
Moreover, with his concept of habitus, ‘the individual and collective history of agents’ 
precludes such a ‘narrow, economistic conception of the “rationality” of practices’ 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 123).   
While Bourdieu rejects the charge of economism, there remains the charge that his 
theory works less well with action which is ‘not consciously or unconsciously strategic’ 
(Calhoun 1993: 71) – that is, ‘the motive force of social life is [not] the pursuit of 
distinction, profit, power, wealth, and so on’ (ibid: 70).  These criticisms seem to be 
particularly applicable to a field, such as the activist field (see Chapter 6), in which the 
actors claim to be working outside the state and the market (to a greater or lesser 
extent) for the ‘public good’ – whatever the NGO, its donors and actors within it, 
conceive it to be.  Nevertheless, in debates over CLARA, people within NGOs were 
engaged strategically in positioning themselves, successfully or unsuccessfully, in 
relation to the politics of the process.  Recognising this enriches what might otherwise 
be a narrowly constructivist interpretation of their knowledge whereby wider relations of 
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power shaping their positioning are eclipsed.  Moreover, Bourdieu’s insights contribute 
to understanding that conceptualisations of such strategies derived from individuals’ 
habitus, structuring in turn their conceptions of particular possibilities and limitations as 
well as shaping the institutional habitus of the NGO.  However, it is helpful here to 
complement Bourdieu’s insights with the notion of ‘investment’, first conceived by 
Holloway but that Moore has elaborated upon (Moore 1994: 63-66).  Such an 
investment is conceived to be ‘something between an emotional commitment and a 
vested interest’ and, recognising that ‘certain subject positions … provide pleasure, 
satisfaction or reward’ (ibid: 64, 65).  This expansion of the notion of capital, and 
contestation within particular fields for such capital, is fitting in this study particularly as 
so often it is emotions, rather than necessarily the pursuit of profit or power, that come 
to the fore in the chapters that follow.  
For Bourdieu, power derives from symbolic capital, that is, the achievement of 
‘legitimacy’, and this concept is particularly pertinent in considering policy and law-
making in which the official version of the social world is being legislated.  ‘Symbolic 
capital’ is exercised in naming, representing and creating the ‘official version of the 
social world’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 13).  Symbolic capital includes such things as 
prestige, status and authority as well as material things that can also have symbolic 
value (ibid).  Legitimacy is achieved through various formal and informal processes that 
enable and constrain the capacity of different individuals to participate in them 
(Bourdieu 1990). 
Mediating between a field that defines relations between agents, depending on the 
capital they possess, is the concept of habitus.  But, while ‘the field structures the 
habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field’, 
habitus also ‘contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 127); it is both structuring and structured.  Habitus accounts for the 
social and historical construction of practice; ‘a socialized subjectivity’ (ibid: 126).  
Practice is therefore ‘to be analysed as the result of the interaction of habitus and the 
field’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 15).  Bourdieu sees habitus as ‘embodied history’ 
(1990: 56): 
a product of history, [that] produces individual and collective practices – more 
history – in accordance with the schemes generated by history.  It ensures the 
active presence of past experience, which, deposited in each organism in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 
‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time … (ibid: 54).   
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Bourdieu therefore indicates that ‘practices … can … only be accounted for by relating 
the social conditions in which the habitus that generated them was constituted, to the 
social conditions in which it is implemented’ (ibid: 56). 
Drawing upon Bourdieu to consider the historical generation of the habitus in any 
particular field brings to light the possibilities of, and at the same time the limitations in, 
the freedom of the ‘production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in 
the particular conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu 1990: 55).  Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus was developed in an attempt to move beyond the gap between subjectivism and 
objectivism: 
 objectivism … depends on understandings and orientations it does not make 
explicit even to itself and … subjectivism neglects to explore adequately the 
objective social conditions that produce subjective orientations to action.  
… [Instead s]ocial life [is] a mutually constituting interaction of structures, 
dispositions, and actions whereby social structures and embodied (therefore 
situated) knowledge of those structures produce enduring orientations to action 
which, in turn, are constitutive of social structures. (Postone, LiPuma et al. 
1993: 3, 4). 
Actors often come together as a result of a shared history, and share a particular 
interpretation of that shared history, and within different fields may create a space for 
their interaction based upon the discourses that have developed between them, 
producing practices and an embodied practical understanding.  Given the fluidity in 
South Africa’s transition, however, as people with a particular habitus moved across 
fields, new contestations have arisen over the control, or even the meaning, of capital, 
such contestations in turn renewing and restructuring the habitus.  The turbulence that 
many people felt at this time, as new opportunities were created for influencing and 
changing the ‘distribution of species of power’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97), is 
hardly surprising.  However, recognising the continuing influence of habitus, even in a 
time of historical crisis and change when those possibilities and limitations are 
significantly disrupted, contributes to a greater depth of understanding in relation to the 
extent of reproduction that may nevertheless continue even in the face of struggles 
against it.  This is particularly pertinent when considering South Africa’s first decade of 
democracy. 
In law-making activities, the drafting of CLARA, for example, as recognised above, 
involves interactions between people coming together from very different fields, lawyers 
and non-lawyers, bureaucrats, activists, each with different practices, shaped by their 
different habitus, and each with different understandings of capital.  As in a trial, what is 
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at stake is ‘monopoly of the power to impose a universally recognized principle of 
knowledge of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 837), a monopoly sanctified as ‘the 
sovereign vision of the State’ (ibid: 838).  Bourdieu sees judgements as ‘magical acts’ of 
‘performative utterances’ with the power to make themselves universally recognised 
(ibid); legislation can be seen in a similar way.  The process towards its construction, 
however, is in no way magical and involves substantive struggles, constrained by 
particular formal procedural rules and informal practices, to acquire the ‘symbolic power 
of naming that creates the things named’ (ibid).  The process of drafting an actual legal 
text (meant in its narrow literal sense) similarly involves lawyers and non-lawyers, all of 
them working for ‘control of the legal text’ (ibid: 817) (meant in its wider sense 
conceptualised in Bourdieu’s 1987 essay and so including the ‘structured behaviors and 
customary procedures characteristic of the field’ (Terdiman 1987: 809)).  Exploring such 
struggles here sheds light on the way those agents within, for example, the legal 
grouping, acting within the legal field, have struggled in the politics surrounding CLARA 
against those in the government – in the bureaucratic field and, surprisingly, also 
against those in the activist field, in relation to the acceptance of different forms of 
knowledge of tenure in the former homelands – agents within each struggling to 
maintain domination over, or even influence, this process. 
As indicated above, Bourdieu likens fields with dynamic games in which, importantly, 
not everything can happen, in that its structure proposes possible questions which 
orients the activities that occur within the field, and renders others unaskable (Bourdieu 
1990: 5):  
in what is unthinkable at a given time, there is not only everything that cannot 
be thought for lack of the ethical or political dispositions which tend to bring it 
into consideration, but also everything that cannot be thought for lack of 
instruments of thought such as problematics, concepts, methods and 
techniques.  
That is, a particular doxa or common sense exists whereby the structure, within which 
the material conditions of life are embedded but which is in fact arbitrary, is 
‘misrecognised’ as ‘self-evidently correct’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 16).  Doxa is:  
a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it presents 
and imposes itself as a universal point of view – the point of view of those who 
dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view 
as universal by constituting the state. (Bourdieu 1994: 15) 
Therefore, ‘practice’, which is ‘determined by the material conditions apprehended by 
agents endowed with schemes of perception that are themselves determined … by 
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these conditions’ (Bourdieu 1990: 97), ‘never asks because it has no need to ask’ (ibid: 
82).  
While, hopefully, this brief excursion into some of the notions and terms deployed by 
Bourdieu will be helpful in setting the scene for some of the analysis in this thesis, 
Bourdieu argued, ‘my ideas are not a general theory but a method’ (Bourdieu, 1985 
quoted in Mahar 1990: 36).  It is not easy therefore to discuss or analyse his theory 
apart from empirical work: ‘it is only through the study of particular practices that a field 
can be delineated, the forms of capital perceived’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 15).  So it 
is only in the following chapters that a deeper exploration of the meanings and impacts 
of habitus, capital and fields on the practices of the different individuals and groupings 
that participated in such policy and law-making processes will be undertaken.  Such 
practices have shaped their positioning as activists, lawyers, people living in the 
homelands, government officials and, together with their conflicts and struggles for 
legitimacy, influenced perhaps by wider international land reform debates, they have 
influenced their ongoing involvement in such debates. 
4 - An actor-oriented approach to practice 
Moving on to think how one would go about undertaking research drawing upon 
Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, capital and field to consider practice leads one to other 
studies that have also insisted also on recognising the agency of individuals, taking 
seriously ‘people’s own intentions and interpretations, accessible only if one adopts the 
perspective of their concerns and their knowledge of the constraints under which they 
act’ (Nuijten 2005: 9).  This study therefore builds upon a tradition of ‘actor-oriented’ 
analyses that put individuals and their practices, their conflicts and power struggles, at 
the centre of the analysis (Long 1992).  In 2005, Mosse published a groundbreaking 
ethnography of aid policy and practice that went to the heart of critiquing both the 
instrumentalist view of policy, falling within the linear tradition, as well as critical studies 
that recognise the depoliticising effects of development policies and practices.  Both 
analyses fail to interrogate the how? – the black box of how the ‘success’ of policy is 
constructed through myriad and diverse practices.  This fits criticisms made of Foucault, 
or if not Foucault himself that social science work which ‘claims to be inspired by 
Foucault’ (Callewaert 2006: 89), that is social constructionist discourse analysis that 
‘assum[es..] that these official discourses also are the causal instruments of action’ 
(ibid: 91).  Mosse argues that both instrumentalist and critical studies (the latter often in 
danger of deserving Callewaert’s criticism): 
divert attention from the complexity of policy as institutional practice, from the 
social life of projects, organisations and professionals, from the perspectives of 
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actors themselves and from the diversity of interests behind policy models. 
(Mosse 2005: 6)  
Mosse considers the heterogeneous practices of individuals involved in development, 
those working in government, for donors, for state development agencies and NGOs, 
and how they are together engaged in contesting and ‘working out’ coherence from that 
which must be incoherent due to the very multiplicity of interests and experiences 
involved.  Mosse’s study adds to influential work considering the importance of a focus 
on practice, including that forged by Fairhead and Leach (2003) with their ethnography 
of science and policy grounded in the ‘local’ practices of individuals in the comparative 
sites of Trinidad and Guinea.  They also see practice as central to their ethnography.  
They focus on the: 
‘intermediate’ processes operating within national settings: the complex, 
historically-embedded relations between politics, bureaucracies, institutions and 
research traditions which articulate with and shape the engagement of local and 
global pressures. (Fairhead and Leach 2003: 3 - my italics) 
This study therefore contributes to and builds upon such work in this tradition (see also, 
Goodale 2007).  Such actor-oriented approaches consider ‘actors’ and their own 
lifeworlds to be central to such analysis.  To quote Long in 1992:  
All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the 
individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and 
transformed by these same individuals and structures. (Long 1992: 20) 
But Long also recognised the importance of examining: 
how individual choices were shaped by larger frames of meaning and action (i.e. 
by cultural dispositions, or what Bourdieu (1981: 305) calls habitus or ‘embodied 
history’, and by the distribution of power and resource in the wider arena) (ibid: 
21). 
Keeping subjects central and recognising the importance of contestation in the 
production of knowledge, in this thesis, without claiming to study emotions as such, I 
nevertheless argue that it is important to recognise the impact of people’s emotions in 
their interactions with others.  In a time of transition, with individuals moving across 
fields, the gendered or racialised construction of identities stabilised within one field, 
may become attenuated (McNay 1999).  Moreover, in South Africa, emotions are often 
bound up with notions of race, or accusations of racism, and yet this has been passed 
over in academic analysis of the ongoing construction and power of such concepts.  
There has been recent criticism of those bandying about ‘the race card’ (Maré 2001; 
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Chipkin 2007), but such criticisms have sometimes been made as if emotional retorts 
and accusations of racism, deeply bound up with an understandable bitterness towards 
the ongoing and very real effects of apartheid’s racist constructions of difference, can be 
academically deconstructed and rationalised away.  In relation to CLARA, accusations 
were made of racism by different individuals; discourses of ‘tradition’ and ‘black 
consciousness’ were woven together by some, ‘liberalism’ and ‘whiteness’ were 
dismissed by others – in turn eliciting emotional responses, upset and bitterness.  It is 
therefore important to recognise that such accusations and responses are emotionally 
grounded in the personal and the contextual, shaped by the historical. 
This study of policy processes relating to land builds upon insights from others who 
have similarly made central analysis of processes and practices in order to consider the 
‘how?’.  But, in order to hold central the importance of considering historicised practice, 
I have considered Bourdieu to provide a useful theoretical point of reference.  Given 
that the policies put forward in the form of CLARA related to an attempt to unpick and 
reform a reality that is deeply bound up with culture and tradition, drawing upon such 
insights has been particularly useful.   
5 - Methodological positioning 
Drawing theoretical insights from Bourdieu and other actor-oriented approaches to 
considering practice has important implications for methodology.  When the purpose of 
my study was to undertake research of the different people involved in the policy and 
law-making processes, and my aim in the thesis has been to analyse the construction of 
practice within different fields, it was necessary to pursue this through undertaking in-
depth qualitative research.  Recognising the importance of vastly different personal and 
shared histories and upbringings – those from different places and sharing social spaces 
with similarly different groupings – is a huge challenge in a country with such diversity 
as South Africa, and with ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ being understandably ever contested.  
Nevertheless, recognising such difference is fundamental for the purposes of properly 
understanding the involvement of those individuals and groupings in the policy process.  
Therefore, the following questions become important, insofar as they relate to 
individuals’ involvement in the policy process: What for these individuals may not 
happen? What questions have been rendered unaskable?  What is conceivable within 
their reality, and in turn what is inconceivable – that is, what is their orthodoxy or 
doxa20?  The orientation of my questions in interviews and conversations usually centred 
around land and land reform and the politics of CLARA, but bearing in mind these types 
of Bourdieu-inspired questions when undertaking research orients it towards considering 
also the extent to which individuals’ involvement in land reform debates has been 
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historically shaped: how their upbringing, their relationships with family, with politics, 
their homes and their lifeworlds have shaped such involvement. 
The make-up of the fields that orients the practices of different people coming together 
cannot be taken as given but must to a certain extent be ‘discovered’ through the 
research and through analysing the practices of different individuals.  Rather than 
undertaking any kind of mapping exercise in relation to all individuals within a field and 
their relative structural positions (see e.g. Bourdieu 1996), I limited the research to 
considering only those individuals who participated in debates around CLARA.  But in 
recognising that they may find themselves within different fields in which different forms 
of knowledge are legitimate, questions to ‘discover’ such different fields and forms of 
capital were to explore, for instance,  What, for them, has material and cultural capital?  
And what is endowed with symbolic capital?  Who else sees such ‘truths’ to be 
unquestionable?  And who, in another field, does not?  And in a period of such change 
and fluidity as in South Africa since 1994, the boundaries between the fields and their 
autonomy, cannot be taken for granted.  This insight also chimes with Gupta and 
Ferguson who argued that ‘taking a pre-existing, localized “community” as a given 
starting point … fails to examine sufficiently the processes … that go into the 
construction of space as place or locality in the first instance’ (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997: 8).  The same can be said of fields. 
This leads on to some discussion of the practical implications of the methodology.  
Marcus conceptualised ‘multi-sited ethnography’ as involving research that ‘moves out 
from the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs 
to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-
space’ (Marcus 1995: 96).  He saw that such a study would be focused on ‘an initial, 
baseline conceptual identity’ (ibid: 106).  Rather than tracing ‘conceptual’ identities, 
however, undertaking this study practically involved ‘following the people’ and tracing 
the networks of individuals that participated in the policy-making processes in relation to 
CLARA.  This ideal, however, had practical limitations in terms of my fieldwork.  Limited 
by my funding to a year, the practical choices I made were influenced by the need to 
base myself in different locations for sufficient time to carry out ethnographic fieldwork 
in different sites with different individuals and in the different organisations – places of 
work, even homes – that together shaped their habitus.  Given the size of the country, I 
had to make certain choices in terms of focus and splitting myself between four 
locations: Cape Town in the Western Cape; Limpopo Province – principally Chavani 
village and Elim; Pretoria and Johannesburg in Gauteng; and a six-week long visit to 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) – principally Pietermaritzburg.  This limited my fieldwork to four of 
the eight Provinces of the country.  I was therefore unable to ‘follow the individuals’ to 
the Eastern Cape, the Northern Cape, the Free State and Mpumalanga.  Having driven 
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the length and breadth of the country, however, I have some idea of and respect for the 
enormous diversity that makes up South Africa in terms of people and landscapes, 
shaped in turn by changing property relations: private property, homeland areas, 
betterment planning, and township developments.  Although my study is therefore not 
comprehensive, my practical choice of sites was also influenced by the goal of bringing 
together the voices of the principal groups that participated in the policy-making 
processes of CLARA. 
Undertaking multi-sited fieldwork involves moving between settings and exploring issues 
of importance to many people for different reasons.  It therefore also involves bringing 
up and sometimes working through issues and events that are deeply contested.  Doing 
so in itself required me to adopt a certain approach to discussions, conversations and 
interviews that involved encouraging reflexivity from informants.  I tried to emphasise 
that my role was not to make a judgement about the legislation and its approach but to 
encourage people to think and talk about their role in the process and their responses to 
other people and events.  I was not trying to deny my own ‘power’ as researcher, but to 
emphasise my role in learning from the particular individual I was talking to, from their 
knowledge and experience, whether that be experiential, academic or practical.  To a 
certain extent the ideal would be that the ‘interview’ became a process of listening and 
allowing people to talk, and created a space of mutual ‘learning’, or reflection.  Having 
said this, creating such a space with those in positions of power – so-called ‘elite’ 
interviews – was obviously harder, constrained as they were by time and the pressures 
on them to present to me, an outsider and member of the public, their professional 
‘face’ as a Member of Parliament, DLA official, advocate, etc.   
Many people wanted to use the time to convince me of ‘their’ take on the issues and on 
other people’s involvement in the events but this in itself was important and relevant, 
particularly given that one of the purposes of the thesis was to consider contestations 
and how they shaped what was considered legitimate and illegitimate knowledge 
amongst different groupings.  Most of my in-depth interviews lasted about two hours or 
so, one lasted six hours – its description as an ‘interview’ becomes a bit of a misnomer.  
While I would prepare questions on the basis of ‘homework’ done prior to approaching 
different interviewees, these became at best a way of structuring the interview and 
focusing it on the issues that I was initially interested in, although I would always be 
inspired by and respond to the story told, with the issues referred to always raising new 
questions. 
6 - Changing positionalities – encountering difficulties 
As Marcus recognised, following changing identities will consistently involve change in 
the researcher’s own positionality (Marcus 1995); my own identity as a young woman 
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will always be constructed in relation to the differing perceptions of different individuals.  
For example, sometimes my status as a woman would take precedence in importance to 
the particular informant I was talking to, but at other times other aspects of my identity 
came to the fore: non-South African, British, well-educated, middle class, a student, a 
researcher, a former lawyer, white, not black.  My identity to different people was 
variously shaped by their habitus, their field, their possession and perception of capital.  
I found many aspects of life in South Africa to have familiar touchstones to my own, 
particularly when undertaking fieldwork in universities, research centres and offices – of 
lawyers, non-governmental institutions, government – even in Parliament: places of 
power.  Being most comfortable in such places thereby reflects my own privilege.   
Similarities, as well as differences, however, cannot be taken for granted and other 
aspects of the world I found myself in were completely foreign to me.  Needless to say, 
living and undertaking fieldwork in a village in the former homeland of Gazankulu was a 
different world from that lived in the UK.  But there were other differences that may not 
be so apparent, including those where similarity might actually be assumed based 
perhaps upon similarities in class of informants with similarly privileged class 
backgrounds.  For example, the issue of race is ever present.  Having grown up in a 
relatively racially mixed South London, and having spent a number of years in similarly 
mixed (though predominantly middle-class) university settings, I was shocked to arrive 
in South Africa and hear the constant daily racialised, and sometimes racist21, 
generalised distinctions made about ‘blacks’, ‘coloureds’, ‘Indians’, ‘whites’22.  When at 
times I challenged it, the challenge became the object of disbelief, or offence, or 
amusement.  On arrival, I was taken aback when I realised that it had not even 
occurred to many people, even those in universities, not to use labels such as ‘coloured’, 
that there might be less essentialised and racialised – more ‘politically correct’ even – 
ways of referring to people.  Such was the naïvety of a newly arrived non-South African.  
Old categorisations of apartheid die hard.  But rather than making a point here about 
the nature of South African society today, it is instead to recognise the importance of 
constantly challenging assumptions about difference and sameness shaping my 
relationships with informants.  Our knowledge is always partial and located, shaped by 
our habitus and changing positionality, and relationships between people with different 
positionalities cannot be essentialised or assumed.  As recognised by Lal, social research 
‘unavoidably reflects the social world in which it and we are situated’ (Lal 1996: 196). 
Most of the people that I approached in South Africa were accessible and open and 
more than willing to share their personal insights and I am overwhelmingly grateful to 
them – as I am to those at PLAAS and the LRC who gave me fairly unrestricted access 
to their substantial archival resources.  But, because of limitations on time and place, I 
had to prioritise people that I spoke to.  I focused on those who had been key in 
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participating in the policy processes specifically in relation to land tenure reform over 
the ten years between 1994 and 2004.  While I carried out over 135 in-depth 
interviews, as well as undertaking archival research and textual analysis, many of my 
insights were developed through participant observation and observation, often by 
‘hanging out’ at different  individuals’ places of work, including NGOs, the LRC, PLAAS, 
Parliament, the DLA. 
Having said this, my ‘multi-sited positionality’ was viewed with suspicion, distrust and 
even hostility by certain individuals, specifically in the national office of the DLA.  After 
trying repeatedly to gain access to a particular official in a superior position of authority 
in relation to tenure there (sending in my CV and a letter setting out the substance of 
my research, speaking even to the DG by phone and subsequently by email in an 
attempt to assure him of the non-partiality of my research so that he might persuade 
the relevant person to see me), I was eventually approached by the National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA) who claimed that, given my approaches to the DLA, they 
wanted to carry out ‘checks’ on me.  Feeling intimidated and, perhaps over-reacting to 
their suggestion that they send their officers (presumably from Pretoria) to where I was 
staying in KZN to collect my documentation, I approached the British Embassy for 
reassurance, cut up my mobile phone SIM card, stopped sending emails, photocopied 
my fieldwork and interview notebooks and sent copies of them and dictaphone records 
back to the UK by registered post.  While I did not have grand delusions about the 
importance of my own research, the NIA had recently been criticised in the media for 
their illicit ‘raids’ on a senior politicians’ legal files and I did not know how much further 
they might go in a course of action that already appeared wholly disproportionate to the 
importance of my study.  I had been warned at every turn about the sensitivities 
involved in relation to land, tenure reform and CLARA but I could only draw the 
conclusion that the NIA were either utterly misinformed in relation to my research or 
else they, or those who had instructed them to approach me, were resorting to petty 
intimidation.  One informant, one of the last people I interviewed – luckily, because by 
this time I was pretty distressed by such a turn of events – told me that they had been 
approached, prior to my contacting them to ask them for an interview, by the particular 
official in the DLA ‘warning’ them about me.  Another informant at the DLA had 
previously indicated that the reason why the particular individual in the DLA was 
“furious” about me was because they believed me to be undertaking partial research, 
for or on behalf of the director of PLAAS.  The subsequent informant confirmed that this 
was the reason for the ‘warning’ he had received.  Prior to this incident, three of my 
informants, without my prompting, claimed to have been approached by the NIA in 
relation to their land sector activism23, but it was only after the NIA’s approach to me at 
the very end of my years’ fieldwork that I fully appreciated the extent of such 
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sensitivities.  Moreover, it cast new light on the extreme pressure that such officials 
working within the DLA must be under if they were willing to resort to such courses of 
action.  I also then, fully understood the distress that casting such mistaken aspersions 
on one’s positionality, one’s intentions and credibility, might cause.   
From the beginning of my time in South Africa I had been made increasingly aware of 
others seeing my position as based upon, as discussed above, their perceptions of me 
and also upon my relationships with others.  I arrived in Cape Town to begin my year’s 
fieldwork and spent the first month staying in a guesthouse while looking for 
somewhere else to stay on a cheaper and longer term basis.  During that first month I 
was told by one of my informants, that one of their close friends and colleagues – 
someone who I pretty quickly came to realise was also absolutely key in organising the 
‘opposition’ to CLARA – was to be going abroad for three months and had a ‘cottage’ (a 
converted garage) in their garden that I might be able to rent.  Without thinking of the 
implications of my doing so, or rather the way others might interpret the move, I 
jumped at the chance, agreeing to pay rent, walk the dog and keep mutual company 
with their Xhosa-speaking housekeeper and family who were to be staying in the house, 
all of which I was more than happy to do during this early time in South Africa when I 
knew very few people.  About two months into this arrangement another informant told 
me that they had heard that I was staying with the family and wanting to know whether 
I was socialising with them – seeking reassurance that surely I was not enjoying 
‘Sunday braais’ (barbecues) with them.  On assuring them that this was not the case, 
and that the family was in any case abroad, they indicated that they were concerned 
that I was aware of how my living arrangements might be interpreted by others.  They 
expressed disbelief that the arrangement had even been suggested to me in the first 
place and advised me to keep it quiet because “no one” would trust me if they came to 
hear about it.  They told me that they thought I had been naïve and foolish but, in 
response to my growing consternation, and indeed feelings of naïvety and foolishness, 
they tried to reassure me that fieldwork is a learning process and told me their own tale 
of having stayed at the house of a chief in a village when they had first undertaken 
fieldwork.  Nevertheless, I was taken aback.  I was still at that time only just beginning 
to realise the sensitivities relating to the process, but had failed to recognise the extent 
to which people were still emotionally upset about the accusations and counter-
accusations relating to the process and the personal betrayals that many people keenly 
felt as being wrapped up in the issues.  From that moment on, however, I was even 
more careful at every point to assert the independence of my research, to refuse to 
align myself with any particular group and to maintain that the purpose of my work was 
not to cast judgement on the legislation itself or the ‘rightness’ of its approach.  
Although I did ‘admit’ to a number of other people later in my fieldwork where I had 
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stayed during much of my time in Cape Town, when the issue arose, for the most part I 
kept my living arrangements to myself.  
Much has been written about unequal power relations between researchers and the 
researched, and development literature focuses particularly on the vulnerability of many 
research ‘subjects’ (Devereux and Hoddinott 1992; Wolf 1996; Brown, Boulton et al. 
2004).  But all research involves people in varying positions of power; my own included 
more vulnerable individuals living in areas to-be-reformed by CLARA but also those 
working for more powerful institutions such as the government, and others, including 
academic researchers, consultants and lawyers.  Some of those in positions of power 
assert that power in the research situation, sometimes undermining, sometimes 
supporting, at other times subverting or manipulating the researcher’s goal (Lal 1996).  
One such fieldwork encounter demonstrates this, as well as the importance of 
interrogating ‘the nature of our relationships with those we study and represent … 
questioning the nature of our insertion into the research process and its resultant 
representation’ (ibid: 100).   
As well as the issue of race ever present, it is impossible to spend any time in South 
Africa without becoming aware of the vulnerability of women.  Numerous women I met 
told me of violence inflicted on them or threatened.  Many of the stories involved guns, 
or brutality, or ‘just’ everyday beatings.  Many others told me personal stories of 
violence against their wives, friends or relatives.  Rape was a violence constantly feared.  
With stories swimming in my head soon after arriving in South Africa, I had an interview 
with a man who is well known for holding power on a number of fronts, one of them as 
a prominent ANC Parliamentarian.  He is also apparently well known for other reasons 
and I had been ‘warned’ about sexual advances he had made to another researcher by 
more people than just her.  He met all my expectations and went on to control the 
space and tenor of the interview, fielding my questions in an accomplished way.  He 
opened the interview by asking whether ‘they’ had told me that he liked women and 
went on to suggest that I would make a good second wife.  Within minutes, however, 
he invited in and began chatting to a male administrator as though I was not there.  At 
one point he switched on the television connecting to a debate in Parliament that he 
told me he was missing for me.  In response to my telling him how my time in South 
Africa was to be split and that I was to be going to Limpopo in the next month or so, he 
responded sarcastically, ‘How very exotic.’.  The next day I received a phonecall from 
him following up on his original, not so implicit, overtures towards me.   
Given the oft-referred to treatment of women in South Africa, and the very issues 
relating to the vulnerability of women that were the subject of so much upset in relation 
to the reforms introduced by CLARA, his overtures towards me in this vein were 
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disturbing.  They also raise important issues that many women have to deal with in 
fieldwork time and again – issues that are rarely referred to in development literature24.  
Furthermore, this particular fieldwork encounter demonstrates well the un-fixity and un-
predetermined nature of our identity (Lal 1996) and of our informants.  As Lal and 
others have argued, our attention should be directed to ‘the micropolitics of research 
interactions and the macropolitics of societal inequality’ (ibid: 197).  In this encounter, 
and I might say in others during the course of the year, I felt that due to vast societal 
gender inequality, shaped by macropolitics but playing out in the micropolitics of the 
interview, the interview space was being sexually constructed by a male informant 
beyond my control, and this was disconcerting and intimidating.  At the same time, this 
individual inverted my assumed privileged position as Western middle-class researcher 
researching ‘the poor’ of Limpopo by an aspersion to ‘the neo-colonial mentality of 
postcolonials’ to exoticise difference and fetishise poverty (Lal 1996: 190).  While I felt 
pretty powerless in this encounter, as recognised by Wolf, patriarchal relations of power 
may sometimes support a researchers’ access, as may one’s race or class (Wolf 1996).  
This reminds us that all our knowledge is ‘situated’ and that we must always as 
researchers interrogate the ‘politics of location’ (Haraway 1988: 589).  Lal also draws 
upon Haraway to remind us that all such encounters and interactions will provide only 
partial access to informants’ identities and of the need therefore to ask ‘where and how 
we are located’ and admit that ‘we are engaged in a mutual, though unequal, ‘power-
charged social relation of ‘conversation’’ (Lal 1996: 200, quoting Haraway 1988). 
The sensitivities involved in the research clearly raised ethical issues in undertaking the 
research, but also in its ‘writing up’.  In this thesis, I have decided that it is appropriate 
to withhold the names of informants.  The only exception I have made is where an 
individual’s identity is already public.  It has, however, been argued (by a workshop 
participant at the North Eastern Workshop on Southern Africa in April 2007 at which I 
presented my research) that many individuals who were involved directly in the politics 
and processes relating to the formulation of policy will be able to identify others involved 
in the same processes and that I owe it to academia to reveal my informants’ identities.  
Certainly I believe that ethically I should not reveal the identities of those who asked me 
to maintain their anonymity.  Nevertheless, I have considered whether it would be right 
for me to reveal the identities of those informants who were explicitly happy for me to 
do so.  However, given that much of my research involved participant observation, it is 
less easy for informants to give ongoing permission in relation to an ongoing 
relationship – as opposed to one-off permission in relation to a specific interview.  
Moreover, the research involved people in varying positions of power, and on reflection 
I have decided not to reveal informants’ names.  However, when I draw upon secondary 
information which is already public (e.g. when referring to a particular article written in 
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the press), I cite the named author.  I have also named institutions and sometimes, 
where I have considered it important to position an individual in a particular hierarchy 
given the position they hold, I have referred to that position (e.g. the DG of the DLA, or 
the Director of the NLC).  However, given that I am personally aware of the potential for 
intimidation in relation to issues raised by CLARA and that a Court case is being taken 
against the government by a number of communities, not revealing individual names 
will avoid particular individuals becoming identified definitively as a result of my 
research – even though maintaining complete anonymity is difficult and there could be 
some conjecture from readers of my thesis who are themselves within the ‘land sector’ 
in South Africa and who may personally know many of the people I refer to and cite.  
For those readers who do not know the individuals involved, my not naming them is 
inconsequential and will not detract from the analysis.  For those other readers, not 
identifying them may arguably contribute to their focusing on the analysis – such as the 
reasons why people have taken particular positions in relation to the issues – rather 
than their personal knowledge of the individuals involved and their relationships with 
them. 
Some of the ‘events’ that happened to me during my time of fieldwork throw a stark 
spotlight on those who are drawing upon particular forms of knowledge in contributing 
to shaping policy.  Indeed, in this thesis I discuss the consultation exercises and 
participatory projects that others within the government and civil society embarked 
upon so as to draw upon particular forms of ‘representative’ knowledge that would 
shape policy.  But in writing up this thesis, to paraphrase Fisher, I have had the freedom 
to position others in particular ways who have not similarly had the freedom to define 
themselves and their relationships with others on their own terms (Fisher 1997).  Such 
discussion of ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’ is therefore also relevant to all 
researchers, who all have a responsibility to allow, as far as possible, the voices of 
informants to be heard, particularly those who do not have that freedom in their 
everyday lives, structured as they are by a harsh political, economic and social 
inequality.  However, the voices of informants will always be mediated and located, 
embedded as they are in particular situated subjectivities and therefore, it is the 
situated nature of all knowledge that I strive to convey.  
7 - Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed in detail the theoretical grounding of my study and the 
implications such theory had on my methodology.  It also discussed some of the 
practical difficulties that I encountered, which in themselves are important in 
contextualising the implications of CLARA, of the contestations over it and the issues 
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that these brought to the fore.  The Introduction set out the main question framing this 
project:  
What have been the policy and law-making processes and practices in relation to the 
Communal Land Rights Act no. 11 of 2004 in its evolution, contestation and 
interpretation?  
In considering this question in the specific contested context generated by CLARA, other 
questions emerged.  These included: 
How and why were these issues constructed so differently by different groupings?  What 
assumptions was their knowledge based upon? How did the different groups legitimise, 
or try to legitimise their positions? How were the political spaces within which they were 
trying to achieve this, shaped? and, ultimately, What knowledge was excluded in these 
constructions? 
This chapter has considered the appropriateness of drawing upon some of the notions 
and concepts brought to us with Bourdieu’s ‘generative structuralism’ in attempting to 
respond to these questions.  Bringing into the equation habitus, capital and field shaping 
the practices of participants in the policy and law-making processes relating to CLARA 
could begin to explain many of these ‘Hows?’ and ‘Whys?’.   
In an attempt to explain the interactions between those individuals and groupings within 
different fields who came together in contestations over CLARA, Bourdieu’s theory 
demands further questions – these are theoretical but they also have methodological 
implications:   
What for these individuals may not happen? What questions have been rendered 
unaskable?  What is conceivable within their reality, and in turn what is inconceivable – 
that is, what is their orthodoxy or doxa?  And, What, for them, has material and cultural 
‘capital’?  And what is endowed with symbolic capital?  Who else sees such ‘truths’ to be 
unquestionable?  And who, in another field, does not? 
These are questions that the following chapters of the thesis respond to.  First, Chapter 
3 introduces the wider context shaping this – it considers the construction of the state 
and begins to trace the wider field of power that influenced these policy processes, as 
well as considering those in ‘civil society’, those outside the state but interacting and 
thereby shaped by changes going on within it, and contestations within that arena.  
Contestations taking place both in the wider field of power and within civil society 
influenced and were sometimes brought to bear on struggles relating specifically to 
CLARA.  In turn, the struggles over CLARA were similarly influenced by and influence 
those taking place in relation to the former homelands – where CLARA is to be 
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implemented.  This does not constitute a discrete political playing field separate and 
apart either from the politics over CLARA, nor can it be separated from the local reality 
in such areas.  Chapter 3 therefore goes on to consider the implications of these 
interactions ‘on-the-ground’. 
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CHAPTER 3 – POWER STRUGGLES IN TRANSITION 
1 - Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the theoretical concepts drawn upon in the thesis and 
also touched on some of the sensitivities raised in relation to CLARA.  This chapter 
builds upon the Introduction in further contextualising, both politically and historically, 
the backgrounds of different individuals who participated in policy debates around 
CLARA.  This paints a fuller picture that contributes to telling the story of their 
participation and explaining further those sensitivities.  It considers how the transition to 
democracy affected the groupings that were involved in the politics relating to CLARA as 
well as those to be the subjects of it.  It considers the dynamism that was brought 
about with the events of 1994 and the dramatic changes that occurred.  But it also 
reflects upon what remained unchanged in the turbulence of that period.  Both change 
and stability affected ongoing contestations between the different actors participating in 
this story and interactions within and between different spheres that together shaped 
the development of new practices.  This contributes to understanding the development 
of habitus of different actors moving in different fields that are considered in the 
chapters that follow. 
My thesis considers a snapshot – one changing over time – of the legal field, the activist 
field, the bureaucratic field and the rural field, brought into focus through my research.  
However, given the movement of people across such fields over this time, they became 
mutually constituting.  And in the relationship between these fields, and other fields of 
social relations in South Africa, a wider field of power is constructed.  These relations of 
power shape and explain wider political processes; such changing relationships 
construct this wider field of power and influence changing symbolic capital in terms of 
what knowledge is considered to be legitimate.  The first part of the chapter therefore 
introduces this wider field of power.  According to Bourdieu: 
the construction of the state goes hand in hand with the constitution of the field 
of power understood as the space of play in which holders of various forms of 
capital struggle in particular for power over the state (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 114). 
It is therefore important to situate the politics of state-making and struggles for 
legitimacy in such a context of change.  Moreover, this contextualises change in the 
different fields discussed in subsequent chapters.  The following section then goes on to 
consider ‘civil society’ over the same period, focusing particularly on those NGOs within 
the ‘land sector’.  I look at changing relationships between actors, positioned in 
particular ways in relation to unfolding change, that have themselves shaped a changing 
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habitus.  This further sets the scene for subsequent chapters considering the effect of 
such changes on different individuals and groupings in their positioning in debates in 
relation to CLARA and their strategies of legitimation (see Chapter 8). 
Together the struggles over wider relations of power and the struggles for legitimacy 
within ‘civil society’ have been mutually constituting in their interactions.  Through such 
contestations, particular conceptualisations of the rural areas of the country are 
constructed and perpetuated.  However, these are spaces that also underwent 
significant change in the decade since the end of apartheid.  In CLARA, varying 
interpretations of such change become the object of contestations that, in turn, shape 
contradictory interpretations of how they should be reformed and how property relations 
within them should be transformed; different versions of reform constructing a different 
reality.  This chapter therefore also goes on to consider that reality, introducing some of 
the change, and lack of change, in those areas that the transition to democracy brought 
about.  Such a ‘context’ is itself contested and power is constantly negotiated – a 
political playing field in itself.  Therefore, contestations over its reform cannot be seen 
simply to have taken place in places apart from that arena, but must contend with such 
negotiated constructions of reality, supporting and supported by, shaping and shaped by 
a ‘vortex’ of power-constructed knowledge (Mendieta 2005: 408). 
2 - Introducing the wider field of power: state-making and legitimacy in 
transition 
Everything changed when the ANC won South Africa’s first democratic elections on 27th 
April 1994.  The gleaming white buildings housing the former white-only Parliament in 
Cape Town now saw black politicians walking down the corridors, men and women 
speaking isi-Xhosa in the public chamber and taking their places at the long dark 
hardwood desks in the wood panelled rooms where decisions had formerly been taken 
by the aged white men of the ruling NP, decisions that oversaw the imprisonment of 
many of those who were now sitting there.  Although some places had been reserved 
for some of these men in the new Cabinet of the Government of National Unity (GNU), 
photographs of the early Cabinet show a group of predominantly black men, beaming 
and full of enthusiastic energy.  Just three years before, many of them had not even 
been living in South Africa, fighting the apartheid struggle from their places of exile.  
Many of them had been schooled, gone to university and worked elsewhere, in Zambia, 
in the UK and the US.  Others who had remained in South Africa had been in the thick 
of the struggle, underground in the ANC or in the leadership of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) (Seekings 2000).  Many had been imprisoned for their efforts.  All of them 
came together now, finally, under a historical mandate to transform South Africa (Schire 
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2001).  For all the international media hype pronouncing the 1994 elections as ‘history-
in-the-making’, these were the people who were to live up to such a mandate.   
Not only did those Parliament buildings in Cape Town see such a change in its corridors, 
but the bastion of Afrikaner bureaucracy, the greyer government buildings of Pretoria, 
also saw a transformation.  While former NP Afrikaner bureaucrats were not, like their 
politicians, elected out of office in 1994, but their ‘attrition’, whether through ‘natural 
wastage’ or resignation in response to the opening of the doors of the bureaucracy of 
government to thousands of the ANC’s supporters (Lodge 2002), was protected by so-
called ‘sunset clauses’ (Sparks 1994).  Such transformation, however, did not take place 
similarly across the board.  For example, the NP’s former Minister for Agriculture 
retained his position in Mandela’s Cabinet and with him his cohorts in government also 
remained, whose experience, certainly in relation to the implementation of the NP’s 
agricultural ‘development’ schemes in the former homelands, was unmatched.  But 
generally, accompanying the changes in personnel, so was the rhetoric of government 
refreshed.  The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) with its socialist 
rhetoric and class analysis of the economic problems of apartheid, was influential in 
crafting the first drafts of the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP), that 
became so popular, and was then shaped by more inclusive debates, with wider ‘civil 
society’ (Lodge 2002).  And that so many of those now in government had formerly 
been involved in the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and before that the UDF, both 
with their emphasis on participatory democracy and non-racialism (Seekings 2000), 
ensured a changed approach to policy-making.  Women too, were recruited qua women 
after the ANC Women’s League had so prominently supported the Women’s National 
Coalition (WNC) that came together to lobby the negotiators to incorporate recognition 
of issues of concern to women in the Bill of Rights (Hassim 2003).  Nevertheless, in 
spite of the flood of people from ‘civil society’ into government, many positions went 
unfilled, not only in central government, but also in the provincial and local tiers to 
which democratic power was supposed now to be decentralised from the formerly highly 
centralised apartheid machine.  But insofar as there were spaces in the bureaucracy to 
be filled, those in national and provincial NGOs, in the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) affiliates, were headhunted and if possible, poached with the 
appeal of working for those ANC politicians in the new democratic Parliament, 
contributing to making history, as well as the appeal of stability that a government job 
held. 
South Africa’s ‘final’ 1996 Constitution, can be held up as the foremost achievement of 
this period.  Hailed by lawyers across the globe as representing a beacon of progressive 
human rights standards, both civil and political rights as well as social and economic, the 
Constitution has been heralded time and again as symbolising just how much was 
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achieved in the transitional negotiations.  As recognised by Klug (2000), for the ANC and 
NP, with their conflicting respective insistence on individual rights and group rights, to 
come to some kind of resolution so as to adopt their Declaration of Intent in support of 
constitutional democracy at the first meeting of the negotiations – the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) – represented a major achievement.  And then, to 
the surprise of many involved, it gradually became clear that the negotiations were to 
involve the drafting of and agreement of a fully-fledged, albeit ‘Interim’, Constitution, 
including a Bill of Rights, prior to the elections in 1994 (Chaskalson 1995; Klug 2000).  
But, given the extent to which the law had been delegitimised through its part in the 
destructive social-engineering that was apartheid – achieved through the adoption and 
implementation of thousands of apartheid laws still on the statute books – it is not only 
extraordinary that a constitution would be raised to its legal pedestal in 1994, but also 
that it was unquestioned by many that the apartheid legal tapestry would be undone 
only by the legislature passing legislation that would unpick, rescind and reform each 
law, one by one (Klug 2000).  But seen against the global backdrop of the resurgence of 
the good governance agenda and the involvement of the World Bank in the negotiations 
(Weideman 2004), and given the purchase of liberal legalism in South Africa as the only 
non-racially based doctrine persuasive amongst all walks of the white elite (Chanock 
1996), the power of discourses based upon law and rights is perhaps less extraordinary. 
The very negotiations themselves, with their series of Constitutional Committee 
conferences and meetings with NGOs, human rights lawyers and academics (Klug 2000; 
Weideman 2004), set the scene for more inclusive policy processes after the elections.  
The first few years of democracy saw black and white people who had been in 
leadership positions in an array of different anti-apartheid groups, making the transition 
from activists to government.  Doing so, however, held no inconsistency; their ongoing 
support for the ANC government in so many ways was the culmination of the struggle in 
which they had so long been engaged.  Aside from the ‘development’ that was clearly 
needed to address the needs of ‘the poor’, ‘participation’, ‘rights’ and ‘gender’ became 
the buzzwords of the day.   
‘Gender’ had experienced an exciting resurgence over the previous few years after its 
relative sidelining during the 1980s when discourses of unity and non-racialism within 
the opposition excluded other more ‘divisive’ issues (Marx 1992; Meintjes 1998; Hassim 
2003).  When CODESA began, women had been excluded from the team of 19 
delegates (Hassim and Gouws 1998), but uniting in their exclusion, diverse women’s 
groups were galvanised to form the WNC to draft a Women’s Charter for inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights.  While this was not achieved, advocates of gender equality achieved more 
than just rhetoric.  With the strong support of the ANC Women’s League (ANCWL), who 
had even threatened to boycott the first democratic elections with the slogan, ‘No 
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Women, No Vote!’, women not only secured a third of seats in the national Parliament, 
and 30 percent quotas for women to be put forward on ANC candidate lists, they also 
made an impact on the institutional framework conceived, with a ‘national gender 
machinery’ being set up, as well as influencing the constitution and the RDP (Waylen 
2007: 531).  Nevertheless, the women’s lobby ‘was left “angry at the fact that they 
received very little support or assistance from the various party leaderships”’ (quoted in 
Walker 1994: 351).  Even within the ANC, there was extreme conservatism when it 
came to gender issues; at the ANC’s 1991 Conference at which the ANCWL pushed for a 
quota system, ‘the majority of the 2000 delegates did not support the proposal … [and] 
Not a single member of the [National Executive Committee] spoke in favour of the 
quota’ (Meintjes 1996: 58).  As recognised by Hassim (2002: 723): 
where meeting women’s demands would seriously conflict with the interests of 
other politically organised groupings, or would create the potential for loss of 
“more important” constituencies – such as the perceived loss of ANC access to 
and control over rural constituencies as a result of reforms of customary law 
that might result in backlash from traditional leaders – the negotiators were less 
keen to concede and, when they did, it was only to defer the conflicts to some 
future policies. (see further below) 
While the changes that were achieved clearly amounted to real triumphs for the 
women’s lobby, the inclusion of provisions protecting formal gender equality did not 
necessarily instigate changed practices.  As Walker vividly describes, in the DLA, the 
genuine commitments to gender equality amongst key policy-makers in the first five 
years of democracy, not only had to be squared with the ANC’s ‘bigger’ political 
intentions, but also had to be translated to changed practices on the ground, and often 
failed (Walker 2005). 
The discourse of ‘participation’ too contributed to shaping policy-making at that time.  In 
line with the approach taken by the RDP to address the extensive poverty and massive 
inequality that was apartheid’s legacy, jointly forged with the ANC’s alliance partners 
COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP), the government set out 
enthusiastically on its participatory approach, setting up local development forums and 
involving many in NGOs, principally the former colleagues and comrades of the ranks of 
activist bureaucrats, as ‘stakeholders’ in a range of government committees involved in 
policy-making (Lodge 2002).  The expertise of academics and lawyers was also often 
drawn upon (Hassim 2005). Money from ‘donors’ (such as the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the European Community and the UK’s Overseas 
Development Administration – transformed in 1997 into DFID), and from private 
foundations such as the Ford Foundation, that had previously been withheld from the 
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apartheid government, but had flowed in the millions to the ANC, UDF and then MDM, 
was redirected back to government.  In turn, government began contracting NGOs, 
calling for tenders for consultants or NGOs, or NGOs-now-cum-development-
consultancies, to work alongside them, not only in policy development, but also in 
‘service delivery’ (Nauta 2004; Ballard, Habib et al. 2007).  Nevertheless, Zola Skweyiya, 
the Minister of Public Services and Administration, indicated in 1995 that: ‘there is ‘more 
emphasis on representativity within the public service than in changing the way the 
public service works’’ (quoted in Sitas 1998: 40).  As recognised by Britton, ‘the 
processes for initiating, drafting, piloting, and debating policy continued as they had 
before the elections even though the people and parties within parliament had 
dramatically changed’ (Britton 2002: 57). 
Klug (2000) recognised that there was one important tension deriving from a 
discrepancy carried through the negotiations and embodied in the Constitution: between 
the need for an interventionist democratic state to address the massive inequalities left 
behind by apartheid – for the ANC once elected to fulfil their ‘historical mandate’ – and 
the demand from many liberals and, ironically, also those who were destined to 
relinquish power in 1994, that any constitution should limit the power of the organs of 
state and the discretion of its leaders (see also, Price 1991).  This tension is still felt 
today (Southall 2001).  Moreover, as others have argued, such a liberal conception of 
legal uniformity that emphasises rights as a basis of entitlements to equal treatment, is 
in any case inadequate in the face of extreme inequality and difference along racial, 
cultural and gendered lines (Chanock 1996); while formal citizenship has been 
disentangled from race, without also disentangling class from race, the practice of 
citizenship will not be realised (MacDonald 2006).  In 1996, Chanock warned that, when 
law and rights depend upon an incapacitated state, such rhetoric, unaccompanied by 
real change, could actually lead to a rejection of the law, and of such liberal discourses.  
Neither the discourses of law nor of rights, therefore, will trump politics.  Nevertheless, 
such discourses are not just embodied in language, but engender institutions and 
practice (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).  And the tensions embodied in the Constitution, 
both between an interventionist state and a pared down liberal state, and between 
individual rights and group rights (or if not group rights per se then the collective right 
to culture), do not just exist within that document, but reflect tensions that exist, and 
sometimes erupt, as a result of the limited ability of the state to produce unity 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2005).  Moreover, the institutions and practices engendered by 
legal discourses ironically provide a means through which such tensions can be, and are 
increasingly, arbitrated (ibid).  So, while the discourse of law, its institutions and 
practices, will not trump politics, indeed they are its product, the law also mediates the 
terms on which politics is often fought. 
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Although COSATU was key in negotiating the terms of the RDP, by 1996 it was 
complaining that the locus of decision-making on key political issues was not in the 
Alliance structure but in individual Ministries (Lodge 2002).  Even though the ANC had 
challenged the form of the state as a racially constructed and constructing entity, it had 
not rejected its basis (Southall 2001).  And although activists were now in the business 
of statecraft, they were learning to be bureaucrats in an already highly liberalised and in 
many ways advanced capitalist economy.  In the face of a lack of faith amongst 
international investors, the early steps taken by the new government in the economy 
were tentative, with the appointment of the former NP Derek Keys as Minister of 
Finance.  The pressure internationally for the ANC to moderate its radical aspirations for 
redistribution and nationalisation was immense and its economic policy soon enough fell 
into line with a liberal global capitalist economy.  Meanwhile, the popularity of 
membership of the SACP fell, with half of its leadership allowing their membership to 
lapse (Johnson 2003).  In 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy 
(GEAR), with its neo-liberal economic framework, was drafted in secret by a committee 
convened by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and was presented to the ANC’s 
National Executive as a done deal (Lodge 2002).  This form of decision-making, while 
apparently contradictory to the enthusiastic openness and participation that 
accompanied governmental policy-making after 1994, very much fell into line with the 
‘democratic centralism, tight internal discipline and strong central co-ordination’ that had 
long marked decision-making within the ANC (Johnson 2003: 333).  COSATU and the 
SACP, however, after their support for the new government and its policies in 
dismantling apartheid, responded with vocal dismay, with COSATU withdrawing from 
Parliamentary hearings on the budget, to which President Mandela in turn responded by 
rounding on the coalition for not falling into line given the global economic realities 
(Hirsch 2005).  So, in the same year as the final Constitution was adopted, so was 
GEAR, but the gap between the rhetoric of rights upheld in the Constitution and the 
realities of life for millions of South African citizens was stark and, for many, they were 
further away from realising the social and economic rights within it, let alone being able 
to exercise their political rights.  From that time, relations between the alliance partners 
have continued to deteriorate, with some in the ANC leadership, labelled as supporters 
of the black bourgeoisie, pitting themselves against what they in turn labelled, the 
‘ultra-leftists’ of the SACP and COSATU, the partners pulling back from the ‘brink’ in 
2002 (Jordan 2004: 211). 
With his active day-to-day handling of the business of ruling, it became clear that the 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki would become the next President.  At the ANC’s 1997 
conference when this decision was announced, the ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) programme and Mbeki’s aspirations for an African Renaissance were also 
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outlined25.  As analysed by Lodge (2002), there are both modernist and cultural versions 
of the visions embodied in the ‘African Renaissance’, but it has been the enduring power 
of this discourse in politics, alongside that of BEE, with its concomitant shift away from 
the idealistic non-racialism of the UDF and ANC into the transition, that is here more 
important to recognise.  Perhaps the liberal ideal of non-racialism was bound to come 
up against the programmes of empowerment that were almost inevitably going to be 
introduced under the historic mandate that the ANC received for far-reaching 
transformation (Sitas 1998).  In the face of massive disempowerment resulting from the 
extreme poverty in which black people continued to live, focusing on BEE in business, 
even in land redistribution, is far easier than the pursuit of equality (MacDonald 2006).  
It does represent an attempt to disentangle class from race, but without threatening the 
interests of business (Hendricks 2003; MacDonald 2006; Ballard, Habib et al. 2007).  
Despite this, it has been coupled with a Leninist discourse of the ANC as being the party 
of the national democratic revolution (Johnson 2003).  In line with this discourse, has 
been its vision of ‘the democratic state … as the only legitimate expression of the 
interests of the whole nation’, the ANC being the vanguards acting on behalf of the 
‘masses’ (ibid: 335).  Criticisms of that state, or demands for change coming from 
outside the state, are therefore denoted as illegitimate.  Supporting that discourse is, of 
course, that of the African Renaissance which in turn supports the ideals of those 
subscribing to the politics of a resurrected black consciousness (Erlank 2005). 
In 2004, Pallo Jordan, Minister of Arts and Culture, wrote: 
 in the past ANC networks linked one to the movers and shakers among 
organisations representing the disadvantaged, the poor and the disinherited, 
today they can also give you access to the leading corporate boardrooms, the 
cabinet, top civil servants and members of the political elite. (Jordan 2004: 209) 
That political office opened up ‘new circuits of power’ (Sitas 1998: 41) after the 
Afrikaner nepotism of apartheid is unsurprising, and must be welcomed.  By the late 
1990s, however, NGO groups (see below) increasingly recognised, as did some of the 
opposition voices in Parliament, the sobering reality that the ongoing division between 
rich and poor continued to coincide largely with the racial categories cast by apartheid, 
and criticism mounted of the new state’s inability to substantially alleviate such poverty.  
Given society’s racially divided ownership structure, the majority of black people 
continue to be marginalised from benefiting from any form of black empowerment 
programme; the political and civil formal ‘equality’ accomplished by the new Constitution 
becomes empty without any achievement of social and economic equality (Hendricks 
2003).  This renders people’s experiences of citizenship, at best ambiguous (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2005; Von Lieres 2005).  But, in the face of such criticism, racial 
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nationalism becomes a legitimating discourse, fitting with that of the leaders’ historical 
mandate, and somewhat ironically (given the increasingly liberal approach of the 
government to the economy), liberal ideals of social and economic rights embodied in 
the Constitution are devalued, and critics are dismissed as ‘liberals’ or ‘racists’ (Maré 
2001; Schrire 2001).  In turn, it facilitates the strengthening of ‘the empowerment and 
accumulation paths of a new power-bloc’ (Sitas 1998: 45). 
In the 1999 elections, the ANC, led by Thabo Mbeki as President and Jacob Zuma as his 
Deputy, won by an even greater landslide than in the elections of 1994.  Given Mbeki’s 
close involvement with the workings of government up to that time, the changes 
brought about in government, particularly in the land sector, were dramatic, but not 
surprising given his clear prior indications of his vision of the work yet to be forged by 
the ANC.  His appointment of a black woman as Minister of the DLA was certainly in line 
with his championing of the empowerment of women for which he has been applauded.  
However, appointments of a growing number of women as Cabinet Ministers, alongside 
the quota system of women MPs, very much reflects a liberal understanding of 
representation, as an ‘equal opportunity’ issue.  As argued by Hassim (2005: 184), 
however, ‘it has not facilitated the redistribution of resources and power in ways that 
change the structural forces on which women’s oppression rests’.  Moreover, while there 
has been increasing rhetoric around ‘gender’, this has been limited to the acceptance of 
the need to eradicate poverty, largely caused by apartheid, and increase the ‘productive’ 
opportunities of poor women – a development outcome – as opposed to recognising 
and committing to change gendered power relations (Erlank 2005).  While gendered 
power relations may well be exacerbated by poverty deriving from apartheid, 
challenging them would inevitably involve analysis of ongoing patriarchal forms of rule 
that have persisted even after the ‘national liberation’.  Instead, ‘gender’ has been dealt 
with through ‘increasingly depoliticized and remote set of policy-making agencies’ 
(Hassim 2005: 191, quoting Banaszak et al 2003), exemplified in the DLA’s ‘Gender Unit’ 
with its ‘weak institutional location and lack of authority’ and its ‘add-on’ approach to 
women in development (Walker 2003: 125). 
After 1999, the changes brought about in the DLA fit very much within the ANC’s 
changed priorities.  First, the new Minister dismissed Budlender as DG of the DLA and 
instigated a turnover of many other members of its staff, many of them who had gone 
into government from the former land opposition sector.  Black faces replaced white, 
while policies, initiated by many who had been dismissed or replaced, were put on hold 
while a far-reaching policy review was initiated.  Policies were repositioned to respond 
both to the demands of commercial agriculture as well as to those of aspiring black 
farmers (Hall 2007; James 2007).  The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD) policy was launched and, as recognised by Walker, ‘‘[r]ace’ and historical 
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disadvantage, rather than poverty or need (or gender), now became the key criteria for 
beneficiary selection’ (Walker 2005: 302).  The mechanism for ‘redressing gender 
imbalances in land access and land ownership’ was a 30 percent quota indicating the 
amount of land that was to go to women (ibid: 303). 
So, in the political arena, change has been dramatic since the days of Afrikaner control 
over the power wielded through the national machinery of Parliament and the 
government bureaucracy.  Through positions opening up in this national machinery, 
‘new circuits of power’ have been reconfigured (Sitas 1998: 41).  Nevertheless, the 
continuation and even strengthening of liberal economic policies has ensured that, 
although access to the thin stratum of power and wealth has been broadened, that very 
thin stratum of society representing the rich and powerful has not widened; in fact, 
inequality has worsened since the end of apartheid (Lahiff 2007).  There still exists 
massive inequality between those accessing that stratum, now both black people and 
white, and ‘the rest’ – the majority of whom are still living in poverty, the majority of 
whom are black.  But power can also be seen in an analysis of ‘[w]hat counts as 
justified belief and valid knowledge [which] set[s] limits to the kind of questions and 
information that are acceptable in the political debate’ (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 13).  
What ‘counts’ will derive from contestations taking place between actors each bringing 
with them particular histories in arenas also historically shaped, but also shaped by 
specific social and economic imperatives (Bourdieu 1987).  Meanwhile, discourses forged 
will interact and ‘fit’ with others, in turn contributing to the ongoing fluidity of the 
outcomes of such contestations in terms of what ‘counts’.  As the discourse of the 
African Renaissance supports that of the national democratic revolution, so have liberal 
criticisms been cast as racist, and feminism, as opposed to gender empowerment, has 
lapsed into a term of awkward disuse in its illegitimacy.  In turn, through such processes 
of negotiation, not only will particular positions be cast as illegitimate, but new spaces 
for new political manoeuvring and resistance will also be opened up. 
3 - ‘Civil society’ 
The separation between the state and ‘civil society’ has often been criticised for being 
artificial (Lewis 2002; Nauta 2004; Mitlin, Hickey et al. 2006).  Certainly in South Africa 
after 1994, the state and ‘civil society’ cannot be separated from one another; with the 
two spheres closely entwined, the relationship between the government and NGOs was 
rendered highly ambivalent.  But ‘civil society’, the notion and its promotion, has also 
been criticised for masking ‘stereotypic, idealized Euro-concepts’ (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999: 23), that ‘whatever is said in its name about universal rights and the 
equality of persons’, even in the West, ‘is founded on exclusion and division’  (ibid: 24, 
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23 – see also Mamdani 1996).  Similarly recognising the inconsistent roots of the 
concept, Lewis argues that:  
[w]hether such efforts can move forward to embrace the political aspects of 
Gramscian notions of civil society, or whether development projects are 
necessarily neutralised by the forces which act to maintain Ferguson’s (1990) 
‘anti-politics machine’ remains an open question (2002: 583)26.   
In the 1980s in South Africa, activists had claimed their own legitimacy as the voice of 
‘the people’, as opposed to the less representative elected councillors and institutions 
put in place by the apartheid government (Friedman and Reitzes 1996).  During that 
time, such activists had been subjected to harassment by the apartheid authorities and 
their leaders to ‘banning, arrests, detentions without trial, death threats and 
assassination attempts, and having their homes and cars petrol bombed’ (Habib and 
Taylor 1999: 75).  But, after 1994, they saw themselves as partners to the ANC in 
reconstructing the country; democratisation was seen to be incomplete without ‘civil 
society’ – deemed to be those associations that participated in ‘the struggle’ – 
participating in decision-making (Friedman and Reitzes 1996).  1994 was to usher in the 
long-demanded non-racial, unitary and redistributive economy that the ANC had for so 
long been demanding (Marx 1992).  Furthermore, it was to be done through fulfilling 
the participatory democratic ideals of this ‘civil society’ that seemed to have been 
incorporated as key policy-making principles in the RDP.  All of the boxes had been 
ticked – the 1994 elections saw optimism, hope and elation amongst the ANC-aligned 
former opposition groupings.  Nauta describes the time as being characterised by a 
‘freedom and consultation’ discourse amongst NGOs in South Africa and a ‘pro-poor’ 
rhetoric  (Nauta 2004: 182), a time when ‘the NGO sector was almost ‘drunk’ with hopes 
for the future’ (ibid: 171). 
Prior to the elections, in the land sector, NGOs, lawyers from the LRC and academics 
had for a long time worked closely together in fighting forced removals from black spots 
into the former homeland areas (Nauta 2004; James 2007).  A number of dissident 
academics were also involved as researchers for the Surplus People’s Project (SPP) that 
culminated in its report on forced removals around the country (Platzky and Walker 
1985).  NGOs were set up, with funding secured from overseas, and, having formed 
relationships with particular ‘communities’ that had contested their forced removal, they 
continued to support the efforts of such ‘communities’ to reclaim their land.  And, 
although they were often run by these left-leaning white middle class activists, they 
often employed fieldworkers from the ‘communities’ with whom they had established 
linkages (James 2007).  And, many of them aligned themselves with the ideals of non-
racialism and unity propounded by the UDF and adopted a ‘rights-based’ approach to 
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reforms.  Similarly, Habib and Taylor (1999: 74-5) position the LRC amongst NGOs ‘that 
more openly associated themselves with the [ANC] and serviced the mass-based 
people’s organisations of the national liberation movement (principally the [UDF] and 
[COSATU]’.  With the National Land Committee (NLC), an umbrella organisation for land 
NGOs, convening meetings on land issues and in the early 1990s responding to and 
engaging with proposals for ‘reforms’ from the NP government, together, they formed a 
coordinated grouping.  Meanwhile, however, ANC capability, even interest, in land 
reform was thin (Weideman 2004).  With the ANC Land and Agriculture Desk that took 
over from the ‘effectively dissolved’ ANC Land Commission (ibid: 226), consisting initially 
of just three people, chaired by Derek Hanekom, recourse to this ready-made opposition 
land sector, with its knowledge and expertise of ‘their communities’, was an obvious 
step that was made more concrete after the elections.  But before this, the ANC 
established the Land and Agriculture Policy Centre (LAPC), including within it 
researchers who had been in this opposition land sector, but also ‘establish[ing] strong 
links with the World Bank’ (Weideman 2004: 227).  The LAPC was, according to Nauta 
(2004), officially an independent NGO, but in practice, after 1994, became intertwined 
with the DLA.  In 1994, Hanekom was appointed as Minister who in turn appointed 
Geoff Budlender, the former director of the LRC, as the DG of the DLA.  The new DLA 
not only recruited extensively from the former opposition land sector, but continued to 
involve land sector NGOs and the LRC in its series of consultative Task Teams and 
Steering Committees working on different strands of policy formulation. 
A number of those involved in the activist land sector were closely associated with those 
in groupings such as the Rural Women’s Movement (RWM).  This had been formed in 
1990 by the formidable Mam’Lydia Kompe, a former trade unionist, who was taken on 
as a fieldworker for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) in order to specifically 
target rural women.  TRAC was a land sector NGO which was established in 1983 by the 
Black Sash in order to support rural ‘communities’ to resist forced removals and 
incorporation into Bantustans (Small and Kompe 1992).  The RWM was ‘a loose alliance 
of rural women’s groups and projects from across the Transvaal and Northern Cape’ 
(Kompe and Small 1991: 155).  In the early 1990s, as the WNC managed to secure a 
wider audience for issues relating to gender equality in relation to the high level 
negotiations that were going on, so groups such as the RWM became more vocal as 
they managed to radicalise their members and make linkages with national networks 
(Walker 1994). As recognised by deputy Minister Mabandla in 1996,  
members of rural women’s organisations were “more vocal about the essence of 
women’s liberation, they talk about emancipation from patriarhal control, the 
traditional system, they talk about equal access to resources … the struggle 
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atmosphere in the country enabled women to at least claim the space to talk” 
(quoted in Geisler 2004: 80). 
The RWM with its picketing and workshops (Albertyn and Mbatha 2004), supported by 
the ‘technical expertise provided by [TRAC] and [CALS]’ (Hassim 2002: 718), ‘ensured 
that the Women’s Charter [adopted by the WNC] paid detailed attention to the issue of 
customary law and that there was follow through on the issue in the constitutional 
negotiations’ (ibid: 718).  In the end, due to these concerted efforts, they were 
successful in ensuring that, in both the Interim and the Final Constitutions, customary 
law and the right to custom would be subject to the right to equality.  As Meintjes 
noted, ‘[t]hough small in numbers, the RWM has been important in giving voice to the 
problems and needs of black women’ (Meintjes 1996: 55).  After this victory over 
traditional leaders (see further below), it became politically correct not only for 
politicians ‘to stress his (or her) commitment not only to a non-racial but also to a non-
sexist democracy’ (Walker 1994: 351), but also for activists, to affirm the importance of 
gender equality. 
The collaborative grouping of land sector NGOs, lawyers and academics, who had so 
readily been included in decision-making for their ‘technical expertise’ in the 
negotiations, both in relation to gender and to land reform more generally, became 
confident about their influence amongst democratic policy-makers; many of them, after 
all, were their former colleagues and comrades.  For many, 1994 marked a change for 
such NGOs from being opposition advocacy-based organisations to ones assisting a 
democratically elected government.  The director of the NLC at that time told me how 
they had worked with the ANC before 1994, how they had engaged with lawyers to 
draft the Restitution Act together, and “we even knew that Derek Hanekom was going 
to become the Minister – that was part of the plan, we wanted a friend” (former NLC 
director, interview – 22.2.05).  In terms of Bourdieu’s notion of capital, there was capital 
to be gained in developing (or even asserting) close relationships, friendships with the 
elected representatives of the people, particularly those who had achieved such a high 
status; at that point, such relationships were perceived as valuable.  This NLC director 
recalled that, at one point in those early days, he had proposed a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ (MOU) between the NLC and the government “to cement an ongoing 
engagement, a forum for engagement – a direct-line.  Government gains from that ... if 
the NGO sector doesn’t have a direct-line, what are they going to do?  Go to press.  
Start toyi toyi-ing.” (ibid).  For him, the former opposition had ‘grown up’ and were now 
partners with the now-democratic government in rebuilding the country.  Going to press 
and toyi toyi-ing, those things they did before, had less credibility than the contractual, 
legal, cementation of such close relationships he now boasted with the Minister.  While 
the subsequent director of the NLC was dismissive of the idea of a MOU, when he had 
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taken over the reins at the NLC he had been similarly positive about the NLC’s special 
relationship with the Minister.  And, just as the former director had boasted of his 
involvement in the plan to have a friend installed as Minister, he boasted of the way he 
and his comrades had taken part in “strategic scheming behind the scenes” as to which 
positions in government they would ‘take’ after the 1999 elections (former NLC Director, 
interview -7.12.05).  By 1999, however, an ideological, perhaps consciously neo-
Gramscian, distance between ‘civil society’ and the state had reinserted itself into his 
analysis of such relationships and he qualified this by adding, even though “as 
‘Comrades’ we would have to be separate from anything to do with government, but we 
also thought that perhaps we ought to put our people inside government” (ibid). 
In 1995, of great significance to the land sector in South Africa, PLAAS (meaning ‘farm’ 
in Afrikaans), was set up by the leftwing formerly exiled academic, Ben Cousins.  It was 
established with the help of a Ford Foundation grant at UWC.  This ‘programme’ soon 
became an institution for both the government and for the non-governmental land 
sector and many activists in the land sector enrolled on its Masters (MPhil) programme.  
Directors of NGOs, those in their lower ranks, as well as those claiming positions as 
radical land activists, all boasted of having passed through the MPhil programme or 
some kind of PLAAS training programme.  With its close linkages to the LRC in Cape 
Town developed through ongoing personal friendships – the two institutions often 
convene, or at least attend, joint workshops on the latest bit of controversial land 
legislation or ‘test case’ brought by the LRC – land sector activists in South Africa are 
among the ranks of the best educated in the country.  Although PLAAS has provided a 
supportive environment for its researchers to engage in critical research and to 
challenge the government’s land reform programmes, it has not been granted core 
funding from UWC other than that generated from student fees.  Therefore there has 
been an ongoing need for the institution and its researchers to continue to secure 
project and other funding.  Meanwhile, it set up training programmes for DLA staff, and 
PLAAS’s director and many of its staff provided consultancy work for the different sub-
directorates of the DLA dealing with land reform.  Over a period of four years, its 
director was appointed to the Tenure Reform Core Group (TRCG) that worked on 
developing the Department’s reforms relating to land tenure in the former homelands 
(see Chapter 5). 
The influence of the former opposition land sector on the new government in the first 
few years of democracy cannot be underestimated.  Not only did those in the non-
governmental sector provide consultancy services and training to government officials, 
as well as participating in government policy-making ‘task teams’ and other fora, but a 
huge number of people working in NGOs from all sectors actually transferred into 
government; approximately 70 percent of the DLA’s senior staff came from NGOs 
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(Weideman 2004: 228).  Meanwhile, however, according to Nauta (2004: 187), in 1996, 
in the NGO that formed the basis of his study of the Eastern Cape, staff numbers 
dropped from 18 to 7, with many of those leaving given government jobs, some after 
only one year of experience.  This mirrored what was happening in many other NGOs 
across the country – up to 60% had left by 1997 (Habib and Taylor 1999: 79).  This 
ushered in a time of forced reflexivity in the NGO sector.  While this was positive insofar 
as their former colleagues were now the shapers of policy in government, it also left the 
NGOs weak and understaffed.  At the same time, they were to cope with a significant 
loss of international funding and, further confusing their status as ‘independent’ ‘non-
governmental’ organisations, both the USAID and DFID adopted policies to ensure that 
their support was limited only to projects or organisations that worked with or supported 
government policies.  All these changes contributed to a ‘deep identity crisis’ (Heinrich 
2001: 4): ‘the ultimate goal of the anti-apartheid and liberal NGOs – that is democracy – 
had been achieved’, replaced by disparate objectives, from development, to lobbying, to 
holding government accountable, which often meant that ‘NGOs suddenly had to place 
efficiency above consultation or internal democracy’ (ibid: 4, 5).  In this context, many 
NGOs turned to project work, partly to meet donors’ demands, and policy research, 
many seeking self-sufficiency through government or even corporate contracts (Habib 
and Taylor 1999).  Some have survived as ‘advocacy agents’,  with expertise and having 
secured sufficient funding to contribute to legal and policy debates and public 
consultations (Hassim 2005: 184).  However, concerns have been raised about such 
organisations moderating their demands so as to ‘fit the discourses of the state’ and the 
inevitability of a growing distance from their constituents with the growing closeness, or 
‘upward political linkage’ with the state that might contribute to their ‘elite bias’ (ibid: 
185, 186).  And then, in 1997, at the 50th ANC Conference, the same conference at 
which the BEE and African Renaissance programmes were outlined, President Mandela 
launched a well-publicised attack on NGOs for their lack of accountability or connection 
with the masses and for servicing the interests of foreign donors.  This was to usher in 
the start of what Nauta (2006: 187) has described as the ‘new realism era’ for NGOs. 
But, even before 1994, certainly amongst the land sector opposition, there were 
murmurings of discontent over the way the ANC was negotiating in CODESA and in 
relation to the property clause.  During the negotiations over the Constitution, the World 
Bank had become increasingly involved, supporting redistribution, but only insofar as it 
was a market-driven process, and in turn supporting the NP for the inclusion of a 
property rights clause protecting the rights of existing owners (Klug 2000; Weideman 
2004).  Unsurprisingly, the opposition land sector were vociferous in their criticism of 
these concessions, but at a ‘strategising meeting’ convened at the end of December 
1993 and well-attended by NGO representatives, LRC lawyers, academics and ANC 
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representatives, including Derek Hanekom, accusations were made that ‘ANC people 
have been involved in trickery and traded for other things’ (Minutes of the Strategising 
Meeting – 9.12.93).  Moreover, there was a ‘need to clarify who our allies within ANC 
are’, and a note that the ‘[s]pace for protest about land issues [is] likely to close’ (ibid).  
While the controversial property clause was accepted in the Interim (and also the Final) 
Constitution, with the coming of the elections in 1994, such misgivings amongst the 
former opposition land sector (who had, in any case, according to Weidemann (2004: 
225), ‘played a key role [in the process]’) were for a while cast to one side in their 
enthusiasm for contributing to making history.  Nevertheless, this began to wane after 
the first few years and, according to Nauta (2004: 207), in the course of 1997 the 
government’s ‘inclusive’ Task Team and Steering Committee meetings involving the NGO 
sector ‘were progressively badly attended and completely ceased at the end of the year’. 
Although the ‘new realism era’ had to a certain extent been forced on the land sector 
through decreased funding and a massive loss of staff, had this ‘realism’ not 
incorporated a reassessment of the relationship between the state and ‘civil society’, the 
second democratic elections in 1999 forced them to do so.  Certainly, none of the NLC 
director’s boasted ‘behind-the-scene schemes’ came to pass.  Instead, when Hanekom 
was replaced by Thoko Didiza, and then Geoff Budlender for Gilingwe Mayende, many 
people resigned in support.  Meanwhile, others working for NGOs, PLAAS and the LRC, 
who had formerly been consultants to the government, felt increasingly excluded, their 
contracts coming to an end or their views simply not sought.  For example, PLAAS’s 
government training programme was cut.  Many spoke with bitterness about the way 
these changes were carried out.  As would be expected, what has been described as a 
‘purge’ (Weideman 2004: 233), was resented most vocally by those who had directly 
been smarted by the changes, or those whose friends or colleagues had been affected 
by them.  There were bitter accusations of racism alongside criticisms of the new 
Minister for her lack of experience and ‘incompetence’, and that of her new government.  
PLAAS’s director, the LRC lawyers and others who had been personally closely involved 
in the government’s land reform programmes, expressed vocal support of colleagues 
who had been dismissed, and criticisms, in the media and elsewhere, of the new 
establishment.  After 1999, a lot of individuals in the land sector felt the change in 
policy-making under Didiza’s Ministry as being defined by their exclusion (see for 
example, Interview with the Minister, AFRA News, March 2000).    Nevertheless, such 
changes also brought about more circumspection from some, including the former 
director of the NLC, about their relationship with the former Minister, recollecting with 
doubt that, “he certainly seemed to listen …” (former NLC director, interview – 7.12.05).  
Given the increased pace of land reform under Thoko Didiza, a number of them had 
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become rather more doubtful about the usefulness of formerly having secured ‘coffee 
meetings’ with Derek Hanekom. 
For some, however, the change of Minister and make-up of the Department caused a 
dilemma of a different kind.  For many NGOs, helping people often meant co-operating 
with the programmes set up by government to get land, slotting within them, ceasing to 
challenge them and often even having government refer difficult cases to them.  Many 
working for NGOs were supportive of the change in the faces of those representing 
government after 1999 but, with echoes of the dilemmas the former opposition land 
sector activists may have felt in the face of the post-1994 government ushering in 
programmes such as GEAR, one interpreted the difficulties that such change had 
elicited:  
 Now our former allies are officials in government, so in situations with them we 
don’t resort to those kind of antique responses.  But we are faced by a dilemma 
of engagement – a new form of engagement.  We need to acknowledge that 
the legislation [that has been] passed as tools are all characterised by loopholes 
and contradictions so we need to effect legislative review.  We are no longer 
activists – yes, we can remain comrades, but with less vigour. (Nkuzi employee, 
Plenary, Strategic Planning Meeting – 22.11.05) 
While this person’s opinion elicited a healthy debate amongst other NGO staff, some 
agreeing but others roundly denying such an interpretation, others remained confused: 
“The DLA is referring so many cases to [us], what is our role?” (ibid).  So, under the 
pressures of limited funding, with many NGOs shifting to project work, sometimes 
responding to government tenders and so contractually bound to fulfil the ‘terms of 
reference’ laid down by the government, their compromised ‘NGO’ positioning was often 
felt keenly. 
Unsurprisingly, the changes were interpreted differently by different actors (James 
2007), with splits appearing depending on age, experience, personal histories and 
sometimes race.  For everyone in the activist field, such changes in government 
represented a shift in their access to different forms of capital.  Some labelled the 
change in government personnel an ‘inverted racial purge’ of white people from the 
Department.  Apartheid was founded on issues of race, but in the early days of the 
transition there was a certain euphoria over ‘the end of racism’ and the realisation of 
‘equality’ between all races.  Of course, such a realisation was never really achieved 
and, before long, issues relating to race re-surfaced as the reality of the lack of 
economic, geographic and material change in the country began to sink in.  But, as 
these changes made splits between activists in the land sector more marked, ‘race’ 
became asserted in struggles amongst them as representing itself something that was 
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valued, a form of capital, sometimes negative capital.  Race had become a card to be 
played in the game and in struggles to accumulate capital amongst activists, and ‘white 
people’ and association with them, often represented negative capital.  This in turn 
wedded with discourses playing out at a national level of the African Renaissance, 
tapping in as they did with those of a resurrected black consciousness.  As the discourse 
of race interweaved with others, so contradictory discourses were set up in opposition 
and, as the conflicts between different groupings within the opposition land sector, all 
supposedly idealists fighting a virtuous struggle, here too, liberals became branded as 
racist (see below).  With such a resurrected racial consciousness undermining the 
‘legitimacy’ of the idealistic non-racialism – talking about race became re-legitimised in a 
kind of populist anti-political correctness – and with a resurrected black consciousness in 
discourses of the African Renaissance, ‘blackness’ gained kudos.  ‘Gender’, however, 
once again lapsed in importance in the hierarchy of issues of significance.  Those older 
activists, for whom non-racialism had been an undisputed goal to strive towards, talking 
about race and acknowledging racial difference was not easy; many were white and 
doing so in any case brought with it uncomfortable questions about their own, 
continuing privilege. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, and certainly after 2000, perhaps to a certain extent 
inspired by the government denying their former taken-for-granted inclusion in policy-
making, concerns relating to the extent to which NGOs were truly representative of their 
grassroots constituents began to appear more prominently in the minds of many NGO 
workers and for the NLC.  Thinking about such issues raised many others relating to 
their role and positioning, but this is not to say that such issues had not occupied 
people’s minds for quite some time.  In 1993, the NLC drafted a position paper on ‘State 
Strategy on Land Reform’ indicating: 
 [this] once again raises the crucial need to facilitate the emergence of a Rural 
Social Movement (RSM), as an independent community-based organisation, 
which can lay some sort of claim to representing a rural constituency.  We are 
not going to have clout as NGOs alone.  The government consults us as service 
organisations, but they equally consult the [South African Agricultural Union] 
and [National African Farmers’ Union].  The implications for NLC in terms of 
assisting funding of a RSM, and its role (more supportive to a community-based 
organisation) are far-reaching. (NLC – draft position paper ‘State Strategy on 
Land Reform’, 11.93: 9). 
The eventual ‘launch’ of such a movement, however, happened only in 2000, at the 
World Conference Against Racism in the form of the Landless People’s Movement (LPM).  
The tensions that this created within the NLC, however, led to its eventual collapse. 
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Although many directors of the NLC’s affiliates were not supportive of the organisation 
having such a close relationship with government up to 1999, whether or not this went 
as far as envisaging their NGO supporting the emergence of a social movement – for 
some, this went beyond their radical positioning – real or conjured pressure from 
funding organisations came to compromise their positions in doing so.  For others, the 
change in government forced exciting dialogues about their own positions in inspiring 
radical change and trips were organised for people occupying prominent positions in the 
NLC, to Zimbabwe (at the time of Zimbabwe’s first high profile land occupations) and to 
foster relations with other, more successful, land reform movements such as the 
Movemento Sem Terra in Brazil (Mngxitama 2006).  One person who had been 
prominent in the NLC over the period was candid in that he “thought that the NGOs 
need to continue playing a leadership role because the landless people are not really 
ready to take on that role” and, as an aside, “vehemently opposed … the discourse 
about land occupations” (former NLC employee, interview – 7.12.05).  Meanwhile, the 
director of the NLC, as well as many staff members working in the national office 
strongly supported the emergence of strong, independent voices from the ground: 
 the only way that we can challenge government is for communities to emerge – 
and as we [the NGOs] are going [into the background] then the social 
movements become more visible … this was a change because what happened 
before was that social movements were giving voice to the agendas of NGOs … 
We believe in the instrumentalism of NGOs – rather than using social 
movements and communities – we can’t just bus them around when we need 
them. (former DLA Director, interview – 7.12.05) 
‘Bussing’ people around was a reference to those NGOs who had facilitated the direct 
participation of ‘community’ representatives in debates over governmental programmes, 
but the criticism was that they had done so in order to influence policy on their own 
terms.  But for this director, and many of the staff in the national office of the NLC, 
inspiring the emergence of a social movement and then letting it loose to campaign on 
its own terms, rather than controlling it, was seen to be more ‘radical’.   
With the pro-poor stance and gender awareness of activists and government in the first 
five years of government, poor women had become their representatives of choice.  
Once the new government began to deny the unquestioned representativeness of 
NGOs, for those wanting to influence policy, ensuring that the voices of ‘the poor’ and 
‘women’ were heard by government seemed to be increasingly necessary, particularly, 
as mentioned above, with the government’s substitution of race and historical 
disadvantage, for poverty, need or gender (Walker 2005).  After 1994, the women’s 
movement, with many of its most active members going into government and 
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Parliament, became what has been described as ‘chaotic, unstructured, and defying 
easy description’ (Horn 1995: 72).  While the RWM continued to exist, and continued to 
work on, for example, the reform to customary law of marriage alongside CALS 
(Albertyn and Mbatha 2004), with its leader also moving into Parliament, it also became 
a much weaker force for lobbying.  Meanwhile, the focus on women’s interests and/or 
gender relations that the transition encouraged had hardly been institutionalised 
amongst land sector NGOs and as recognised by Meer, ‘there was little research or 
practice to inform attempts to address this issue’ (Meer 1999: 80).  For example, in 
KZN, the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) that was established in 1979,  only 
in 1995, in a self-avowedly ‘tentative’ way in the face of a rather ambivalent response 
within the organisation, that they ‘started working on gender issues in communities 
when a gender specialist was employed’ (Kleinenberg 1998).  But, following the 
precedent set by TRAC in the early 1990s, in 1998 AFRA took the decision to similarly 
‘facilitate a Rural Women’s Movement’ (ibid).  Although this organisation now indicates 
that it is ‘the Rural Women’s Movement’ (www.rwm.org.za – my italics), by 2002, 
according to (Cross and Hornby 2002: 139), it ‘had not addressed land issues with any 
seriousness’.  This was a disappointing contrast with the original Transvaal RWM of the 
early 1990s that describes itself as having been a ‘lobby group on land issues’ 
(www.nmrw.org.za)27.  Furthermore, although ‘gender’ was increasingly incorporated 
into the land sector’s interventions, it was perhaps done so as a bit of an uninterrogated 
‘add-on’ (Meer 1999; Hargreaves and Meer 2000), as Walker’s work also reveals in 
relation to government practice (Walker 2003).  And certainly, until the uproar created 
by the NLC/PLAAS Project in relation to the CLRB in 2003 (discussed in the Introduction, 
and subsequent chapters), the practices engendered by the land reform programme had 
not been subject to real scrutiny in terms of their impacts on gender equality.  But, with 
the discourses of the African Renaissance linked with liberation, race became ‘superior’ 
in the criteria of those to be empowered and for those who considered themselves to be 
more ‘radical’, even this focus on ‘women’ did not go without contention.  During an 
interview with one of the key drivers of the LPM, s/he began talking about an 
‘obsession’ of certain activists with ‘women’s voices’: 
 ERAF28:  Sorry, you were saying, ‘Liberal, feminist …’. 
Yeah this obsession with, – part of the anthropological experimentation, you 
know – ‘All these Africans, they are oppressing each other what, what, what …’. 
So my point was – equality amongst African men and women in poverty, in 
landlessness doesn’t particularly interest me.  It’s kind of, the down spiral kind 
of thing – common denominator at the lowest level.  …   
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You see, the ANC and other land organisations were very influenced from a 
conceptualisation which emerged from the NGOs, Black Sash – I’m sure you’ve 
heard about that thing, you know, very welfarist, unashamed kind-of-thing, 
which does not link the land question to liberation – these are about 
ameliorating the conditions of people who are not necessarily seen as equals … 
(former NLC employee, interview – 13.1.06) 
In a climate of penny-pinching for all NGOs in South Africa, the frustrations of both 
camps within the NLC were inflamed by financial concerns: the withdrawal of funding 
for a long-standing ‘capacity-building’ project and the securing of funding for the LPM 
from War on Want.  Ideological accusations were fired in both directions.  The LPM 
became the target or, depending on one’s position, the quarry or prize of the opposing 
camps.  People put a great deal of effort to ensure that I heard the full story, but in 
doing so wanted me to know who was to blame.  Many people’s views, however, were 
not put forward in support of their own positions, but in opposition to framings that they 
did not want to be identified with.  For example, if a particular framing is constituted by 
‘black = radical’, in this case such radicalism goes with ‘in support of social movements’ 
(and by extension the LPM), and in turn, with ‘anti-NGOs’, ‘anti-government’.  The 
opposition is thereby cast as ‘white = liberal’ and so ‘in opposition to social movements’, 
‘pro-NGOs’, and ‘pro-government’.  Therefore, being accused of subscribing to any one 
of these categories automatically draws in the other concomitant parts of the frame.  
So, for example, the accusation - “all of these guys were experts, and these are white 
guys in the NLC network – as soon as you have an LPM that speaks for itself, their kind 
of prestige becomes questionable” (former NLC employee, interview – 13.1.06) – 
immediately explains that the “white guys” have good reason to oppose the LPM.  Some 
accusations were also attempts at undermining the integrality of the frames themselves: 
the accusation that “the office staff … were self-serving in that they wanted to continue 
getting their over-generous salaries” (former NLC board member, interview – 12.1.06) 
puts the office staff into the ‘liberal’ camp and thereby undermines their own ‘radical’ 
positioning.  In turn, the accusation that “those leading the charge towards the rurally-
poor-led-social-movements were extreme vanguardists – who were really driving it 
forward as individuals” (former NLC employee, interview – 7.12.05),  undermines the 
unassailability of the position of those supporting social movements, by casting doubt on 
their relationship to, and therefore the integrity of the ‘social movement’ in question 
(see James 2007: 216-222 for more details about the specific events at this time). 
These struggles clearly imply contestations over attempts to claim symbolic capital, the 
achievement of legitimacy for their version of the ‘truth’, both through the use of 
techniques involving accusations of illegality, of racism, of bourgeois interests masked 
by ‘claims’ to support ‘the poor and landless’ and through endeavours to imply a 
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distance from similar prejudice and instead present the ‘objectivity’ of situation.  Many 
have expressed scepticism in relation to the achievements of the LPM.  Indeed, 
attention can be drawn to the real weakness of the movement as a national movement 
in provinces outside of Gauteng and Mpumalanga, with local branches both uninformed 
about decisions taken at a national level but also caught up and weakened by their own 
internal politics as well as their lack of resources and weak membership.  Moreover, at 
this time, the environment in the NLC national office was obviously difficult – one person 
described the conflict as “a political battle – it was – full of vision, of the direction of the 
NLC” (former NLC employee, interview – 13.1.06), and another as “just war every day” 
(former NLC employee, personal communication – 19.12.05) and the issues, particularly 
those relating to race, have clearly generated discomfort amongst activists.  But even 
one of the former NLC board members who had been openly critical of some of the 
people in the NLC national office, accepted that the emergence of the LPM at that time 
was important in “creat[ing] a different kind of momentum and elicit[ing] different 
responses from government” (former NGO director, interview – 12.1.06).  While its 
emergence may not have obviously achieved much that is tangible, it has been 
important for other reasons relating to the struggle taking place in the activist field, and 
in South Africa more widely.  It created waves that generated debate in wider circles 
than just the NLC national office.  Primarily it has been important in upping the stakes in 
the activist field, in bringing the struggles over race, identity and even activism to the 
fore – crucial issues that will continue to challenge South Africa’s transition. 
4 - Beyond apartheid: new rural spaces? 
Both of the above sections on the effect of change forged in the transition on the wider 
field of power and on ‘civil society’ are to a certain extent incomplete without 
considering how lobbies representing chiefs were received within such arenas and how 
that response shaped politics in relation to the institution of the chieftaincy.  This is of 
particular relevance when considering the politics that played out between them in 
relation to the reform of land tenure in the former homelands and specifically politics 
over CLARA.  Politics within the wider field of power shaped more located struggles 
relating more specifically to changes embodied in the proposals for reform, those 
relating to gender empowerment and constructions of citizenship and culture.  Together 
these were the terms on which contestations over CLARA must be situated, and are 
discussed in the next section.   
But such contestations also relate to real places - the former homelands – that are to be 
reformed by CLARA.  These places, like the rest of South Africa, have been subject to 
considerable change since the end of apartheid and the coming of democracy.  Many of 
such changes have had real material effects on the lives of people living there, such as 
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the provision of electricity.  Others relating to the administration, boundaries or political 
status of the areas have affected the lives of people living there no less fundamentally.  
However, these changes have been mediated by contested local politics shaped in turn 
by power relations on the ground.  The following section considers this context: how 
negotiations relating to chieftaincy and tradition at a local level continue to shape power 
relations amongst the people living in such rural areas of the country.  This qualifies any 
assumptions of change that may otherwise derive from analysis of those changes 
introduced at national level.  Given the case study undertaken for this thesis, of a village 
called Chavani in Limpopo Province on the edge of the former Gazankulu homeland (see 
Chapter 7), the focus here is also Gazankulu. This contextualises how such changes 
unfolding at the end of apartheid came to impinge on that particular place. 
4.1 - A political playing field 
Although Mbeki’s calls for an African Renaissance interwove with and were strengthened 
by discourses defined by a resurrected black consciousness, Africanist and traditionalist 
discourses had been shaping politics since long before 1994 (Spiegel and Boonzaier 
1988; Walker 1994).  With ongoing violence between IFP and ANC supporters in 
KwaZulu in the early 1990s (between 1990 and 1994 14,211 died, mostly in KwaZulu 
and Natal (Maré 1996)29), the IFP commanded recognition and, in spite of withdrawing 
from the negotiations and threatening to boycott the elections, strongly influenced the 
politics of the transition.  Banding together with a variety of rightwing and/or federalist 
groups, such as the Terreblanche’s rightwing Afrikaans party (Sparks 1994: 25) and the 
Gazankulu Chief Minister’s Ximoko Progressive Party, they drew upon ‘traditionalist’ 
discourses in having their voices heard (Maré 1996; Allen 2006). 
Not only the NP30, but also the ANC saw traditional leaders as potentially important 
intermediaries in garnering support (Oomen 2000; Ntsebeza 2005) – ironically given the 
historical failure by the NP in presuming the same since 1948 (Evans 1997) – and in the 
negotiations over the interim Constitution, the ANC-aligned CONTRALESA were also a 
vocal lobby.  CONTRALESA was formed in 1987 by a number of ANC aligned chiefs, 
mainly from KwaNdebele, Venda and Gazankulu, then in the Transvaal, many of whom 
had united in fighting the ‘independence’ of the KwaNdebele homeland and the 
incorporation of Moutse into that homeland (Murray 1987; Maloka 1996; Van Kessel and 
Oomen 1997).  On the one hand, they had been brought together through the activities 
of ANC aligned UDF structures (Maloka 1996) – the Black Sash, TRAC, the National 
Committee Against Forced Removals and the LRC had all worked to support those 
fighting these battles in Lebowa and KwaNdebele (Abel 1995) – but on the other, just 
one year before, in 1986, the National Working Committee of the UDF had resolved in 
1986 that ‘tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organisations’ (Van 
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Kessel and Oomen 1997: 5).  However, the ANC quickly moved to support 
CONTRALESA, despite criticism from ‘old guard ANC activists, intellectuals and rank and 
file members’ (ibid: 7).  Such support for CONTRALESA proved to be a double edged 
sword (van Rouvery van Nieuwaal 1996): by 2004 CONTRALESA had some 2000 
members, the majority in the Northern Transvaal where the ANC also found its 
strongest base of support, but at the same time, many of its members ‘had a history of 
bitter conflicts with their own communities’ (Maloka 1996: 184) and were using 
CONTRALESA to support their power and bolster their undermined legitimacy.  With the 
IFP commanding such authority in KwaZulu, the ANC, with its longstanding urban bias, 
was trying to use CONTRALESA as its own lever into the rural field – or, ‘that other 
world’ as described by van Rouvery van Nieuwaal (1996: 54).  He also recognised that 
the chief is positioned in an ‘intermediary role between state and people’ (van Rouvery 
van Nieuwaal 1996: 68): ‘the chief has been charged with double legitimacies [ – ‘of 
traditional phenomena’ and ‘of state institutions’ (ibid: 67) –] and double loyalties 
[‘between state and people’] (ibid: 68).  And so, with supposedly privileged access to 
‘traditional’ capital, as well as that derived from the ‘politico-legal means of power from 
[a] different world..’ such as ‘academic titles and various economic activities’ (ibid: 62), 
particular chiefs in South Africa began their own crusade to gain symbolic power. 
After Buthelezi’s IFP refused to participate in CODESA, due to the exclusion of the Zulu 
King Goodwill Zwelethini, the talks collapsed.  In response, so as to counter Buthelezi’s 
demands, the ANC campaigned to open up the negotiations completely so that ANC-
aligned groupings could also participate (Maloka 1996).  But, when the multi-party 
negotiating process was reconvened, the IFP, CONTRALESA and representatives of 
chiefs from the Eastern Cape, the Orange Free State and parts of the Transvaal all 
participated and, in turn, the attention given to the chieftaincy was bolstered (ibid).  
Then, in the negotiations over the interim Constitution, CONTRALESA spearheaded a 
campaign over the exemption of customary law from gender equality provisions, and 
then for customary law to be entrenched as a fundamental right.  ‘Traditionalist’ and 
‘Africanist’ discourses were deployed, not only to legitimise their position, but also in an 
attempt to set out, and thereby delineate the boundaries of, the terms on which the 
battle was to be waged (Walker 1994).  Although, as indicated in the section above, the 
‘traditional’ lobby were ultimately defeated by a vocal opposition of women’s groups, 
such a victory for women did not receive unqualified political support from the 
leadership of the main political parties.  Moreover, the interim, and subsequently final, 
Constitution recognises the institution of the chieftaincy and customary law, as well as 
giving traditional leaders, through the establishment of a National Council and Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders, advisory powers ‘but not to initiate or veto any act’ 
(Walker 1994: 354).  That they do not have the Constitutional ‘right’ to initiate or veto 
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any act, presumably does not, however, preclude their attaining the power to do so; 
symbolic power is not so easily delineated. 
Two months before the 1994 elections, 40,000 IFP supporters had marched on Durban 
demanding succession and, with the IFP still threatening to boycott the elections, in 
April that year, leaders from the ANC, the government and the IFP met for talks and 
together agreed that the IFP would participate in the elections and ‘to recognise and 
protect the institution, status and role of the constitutional position of the King of the 
Zulus and the Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal’ (Landsberg 2004: 154).  After the elections, 
Buthelezi was given a Cabinet position in the GNU.  It was then revealed that, the same 
month, the NP had hurriedly and secretly allowed the KwaZulu legislature to pass the 
Ingonyama Trust Act, whereby the KwaZulu homeland was transferred from the state to 
the Zulu Ingonyama (king), just days before the elections.  After an initial outcry by the 
ANC, it dampened down its opposition in the name of ‘tradition’ so as not to upset its 
wooing of the Ingonyama Zwelethini away from the IFP (Walker 1994).  These 
backroom negotiations with those in the highest echelons of the political field, set a 
precedent for the continued bypassing of official policy processes in traditional leaders’ 
ongoing concerted campaigns to achieve their objectives (Ntsebeza 2005).  In the ten 
years that followed, rather than negotiating directly with their opponents in, for 
example, departmental consultation processes, time and again they have secured their 
greatest coups through closed-door meetings with the President, the Deputy President, 
through ‘technical committees’ and ‘task teams’, and through other means.  For a start, 
three of their most prominent spokesmen themselves figure prominently in the political 
field and, from within that playing field, cover all bases: the ANC, IFP and CONTRALESA.  
Nkosi Phathekile Holomisa, an advocate, has been the President of CONTRALESA since 
1991 and since 1994 has also been an ANC Member of the National Assembly.  As such, 
he has chaired the Portfolio Committee for Land and Agriculture and in 2002 was 
appointed to Chair the Joint Constitutional Review Committee.  Meanwhile, Nkosi Mwelo 
Nonkonyana, the former Secretary General, now Organiser, of CONTRALESA, is also an 
ANC Member of the National Assembly and has been a member of the Portfolio 
Committee on Provincial and Local Government.  Nkosi Mpiyezintombi Mzimela, an IFP 
Member of the National Assembly, was the Chairperson of the National House of 
Traditional Leaders until 2006.  In turn, the not-so-subtle political manoeuvrings by the 
ANC in the face of such a ‘traditional’ lobby can be traced in the convoluted political 
paths they have trodden in relation to a number of different legislative attempts at 
reform (Van Kessel and Oomen 1997; Beall, Mkhize et al. 2005; Ntsebeza 2005). 
While there was some kind of Constitutional compromise forged between respecting 
tradition and gender equality, the resolution of another conflict over provisions for local 
government, in the face of demands by traditional leaders that they ‘continue’ to be the 
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local government in their areas of jurisdiction (as opposed to the devolution of power to 
a newly constituted democratic local government), was left to a later date.  During 
apartheid, in the homelands where black people were not entitled to any form of 
democratic local government, they were represented and managed by Tribal Authorities 
supported by an array of officials and institutions supporting the fulfilment of their 
responsibilities and their authority; they were the face of a form of ‘local government’ 
(Evans 1997; Oomen 2005).  Handing over those powers and that authority to elected 
Local Government, was simply ‘politically unattainable’ (Oomen 2005: 59).   
The ‘transitional’ arrangements for local government contained in the Interim 
Constitution, that were to be fleshed out in the final Constitution, were unclear as to 
what would happen to traditional leaders (Ntsebeza 2005; Oomen 2005), but legislation 
passed in 1995 to clarify such arrangements was met with outrage by traditional 
leaders.  That legislation provided that they would either only be entitled to ex officio 
membership of local government (the government arguing that ex officio meant that 
they would only have observer status), or be limited to ten percent representation on 
the transitional councils, along with other ‘interest groups’, including women.  In 
response, CONTRALESA, uniting with the IFP, threatened legal proceedings against the 
government, called for a boycott of the local government elections, and also organised a 
march to Pretoria against the President (Maloka 1996; Ntsebeza 2005).  This alliance 
between a formerly ANC-aligned organisation and the IFP was controversial.  In 
retaliation, the ANC took disciplinary action against Holomisa, ruling, inter alia, that ‘He 
be removed from his position as chairperson of the Land Affairs Portfolio Committee’ 
and threatened to suspend him from the ANC for a year (ANC – Disciplinary action 
against Patekile Holomisa, 11/04/96).  While CONTRALESA’s National Executive 
Committee ‘gave Holomisa its “unconditional support”’ (ANC Daily News Briefing – ANC 
Action Against its Leader An Attack on CONTRALESA, 24/08/96), the alliance between 
CONTRALESA and the IFP also precipitated disputes within CONTRALESA.  For a while, it 
appeared that the Transkei faction – Holomisa, Nonkonyana and Winnie Mandela (the 
organisation’s Treasurer) – were turning the organisation into their personal power base 
(Maloka 1996; Van Kessel and Oomen 1997), and in response to these events, Winnie 
Mandela was removed and Holomisa was suspended until the 1996 AGM.  Such disputes 
can also be seen as more personal struggles to achieve dominance, or counter existing 
dominance, within the hierarchy of that organisation. 
In 1998, the Municipal Demarcation Act was passed, that was supposed to re-demarcate 
the former boundaries of ‘white’ local government so as to deracialise them, that is to 
incorporate within them former ‘black’ areas – sometimes vast, rural, former homeland 
areas that were extremely poor.  The intention was that the richer areas both within the 
municipalities, and within the wider district that they were grouped under, would 
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subsidise those with insignificant tax bases (Zybrands 2001; Lodge 2002; Ntsebeza 
2005).  At times, however, it also involved the amalgamation of former TA areas, 
sometimes with the aim of splitting such areas between two municipalities (Oomen 
2005).  As it became clear what the demarcation would actually involve, it was greeted 
with further outrage, spectacular displays of traditional leaders brandishing traditional 
battle regalia and ‘ethnic’ violence breaking out over the imposition of new borders in 
many rural areas.  In response to these plans, traditional leaders, once again supported 
by Holomisa, threatened the first proper Local Government elections in 2000 (Ntsebeza 
2005).  Oomen (2005) describes the subsequent flurry of behind the scenes meetings 
between President Mbeki and traditional leaders, the amendment of the Municipal 
Structures Act to allow them 20 percent, rather than ten percent representation in the 
municipalities, and the Act’s further amendment.  But that amendment only went so far 
as to recognise the largely symbolic ‘functions’ of traditional leaders.  The chiefs were 
unappeased and continued to threaten the elections.  As a result, the government set 
up a ‘Joint Technical Committee’, including within it traditional leaders, that recalled 
Parliament to consider a further amendment to the Bill that would recognise not only 
their symbolic functions, but also their ‘right to administer communal land’31.  Even 
though the amendment Bill was not passed in time (such a provision and lack of 
consultation on it would in any case have been unconstitutional), the elections duly took 
place on 5th December 2000.  In 2000, according to Oomen (2005: 68) ‘the prospect of 
erasing apartheid’s institutional borders to make way for universal democratic 
government seemed further away than ever’. 
Around the time of the 1999 general elections, chiefs’ salaries were increased, their 
judicial powers reinstated and, in response to the UDF’s ‘reported… inroads into the 
ANC’s support base among traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape [,] … the ANC put 
Holomisa and Nonkonyana high on its election list of candidates for the National 
Assembly’ (ANC Daily News Briefing – Traditional Leaders Kingmakers in Rural Vote, 
18/05/99).  And just after the elections, the new Minister for Land and Agriculture, 
Thoko Didiza, withdrew the Land Rights Bill (LRB) that was supposed to have reformed 
the land tenure of those living in the former homelands.  When it had been tabled in 
1998 by Hanekom’s TRCG, made up of a number of people whose history of 
involvement in land struggles positioned them squarely in the ‘anti-traditional leader’ 
camp, it had been roundly criticised by Provincial offices of the DLA for ‘ignoring’ the 
political reality of traditional leaders.  After withdrawing that Bill, the Minister indicated 
her intentions in relation to communal land: 
In the policies of the past governments all tribal land was held in trust by the 
State. There is a need to redress this. To this effect, transfer of land to tribes 
and communities will be done. To facilitate the disposal of land to tribes work is 
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underway to address changes to the legislative framework and the drafting of 
regulations under the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act of 1991. (Didiza, 
Media Briefing – 02/00) 
Moreover, she proposed that to effect such disposal, a Committee should be established 
in each Province, comprising: ‘the Provincial Department of Land Affairs, Provincial 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Public Works, Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry, Representatives of the traditional leaders; Municipalities and Land Bank.’ 
(Didiza, Policy Statement – 02/00).  When in November 2001 the draft CLRB was finally 
‘leaked’ at the Tenure Conference, however, although it was greeted with outrage by a 
number of activists, it was also opposed by traditional leaders.  The President of 
CONTRALESA was once again vocal in speaking out against it pitting ‘democracy’ against 
‘tradition’, and women against traditional leaders, who were decried by the opposition 
(to the Bill) as ‘decentralised despots’ – and Mamdani was liberally quoted (Ntsebeza 
2003, 2005).   
While negotiations over CLARA form the basis of this thesis, and liaisons between 
Parliamentarians and traditional leaders are discussed further in Chapter 4, the context 
to these is clear: while activists were lobbying the government to ‘scrap the CLRB’, apart 
from them ‘endless rounds of consultation (largely, but far from exclusively with 
traditional leaders)’ and negotiations with the ANC leadership were also going on in 
relation to reforms to local government reform and to the continued roles of traditional 
leaders (Oomen 2005: 68).  These were to be embodied in the White Paper on 
Traditional Leadership finally issued by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government in July 2003.  It was the TLGFB that was eventually agreed in September 
2003 alongside amendments to the CLRB: the provisions of the two Acts were tied 
together, decried as a ‘carrot and stick’ to traditional leaders. 
In these struggles recounted here, traditional leaders have attempted each time to claim 
the symbolic capital, the unquestioned legitimacy, to define ‘tradition’ and to undermine 
the legitimacy of others to do the same.  Although, as recognised by Ndashe, traditional 
leaders do not speak with one voice (Ndashe 2006), such voices have combined to 
produce a discourse of ‘tradition’ that high profile traditional leaders have attempted to 
draw upon so as to gain traditional capital for wielding in the political field.  In such a 
discourse, ‘tradition’ in and of itself is held out to be a good thing: it is ‘traditional 
African leaders and the age-old decision-making processes of the traditional African 
communities’ that were to be undermined by ‘the colonial powers’ (Mzimela 2005: 3).  
Meanwhile, ‘a traditional leader … was not allowed to be autocratic’ and ‘retained their 
positions because of their wisdom and fairness’ (ibid: 3).  And so, being conflated with 
‘colonial powers’,  ‘westernised norms and values’, ‘foreign systems’ (Nonkonyana 2003) 
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and, in turn, ‘[w]hite society’ (Holomisa 2007) become delegitimised.  And ‘[w]hite 
society’ is pitted against another society – presumably a united black society, that 
reclaims and includes all things ‘African’ and all Africans as inherently good, and that 
speaks with one voice, here, that of traditional leaders.  It is ‘white society’ that has 
‘misinterpreted, misunderstood, distorted, manipulated and disfigured our culture, 
customs, traditions and our ways of life as Africans generally’ (ibid: 1 – my italics).  Such 
misinterpretations ‘trash African customs’ (Holomisa –Black Electorate.Com, 16/08/05) 
and ‘[‘castigate..’] anything which is not informed by western values … as variously 
backward, paternalistic, sexist and undemocratic’ (Holomisa – Business Day, 05/06/08).  
‘Custom’ is held up as being under assault.  In its personified form, it can even be 
‘offend[ed’ – by women, for instance, in acting according to ‘Westernised norms such as 
equality’ (Nonkonyana, quoted in Terreblanche – The Sunday Tribune, 06/05/07).  On 
the other hand, ‘we’, the united society of before, or ‘Contralesa’, “protects its own 
tradition and custom” (ibid): ‘We don’t want to interfere with custom … it would amount 
to diluting the legitimacy of traditional values and customs’ (Holomisa, quoted in 
Terreblanche – The Sunday Tribune, 06/05/07).  And so, in an appeal to ‘[o]ur own 
educated leaders and policy-makers, males and females’, even though complementing 
them as ‘intellectuals’ themselves, they are said to have ‘imbibed the white man’s 
education’ and failed to ask the ‘organic intellectuals’ the truth behind ‘our age-old, 
African customs’ (Holomisa 2007).  So here, human rights and gender equality receive a 
double assault: not only are they undermined because of their ‘foreign’ derivation, but 
even if this were not accepted, there must be no questioning, let alone disbelieving, the 
‘gender equity’ that truly exists ‘[i]n African culture’ (ibid).  It is one thing to criticise 
‘individual traditional leaders and their [presumably negative] actions’, but quite another 
to criticise ‘the institution of traditional leadership’ (Holomisa 2007) – that is beyond 
criticism.  Comaroff saw the ‘political struggle fought … with “cultural weapons” (rather 
than unencumbered universal suffrage and individual rights) in a society … based on the 
axiom that patterns of identity will never change’ happening ‘especially before the first 
democratic election’ (Comaroff 1996: 179).  However, such a struggle has obviously 
continued throughout the first decade of South Africa’s democracy and beyond. 
4.2 - The rural playing field 
While the previous section indicates the political contestations over changes to such 
areas that were to be introduced at National level, this section indicates the extent to 
which such changes are mediated through local contestations that much more directly 
shape power relations ‘on the ground’ in such rural areas.  At the end of apartheid, 
Gazankulu, the homeland for the so-called Tsonga or Shangaan-speaking ‘tribe’ of the 
Transvaal, had had the same Chief Minister, Hudson Ntsanwisi, ruling over its Legislative 
Assembly for over two decades (Schmid 2005).  Since 1962, with the establishment of 
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the Matshangana Territorial Authority made up of the four Regional Authorities32 
dominated by Tsonga-speakers (amongst those that were dominated by Venda and 
North Sotho speakers), political mobilisation along ethnic lines had been pursued by the 
Territorial Authority and later by the ‘self-governing’ Gazankulu Bantustan, in defence of 
Tsonga-speakers’ access to resources (Harries 1989).  This was in the face of a break-
up and distribution of land and power between the formerly heterogeneous, but now 
competing, Venda, Sotho and Tsonga/Shangaan-speakers (Platzky and Walker 1985).  
Harries (1989) describes how politically arbitrary borders had been drawn across the 
countryside, along roads or according to farm boundaries, and thousands of families 
were forcefully removed across the borders.  Hospitals and schools, water and land 
were fought over as they were to be demarcated as exclusively for the different, now 
politically ethnic, groups.  
In 1981, Ntsanwisi established a political party, ‘Ximoko’ (later the Ximoko Progressive 
Party), touting ‘tradition’ and evoking ethnic customs in its defence of the ‘Tsonga 
people’ (Harries 1989).  It was modelled on Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement.  However, 
support for apartheid in the early 1990s appeared to be a ‘taboo’ even for the homeland 
structures of authority including Ntsanwisi (Schmid 2005: 16) and in 1992 the Ximoko 
Progressive Party participated in CODESA, with demands in tune with the federalism and 
market economy demanded by the IFP.  In a context of extreme deprivation throughout 
the Gazankulu homeland, whether or not the support of apartheid per se – even the 
homeland system – was taboo, it is unsurprising that those who had been benefiting 
from the status quo would endeavour to support changes that would enable them to 
hold onto what power they had managed to access.  As recognised by Maloka (1996: 
175), ‘a certain stratum of the African petty bourgeoisie also saw the Bantustan 
administration as an important avenue for capital accumulation and upward social 
mobility’ (see also, Peires 1992).  For example, salaries and benefits were provided via 
the South African state to the homeland civil servants and traditional leaders, to some 
for as long as 20 years.  In 1983, not only did the Gazankulu government control over 
half of the jobs in the homeland, but it also provided business loans and a range of 
licences to its ‘citizens’ (Harries 1989). 
In spite of the political polarisation between the government and traditional leaders over 
defining their ‘respective’ roles, the political battles that played out in the 2000 local 
government elections in any case often reflected former power hierarchies.  Given their 
long standing involvement in politics, many traditional leaders actually stood as 
candidates.  In the former Transvaal, home to the former Venda, Sotho and 
Tsonga/Shangaan homelands of Venda, Lebowa, Bophutatswana and Gazankulu, ANC 
candidates included the former Secretary to Chief Patrick Mphephu’s Cabinet in 
Thoyandou (Venda homeland), the last Venda Head of State in Messina, the former 
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Minister of Justice in Bophuthatswana, and a former Gazankulu Minister was the 
candidate for Louis Trichardt’s mayor (Lodge 2002).  Such candidatures themselves 
each involve political rivalries that can be seen to go right through different levels of 
politics.  At a Provincial level in Limpopo, rivalries between politicians from the former 
homelands have entailed accusations of ethnic favouritism at different ranks in different 
government departments (ibid).  At a local level, with boundaries of municipalities 
incorporating, for example, both Shangaan-speaking people living in the former 
Gazankulu, and Venda-speaking people living in the former Venda homeland, the new 
demarcations also at times revived ethnic conflicts.  The divisions and conflicts between 
people based upon apartheid-animated ethnic differences have not been expunged with 
the end of apartheid and continue to exist today. 
Even though so much energy is spent in negotiating legislated settlements of contested 
power relations, in many cases these have very little bearing on ongoing contestations 
that shape day-to-day reality.  So, at a local level, resolutions to power struggles have 
sometimes been achieved despite, rather than because of, legislative compromises.  And 
even where traditional leaders’ and municipal roles do overlap on paper, Oomen (2005) 
notes that, in practice, through a ‘working out’ of power relations on the ground, there 
was often little actual overlap between the operations of such structures.  Such a 
political reality is in many cases bolstered by a sobering financial reality – the two 
working together to construct a messy reality that in any case represents a huge gap 
from the ideals for change forged at a national level.  So, with such little support given 
to rural councils, financial and other, even if they were able to politically, they have 
often been unable to extend their reach into the former homelands or rural areas.  And 
this lack of financial support has had far-reaching effects.   
Given the extent of the poverty that many of the new local governments took over, 
even before the local government elections in 2000, many of the local councils were 
already bankrupt, with more bankruptcies following on their heels in the next few years 
(Lodge 2002).  Such a financial and political reality often means that plans to foster 
progressive change in local government, such as the laudable requirement for each 
municipality to prepare an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) to set out their 
development goals, how they are to be achieved and their success measured, often 
remain an ideal.  And, in turn, a rural day-to-day reality similarly mars such ideals.  For 
example, the introduction of the Ward Committee system, whereby local ‘wards’ are to 
participate in local government through representatives chosen locally, is often marred 
by the variable pressures imposed on those representatives given the reality of the 
poverty in which they are living.  Moreover, as Lodge (2002) points out, some 
municipalities include areas that incorporate settlements more than a hundred 
kilometres apart leaving the question open as to what ‘public participation’ could 
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possibly look like in such circumstances.  Meanwhile, hangovers from apartheid similarly 
hinder the implementation of models of change.  For example, even though the 
boundaries have now been formally changed in many areas, some administrative 
institutions leftover from the homeland administration, such as the old District Control 
Offices (DCOs) in Gazankulu, continue with their staff on the government payroll and 
continue fulfilling their duties of oversight over the Tribal Authorities still falling within 
their ambit.  Although they are in fact formally now named Traditional Authorities they 
are still colloquially referred to as ‘the Tribale’, or ‘Tribal Authority’, with staff who are 
also on the government payroll and carry on with their leftover administrative 
responsibilities.  In continuing with practices that have developed over decades and 
longer, there remains a certain obliviousness of the formal changes wrought by the end 
of apartheid, practices that no doubt make unquestioned sense to those on the inside.  
For many concerned with reform, however, change has brought about a chaotic 
incoherence, with the status of such leftovers existing in a nebulous illegality and 
illegitimacy. 
5 - Conclusion 
This chapter has considered how power in the former homelands is deeply contested, 
always negotiated and shaped by wider politics taking place on a bigger political playing 
field.  While reforms to such areas are also deeply contested at the national level, they 
cannot ignore such a reality.  Moreover, such politics and struggles over reform and 
change are recursively constituted by and through relationships of power that are 
themselves imbricated in the past.  Different actors have struggled to be able to position 
themselves in particular ways, to legitimise their positions, and in doing so have drawn 
upon discourses that have emotional resonance because they are shaped by the past.  
This underlines the importance of remembering that the past affects the future; habitus, 
as Bourdieu reminds us, shapes ongoing practice, as does the materiality of people’s 
everyday lives.  Given that politics and ‘the state’ are constituted through interactions 
between people, constituted as social beings, with all their messily formed knowledge 
shaped as much by education as upset, considering how and what particular aspects of 
the past have affected the politics of knowledge today in South Africa remains crucial.  
Shifts in discourses, the construction of problems and their solutions, are unlikely to 
arise spontaneously and nor will they occur without bringing with them their ‘emotional 
baggage’ – emotional resonances shaped by the past.  Responding to events taking 
place in the 1980s, those making up the opposition ranks assumed particular identities 
and positioned themselves in particular ways.  However, the roles they played in those 
days, the identities they assumed and the discourses that had resonance, were not just 
cast to one side in the negotiations to democracy and in the subsequent transition, but 
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have continued to shape their subsequent positioning and their leaning towards 
particular ways of interpreting issues.  As recognised by Marx (1992: 257): 
many in South Africa have a long standing attachment to symbols … [for 
example,] to the ANC’s history and leaders … [that they may have] inherited 
through family ties and lifetime associations, picked up from friends, and 
reinforced by organizations, press reports, or a ground swell of popularity from 
which many do not want to be left out. 
It is uncanny the extent to which many of the debates and controversies amongst 
activists and even within government, taking place today have echoes of those 
rehearsed before democracy.  But this chapter also begins to uncover the extent to 
which the practices of those participating in the transition to democracy are also shaped 
by the past.  The following chapter goes on to further delve into the practices of those 
in government, in the bureaucratic field.  Given the government’s positioning between 
their political masters, directly constrained by the wider field of power, and ‘civil society’ 
acting as self-appointed critics and representatives of the subjects of reforms, the 
chapter is entitled ‘Caught in the Middle: Bureaucracy, Politics and the DLA’.  It 
therefore builds directly upon this chapter, elaborating upon these varying pressures, 
and how, in relation to CLARA, many in the government found themselves impossibly 
‘caught in the middle’. 
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CHAPTER 4 - CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND THE 
DLA 
1 - Introduction 
In the following four chapters, the discussion shifts to considering the different ‘fields’ 
within which actors participating in debates over CLARA were positioned, this chapter 
considering the bureaucratic field.  The Introduction set out the broad terms on which 
these debates took place: CLARA was situated within tenure debates that pitted 
individualisation of land against its communal counterpart, and was caught between 
contradictory discourses of democracy and tradition, the latter eventually strengthened 
through an unlikely alliance between both ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’.  Chapter 3 then 
contextualised the broader political changes that influenced South Africa’s 
transformation.  It also discussed the implications of the changing relationship between 
the state and ‘civil society’, recognising the responses of non-governmental actors, often 
emotional – not to be pitted in any way against ‘rational’ – to their enforced re-
alignment due to political change taking place.  In this chapter, now the perspective 
shifts to those working for the government over the same time.  It discusses how those 
drafting the Bill were positioned themselves, and moreover, in their position as 
bureaucrats, were positioned by others more politically powerful, in relation to those 
debates.  It considers the practices of people working for the DLA in the policy 
processes that unfolded in relation to the passing of CLARA in February 2004.  Changes 
in the political landscape that took place in the first decade of democracy in South Africa 
had various effects on the relations between people working for the Department and 
‘civil society’.  The DLA has received extensive criticism focusing predominantly on the 
actual form of CLARA and for the consultation undertaken by the Department in relation 
to the Bill.  But this chapter contributes to this discussion with an analysis of the 
processes that have shaped the ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Clay and Schaffer 1984) in which 
particular actors within the government have found themselves. 
2 - Caught in the middle: tenure and research in the DLA 
Having not started my fieldwork in South Africa until May 2005, it was not until the Land 
Summit in July before I met anyone from the DLA.  Apart from a brief road trip up to 
Limpopo province, the first few months had been spent in Cape Town, shuttling 
between interviews with politicians who had participated in the Portfolio Committee, 
those in COSATU, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the CGE, those in other 
NGOs who had made submissions to the Committee, as well as with people at PLAAS 
and the LRC who had been heavily involved in the advocacy campaign against the CLRB.  
But when I arrived at the Land Summit in Johannesburg, I felt very ‘out of the loop’ as a 
white, non-South African.  There were other faces I recognised: the TCOE (Trust for 
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Community Outreach and Education) ones, the PLAAS ones and Nkuzi (Nkuzi 
Development Trust) ones.  They were chatting, greeting each other, laughing and 
milling around.  But, even though I felt ‘out of the loop’, I did not know who I could talk 
to.  I had been told, even warned, by many people about the politically charged 
relationships between many of the people I had already met and ‘the rest’ – the DLA, 
the LPM.  I greeted those people I knew warily, feeling dishonest for my wariness, 
resulting from my fear of any ‘guilt by association’ that others who I wanted to meet 
might cast on me, and uncomfortable with behaving according to my belief that others 
might judge me if they thought I was ‘one of them’.  But at the same time I was acutely 
aware of the incompleteness of my understanding and knowledge of any such dynamics 
in those early months of fieldwork.  I was also aware that my white face stood out, and 
for the next five days I presumed others were somehow judging me by association, 
because of my skin colour, because I was on the outside, because of these links that I 
had already established, the research I had already done.  All of these were ‘facts’ that 
were politically and sometimes emotionally charged in themselves and also created 
politically charged relationships.  Added into this, I was a researcher, with its own 
implications in my relationships with people. 
The conference hall itself was enormous, the seating split into six, two aisles leading 
down to the stage, and another leading across, splitting the front seating from the back.  
Hanging above this middle aisle were a number of screens and three more above the 
stage, reflecting back massive simultaneous images of the speaker, and also showing 
the DLA’s logo for the Summit. The hall was draped in black with spotlights to the stage 
with its three screens and coloured banners like ships’ sails lit up, brightly dramatic.  As 
we went in to the sound of upbeat kwaito (urban pop) music, we were each given a 
khaki-coloured, logo’d Land Summit bag, a khaki-coloured, logo’d Land Summit cap and 
bright orange logo’d t-shirt.  Looking to the front of the stage, one’s eyes swept across a 
sea of caps to the podium draped in thick garlands of flowers.  We were also given 
headphones that we could plug in to any one of six channels to get simultaneous 
translation of the speakers.  A feeling of upbeat, lively expectation was conjured up, 
people were singing, some were dancing when Lindiwe Msengana Ndlela, the DG of the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government began: 
We are going to soon welcome our leadership!  I would like to request you to 
provide them with space when they come in from the back, and recognise them 
by standing up!  We will advise you when the leadership comes.  The DLA is 
one of the most progressive Departments – and they have organised that we 
have interpretation services! (Land Summit - 27.7.05 (Fieldwork notebook)) 
 
 
 
 
 86 
This was greeted by singing from the LPM, clapping and ululating.  She ended by 
getting each ‘Province’ (different parts of the hall had signs with the names of the 
different Provinces on each – for some reason I was sitting amongst people from the 
Free State) to cheer for their Province:  “We need to tell the Minister and the Deputy 
President who is here!” (ibid). 
 
 
And then Thoko Didiza spoke.  She too started with a song – my neighbour told me that 
it used to be a hymn, but they had changed the words.  People joined in singing, 
standing up to greet her.  She then raised her fist into the air shouting “Amaand-la!” to 
the instant chorusing cry “Aweh-thu!” (Power!  To the people!) before welcoming all.  
She referred to the words ‘A new trajectory’ the banner chosen by the DLA for the 
Summit … ‘What can we do better to deal with issues of inequity so that when we say 
‘Land belongs to all’, then we can mean it?’  She referred to Jeffrey Sachs’ question, 
‘Can the rich afford not to help the poor?’ and ‘Can we afford not to do anything about 
land reform in South Africa? … It’s not about whether we don’t need to do it, but 
whether we can afford not to do it.’ (ibid).  She talked for some time, ending with a 
reference to communal land, affirming the government’s commitment to the need to 
implement CLARA fully without the state being a trustee or a ‘mother’ to people living 
there.  In response to this there was clapping. 
In spite of this promising start, the afternoon ‘commission’ session that was devoted to 
tenure reform and to which the Director of PLAAS had been invited to make a 
presentation – to his great surprise given the increasingly icy relations between the DLA 
and PLAAS over the last few years – was disappointing.  The entire session was taken 
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up with a discussion of issues relating to farmworkers and labour tenants and 
testimonies about their ill-treatment at the hands of farmers.  Many people, including 
people who had come from the former homeland areas of the country, complained that 
no time was allocated by the chair to a discussion of issues relating to the security of 
tenure in those areas, despite the schedule stating otherwise.  It was disappointing to 
me because it would have been the first time that I was to witness the government and 
their opponents confront each other in public.  Nevertheless, during the course of the 
four day Summit I met the Director of the KZN Provincial office who had participated in 
the tenure ‘commission’.  When chatting to him about my research, I asked him if it 
might be possible to do an unpaid internship with the Tenure Directorate of the 
Department.  He was encouraging and introduced me to his colleague, the director of 
the Tenure Directorate, who I was aware was key in the Department in terms of CLARA.  
Both of them appeared friendly and encouraged my application to spend some time in 
the Department so as to get more of an idea about a more policy-oriented perspective 
of tenure.   
I followed this up, sending the Director a letter setting out my research and my CV.  
When I spoke to him a number of times over the next few months, he continued to 
encourage this internship and agreed to a start date of the beginning of December.  At 
some point over that period however, it appeared that he became suspicious as to the 
authenticity of my research interests and extremely distrustful of me.  It gradually 
dawned on me during the course of December and January that, despite repeated 
efforts through meetings, phone calls and emails, my hope of an interview with him, let 
alone an internship, would not be realised.  At one point I was told by another DLA 
official that: 
I should not take it personally but X33 has turned it into this really big thing, 
s/he didn’t know what it was but for some reason he had got it into his head 
that he really didn’t want me around.  S/he had never seen him behave like 
that, he had even left the room yesterday to phone the DG about it.  S/he asked 
whether I had had anything to do with PLAAS. 
ERAF: Yes, but as I should have done, when I was in Cape Town, as they were 
a key player in all of this.  But I had also been to UCT, Stellenbosch, as well as 
organisations like the HRC etc.  They were part of my research and that was 
precisely what I was trying to do, bring together different views, which is why I 
had thought those of the DLA were important. … 
S/he said that basically CLARA was [the Director], so no one else could do 
anything about this.  (National DLA official, personal communication - 17.1.06 
(Fieldwork notebook)) 
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Despite this official’s efforts to raise the matter with the DG, and numerous other 
attempts by me including a phonecall with the DG in which I agreed to send him copies 
of my interview questions and list of interviewees to date (which I did, bar those who 
had requested to remain anonymous), I heard nothing further from either of them after 
the end of January 2006.  Instead, as indicated in Chapter 2, I was approached by an 
official from the NIA who greeted me with “I understand that you have approached the 
Department of Land Affairs and they want us to carry out some checks on you” (NIA 
official, phonecall - 10.3.06).  Clearly my extensive attempts to be able to research more 
comprehensively within the Tenure Directorate of the DLA, by spending time openly 
there on an internship, had touched upon sensitivities. 
3 -  Post 1994 context  
Comaroff (2002) has drawn our attention towards the contradictions of ‘the’ colonial 
state and its postcolonial successor: that at the same time it was manufacturing 
sameness and citizenship, it was also managing and producing difference and 
subjection, together seen in the ‘capillary processes’ (Comaroff 2002: 122) of its 
techniques and ‘methods of enumeration, serialization, individuation, identification’ (ibid: 
115).  The exercise of such techniques to officially inscribe such identities and 
differences became the ‘business of government’ (ibid: 117).  But he warns us against 
seeing such techniques as comprising the state as a generic entity.  Instead, we must 
recognise its variety of forms, its complexity, the conflict within and between different 
ministries and departments and the resistance they encounter and its incomplete 
mastery over people’s lives.  The analysis here considers some of those processes and 
conflicts within government, their less-than-straightforward reality, in their endeavour to 
inscribe new identities onto those people who have typically been cast as ‘subjects’ 
(Mamdani 1996).  And it also considers the limitations and incompleteness of fulfilling 
that task.  Bourdieu argued that ‘one of the major powers of the state is to produce and 
impose … categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all things of the social 
world – including the state itself’ (Bourdieu 1994: 1) and  
it follows that the state, which possesses the means of imposition and 
inculcation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its 
own structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of 
symbolic power (ibid: 9). 
But in South Africa, the state was also the site of immense change and upheaval in 
1994, and to a lesser extent again in 1999.  Certainly in relation to CLARA, after 1999, 
the attempts by the state to impose such ‘principles of vision and division’, through the 
adoption of a piece of legislation that was to change relations of power in the former 
homelands, was deeply contested; CLARA posed a challenge to power relations and 
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forms of capital that formerly had come to be, to a certain extent, unquestioned.  And 
within the bureaucracy, officials were similarly experiencing change and upheaval: 
individuals coming together, each with a different habitus, and changes in the hierarchy 
of the DLA, in turn challenging ‘the distribution of the species of power’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 97).  To secure their positions, sometimes their promotions, officials 
were not only required to continue to respond to the ‘needs of the job’ with competence 
and professionalism, but also to ‘fit in’ with the habitus – a form of capital in itself – of 
those who were dominant within the bureaucratic field and, given their proximity to 
their political masters, with the habitus of those within the wider field of power.  As 
recognised by Bourdieu in his discussion of the construction of the state, ‘the question 
of the legitimacy of the state, and of the order it institutes, does not arise except in 
crisis situations’ (Bourdieu 1994: 15).  While 1994-2004 was no longer ‘a crisis situation’, 
the state in many ways was still in a state of construction and there continued to be 
immense struggles and ‘dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated 
groups’ to eliminate ‘lateral possibilities’ and produce ‘doxic submission to the 
established order’ (ibid: 15).  This chapter discusses some of those struggles for 
legitimacy of those who had been appointed to the government during this period of 
change, struggles that were, on the one hand, very personal but, on the other, 
connected to those taking place in the wider field of power.  
The new DLA, responsible for a nationwide three-pronged land reform programme, took 
over the responsibilities of the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, that had 
succeeded the Department of Development Aid (formerly the Department of Native 
Affairs), responsible for surveying, registering and keeping the records for the former 
homelands (Hall and Williams 2003; Weideman 2004).  While there was some 
continuation in terms of personnel fulfilling such day-to-day registration and record-
keeping jobs, the formulation of such a progressive programme of reform from scratch 
required the creation of many entirely new positions for policy-makers.  As indicated in 
the previous chapter, many of those working in land NGOs in 1992-3 had been heavily 
involved in lobbying the ANC/NP negotiations in relation to land reform and the form it 
would take and so, after 1994, the new DLA drew extensively upon their knowledge and 
experience, and their political loyalties.  Although ‘agriculture’ obviously overlapped with 
the DLA’s land reform programme, it fell exclusively within the DOA and, according to 
Weideman (2004), relations between the two departments was poor.  And while new 
positions in the DLA were peopled with these former NGO activists, there was more of a 
continuation of personnel in the DOA, including its NP Minister, and therefore its policy 
focus on commercial agriculture.  Meanwhile, with close relationships continuing to exist 
between those now with positions in the DLA and those remaining in the NGO sector, 
their mutual involvement and concern with the direction both of policy and of activism 
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also continued.  In the first five years of post-apartheid transition, the DOA hardly 
influenced the direction of land reform policy.  Those who were most influential were 
those most articulate and those considered to have the best grasp of the issues both 
politically and intellectually.  These forms of cultural capital clearly privileged the 
privileged; those who had received good education, but also those who had experience 
of the politics of the issues, perhaps spokespeople who were used to representing the 
views of others.  Vocal activists in the land sector were ideal.  Given the disruption of 
education in many of the black areas of the country as a result of mass boycotts and 
stayaways of that time, the majority of those receiving such educational credentials 
were white, or those who had been educated outside South Africa. 
Those with intellectual capacity, fostered through education, as opposed to experience 
‘on-the-ground’, were privileged in formulating policy and many lawyers were put to 
work in “writing policies” (LRC lawyer, interview - 23.06.05).  During the first five years 
of government, this contributed to an institutional separation in place between ‘policy’ in 
Pretoria and ‘implementation’ in the Provinces.  This was further supported by a 
formalised bureaucratic hierarchy between the two, land being a ‘national competency’ 
and with Directors of Provincial offices being unable to sign off on particular projects to 
be carried out by their provincial level staff.  Instead, they would have to bow to the 
superiority of Chief Directors operating out of Pretoria before the DG’s or Minister’s 
approval could be given.  Nevertheless, the Provincial offices were expected “to ‘do’ land 
reform” (former Director of Provincial DLA, interview - 16.2.06), to implement the 
policies formulated at National level.  When speaking to a former director of one 
Provincial office, he – all but one of the directors of Provincial offices were men – 
referred to “this army of policy-makers sending it all down for us to read.”: 
It was that old problem of thinking that policy was one thing and 
implementation another, but of course when you think about it like that, the 
moment when policy and implementation converge it becomes chaos.  So we [in 
the Provincial office] were caught in a whole series of policy directives from 
people in national office who were senior to them … and when each person 
sending out this stuff thinks that what they’re doing is the most important stuff 
of all, and sends you emails with this stuff and then wants comments and 
meanwhile [the people at the Provincial office] are trying to implement. … 
ERAF: Didn’t the people formulating the policy seek inputs from the people in 
Provincial offices. 
No, they didn’t involve us.  It was a very didactic thing.  Because it was dogma 
– ‘Believe’. (ibid). 
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While he admitted that he was putting it crudely, but did not want to be ‘correct’ and 
spoil the story, he obviously resented the inferior positioning imposed on him.  While on 
the one hand, he denies the existence of a split between policy and implementation – in 
not granting it recognition he attempts to dissolve the fact of the imposed hierarchy – 
on the other hand, he asserts the importance of the knowledge and experience of those 
in the Provincial offices for the purposes of formulating policy.  His complaints were 
further fuelled by the perceived lack of recognition by those in the National offices of 
the ‘capacity’ problems that Provincial offices were having due to insufficient staff 
numbers and difficulties with recruitment.  However, his and others’ frustrations went 
deeper than this, with those in Provincial offices complaining that influential policy-
makers in Pretoria, former NGO activists, did not necessarily have the experience of 
implementing policies those “at the coalface” had (Provincial DLA Director, interview - 
2.3.06).  What made intellectual sense on paper to those formulating policy, did not 
necessarily coincide with the practice of those in the places where such policies were to 
be implemented.  At the same time, the “activists with soft skills” did not necessarily 
have the “hard technical skills” required to understand what was required of policy 
(ibid).   
Another former employee of the Department at that time similarly complained that 
these more practical skills had not been carried over into the post-apartheid 
Department; what was carried over was a rather didactic form of government, 
experienced here by those in the Provincial offices from the policy-makers in Pretoria.  
S/he thought that this was due to “a historical mindset that was left over, which was 
very patriarchal” (former employee of the National DLA, interview - 9.12.05).  In a 
bureaucracy, even when individuals, each with a very different habitus move into 
government, the existence of particular rules and procedures, methods of asserting 
one’s authority within a hierarchy, ensures that acts of authority are guaranteed 
(Bourdieu 1994).  The responses to such authority by the different Provincial 
departments differed considerably and so shaped their relationships into the future: 
some were impressively proactive in expanding their own authority, asserting their own 
competences and developing their own approaches to reform aside from the national 
policies developed at National office, but others ceded control to the National office. 
Although the government’s approach to tenure reform policy up to 1999 is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5, what is not discussed there are the perceptions of those in 
government who were not part of the tightly-knit circles of individuals who were 
formulating the policies.  In terms of policy, the ‘rights-based’ approach to land reform 
developed in these first five years was seen by some as neither tackling, or even 
acknowledging, the limited capacity of the state, nor the economic realities of South 
Africa’s transition, both of which would shape the context in which such policies were to 
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be implemented and therefore their likelihood of success.  A director of one of the 
Provincial offices gave his analysis of the approach taken during these years: 
 There are two views of land reform: that land reform is fundamentally a rights-
based approach, which is a minimalist view which never looks beyond to 
development.  That’s not a development programme, it’s a social justice 
programme.  So it’s trying to say, there’s this injustice that’s happened so let’s 
give more black people land.  And there’s a legislative regime to support it, with 
ESTA [Extension of Security of Tenure Act 1997] and the LTA [Labour Tenants 
Act 1997] ... But if you look at the money being spent between 1994 and 2004 
it’s clear, it’s such a minimalist approach.  [It’s saying,] ‘White people are 
pushing people off farms.  How do we respond?’  It’s coming up with a judicial 
process that’s very cumbersome, so let’s make it difficult for people to displace 
people.  But they can still evict them.  And to go to court is difficult but there 
are no resources that were put in place to enable people to go to court. 
(Provincial DLA director, interview - 2.3.06) 
The limited extent to which the rights-based approach to land reform incorporated a 
wider development agenda and its focus on ‘the poor’ was also seen by some as not 
giving sufficient support to black people to achieve economic upliftment.  Moreover, in a 
context of a growing resurgence of black consciousness, such a limited approach was 
seen to have undertones of racism: “One side wanted to see black people just getting 
by as opposed to, why shouldn’t they have the same quality of life?  We don’t want to 
maintain the status quo.” (ibid).  Meanwhile, there was a perception by many that “all 
the intellectuals, the people writing the policies were white people” (ibid).  This was 
symbolically, if nothing else, a problem to many.  One official in the DLA today, who had 
been appointed at that time, recalled some of the tensions: 
 When Derek Hanekom was the first Minister of the Department many of his 
comrades from NGOs were appointed in the Department and they were white in 
higher positions and us blacks came into lesser positions.  It started a debate, 
‘Are we going backwards?’, ‘Has there really been a shift of power?’, ‘Why are 
they being appointed and us are in the lower positions?’.  The Department went 
through a rough period … between 1996-1999. … Derek Hanekom did not 
entertain the issue about race relations on the agenda.  He had appointed a 
team to look at transformation and they had all been interviewed, but nothing 
happened. …  In DH’s time they perceived their white colleagues as whites 
dictating to blacks and they didn’t seem to take them seriously when they made 
suggestions. (National DLA official, interview - 10.1.06) 
 
 
 
 
 93 
Although a number of people told me of such racial hierarchical divisions during that 
period, their ramification ironically may have been felt most only after many of them 
had left the Department. 
4 - Post 1999 context 
The ‘purge’ in the Department has been discussed (in the previous chapter, and will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters) in terms of its effects on those smarting from 
their or their close comrades’ treatment.  But for those who remained, the arrival of a 
new Minister had different repercussions.  A number of those who had been appointed 
or retained by the ‘new’ government in 1999, presumably in an attempt to bolster their 
own authority and legitimacy, and that of their colleagues, mentioned the fact that 
Ministers of other Departments similarly appoint ‘their own’ advisers and DGs.  The 
strikingly obvious replacement of the white faces that the white Minister had surrounded 
himself with (presumably for the ‘rational’ and impersonal reasons of their holding 
particular forms of intellectual capital, for instance), with black faces was powerfully 
symbolic: 
 So with the DG going and the minister going it looked like there was an exodus 
of white people.  And then others saw that the environment was not friendly to 
them so they left themselves.  Which I think is a pity, because you are left 
asking, ‘Why were they there if they were so progressive but then couldn’t work 
with black people?’  So you just realise that the racial consciousness really 
affects things.  And then of the team that remained, there were some who 
came in with the new Minister initially, and there were people who talked a lot 
about race, and who were bitter, and that polarised the situation, with them 
saying, ‘You people are here, you created a white colony.’ (DLA consultant, 
interview - 12.1.06) 
Many of those who joined the ‘exodus’ claimed to have left out of loyalty to those who 
were dismissed, not because they “couldn’t work with black people”.  Casting such 
aspersions on them - others spoke about the “sour grapes” of those who had left – 
again is an attempt to reduce their legitimacy, and raise that of those remaining, 
identified here as “black people”.  But this clear racialised interpretation of a change in 
government, taking place after waving good riddance to apartheid, also brings to the 
fore the emotion and bitterness wrapped up in the habitus of so many.  Someone who 
had not experienced institutionalised racisms structuring their lives enjoyed a very 
different habitus.  Such an embodied history makes it easy to see racialism and racism 
in any negative change.  But habitus is both ‘structuring and structured’, thereby 
changing the forms of capital different people could access or investments they might 
make.  Social capital built up through fostering relationships and forging networks was 
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meanwhile lost: the ‘situation’ aroused “suspicion” on both sides and colleagues, “former 
comrades”, stopped socialising with each other (DLA official, interview – 10.1.06). 
Nevertheless, there were changes that were introduced by the new Minister that 
affronted many people on both sides.  For example, the new Minister moved across 
from the DOA and introduced new policies focused on commercial agriculture.  Such 
change challenged the institutionally shaped habitus and cultural capital within the 
Department that had, until then, developed around a discrete focus on land reform.  
Furthermore, the ‘moratorium’ imposed on both the redistribution and tenure arms of 
the land reform programme did not go down well with many civil servants who had 
worked so hard to develop them.  It inspired many of the departures and, for those who 
stayed, it created some divisions.  One official said that the Minister:  
was slated for that [the moratorium] – it was something even we in the 
Department could not agree on.  I remember crossing swords with my Director, 
because people wanted to kill me when I couldn’t give them an answer about 
getting land. (former Provincial, now National, DLA official, 10.1.06) 
Not only did this indicate that their Minister, a black woman who for so many reasons 
should be aligned with them and who commanded for those reasons a certain loyalty, 
had not valued their efforts, but also that ‘the people’ were unhappy.  ‘The public’ 
ultimately justify and legitimise the positions of public servants, and this statement 
represents a certain rebellion against the authority of the Minister (Bourdieu 2004): if 
‘the people’ were unhappy, their positions, as well as that of the Minister whose 
authority they bore but also served, would be delegitimised.  As argued by Bourdieu, 
there are: 
 very real effects of the obligatory reference to the values of neutrality and 
disinterested loyalty to the public good.  Such values impose themselves with 
increasing force upon the functionaries of the state as the history of the long 
work of symbolic construction unfolds whereby the official representation of the 
state as the site of universality and of service of the general interest is invented 
and imposed. (Bourdieu 1994: 17) 
These changes introduced by the Minister were understandably unpopular, not only 
because the new policy directions, new appointments and institutional changes 
threatened the recognition granted to and taken for granted by many of those who 
stayed; such changes could potentially reduce their bureaucratic capital.  But because 
they had resulted in an acknowledged loss of capacity in the Department due to many 
posts simply being unfilled, along with a similar loss of experience that had gradually 
been built up over the first five years, they also allowed the competency of those 
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remaining, left without the social and cultural capital deriving from that shared 
experience, to be called into question. 
Although criticisms of change introduced are likely if they threaten the positions held by 
officials within the bureaucratic field, others welcomed some of the changes that were 
introduced by the new Minister.  One former official who had stayed on until 2004 in 
government contrasted the more inclusive approach to decision-making that existed in 
the Department prior to 1999 against the strong Ministerial-level decision-making.  But 
for him, the “inclusivity” of ‘before’ meant that there were “issues that had been 
discussed for 5 years or so – but they had a very abstract view” (former National DLA 
official, interview - 9.12.05).  Now, a strong leadership to a certain extent allowed them 
to ‘get on with the job’ and therefore for implementation to progress faster than before, 
thereby enhancing their bureaucratic legitimacy.   
Perhaps in light of criticisms made by those in Provincial offices in relation to the overly 
centralised decision-making in the first five years of government (referred to above), the 
new Minister also introduced certain formal changes to decentralise power – or at least 
take a less centralised view of the distinction between National and Provincial offices in 
relation to land reform, which remained a national competency.  For example, the 
formal bureaucratic hierarchy between the Provincial and National offices was 
recognised as a limitation and the status of Provincial directors was changed from 
Directors to Chief Directors.  This enabled them to sign off on projects to be carried out 
by their Provincial office without deferring to Chief Directors who were formerly to be 
found only in the National office.  Although this would have appealed to Provincial 
offices, even though they had different levels of capacity as well as priorities, such 
changes could prove less popular, even be ignored, by those in the National office.  For 
example, one official from the National office who was tasked to coordinate the input of 
the Provincial offices on a national project, was clearly unhappy that his/her authority 
had been compromised, complaining that at his/her hierarchical level in National office, 
s/he was now no longer able to give the Provincial offices “instructions, or even work 
with them.  It makes it difficult for us to function.” (National DLA official, personal 
communication - 17.1.06).  S/he said that in the end it would depend on “how you were 
with them”, “on personally how you got on with them” (ibid).  Resorting to the personal, 
however, was risky – it entailed a move away from the impersonal bureaucratic 
‘rationality’ that endowed such functionaries with legitimacy (Bourdieu 2004: 31).  And 
those in Provincial offices continued to resent the imposition of authority by those in the 
National office, now through personal relations rather than official lines.  A number of 
people working for Provincial offices expressed ongoing frustration: of “those in National 
office jumping on our heads”; “when National office want the Provincial offices to 
produce something, it’s always ‘Now’, ‘For today’ and then everyone is running round 
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manically busy trying to get this thing done but then we don’t hear about it for a week” 
(Provincial DLA official, interview - 6.12.05).  So decentralisation of power on paper did 
not necessarily translate into practice, with officials continuing to compete for places 
within the bureaucratic hierarchy by competing for recognition and authority. 
5 - Tenure reform after 1999: room for manoeuvre? 
5.1 - The Bill’s political framing 
After 1999, as indicated, the LRB was put ‘on ice’ by the new Minister and was 
subsequently dropped.  A number of people who had been working on the LRB, 
including some who left the Department at that time, as well as others who remained, 
spoke to me of the change of direction in relation to tenure reform that came from the 
new Minister.  Many related it to the political change in the relations between the ruling 
party and traditional leaders: 
[w]hen the new Minister came in and said ‘I don’t want to necessarily adopt 
what has been done before’ … She thought that in rural areas there is in many 
cases still a role for traditional leaders, and in recognising that we’re in a new 
dispensation, we should try to tread a middle path.  And that has to involve 
looking at the roles of traditional leaders and acknowledging that municipalities 
are often not in a position to do it all themselves. (DLA official, interview - 
11.1.06) 
The media also, in their reporting of the moratorium brought to bear on the LRB, 
indicated that such a turnaround related to the change in approach vis à vis traditional 
leaders.  At the end of 2001, the government held the national Land Tenure conference 
that was principally concerned with this issue and at which the CLRB were leaked.  The 
response, as indicated in the Introduction, from the government’s critics, who also 
successfully managed to alert the media of their concerns, was outrage, principally to 
the ‘transfer of ownership’ model adopted in the Bill but also because they had not been 
consulted. 
Tracing the wider political dimensions of the Bill’s progress is useful in understanding 
the ‘room for manoeuvre’ in which the bureaucrats on the drafting team were operating 
through this intensive process.  Less than a week after the end of the Tenure 
Conference in 2001, Thoko Didiza addressed the National House of Traditional Leaders, 
where the overtures she intended to make to traditional leaders through their input on 
the CLRB was made explicit: 
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 During the National Land Tenure Conference held from 26-30 November in 
Durban, the Department of Land Affairs asked the traditional leadership for their 
perspective on how best to secure rights on communal land.  
 The call to traditional leaders on how to secure communal rights comes at an 
opportune time; when our President is calling for and championing the African 
renewal cause.  African Renewal alone, ladies and gentlemen, cannot reach its 
pivotal realisation without us going back to our natural leaders, our traditional 
leaders, who have been custodians of the rich African land. (Didiza – Address, 
4.12.01) 
These were the real politics that were driving the Bill.   
When the CLRB was first officially published in August 2002, it did adopt a model of 
reform that would see the transfer of ownership of land to traditional ‘communities’, but 
it envisaged that those who would administer that land would consist of a committee to 
be made up of elected representatives, and traditional leaders would only appear on it 
in an ex officio capacity.  Soon after its publication, and the publication of the draft 
White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance, traditional leaders made it clear 
to the government through the media and otherwise, that they opposed the proposed 
reforms.  Of principal concern in relation to the CLRB, was its early references to their 
ex officio status and seeing in its ‘transfer of ownership’ the threat of freehold 
ownership and consequent land sales by people living on their communal land.  In 
November 2002, Mzimela, the chairperson of the National House of Traditional Leaders 
and the co-chair of CONTRALESA, pronounced that  
Although [“the institution of traditional leadership” ..] are opposed to the draft 
Communal Land Rights Bill, this however does not mean that the solution to this 
is through the use of violence. (Mzimela – ANC Daily News Briefing, 6.11.02).   
Soon after that, in December 2002, Holomisa, the President of CONTRALESA, spoke at 
its three-day annual national conference in Kempton Park, indicating that “some of the 
government’s policies diminished the role, powers and functions of traditional leaders in 
matters of land, development and local governance” and referred to an “impasse on the 
role of ubukhosi (the institution of traditional leadership)” (Holomisa – ANC Daily News 
Briefing, 4.12.02).  Although the President, Thoko Didiza and Sydney Mufamadi, the 
Minister for Provincial and Local Government, had been invited to the conference, 
Holomisa indicated that “I don’t think it (Contralesa’s position [in relation to the CLRB]) 
is going to change as a result of deliberations from this conference” (ibid).  He spoke 
against a background of news briefings in which he warned, in language that sounded 
like a thinly veiled threat, that “From an insider point of view, it is no exaggeration to 
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maintain that were it not for Contralesa, violent conflicts will have … erupted over some 
of the government’s policies.” (ibid).   
Over the next year, there were undoubtedly meetings behind closed doors between the 
ANC and such representatives of traditional leaders and on 1st April 2003, Thabo Mbeki 
addressed the annual opening of the National House of Traditional Leaders.  In that 
speech he referred first to the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance 
before going on to refer again to the CLRB: 
 In addition, we must, of course also mention the Communal Land Rights Bill 
which is still being processed.  Once more, I would like to thank you and all our 
traditional leaders for your participation in its discussion.  Currently, the Bill is 
being redrafted to take into account the various observations that have been 
made, including your own. 
 When the Bill is tabled in Parliament, there will be a further opportunity to make 
such additional comments as you may wish.  Yet again, I must emphasise that 
the government seeks a finalisation of this matter through a process of 
discussion and without unnecessary confrontation. 
He went on: 
 Because the work that the two departments of Provincial and Local Government 
and Agriculture and Land Affairs are doing is related, we have ensured that the 
respective Task Teams are now able to co-ordinate and align their work. (Mbeki 
– Address, 1.4.03) 
No other substantive matters are referred to and the rest of the speech is devoted to 
appeals to traditional leaders to remember the colonial history of their people, and to 
work together with the government, “without confrontation” (ibid).   
The DLA drafting team working on the CLRB had by then, April 2003, finished the formal 
process of incorporating comments to its August 2002 version and this amended version 
was submitted to Cabinet around the same time.  However, before the new version of 
the Bill was released for comment at the end of June 2003, substantial amendments had 
been made to it since the drafting team had ‘completed’ it in March: it had been cut 
down substantially, including cutting out many of the former provisions referring to the 
protection of human rights or women.  The government indicated that this new version 
was to go back to Cabinet by 16th July before being timetabled to go to Parliament at 
the beginning of August (Notes on Reference Group Meeting on CLRB, 1.7.03).  As it 
was, the Cabinet did not approve the CLRB until October, after it had been explicitly 
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linked to the TLGFB that in September and October was going through Parliamentary 
hearings and deliberations.   
Meanwhile, on July 15th, a joint task team between the ANC and CONTRALESA was 
established to ‘operationalise these issues’ relating to the TLGFB and the White Paper 
(ANC – Statement on meeting with CONTRALESA, 15.7.03).  The TLGFB was to reform 
the powers of traditional leaders and was already high on the ANC’s political agenda, 
with many traditional leaders still strongly opposed to it.  As indicated in the 
Introduction, sometime during the time of the Portfolio Committee deliberations, 
however, the two Bills became linked and in September traditional leaders finally came 
round to seeing both the TLGFB and the CLRB as acceptable to them.  Holomisa spoke 
out in support of the TLGFB during its Portfolio Committee process and, in early 
December 2002, after the CLRB had been subject to hearings in the Portfolio 
Committee, Mzimela, who had spoken out so readily against the two pieces of legislation 
a year before, published an article in Business Day: 
The Communal Land Rights Bill aims to restore to rural communities ownership 
of the remnants that they occupy of land that the colonial and apartheid 
governments took from them by force – giving the communities registered title 
so that it cannot happen again.  … Some of our detractors have a puzzling but 
sinister motive; they appear to be intent on destroying custom, community, 
family and African direct democracy. (2.12.03) 
According to one reporter, the changes to the Bill ‘by the Cabinet only on October 8, 
shortly after a previous meeting between Zuma, Buthelezi and the Zulu king’ and 
subsequently, in January 2004, the Portfolio Committee passed the Bill following a ‘high-
level meeting … between Deputy President Jacob Zuma and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi’ (Terreblanche – The Pretoria News, 28.01.04).  As 
indicated in Chapter 3, there had been a history of precedents for such high-level 
meetings between those representing traditional leaders and leading Parliamentarians.  
5.2 - The government’s critics 
In “a very intensive process with a lot of time spent on it”, a drafting team that included 
two outside consultants, “attend[ed..] hours and hours of meetings” as well as 
“numerous meetings with government departments” “working through the clauses so as 
to try and make them reflect what we thought they should say” (DLA consultant, 
interview - 19.12.05).  But when the August 2002 version had been published for 
comment, it simply met with a “barrage of criticism” (DLA informant, interview – 
19.12.05) on everything from the consultation processes the Bill had been through, to 
its grave implications for human rights and gender equality.  Other than traditional 
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leaders who were then amongst its most vocal critics, the chief critics of the 
government’s approach to reform not only included many of those who had left the 
Department in 1999 as a result of ‘the purge’, but also a number of them who had 
actually been working on the former LRB that had been dropped.  Furthermore, one or 
two of them had already been publicly highly critical of the new Minister and her ‘new’ 
department.  It is fairly understandable that the response to such criticism and pressure 
from many of those still in government was to come together in collective 
defensiveness: 
Relations soured with NGOs … they’re always looking at the negative side and 
always reporting as though the situation is disastrous.  It’s always ‘us versus 
them’ which cripples our interaction a bit … I remember a meeting that took 
place in Johannesburg where there were all the same colleagues who had left 
and all they reported on were the negative findings.  They had invited DLA 
officials and before they had finished the meeting, we had all got up and walked 
out.  (National office DLA official, interview - 10.1.06) 
Again, a number of people mentioned “sour grapes”, others spoke about attempting to 
disengage from their critics: “In the end I just forget about them.  For me, they don’t 
even exist.” (Director of Provincial DLA, interview - 2.3.06).  This was not, however, 
particularly easy to do and some officials continued to feel such ongoing criticisms, 
sometimes from former colleagues, keenly.   
From the legal grouping (see Chapter 5) the Tenure Directorate came under fire on 
every front, not only in relation to the model of reform adopted, the transfer of 
ownership ‘paradigm’, but also in relation to the planning and the IDP process, the role 
of municipalities, gender and human rights issues, the lack of consultation: 
 The Bill which was published was roundly condemned by all groups … it also 
came under attack from the trade unions, the NGOs, the LRC and PLAAS 
people, because they were saying that the philosophy underlying the 1999 Bill 
was the only way – they were saying that that was the way it should be done 
and any departure from that was troublesome. … and from the point of view of 
the LRC and supporters there were just a million technical objections to the Bill 
… and of course the criticism was all in writing – we received reams and reams 
of written material from the LRC people. (DLA consultant, interview - 19.12.05) 
In spite of clear signals from key Parliamentary figures that it was the bigger politics 
that would be driving the political agenda that was to frame the CLRB, the team of the 
government’s foremost opposition kept up the pressure, organising an ever-widening 
circle of critics, and holding to their campaign on the Department to ‘change the 
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paradigm’, to relinquish the ‘transfer of ownership’ model (discussed further in Chapter 
5).  Someone heavily involved in the process, indicated that: 
they were just wanting to block the Bill, end of story.  They didn’t want the Bill.  
And it was just impossible to discuss it with them – they just met everything 
with a barrage of criticism, at every turn, a lot of which I had difficulty in 
understanding.  So it was difficult to deal with them at such a stage. (DLA 
informant, interview – 19.12.05) 
So, the criticisms can be divided broadly into two categories: first, ‘change the model’, 
and second, ‘the rest’.  But so long as the first was not met, the government’s critics 
would not be satisfied and would continue with its “barrage of criticism” on ‘the rest’.   
It is unlikely, however, that many people in government saw the issues through the 
same lens as those in the legal grouping (see Chapter 5) and so many simply failed to 
understand quite how the early versions of the CLRB could be considered to be a ‘sell-
out’ to traditional leaders, nor were they necessarily politically inclined to support any 
such sell-out, many of them being ANC supporters themselves.  One explicitly 
mentioned a government official whose PAC-aligned political support for traditional 
leaders contrasted with his/her own views and those of his/her colleagues: 
 I wish you could speak to one of the Provincial Directors … who would give you 
some different views [very supportive of …] traditional leaders – they were 
opposed to what the rest of us in the government think of traditional leaders.  
… Some people think that we have emasculated traditional leaders with CLARA.  
I think it was X who with the first draft of CLARA had said ‘With that we have 
killed off the traditional leaders!’. (National DLA official, interview - 10.1.06) 
When I asked someone in the drafting team how they had responded to such criticisms, 
he expressed a similar lack of understanding: “With complete bewilderment”, saying 
that “It was difficult to understand it” (DLA consultant, 19.12.06).  At the same time, as 
indicated above, many traditional leaders were themselves expressing their own fury 
with the approach adopted by the ANC in the CLRB. 
While the ‘model’ could clearly not be changed, the ‘rest’ of the criticisms could be 
addressed and these were what the drafting team initially worked hard to tackle.  By the 
time the drafting process that included the efforts of both external consultants, came to 
an end at the end of March 2003, the team thought that they had managed it: 
 At that stage, we had prepared and taken into account all the comments, 
including those of the LRC.  We thought we’d done a good job – I remember 
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when we’d finished – it was 12 o’clock at night and when we left and were in 
the corridor we’d been giving each other high fives. (ibid) 
But it was at that point that the political pressure from above narrowed the ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ of the bureaucrats who the critics were targeting as policy-makers, 
constricting the extent to which even ‘the rest’ of the criticisms could be dealt with, 
certainly it appears insofar as they related to concerns over human rights or gender.  
Nevertheless, the extent of the criticisms may well have felt like an assault on their 
personal credibility, as professionals in their work and, perhaps feeling professionally 
smarted, with many of those working on the drafting having been former colleagues (if 
not friends) of the critics, there was a need for the Directorate to defend itself.  Given 
the constrained political space in which they were operating and their inability to 
‘change the model’, working to take into account all the comments in the drafting 
process was unlikely to constitute an adequate defence.  In addition therefore, members 
of the Department turned to questioning the extent to which those critics were 
representative of ‘people on the ground’ and in turn casting doubt on their legitimacy.  
People also spoke of such critics being ‘compromised’ and ‘manipulation’ by them of 
people on the ground.  One former official described the mood as: 
a real sense of ‘distrust’ [on the part of the DLA] – maybe that’s too strong a 
word for it – a sense of belief that civil society don’t really speak for 
communities, and they’re actually pushing their own agendas. … this was the 
first time with land legislation that civil society organisations were at odds with 
the state and rallied to have their voices heard.  But it was said that they were 
manipulated. (former DLA official, interview – 9.12.05). 
The extent of the criticisms could easily be read not only as a challenge to the 
competence of the bureaucrats involved, but also had the potential to undermine the 
credibility of the (post-apartheid) state.  Parliamentarians who were closely involved in 
the process therefore also questioned the extent to which the public criticisms, that 
were made in the later Portfolio Committee hearings on the Bill in November 2003, were 
representative of ‘people on the ground’.  Although some of the Portfolio Committee 
members provided representatives making submissions with the chance to elaborate on 
their concerns, when it came to questioning the government’s chief critics, that is the 
organisers of the wider PLAAS/NLC Project, some Parliamentarians’ comments and 
questions were more frank: 
 Chair Masithela responded to Ms X's presentation by explaining that the 
Committee recognized the right to lobby, but expressed displeasure when 
lobbying was conducted via proxy, when presentations did not reflect authentic 
views. Chair Masithela concluded his remarks by explaining that all the 
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presentations made to the Committee had been heard and would be taken 
under consideration. … Chair Masithela noted that the consultation was not 
intended to be a complaint process but a point for input, and requested 
presenters concern themselves with the Bill before the Committee, not previous 
versions. (PMG minutes, 13.11.03) 
As well as questioning the authenticity and legitimacy of the critics, even prior to the 
public Portfolio Committee hearings, the Tenure Directorate had also begun to respond 
explicitly and publicly to the criticisms, expending time and money on defending itself 
and its officials.  For example, in September 2002, Tenure Reform Implementation 
Systems (or TRIS) produced ‘A Guide to the Communal Land Rights Bill, 2002’ in which 
attempts are made to respond to some of the criticisms from the legal grouping.  Using 
language clearly pitched so as to be legally persuasive – to meet those critics on their 
own terms – it states: 
 It is abundantly clear therefore, that in terms of section 16(1)(a) and (b) that 
the ownership of communal land vests with a community or a similar entity and 
not with the administrative structures (traditional leadership institutions or any 
organ of state). … Sections 2(1), 6(3), 10(1), 22(1), (2), 23(1), 25(4) and (5), 
29(4), 30(5), 31(5), 33 and 34 therefore, clarify the position of an 
administrative structure (traditional leadership institution and other community-
based institution) vis-à-vis the position of the owner of communal land as 
contemplated in section 16(1)(a) and 21(3). (TRIS, 2002: 9) 
It goes on: 
 The continued role of the traditional leadership institutions and other 
community-based institutions in land administration and natural resources 
management is subject to sections 2(h)(i), (ii) and (333), 7, 32(3) and 33 of the 
draft CLRB dealing with the protection of the fundamental human rights … (ibid: 
10) 
Later however, in the same document, an attempt is made apparently to appease 
traditional leaders who would object strongly to those very provisions and safeguards: 
 The draft Bill’s point of departure is the recognition of 
• the gallant role played by the administrative structures and particularly 
the traditional leadership institutions in channelling the resistance to 
colonial dispossession of land and upholding the dignity and cohesion of 
the African people, and in retaining access to parts of their land … (ibid: 
22) 
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Attempting to tread a political middle road is bound to be fraught with difficulties; words 
that may be reassuring to one party may be unwelcome to the ears of the other, raising 
levels of antagonism even further.  Nevertheless, other similarly strongly worded 
documents were written and circulated internally and also published externally, many of 
them both explaining the Bill but also setting out a case supporting, or defending, the 
approach taken (eg. The A-Z of the Communal Land Rights Bill, 2003).  Such 
publications continued to be produced even after CLARA had been passed into law in 
2004. 
6 - Working on tenure in the national and provincial offices 
In 2000, the Land Rights sub-directorate dealing with the land reform programme 
relating to rights of people on farms was merged with the Land and Tenure Reform 
Directorate, to become the Tenure Directorate.  After this merger, one director was 
tasked with overseeing this programme, the programme dealing with Communal 
Property Associations (CPAs), as well as reforms in relation to communal land, that is 
the formulation of the CLRB. 
For people working on the CLRB, the process was very intensive.  People spoke of day-
long meetings, and of meetings ending at midnight.  Even after the passing of the Act 
by Parliament, the pressure did not let up for long with the need to draft Regulations 
and then the announcement of a constitutional challenge to the Act which was launched 
on 20 April 2006, but had been publicly referred to in the 2005 Land Summit and known 
about by the government long before that.  I went to meet with one official shortly after 
the Christmas and New Year break in 2006 and when I asked him/her when s/he had 
started back, s/he said that they had started straight back after the new year break 
because they were in the process of drafting the Regulations for CLARA and s/he had 
been involved in intensive drafting meetings.  When s/he told me about the 
constitutional challenge, s/he said that the Director had received a phonecall at 7.30am 
one morning from the Minister who was in Belgium, to tell him that the LRC were 
bringing a challenge and that he should get hold of the papers.  He referred me to a pile 
of papers on the table in front of us.  It was covered in papers stacked neatly in piles 
including a pile of the ‘Tenure Newsletter’, another of the glossy pocket-book sized copy 
of the Act and another pile of papers, the top one being ‘LRC’s objections to CLARA’ with 
the LRC’s submissions to the Portfolio Committee poking out underneath.  He said that 
they had just been reading the stuff that the LRC had submitted at the time it went 
through the Portfolio Committee to try and get an idea of what their issues are.  
Meanwhile, he said that they were having day-long meetings every Thursday and Friday 
drafting the Regulations for CLARA with people from Legal Services.  This was all in 
addition to other work that they were tasked to do. 
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The DLA’s Strategic Plan of 2001-2 indicated that the directorate was to ‘Develop and 
submit the Communal Land Rights Administration Bill to Cabinet’, by June 2001.  Such a 
timetable was not met, but the pressure from on high was intense.  The Director of the 
Tenure Directorate, having been working on this particular programme since his 
appointment in January 1997 along with those formerly involved in working on the LRB, 
continued to be heavily involved.  A number of people spoke of the Act being the 
Director’s ‘baby’ (DLA official, personal communication – 17.1.06) or suchlike.  Bourdieu 
speaks about the importance of the genesis of the ‘impersonal’ in the bureaucracy in 
contributing to its legitimisation, and the legitimisation of its office bearers, in the name 
of the ‘public good’ (see also Osbourne 1994).  Bourdieu (2004: 33) quotes Richet 
(1973) who describes the civil service prior to this ‘dissociation of the function from the 
person’: 
 What we call the “civil service” was so bound up with its occupants that it is 
impossible to retrace the history of a given council or post without writing the 
history of the individuals who chaired it or held it.  … The man made the 
function to an extent that is unthinkable now.  
That personal association between the Director with the function, here CLARA – even 
referred to as his ‘baby’ – wholly compromised, even displaced, the ‘impersonal’ ideal 
that both grants authority to officials, but also protects them from personal criticism.  
For the Tenure Directorate, at this time of huge political pressure to formulate 
legislation that would satisfy their political masters – even the President was referring to 
the Bill in speeches – as well heading off criticisms from one’s former colleagues, many 
of them extremely renowned lawyers claiming to represent ‘the people’, the pressure on 
a Director to ‘get it right’ must have been immense.   
Meanwhile, there were institutional politics to contend with: according to one informant, 
there were competing ‘camps’ across the Department at the time, those whose 
allegiances to the Minister and those who were aligned with the DG, support for either 
granting access to particular avenues of power and authority, but restricting others 
(former DLA official, personal communication – 9.12.05).  While this informant 
maintained that the Director did not align himself with either ‘camp’, I heard on more 
than one occasion that one of his superiors, aligned with the Minister, was referring 
negatively to the Director’s differing background and his position.  Although the Director 
had also made the transition into government from one of South Africa’s oldest land 
sector NGOs, coming from a country outside South Africa appears to have represented a 
form of negative capital, perhaps casting doubt on his anti-apartheid struggle 
credentials that were still so important. 
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This was also at a time, discussed in Chapter 3, in which ‘race’ became almost a form of 
positive or negative capital, and being an ‘outsider’ similarly may have undermined one’s 
social capital.  When one’s position in the hierarchy, one’s job rested on playing the 
game successfully, on proving that the capital asserted in a superior’s differing habitus 
did not matter when compared with one’s competence, delegating authority and power 
might have seemed unthinkable.  And such practices, in turn, perpetually shape one’s 
habitus.  Moreover, contributing to his own cultural capital and therefore authority, the 
Director’s own experience in relation to tenure reform was unmatched in the 
Department: he had been working on the programme as Director longer than most of 
his colleagues, and alongside those former colleagues who were now the Bill’s foremost 
critics.  Furthermore, working on the CLRB held a certain cachet.  The issues were 
complex and according to one senior official, “A lot of people in the department couldn’t 
follow the debates” (DLA official, interview - 11.1.06).  The Director, however, was 
extremely well educated with an extensive international experience and his holding of a 
doctorate gave him sufficient credentials to be ‘the expert’ in the Department on CLARA; 
with many of his colleagues referring to him using his title, the importance of such a 
credential was reaffirmed.  It was also affirmed by colleagues who worked with him on 
CLARA, even by two of them who had known him for some ten years and had previously 
worked with him at the same NGO.  However, holding the authority gained from being 
‘the’ expert in the Department close to one’s chest, also provoked a feeling amongst 
many within the Department that “they couldn’t feel that they had been consulted” 
(ibid). 
To people working on some of the other programmes in the Department, it appeared 
that much of the energy of the Directorate, certainly among many of those in positions 
of authority, was overly taken up with the development of the CLRB.  One official who 
had come into the Tenure Directorate from Land Rights, was disappointed that a Bill 
they had been working on developing in that sub-directorate had stopped in its tracks 
“because there wasn’t any spare energy”; in the end they felt that they “just didn’t get 
the support” (former DLA official, interview – 9.12.05).  This lack of capacity because of 
the (over-)concentration on communal tenure, was exacerbated by bureaucratic 
hierarchical divisions that meant that there were those in the Directorate who did have 
capacity but who “because of issues of authority [were …] not in positions to take 
something on pro-actively” (ibid).  It was also exacerbated by what might impersonally 
be called “bottlenecks in the project cycle”, but which actually meant “particular people 
known not to be terribly efficient or effective, at particular points in the Department’s 
hierarchy” (ibid): 
 We needed the meeting with the Minister about it and full political backing.  I 
had asked the DG’s office to set up a meeting but I don’t know whether there 
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was just inertia in the DG’s office, but no one set it up.  It annoyed me because 
I knew that X [in his/her Directorate] could have set it up – when an issue 
about CLARA came up, X would call [the Minister] up on her cellphone.  (ibid). 
In relation to those working in the Provinces, their own potentially much closer 
relationships with people ‘on the ground’ than those of officials working from Pretoria 
could have provided an important source of knowledge that might have contributed to 
the formulation of policy and law-making.  Certainly the changes introduced by the 
Minister so as to decentralise power to the Provinces provides one potential change that 
could contribute to this process.  However, as discussed above, in and of itself this is 
unlikely to institutionalise any kind of changed practices, in terms of internal 
communication or the development of knowledge-sharing processes between the 
Provincial and National offices.   
During my time in Limpopo, when I first contacted the Provincial office in August by 
phone to arrange an appointment to meet with one of their officials to talk to them 
about CLARA and their office’s involvement with the implementation programme, I was 
told in no uncertain terms that I was wasting my time, the President had not yet given 
his assent to the Act and so it was not in force, and in any case the Regulations that 
would be necessary for its implementation had not been finalised.  Subsequently, 
however, in September 2005, another official from that office gave an enthusiastic 
presentation of CLARA at a ‘Stakeholders’ workshop’ organised by the Human Sciences 
Research Council.  When I talked to him/her at a later date, s/he expressed 
disappointment that, whereas some Provincial offices had been already advertising 
positions dealing with tenure reform, his/her own office was not yet recruiting anyone to 
take forward the tenure programme.  Instead, s/he told me the extent to which people 
from National office were themselves involved with issues arising in the Province: “Why, 
if there’s an issue at Mashamba [some 400km away from Pretoria], X [from National 
office] would come down [here] and with people at Provincial to go down [to 
Mashamba].” (official from Provincial DLA, interview - 29.9.05).  Even the consultation 
workshops had been co-ordinated by National office, with provincial officials 
accompanying the person from National office charged with running the workshop in 
question. 
Such practices of hands-on control by the National office seemed to have continued 
even after the CLRB had passed into law.  One official from the Limpopo office 
expressed a certain amount of frustration that s/he was in the dark as to the plans in 
relation to the implementation of the Act: 
 There are plans about it which were developed by National Office and everyone 
had had to say what staff they would require.  …  
 
 
 
 
 108 
ERAF: Have you seen any plans or timetables about the implementation of the 
Act? 
No – I haven’t received any emails about it.  It might be that a plan has been 
sent to the head of the office but I haven’t seen anything … if you could see in 
my email inbox you’d see that there’s nothing and that there’s been nothing 
about CLARA for the past year.  The Provincial office don’t know what’s going 
on with the plans at National office and we need to know why.  [S/he seemed 
to speak with some resentment.] (Provincial DLA official, interview - 6.12.05) 
Provincial offices obviously had different experiences, depending on how proactive 
managers were, but also depending on how valued they felt their inputs were by people 
at National office.  I heard from an official from the National office that, similarly to the 
experience of some officials in the Limpopo office, the director of the KZN office had 
also had difficulties with the over-centralisation of power by particular officials in the 
National office in relation to the CLRB and their overly ‘hands-on’ approach: 
 X would always be coming to KZN without informing him [the director of KZN].  
He wasn’t saying that x needed his permission, just that he wanted to be 
informed about what he was doing in the Province, but X thought he could do 
what he liked.  (former National DLA official, interview - 9.12.05) 
Nevertheless, in KZN, the Ingonyama Trust had been in existence since 1994 and so 
consequently there were a number of people on the board of Trustees, including the 
Director of the Provincial DLA, with experience of administering all the communal land 
within the Trust and dealing with issues arising in relation to it.  When I asked this 
Director to what extent the Provinces were involved in the formulation of the legislation, 
he said that: 
Personally, he said that he’d been very much involved.  But he admitted to 
having had run-ins with X, at times not even being on speaking terms with him. 
… Not all the changes were taken into account.  In the final analysis, X kept 
what he wanted.  He said that he was more involved than other persons from 
the Provinces.  He felt that his work on the Ingonyama Trust meant that he had 
knowledge that they didn’t have and that they had valued his input.  He had 
been more involved because of the Ingonyama Trust, and he said that he was 
very assertive.  (Provincial Director, interview - 2.3.06) 
He was clearly able to assert his greater cultural and social capital, at least in relation to 
the Ingonyama Trust, so as to maintain his position and continue to assert his influence 
and authority over the process.  He was less positive, however, about his input in 
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relation to the drafting of the Regulations (happening at the time I spoke to him) that 
he described as “a very private affair” (ibid). 
It is not difficult to criticise policy, but not so easy to explore why the policy processes 
unfolded as they did, why particular bureaucrats acted and (re)acted as they did to 
shape those processes.  With the process still unfolding today, however, it is even more 
important to try to shed light on the answers.  With hindsight one senior official was 
candid: 
 I believe that we could have done things differently without the haste, but we 
were all very much under pressure.  But it could have cost the Department a lot 
of money in litigation and what we are going to do I don’t know.  We don’t have 
the budget to implement it.  I don’t think it’s a disaster, but it’s a near disaster. 
(National DLA official, interview - 11.1.06).  
However, as recognised by Bourdieu (1990: 81): ‘because it is entirely immersed in the 
current of time, practice is inseparable from temporality, not only because it is played 
out in time, but also because it plays strategically with time and especially with tempo’.  
The pressure, and the haste with which things were done under that pressure, were a 
reality in which particular people within the Department were expected to work, produce 
results and be held responsible for those outputs.   
One national DLA official was reflective about his/her role as a civil servant:  
 I thought hard before joining the Department because it was a hard task 
whether to make the decision whether to join or not.  Sometimes you may not 
agree with something that comes from the top but you are bound by an oath 
that you took, so when the appointment letter is sent you have so many days 
whether to accept the offer.  It’s a big decision.  Sometimes you have to change 
direction and then a new Minister may come in and say we are not doing this 
thing that you have been working on any more. (Former Provincial, now 
National, DLA official, interview - 10.1.06)  
In terms of a bureaucracy, this is presumably the ideal, and also presumably not too 
difficult a path to tread with a “Minster [who] made very strong decisions”: sacrificing 
one’s personal opinions for those of your political masters being the elected 
representatives of the people.  But at the same time, “it’s a big decision” because, as 
recognised by Bourdieu, ‘the executant is both controlled and protected by the decision-
makers’ (Bourdieu 2004: 33): on the one hand, ‘they receive their authority and their 
power’ from their superior, on the other hand, ‘they are answerable for him [sic]’ (ibid: 
32 – my italics) to the public.  This involves a submission of one’s own view of the public 
good, to that of one’s superior, in fact arbitrarily shaped by the politics of the time 
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within the wider field of power, but symbolically impersonalised in and through the 
actions of bureaucrats acting to further ‘the public good’: 
 As would be revealed by the analysis of the functioning of this strange 
institution ... officials constantly have to labor, if not to sacrifice their particular 
point of view on behalf of the “point of view of society”, at least to constitute 
their point of view into a legitimate one, i.e, as universal …  (Bourdieu 1994: 
17). 
This official justified such contradictions to himself:  
I decided to go into government and work to give land back to people rather 
than to criticise … [and later] I thought that I’d spent so long toyi toying for this 
government, but then when the ANC government had come into power I had 
continued toyi toying against them and I thought I could start actually working 
with them, working to give land back to the people. (former Provincial, now 
National, DLA official, interview - 10.1.06) 
Bourdieu, however, was not blind to a ‘discrepancy between the official norm as 
stipulated in administrative law and the reality of bureaucratic practice, with all its 
violations of the obligation of disinterestedness’ (Bourdieu 1994: 17), but he 
contemplated that such violations would only encompass ‘cases of “private use of public 
services”‘ (ibid: 17).  In a time of such great change from an utterly delegitimised 
apartheid state, a time too of great idealism, many within government may not have 
lost sight of that idealism and truly have struggled with implementing those superior’s 
orders when they contradicted their ideals and values.  In an under-capacitated, newly-
formed and still changing government, this presumably was a time in which there was 
the ‘room for manoeuvre’ in which those orders could to a certain extent be challenged, 
or certainly manipulated.  But at the same time there still existed inevitable competition 
over authority and power amongst all officials within government, whether they were 
retaining idealism or wholly submitting to the will of the ‘universal’.  As indicated above, 
alliances formed between people with different loyalties based upon personal 
relationships as well as progression up through the ranks based upon which ‘camp’ one 
was in. 
Balancing the inputs of different, contrasting and, in the case of CLARA, politically 
antagonistic groupings is professionally and personally not an easy path to tread and, as 
recognised above, a number of people working for the government found the extreme 
nature of the criticisms very difficult to take.  One DLA consultant related the difficulties 
of being on the inside of the law-making process to his personal position in relation to 
government and ‘civil society’: 
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 I came to it as … a member of NGO structures lobbying to us. … So I was 
having to consider inputs from my own people, and I could see how they were 
seen as a drafter.  And we had to ask, ‘What are the objectives of the legislation 
and how do we accommodate them?’  Sometimes you have to be quite ruthless.  
The role of civil society in the law-making process is a difficult one. (DLA 
consultant, interview - 12.1.06) 
Given the formal lines of the bureaucratic hierarchy, however, balancing the need or 
appropriateness of ‘ruthlessness’ in relation to the comments of critics, deciding where 
the boundaries of the ‘public good’ are drawn, can only be determined by those who are 
sufficiently senior.  But inevitably bureaucrats will breach into the realm of the political, 
thereby losing their bureaucratic ‘independence’ and also the protection bestowed on 
them from their political masters.  Treading such a line, however, will come up against 
criticism, even from one’s colleagues, competing for authority and also for bureaucratic 
capital derived from receiving sanctification, ultimately, from the approval bestowed on 
their actions by ‘the people’.  One relatively senior former official, claimed not to accept 
the ‘ideal’ of bureaucratic independence and was highly critical of another powerful 
official who they felt did not take a personal stand on the political decisions that arose: 
 S/he thought that it [the approach taken at a level of policy] was clearly flawed, 
but said that X had no principles.  For example, s/he thought it was impossible 
to figure out where X stands on issues – whether there should be democratically 
elected structures for instance.  It always depends on who is pulling the strings, 
so depending on the instructions from the DG X will just go ahead with 
whatever that may be.  X does not fight for his/her principles … (former 
National DLA official, interview - 12.12.05) 
Walking the path of bureaucrats – balancing maintaining political independence and 
following the prescriptions of one’s political masters, gaining approval from ‘the public’, 
from one’s colleagues too, and holding on to particular political ideals, all at the same 
time as portraying oneself as a figure of competence, professionalism and responsibility 
– is an ambivalent, contradictory and often difficult one and it may contribute to 
considerable stress, particularly for those in positions of responsibility.  On the other 
hand, although this may be seen playing itself out in relation to the development of 
CLARA, such bureaucrats may themselves have contributed to and at times exacerbated 
such difficulties. 
By March 2003, many of the consultation workshops had already taken place.  Alongside 
the obvious criticisms received from traditional leaders and their supporters at many of 
the workshops, there had also been particular pronouncements, referred to above, 
widely reported in the media, by high profile traditional leaders threatening violence in 
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relation to the passing of the CLRB in late 2002.  Despite this, in the same month a draft 
paper was written by the Director of the Tenure Directorate prepared for the Chief 
Directorate: LRSSS Colloquium, in which he dealt forcefully and strongly with such 
critics: 
Their [traditional leaders’] interpretation of section 31 [which was to grant them 
ex officio status on the LAC] is that it severely limits their participation in the 
land administration committee.  The traditional leaders want exclusive control of 
communal land within the context of the existing customary structures 
traditional leadership [sic].  It is difficult to accommodate and embrace the 
position that is articulated by the traditional leaders given the imperatives of the 
Constitution and the White paper on South African Land Policy to transform and 
democratize the structures of governance within the context of a unitary land 
administration. (2003: 54) 
This was argued even after recognising earlier in the document that the clause granting 
powers of administration over land tenure rights to the LACs, on which traditional 
leaders at that time were only to have ex officio status, ‘provides the most prized 
generic powers and duties of a land administration committee in land administration’ 
(ibid: 38).  However, despite the strong sentiments voiced so forcefully in that paper, 
effectively putting traditional leaders in their place, CLARA, when it was passed by 
Parliament in February 2004, did in fact give those traditional leaders who had 
constituted a Traditional Council pursuant to the TLGFA, exclusive control of the LAC.  
Nevertheless, and inconsistently with the former position taken in that discussion paper, 
just before the Bill was passed by Parliament, in a rather triumphant tone, the Director 
published an article in the Sunday Independent (1.2.04): 
 The recent brouhaha surrounding the communal Land Rights Bill [sic], now 
already adopted by the portfolio committee on agriculture and land, has posed 
two distinct scenarios.  Either those who wrongly interpret its contents and 
lambaste us on those unwarranted grounds are ignorant and stubborn, or they 
are downright mischievous. 
 We have said it before, and are all too happy to say it for the umpteenth time: 
the bill seeks to democratise the system of land ownership and administration 
by transferring both aspects from what used to be a paternalistic state system 
to the people.  … Criticism to the contrary are both baseless and legally of an 
irrelevant nature.  …  To ascribe an electioneering motivation to the 
government in having the bill considered by parliament is disingenuous and 
insulting and is divorced from the reality of that development process to which a 
number of the most vociferous critics of the bill were in fact a party. 
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Whether or not the Director’s political masters had directly delegated their authority to 
pronounce publicly in such a way on these matters, given his ongoing personal 
association with the Bill, he seemed to have forsaken the concomitant protection that 
might have been given to him had he maintained the symbolic masquerade of 
impersonal neutrality.  Because ultimately it was not officials such as him who had the 
power to match their words with action, in the end, such strongly worded albeit 
inconsistent pronouncements by government officials, came to be considered by their 
critics as no more than personal rhetoric.  In turn, criticisms may have begun to feel 
increasingly personal.  While the official’s pronouncements may have continued to: 
‘portray bureaucracy as a “universal group” endowed with the intuition of, and a will to, 
universal interest … and a rational instrument in charge of realizing the general interest’ 
(Bourdieu 1994: 3), and he may even have continued to believe this himself, the doxa 
that ‘the state, and … the order it institutes’ is legitimate and ‘not problematic’ (ibid: 15) 
had been broken, or forsaken.  Instead, the power that was wielded by the state 
passing such legislation was recognised as being arbitrary.  Moreover, given that such 
rhetoric was made by the most senior official in government working directly on the Bill, 
such pronouncements, rather than quashing the critics, instead contributed enormously 
to fuelling their antagonism.  Furthermore, rather than successfully defending the 
credibility of the government and such officials, such pronouncements and the 
advertisements of support for the Bill, the retorts and responses to such critics 
contained in glossy government publications, undermined any vestiges of respect that 
their critics had for them.  Perhaps criticism can be made of both the critics for directing 
their challenge and criticism to such government officials, rather than to the 
Parliamentarians driving such decisions, but also of particular government officials for 
inciting the ‘barrage of criticism’ that it ultimately received.  In the end, however, it is 
obviously those Parliamentarians who should have been answerable to their critics. 
7 - Conclusion 
CLARA was a piece of legislation introducing potential change to relations of power 
between traditional leaders and those living in the former homelands.  It was inevitably 
going to be politically controversial and, in relation to the planned reforms, the 
government came under extensive, strong and public criticism from several groups of 
critics.  On the one hand, they underwent ‘a barrage of criticism’ from different ‘civil 
society’ groupings, including statutory bodies such as the HRC, supported by some of 
the best human rights lawyers in the country.  Amongst these groupings were 
individuals who were former colleagues of officials on the new drafting team.  On the 
other hand, criticisms also came from traditional leaders, who threatened violence in 
response to the reforms.  These criticisms were set against political gerrymandering 
between Ministers and high profile traditional leaders in CONTRALESA.  These politics 
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obviously had a longer history, with ongoing violence in KZN between the ANC and IFP 
(Maré 1996).  Meanwhile, the third democratic elections to take place in April 2004 were 
looming.  It was these politics, amongst those in the highest echelons of the political 
field, which were driving the convoluted path of the Bill.  This constrained the ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ in which governmental officials were operating and, in turn, limited the 
extent to which they were able to respond to their other critics.  Nevertheless, given the 
extensive nature of such criticisms, calling into question the competency of some of the 
officials who were involved in the process, even challenging the credibility of the post-
apartheid state, they could not be ignored.  The government tried its best to defend 
itself publicly, but with the agenda being set by others, the strong pronouncements that 
they made did not retain much legitimacy given the little real influence such officials had 
over those agendas. 
This field is in many ways clearly demarcated, constructed according to institutionalised 
regulations and hierarchical divisions of the bureaucracy that in turn shapes the forms of 
capital recognised as being valid within it.  However, at the same time, it is defined in 
relation to other fields, such as the legal field, the political field and the wider field of 
power.  As a result, as we saw here, officials endeavour to meet criticisms from those in 
other fields on their own terms – such as responding with arguments constructed so as 
to be legally persuasive.  Such attempts, constrained as they are by limitations within 
the bureaucratic field itself, as well as their position between a variety of other fields – 
truly ‘caught in the middle’ – are unlikely to be successful and can hardly be said to 
have been in relation to CLARA. 
The Tenure Directorate was particularly affected by the changes the came about after 
the second democratic elections in 1999; the officials that remained not only had to 
cope with a significant loss of experience, but also with extensive public criticisms that, 
politically, they were unable properly to respond to.  Meanwhile, difficult divisions 
developed within the Department according to varying levels of resistance to change 
and loyalties and subsequent alliances that formed around them.  In some Directorates 
particularly, fewer people were required to do more and were operating under a great 
deal of pressure.  While this to a certain extent represents a rupture, there were also 
many continuities with the Department pre-1999.  For example, although after 1999, 
land remained a National competency, the new Minister adopted a less centralised 
interpretation of administrative power and made changes that were to facilitate 
decision-making at the Provincial level.  Nevertheless, the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
initially sustained by particular bureaucratic rules, contributed to a particular institutional 
habitus of superiority within the National office.  Meanwhile, officials continued to 
struggle to maintain their positions of authority in the face of change, and criticism and 
power struggles thereby further contributed to a ‘hands on’ approach.  In the face of 
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such enormous pressures that those working on the Bill were under, the government 
responded with an understandable siege mentality. 
While this chapter has considered the practices that were built up in the bureaucratic 
field after 1999, the following chapter goes on to consider some of the government’s 
foremost critics, some of whom had been involved in working for the government on the 
LRB prior to it being dropped by the new Minister.  The chapter is entitled ‘A person or 
community whose tenure of land is legally insecure …’ picking up on the words of the 
Constitutional provision mandating the government to pass legislation dealing with 
tenure reform.  Many of these critics were lawyers, or moving in the legal field, 
advocating an alternative ‘rights based approach’ to tenure.  It discusses why they 
responded with quite such dismay to the ‘model’ of reform adopted in CLARA, to 
transfer ownership of the land to ‘African Traditional Communities’ and how the ‘rights 
based approach’ differed from this. 
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CHAPTER 5 - ‘A PERSON OR COMMUNITY WHOSE TENURE OF LAND IS 
LEGALLY INSECURE …’ 
1 - Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the uncertain autonomy of the bureaucratic field, 
particularly since 1999.  This chapter goes further back than that, considering the 
involvement of many individuals in governmental policy-making prior to 1999 and their 
engagement with tenure reform subsequently to that.  Such people make up what I call 
the ‘legal grouping’, the leading critics of CLARA, who focused their rage towards the 
model of reform adopted in the Bill that was to transfer the ownership of the land to 
‘African traditional communities’ (Sibanda 2004: 160).  This was seen to be in direct 
contradiction with a ‘rights-based approach’ that was to confirm, through statutory 
recognition, the status of existing de facto rights as property rights and thereby to grant 
people living in those areas legally recognised security of tenure.  This chapter considers 
the influence of this legal grouping made up of a number of prominent lawyers and 
others moving in a tight circle based upon a shared history of involvement in the ‘land 
struggle’ and more broadly, involvement in specifically legal struggles against the 
policies of apartheid.  Many of them continued their involvement in the new democracy, 
gaining positions within, or as consultants to, the newly created DLA.  It includes a 
number of people who, after 1994, were included in the DLA’s ‘inner core’, a number of 
white activists who had been actively involved in the former SPP, the LRC and the ANC.  
The chapter looks at how this shared history shaped their particular approach to tenure 
reform in general, as well as their opposition to the specific tenure reforms on the table 
in the form of CLARA.  It explores how their model of reform based upon a ‘rights-based 
approach’ has been shaped by layers of discourses and it then goes on to consider some 
of the processes they followed to legitimise this particular approach.  At times those 
processes were challenged by others so as to undermine both the approach as well as 
particular individuals within the grouping.  At other times, they were simply unsuccessful 
in smoothing over the cracks that emerged at points where their knowledge was 
incompatible with other forms of knowledge.  Struggles emerged over meaning and the 
hierarchy between particular forms of knowledge. 
The focus of this chapter is the interaction between individuals in the legal field in South 
Africa, often with others outside that field.  Many sociolegal scholars and anthropologists 
of law are familiar with Moore’s concept of a ‘semi-autonomous field’ – a social space 
that ‘can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but … is also vulnerable to 
rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is 
surrounded’ - (Moore 1973: 720).  For her, however, in considering legal pluralism, what 
was important was the generation of rules and norms within the field.  Similarly to 
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Bourdieu, the extent to which this would be possible, and therefore the extent of the 
field’s ‘autonomy’, would depend upon the operative ‘rules of the game’ within the field.  
Moore’s conceptualisation has been extremely influential in contributing to sociolegal 
scholars’ understanding of legal pluralism and their recognition of the ‘dialectic, mutually 
constitutive relation between state law and other normative orders’ (Merry 1988).  
These two conceptualisations of social fields are not incompatible but, Bourdieu’s notion 
of fields extends and elaborates upon how such ‘rules of the game’ may come into 
existence through the practices shaped by the habitus and material reality of those 
within a field and the different forms of capital recognised within it, which in turn will be 
influenced by the wider field of power. 
South Africa is a country that also has a highly developed legal system with the 
apartheid state having been founded upon a legalised form of racial segregation.  In 
South Africa’s transition, many of the contestations taking place between those in the 
legal field and those outside it, contestations that contribute to shaping a wider field of 
power, involve struggles to reclaim the legitimacy of the law.  But within the field people 
will also struggle against each other for hierarchical positions, and these struggles within 
the legal field are also explored in this chapter.  As Bourdieu recognised, professionals 
included within the legal field will ‘have in common their knowledge and their 
acceptance of the rules of the legal game, that is, the written and unwritten laws of the 
field itself’ (Bourdieu 1987: 831).  Law-making activities, however, will involve actors 
who participate in the legal ‘game’ even though they may not have professional 
recognition or the status of lawyers within the field.  Considering law-making therefore 
brings to the fore interactions with those outside and excluded from the field. 
Nevertheless, these include those in other fields who nevertheless possess other forms 
of power, or capital.  Moreover, after 1994, along with its legitimacy, the autonomy of 
the legal field was undermined by its embroilment with the apartheid state.  Given this, 
struggles between those within the legal field and those outside it are particularly 
intense. 
2 - The development of habitus: circles of influence over a legal transition 
That’s why I wanted to be a lawyer as so much of the apartheid state was 
based on ‘law’ – and I’d wanted to nail them at their own game.  (LRC lawyer, 
personal communication - 29.5.05) 
In post-1994 there was a complete euphoria.  You could see it with the 
numbers of legislation drafted – I looked and it was something like 150 pieces 
of legislation a year in the first years, and now it was down to 30 or 40 a year. 
(former DLA lawyer, personal communication – 16.1.06) 
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Those in the legal grouping, for a long time prior to 1994, had been involved in the 
struggle against apartheid.  Some had been involved as activists and researchers 
working for land NGOs, others as prominent lawyers in the LRC.  Much of the work at 
that time involved legal struggles against the forced removals of people from black spot 
areas to the homelands (Abel 1995) – their ‘rights’ unacknowledged or swept aside by 
the application of swathes of increasingly regressive apartheid legislation.  Human 
rights, therefore, for all of those who had worked together in the dark days of the 1980s 
– those in the LRC, for members of the Black Sash and CALS, for many in land NGOs at 
that time – held up not only an ideal, but also a promise to provide both a shield and a 
sword to limit the power of an unjust state. 
Within the legal field, however, symbolic capital, deriving not only from the symbolic 
acceptance of the apartheid legal system by lawyers, but also from the judicial approval 
given by jurists to the state in their judgements, was not shared equally.  Human rights 
lawyers, while symbolically accepting the existence of the legal system, pitted 
themselves consistently against those others, with the aim of subverting the distribution 
of power within the legal field, as well as that within the wider field of power.  Going 
against the grain of power of the times, what they lacked in terms of social capital 
because they were not part of particular networks of power, they endeavoured to make 
up in terms of legal capital – through legal reasoning and superior competence.  Their 
struggle was a struggle against the state, for the recognition of people’s ‘rights’.  And 
then in CODESA and the multi-party negotiating process in the early 1990s, many of 
them had managed skilfully, and successfully, to contribute to such process.  For 
example, many of them were key in providing ‘technical expertise’ to the women’s 
movement in their successful campaign for ‘equality to ‘trump’ custom’ (Hassim 2002: 
725, 719).   
When the subversive intentions of the legal grouping joined with those in the wider field 
of power in the early 1990s, apartheid was overthrown and all of their hopes were 
realised; finally the constitution of a new democracy based upon the respect for human 
rights of all.  In 1994, for once, these human rights lawyers enjoyed the euphoric 
position of playing at the top of the league – they were the ones in the legal field who 
had spoken the language of human rights all along and in the new democracy this was 
held up as a mark of respect.  In its recognition as valuable, their human rights badge 
could now be held up and used as a form of capital.  And after 1994, it was their voices 
that would be heard in the new democracy, particularly in relation to land reform.  In 
Nelson Mandela’s new government, many of them, their colleagues and supporters, 
filled influential positions such as ‘special adviser’ to the Minister of Land Affairs, even 
the DG of the DLA.  In relation to tenure, one of them became key in driving the 
development of the DLA’s reform policies.  They would ensure that their vision of the 
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new democracy would be realised.  There still existed injustice, but this could be 
overturned so long as the rights that became enshrined in the Constitution were 
realised.  Of course there would still be those with ‘vested interests’ that would argue 
against change, but these would be legal battles, and so long as there were basic 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution, such rights were irrefutable.  Not only did 
legal reform present a substantive response to the plethora of social problems facing the 
new government – new legislation could be held up as evidence of actual, tangible steps 
that were being taken to overturn such an abysmal legacy.  Furthermore, passing such 
progressive legislation would also go some way to reclaiming the legitimacy of the law 
from the dark days of its bastardisation under apartheid.  In relation to land, a ‘rights-
based’ approach would therefore be adopted.  All those people whose rights had been 
trampled upon with the wave upon wave of forced removals of millions of people would 
now know what ‘real’ rights were.  Their security in land would be protected by the 
recognition of their rights to land; their human rights would be upheld. 
In February 1996, even though a director of the Tenure Directorate in the DLA had not 
yet been appointed, the TRCG was set up.  This was a group that operated within the 
DLA, but also included ‘non-official members’ to be initially funded by a Ford Foundation 
grant to the DLA (Minutes of the first TRCG - 13.2.96).  Again, those who peopled the 
group included some of the same names, taken on as consultant ‘tenure experts’ (ibid).  
One of them was the director of PLAAS.  Another of the consultants, who, before 
becoming a senior researcher at CALS, had formerly worked for TRAC, and continued to 
be closely linked to the RWM, was subsequently brought inside government with a 
formal appointment as adviser to the Minister.  When the Drafting Team for a new Bill 
was convened, to be based on the approach developed by the TRCG, it also included 
this special advisor.  In 1998, the culmination of ongoing meetings of first the TRCG and 
then the Drafting Team, was the LRB that was tabled in early 1999. 
On its release, however, the LRB did not receive wholehearted endorsement from the 
rest of the DLA, receiving particular criticism from the Provincial offices.  Then, after the 
second general elections in April 1999, with Thabo Mbeki succeeding Mandela in the 
Presidency, the hopes and plans for tenure reform of those within such tightly knit 
circles were shattered.  The new Minister made clear to the Drafting Team that she did 
not accept that the LRB would provide a suitable model with which to deal with the 
issues and that the team should come up with an alternative.  As discussed in previous 
chapters, within months of Thoko Didiza’s taking office, the appointments of many of 
those closely involved in the tenure reform process within the DLA came to an end.  The 
positions and influence of others who could be said to be inside the legal grouping, 
including particular people still working for the LRC, similarly shifted from within the 
government (or closely connected to it, through consultancies and advisory roles) during 
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those early post-apartheid years, to falling back upon advocacy from the outside after 
1999.  It was many of these same individuals who convened the ‘civil society’ grouping 
of people in the Western Cape concerned with tenure issues and who went on to secure 
funding from DFID for the PLAAS/NLC Project. 
3 - Defining ‘the problem’ 
The legal grouping for a long time was concerned that the de jure situation in the 
former homelands often did not match up with the de facto situation on the ground.  
This can be demonstrated by their interpretation of the tenure problems in the 
homelands: 
 [there], most of the land is nominally owned by the SADT or the homeland 
governments.  In fact, the land is occupied by people who have often dealt with 
it as if they were full owners, although the applicable regulations do not provide 
for this.  There is thus a conflict between the legal system contained in the 
regulations and the actual way in which the land is held and used.  In addition, 
many people who in fact are the undisputed occupiers of the land do not even 
have any form of certificate or permit issued in terms of the regulations.  People 
have exercised and relied on their practical rights in building their homes and 
investing in the land. (Statement on the White Paper on Land Reform and the 
Accompanying Bills – undated [estimated date: early 1991], seven signatories 
[including three key individuals in the legal grouping]) 
Even though it is recognised here that the applicable legislation and regulations deriving 
from it in effect mean virtually nothing – the ‘virtually’ indicates the vestige of symbolic 
importance that legislation nevertheless retains in their eyes.  In this vein, the analysis 
goes on:  
The repeal of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act inevitably carries with 
it the abolition of the SADT (the nominal owner of the land), and the repeal of 
the regulations.  This will remove the legal basis for the rights of the existing 
occupiers.  The question then is, who will own and occupy the land? (ibid: my 
italics).   
While in the one breath the reality as providing a basis for the recognition of people’s 
‘rights’ is recognised, in the next that people’s rights might only derive from law appears 
to be asserted.  This contradictory analysis effectively deprives people of any rights at 
all if the legal rights they have been given in no way match up to the rights they have in 
practice, that is their legal rights are virtually meaningless.  Although the recognition of 
their practice in terms of ‘rights’, albeit de facto ones, implies a fair and progressive 
interpretation of the reality such people are faced with, such recognition nevertheless 
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confounds legal analysis.  This legal conundrum continued to be the basis for their 
interpretation of ‘the problem’ that any legislation passed pursuant to the Constitution 
was to solve. 
Twelve years later, the submission regarding the CLRB made by the PLAAS/NLC Project 
to Parliament with inputs from or drafted by key members of the legal grouping sheds 
light on the assumptions upon which their particular interpretation of tenure reform is 
based.  While their thinking has developed since the early 1990s, the views expressed in 
that submission are largely consistent with those held twelve years earlier by many of 
the same people.  The following section analyses the assumptions on which that 
knowledge has been based and also on which particular models of reform have been 
constructed.  Moreover, it considers the extent to which such views have been shaped 
by their proponents’ particular participation in the struggle against apartheid.  This was 
a struggle determined by the limits of the law and since apartheid, in a struggle to 
reclaim the legitimacy of the law.  
4 - Shaping discourses: layers of complexity 
In those areas of South Africa in which the formal legal system worked, people could 
hold private property rights relating to land that had been immaculately surveyed and 
which would be recorded in a central Deeds Registry.  This provides a stark model 
against which the ‘other’ areas of the country could be compared.  These ‘other’ areas, 
including the homelands, with their contrasting forms of practice, can then quite neatly 
be described in terms of dichotomies that highlighted the differences: communal as 
opposed to private; permit in contrast to ownership; informal and formal; legal and non-
legal.  These could be and were extended in further ways: traditional and modern; 
subsistence and commercial – all terms which would conveniently support particular 
arguments for reform.  Such overlapping discourses may interact to shape a variety of 
responses to tenure reform policies and unpicking such complexity is not 
straightforward.  The following sections unpick three key discourses: the law and rights; 
gender; and modernity and tradition.  Each have shaped the dispositions of those in the 
legal field and the legal grouping’s response to the CLRB. 
4.1 - The law and rights 
In 1996, the final Constitution was adopted, along with its property clause in s. 25, as 
one of the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights.  The adoption of a property clause 
in the first place was extremely controversial and much has been written about it 
(Chaskalson and Lewis 1998; Klug 2000; Roux 2002), but rather less attention has been 
focused on the clause dealing with insecurity of tenure.  Section 25(6) reads:  ‘A person 
or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
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discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress’ and 
therefore mandates the government to pass an Act of Parliament to bestow legal 
security on those persons or communities that do not enjoy such security or to give 
them comparable redress.  CLARA was adopted to meet this Constitutional imperative.  
In the face of the fame of South Africa’s Constitution, widely hailed by lawyers and non-
lawyers alike as a ‘model’ constitution, it is useful to remember that ‘[n]othing is less 
“natural” than the “need for the law”’ (Bourdieu 1987: 833).  There are many forms of 
insecurity perceived by people living in the former homelands, but the specific nature of 
the insecurity of tenure envisaged here is clearly narrowed to legal insecurity. 
In November 1996, the TRCG produced a draft ‘Policy Framework for Tenure Reform’.  
Much of this document provided the foundation for the tenure sections of the 
government’s 1997 White Paper and is reproduced there verbatim.  In this document 
the ‘Broad Principles of the Government[‘]s Approach to Tenure Reform’ were set out 
along with their analysis of the problems arising as a result of the ‘lack of legally 
enforceable rights to land’, including ‘vulnerability to interference or confiscation of 
rights whether by the state or other people’ (ibid: 2).  To resolve this, the ‘rights-based 
approach’ was adopted, set out in more detail in the TRCG’s former ‘Foundation 
Document: Land Tenure Reform’: 
 This approach may be likened to the concept of “upgrading rights”.  Its basic 
intention is to find legal ways of transforming current de facto relationships to 
land into formal legal rights to land.  The aim is to normalise and stabilise land 
rights by conferring secure tenure rights on those people who, while they are 
widely recognised as de facto owners or rights holders of land, have no legally 
recognised security of tenure under current law.  This process has to start with 
an understanding and acceptance of current occupation patterns and systems 
and values in relation to land rights … (1996: 10). 
Although the ‘legal’ nature of areas in which most white South Africans own land and 
property negates the merit of questioning the ‘security’ that that system might not offer 
to particular individuals or groups of individuals, time and again the ‘non-legal’ nature of 
practice in such other areas entails the conclusion that land rights in those other areas 
are insecure.  Although they may indeed be insecure, such insecurity may not derive 
from their lack of ‘legality’, nor be solved by their legal recognition.  And, while their 
‘informality’ is assumed, in contrast to the formality of the formal system in which such 
rights are recorded in writing, legally recognised and registered, the extent of formality 
of practices that exist in those areas, a formality that may be tangible for people living 
there, will not be explored.    Moreover, the meaning of that informality, and per se 
 
 
 
 
 123 
insecurity, is defined by those outside it, those within the ‘legal’ system – therefore, by 
extension great value is given to ‘real land rights’ (Green Paper on Land, 1996: 43).  So, 
although, importantly, people’s de facto rights are recognised, such rights do not and 
cannot exist apart from the relationships that shape them and practices built up around 
them. 
For actors in the legal field, ‘the prevalent dispositions of the legal habitus operate like 
categories of perception and judgement that structure the perception and judgement’ 
(Bourdieu 1987: 833).  There appears to be an assumption here, a ‘misrecognition’ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 123) that, what such a lack of legal structure and framework means for 
them (as individuals within the legally defined world) – that there would be a lack of 
respect for their rights, rights which are not ‘real’ (in the legal and non-legal sense of 
the word) and so can be ‘arbitrarily’ extinguished – can be extended to those living 
outside the field.  Whether or not such extinction may or may not be arbitrary for people 
living according to these ‘other practices’ is therefore another aspect of their reality that 
would not be explored.  The approach further assumes that for people living in such 
areas, statutory rights will be endowed with the same import and meaning that they 
may well contain for people living within the legal field, within a reality where ‘the law 
governs every tiny little piece of our life’ (Litigation lawyer, personal communication - 
18.6.05).   
It is not hard to find problematic cases exemplifying the conclusion that lack of legality 
entails insecurity – women who have suffered ‘eviction’ after separating from their 
husbands, who have not been able to access land in the first place because of the 
‘arbitrary’ application of a ‘deformed’ customary law resulting from its interaction with 
sexist apartheid laws, and such cases also chime in accord with progressive feminist 
principles – but this approach rests on the assumption that the lack of legality in the 
former homeland areas causes such cases.  However, women endure such evictions and 
constrained access to land and property all over the world, even in cases where they are 
living under legalised property arrangements.  But, such an assumption entails a 
particular type of tenure reform.  High hopes are held out for such reforms: 
 [Tenure reform] will enable citizens to hold and enjoy the benefits of their land, 
their homes and other property without fear of arbitrary action by the state, 
private individuals or other institutions.  Tenure security will contribute to 
personal security and social stability, as well as to higher levels of investment 
and more sustainable use of land and other natural resources. (Green Paper on 
Land, 1996: 43) 
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Tenure reform may well result in such benefits, but the assumption is that people living 
in such areas do not today hold and enjoy the benefits of their land, homes and other 
property because of the non-legal nature of their land rights. 
4.2 - Gender 
For those activists who continued to be involved in the ongoing struggle against 
injustice in the new democracy, the former homelands were areas in which so many of 
their clients in the 1980s had been fighting against being forcefully removed to (Abel 
1995).  These were where some of the worst poverty in the country could be found.  
This in itself justified intervention.  For women, only more so.  With their poverty and 
vulnerability only exacerbated because of their sex, they were said to suffer a triple 
oppression – of class, race and sex (Meintjes 1996); and also, as Lydia Kompe, the 
founder of the RWM, spoke of, ‘by husbands, sons and traditional practices’ (Small and 
Kompe 1992).  It was the legal grouping’s engagements with the RWM, through TRAC 
and then CALS, that had made this so clear.  But after 1994, they made sure that such 
oppression would be fully recognised.  As indicated in the Land White Paper (1997, s. 
2.5.1): 
 Much of the country’s most severe poverty is located in rural areas, where the 
poorest ten per cent of the people are Africans and where women-headed 
households are particularly impoverished.  Three-quarters of the children in 
rural areas are in households living below the minimum acceptable subsistence 
level. 
It is not surprising that the proposed solutions to such problems follow on smoothly 
from the discussion in the section above on the law and rights as a discourse of change.  
Here again, legislative change or legal safeguards are seen as the answer: 
 All South Africans should enjoy equality in the exercise of land rights without 
reference to gender.  To attain an end to discrimination against women in land 
allocation, a myriad of laws and customs relating to property rights, marriage 
and inheritance must be reviewed and amended. (Green Paper on Land, 1996: 
47) 
There are other examples from that time that represent a similar faith in the law and 
legal change to effect such positive change on the ground.  Nevertheless, there is also a 
certain realism that the law will not implement itself: 
 The law will also provide for protections pertaining to equality and rights for 
women.  Any decision which discriminates against women would be invalid.  In 
order for the rights and protections enshrined in the envisaged law to be 
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effective no transfer of land to group based systems will happen until there has 
been a process of information sharing and workshopping [sic] with the 
members of the land holding group. (Draft Policy Framework for Tenure 
Reform, 29.11.96: 11) 
Despite the recognition that passing a law is not sufficient, there appears to be a liberal 
faith that if people have knowledge of the law, change will be effected.  This faith was 
carried through to 2003, when, in criticisms of the CLRB, a lot of faith was similarly 
invested in the law being the instrument to change such practices, and legal safeguards 
were important to fight for: 
 To the extent that anyone may be available to help women assert their rights, it 
[is] much easier to intervene when the law is clear and precise.  It is more 
challenging to have to work out the intersection of community rules, law and 
practice in every case. (NLC/PLAAS Project - ‘CLRB and women’, undated 
[relates to CLRB, 8.02]) 
Although, it was acknowledged that ‘many areas of discrimination will not be written 
down … they will simply occur as unwritten practice’ (ibid), such undinted faith in ‘the 
law’ to effect change to practice is not surprising if we recall the habitus of actors in the 
legal grouping and their hopes held out for the new Constitutional democracy. 
According to a number of members of the legal grouping, the reason for such double 
injustice meted out to women in the former homelands is that the rights that people do 
have in such areas are held by men and that this is due to the discriminatory operation 
of customary law: 
 The legacy of past discriminatory laws, and the operation of some aspects of 
customary law, has created a situation where most women in communal areas 
do not have secure land rights.  Their position remains vulnerable and unequal.  
Not only do they not have land rights, but customary practices restrict (and in 
some cases completely prohibit) their right to participate in decision making 
processes under communal tenure. (NLC/PLAAS Project - ‘CLRB and women’ 
[later version], 14.11.03) 
This response to the CLRB sounds as an uncanny echo to words singing the same tune 
in the TRCG’s Foundation Document years earlier, and analyses undertaken by the RWM 
that had born out these analyses in the early 1990s (Kompe and Small 1991).  But for 
the legal grouping, while the context of the debates had changed, customary law and 
‘tradition’ continued to be pitted against ‘basic human rights’.  ‘Human rights’ were seen 
to offer the panacea to the fermenting ethnic divisions in the country; conflict would be 
resolved through the careful application of the Constitution and the balancing of 
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people’s rights that for so long had gone unrespected, through the application of the law 
with its reclaimed legitimacy.  While this kind of argument may provide some 
consistency to those within the legal field, as indicated above, law-making involves 
interactions between actors in different social fields and moved by divergent interests 
competing for ‘monopoly of the power to impose a universally recognised principle of 
knowledge of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 837).   
For those outside the legal field, that is for those who did not accept or even recognise 
that “the law governs every tiny little piece of our lives”, any support for women 
challenges and has the potential to unsettle the stability of the relations of power 
through which discriminatory practices are sustained and perpetuated.  While the WNC 
and RWM had triumphed over traditional leaders in relation to the Constitutional 
negotiations in terms of culture being subject to equality, as recognised by Hassim 
(2002: 720):  
the political tensions between traditional leaders and the women’s movement 
were not resolved by these mechanisms.  Instead, the contestation between 
[them…] was in effect delayed to be resolved by the new government.   
And, by the late 1990s, as indicated in previous chapters, particular high profile 
traditional leaders threatened the instability of KZN and, with the country’s second 
democratic elections approaching in 1999, that instability would have wider resonance 
for the political and economic balance of the country.  Certainly such issues held a great 
deal of sway with the ANC, competing, at that time unsuccessfully, with Buthelezi’s IFP 
in KZN.  As a result, counter-discourses drawing upon ‘customary law’ and ‘tradition’ 
began to be pitted against, and come to displace, discourses of ‘human rights’ and ‘the 
law’; the heyday of human rights lawyers’ possession of capital qua human rights 
lawyers had passed.   
Even if such a challenge to the balance of power relations is framed in terms of human 
rights law, this will not necessarily determine the field within which such a challenge will 
be fought.  Being no doubt aware of this, efforts were made by those in the legal 
grouping not only to deny the existence of such a conflict between support for women 
and maintaining the status quo in terms of existing power relations but even to justify 
such change in the name of ‘tradition’.  This represents an attempt to meet their 
contenders on their own terms, that is to bring ‘tradition’ – or ‘customary law’ – within 
the legal field: 
 The Department of Land Affairs does not believe that the above measures are in 
conflict with customary law. They provide recognition and protection for 
indigenous land rights and vest the ultimate ownership and control over the 
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land with the members of a group as is the case under customary law. The 
requirement that traditional systems adapt to accommodate the changing 
position of women is also not fundamentally threatening to customary law. 
There are many deeply traditional areas where these changes are happening 
spontaneously. (White Paper on Land Reform 1997, s. 4.19) 
Research was even commissioned at the time into such ‘spontaneous’ changes, 
presumably in an endeavour to repudiate such powerful counter-discourses with 
evidence that could not then be denied and that could support the formulation of 
appropriate ‘evidence-based policies’.  By 2003, however, while a ‘conflict’ between 
these discourses is not quite acknowledged, a ‘tension’ is, with hope still held out for 
such change, aided by the setting of ‘standards’ to which customary systems must 
conform: 
 The tension between customary law and human rights is well known … There 
are other issues as well to do with transparency, accountability and democracy.  
One way to handle this tension is to acknowledge it and set standards that 
require customary systems to conform with human rights standards.  That 
customary systems are flexible and capable of change is evidenced by changes 
that are already occurring in some areas: for example women with children 
being allocated land by some chiefs and headmen. (PLAAS/NLC Project - 
Summary and analysis of the Cabinet-approved CLRB, 20.10.03: 7) 
However, such attempts to (re-)interpret ‘tradition’ by members of the legal grouping, 
however, served to irk others who thought of themselves as having far greater 
legitimacy, if anyone was going to, in interpreting African tradition.34  That is, their 
attempt to bring ‘tradition’ within the legal field failed.  Members of the legal grouping 
may well have held considerable cultural capital deriving from their recognised 
competence in legal analysis, but were unable to translate that capital into the symbolic 
capital that they would have held had they achieved legitimacy of their version of the 
social world in the wider field of power.  Such symbolic power of the law may often be 
taken for granted in countries where the autonomy of the legal system is a given, but in 
a country like South Africa, undergoing a transition from a time during which the 
legitimacy of the law was so thoroughly undermined, such assumptions cannot be 
made. 
As has been seen here, discussion of the conflicts raised by discourses around gender 
naturally leads on to a discussion of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, another key discourse 
that has shaped the response of the legal grouping in their approach to the tenure 
reform and response to the CLRB. 
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4.3 - Modernity and tradition 
In 1991 the NP government had passed legislation to upgrade the rights of tribes to 
ownership (the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, number 112 of 1991).  This was 
criticised because the:  
land vests with the tribe and not the individual, therefore the security of 
individuals to occupy tribal land is dependent on membership of the tribe and 
the acceptance of [the] tribal authority. … this situation lends itself to potential 
conflict and abuse of authority. (DLA - Workshop on Tenure Reform and Land 
Administration, 1-2.9.94: 33).   
Such arguments in turn tapped into a groundswell of opinion in activist circles against 
any perpetuation of the support by the government of the chiefs or traditional leaders, 
who continued to receive government stipends after 1994.  Traditional leaders were an 
easy target of opposition at the time and were all tarred with the same undemocratic 
brush; they had often wielded what little power they had within their areas of 
jurisdiction in tribal areas, acted as apartheid government lackeys in thwarting ANC anti-
apartheid uprisings and, in many cases, helped by the collusion of customary and 
apartheid laws, contributed to making the lives of many people living within their 
jurisdiction, particularly women, a misery.  This framing of ‘tradition’ provided an 
important dimension to the approach of the legal grouping in their approach to tenure 
reform, shaping possible solutions to the problem, at the same time as involving its own 
inconsistencies to be somehow resolved. 
On the one hand, land activists generally and the legal grouping in particular were 
opposed to any support being given to traditional leaders.  On the other hand, they 
continued to support ‘communal tenure’, albeit reformed, as opposed to individual 
tenure that would unacceptably amount to privatisation.  While theoretically there is a 
difference between communal and customary tenure, in South Africa’s former 
homelands where communal tenure is sustained by and often messily entangled with 
traditional systems, politically the two are embroiled; support for one but not the other 
is likely to be similarly messy.  As indicated in the previous section, the legal grouping’s 
opposition to traditional authorities’ counter-discourse of ‘tradition’ initially involved their 
denying that there was any contradiction between support for women’s rights and ‘the 
customary’ – a position that is consistent with the legal grouping’s continuing support 
for the retention of communal tenure.  Nevertheless, the initial inconsistency continued 
to have repercussions and entailed subsequent efforts of explanation, for example, 
when there was evidence that many communal systems were failing vulnerable people.  
It is understandable that the influence of apartheid laws and policies are referred to as 
providing one explanation for this: 
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Historically, communal tenure systems had provided secure access to land for 
millions of black South African families.  However, a variety of government laws 
and policies have contributed to growing disorder in communal land allocation 
and management systems thoughout the country, resulting in widespread 
tenure insecurity. (Draft submission to Green Paper on Land, 23.10.95: 3) 
This argument acknowledges the debased status of apartheid laws, but pursuing this 
argument sometimes involves harking back to a golden age in which the customary and 
communal fulfilled its ‘proper’ ends, meeting the needs of all prior to its corruption by 
apartheid legislation35: 
 Traditional leaders unwilling to implement government policy were often 
removed from office.  They were replaced with leaders more directly 
accountable to state agencies and distant political authorities, and less 
accountable to community-level decision-making bodies, such as the kgotla and 
the pitso [traditional decision-making body/process].  This politicisation of 
traditional leadership often had the effect of concentrating more rights over 
communal land in the hands of traditional authorities than was intended by 
customary law or practice … (ibid: 3) 
By extension, customary law and practice of days gone by was not similarly politicised 
and did not result in a concentration of rights in the hands of traditional authorities.  
Apartheid provides an explanation for its subsequent corruption.  Such explanations 
entail particular solutions: here, any solution must not allow any recognition of, or 
building upon, the reality of the present, involving, as it does, such corruption.  
However, an approach that recognises people’s de facto rights, is inconsistent with a 
framing that disallows an endorsement of the present. 
Recognising and building upon the reality of the present was precisely what was 
advocated in the ‘rights-based approach’ to the reform of tenure.  This would involve 
the legal recognition of the de facto rights that people have on the ground.  Such de 
facto rights, however, have been shaped by those very apartheid laws so decried, with 
many people holding rights over a piece of land unrecognisable from that which they 
held prior to the betterment planning for example, that was introduced in line with 
apartheid law.  Prior to 1999, this inconsistency was to be resolved by the holding of a 
‘rights enquiry’ further to which people would receive ‘comparable redress’ for such 
wrongs.  This was to ‘adjudicate the content of different rights to land, who the bearers 
of the right should be, and … conflicting and overlapping claims to tenure rights’ 
(Foundation Document, 1996: 11).  Such adjudication was to be carried out according to 
particular criteria, or:  
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guiding principles [to be] used to evaluate current interests and claims [that] 
must reflect the views and values of the wider society, particularly the people 
who will be affected.  Thus they must incorporate the values intrinsic to the 
African land ethic36 (ibid: 17).   
During the course of the next two years, a pilot process of ‘test cases’ was carried out in 
various locations around the country where tenure problems had been identified for 
resolution.  It was intended that through this process it would be possible to capture 
and document in writing such values, including the concept of relative or nested rights, 
so as to provide criteria against which the varying rights of people could be adjudicated.  
While the recognition of certain values that have not been corrupted by the application 
of apartheid laws can be seen as an attempt to iron out such inconsistency, again such 
an approach is in real danger of falling back upon essentialised notions of frozen 
‘culture’.  For people living in areas to be reformed, policies shaped by such a discourse 
will have far-reaching consequences.  The present involves an ever changing custom in 
constant transition in its interaction with outside influences whether arising from 
apartheid, capitalism or migration. 
On the other hand, traditional leaders provided a tangible example of the corrupt 
present.  Having lived through apartheid as traditional leaders they were bodily, and so, 
unwieldy, reminders of the illegitimacy of apartheid.  Given their embodiment of such 
wrongs, they could never be ‘reformed’.  They could not be ‘righted’ through laws 
setting out how they must change, nor through their embracing some form of 
customary law that could be seen to incorporate values that were uncorrupted by 
apartheid.  In terms of tenure reform, when the recognition of people’s de facto rights 
may involve transfer of ownership of those rights, transfer of ownership to the tribe with 
the chief as its leader was simply unacceptable.  For that matter, so too was the 
recognition of practices that were considered to be objectionable, practices that may, 
however, shape people’s de facto rights.  With the involvement of many legal activists in 
the legal grouping having been involved in fighting forced removals, this history was 
important in shaping a collective habitus.  Given this, the adoption of such an anti-
chieftaincy line is understandable and fits with the anti-chiefs position of the ANC/UDF in 
its struggle against the formation of the homelands (Van Kessel and Oomen 1997; 
Robins 2001).  As a result, many of them continued to hold similar views today and 
applied their convictions to the issues relating to the reform of land tenure in these 
areas.  Such discourses relating to ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ shaped the particular 
approach to policy reform of the legal grouping both during their time as ‘insiders’ to the 
government prior to 1999 and in their opposition to CLARA.   
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5 – Struggles for a legal transition 
The struggles that took place over CLARA related to the conceptualisation of a particular 
version of land and property in the law.  Law is recognised by Bourdieu as being one of 
the most powerful examples of the exercise of ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 1987).  In 
turn, the outcomes of these struggles involve ‘symbolic violence’ (ibid); just as some 
things achieve legitimacy, others are dispossessed of that legitimacy, or even of 
recognition.  In the legal field many of the struggles for capital have been played out in 
terms of competition for hierarchy within the field.  They have often involved displays of 
competency in legal analysis through critiques of draft legislation and its legal fluency.  
These have also worked as attempts to undermine those others’ positions within the 
hierarchy of the field.  But the use of such techniques, that are perfectly acceptable and 
even to be expected within the legal field, may not have achieved their goals if those 
involved in drawing up the policies and drafting the legislation are themselves non-
lawyers.  It is clear that non-lawyers may play the legal game, fully accepting its rules 
including its fundamental rule that conflicts can only be resolved on legal terms – 
indeed, a number of players within the legal grouping were non-lawyers, but could 
nevertheless be said to have been playing the ‘legal game’.  However, the involvement 
of such non-lawyers in legal games potentially involves a challenge to the ‘boundaries’ 
of the legal field, even, as here, in law-making, an activity which requires to a greater 
extent the acceptance of such rules.  Importantly, it may also involve a challenge to the 
extent to which the symbolic capital accessed by those within the field retains its 
symbolism outside the field, in the wider field of power.  Here, such impressive displays 
of legal competence in the techniques of drafting may well not have been endowed with 
the same value by those sharing an alternative habitus.  Instead, such attempts may 
only have served to alienate those reacting defensively in the face of such irrepressible 
criticism.   
5.1 - The legitimacy of law? 
Many black tenure systems are characterised by endemic violence.  This can be 
attributed to severe overcrowding, desperate land hunger, the insecure status 
of most forms of black land rights which then gives rise to disputes and 
uncertainty … (White Paper on Land Reform 1997, s. 3.21) 
Endemic violence, disputes and uncertainty all caused by severe overcrowding, 
desperate land hunger and the insecure status of most forms of black land rights are 
problems that justify change.  But, with the nature of change contested, shaped as it 
was by discourses that tapped into powerful political positions, the legal grouping had to 
find ways of bringing round others to their way of thinking rather than simply asserting 
such causation.  This section considers the principal strategy of legitimation that those 
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within the legal grouping followed in order to do this37.  In order to explore this further, 
I go back to the 1990s where these beliefs and knowledge were shaped into a particular 
policy of tenure reform. 
When the NP government published their White Paper on Land in 1991, groups who had 
for a long time been involved in the land struggle criticised its approach.  In a response 
from the group of legal land activists (referred to above), their principal concern was the 
‘vast administrative powers’, that would be given ‘to the State President and his officials’ 
(Statement on the White Paper on Land Reform and the Accompanying Bills – undated: 
[estimated date: 1991 – seven signatories]: 3).  For them, the problem with 
administrative power, as opposed to legal rule, was that: 
the very legislation which will abolish central apartheid laws should recreate this 
administrative rule, in aggravated form, and in relation to one of the most 
disputed issues in our country, namely the right to land (ibid: 4).   
What is at stake here is the legitimacy of the law at the end of the days of the apartheid 
state.  The importance of this is emphasised in the reference to the debasement of the 
law that would occur, in aggravated form, even than that of apartheid laws, should this 
White Paper and related legislation be adopted.  The irony that this might occur in the 
passing of legislation to abolish apartheid laws was not lost on its authors.   
In the same document, they go on, with true lawyerly erudition, referring to precedent 
for support: 
In a passage which has been approved by the Appellate Division, the eminent 
legal scholars Schwartz and Wade (‘Legal Control of Government’) have pointed 
out: 
 “Every legal power must have legal limits otherwise there is dictatorship.” (ibid: 
4). 
In 1991, the formation of a democratic state out of an apartheid state was balanced on 
a knife edge (Sparks 1994).  Moreover, it was an apartheid state in which ‘lowly’ human 
rights lawyers had thrown themselves into an arena shaped by apartheid legislation and 
by other lawyers and judges who served as the backbone of that state in implementing 
and upholding such debased legislation.  What is also at stake here is the position of 
those human rights lawyers within the hierarchy of the legal field; as recognised by 
Bourdieu, ‘the relative power of the different kinds of juridical capital … is related to the 
general position of the juridical field within the broader field of power’ (1987: 823).  As 
with a legal judgement, ‘the practical content of the law which emerges … is the product 
of a symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal technical skills and 
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social influence’ (ibid: 827).  So, as might be expected, we see here the exercise of 
techniques that will bolster their legal credentials and in turn their possession of cultural 
capital in the legal field.  Bourdieu actually recognises such techniques may include 
those intended to produce the ‘neutralization effect’: ‘to  mark the impersonality of 
normative utterances and to establish the speaker as universal subject, at once impartial 
and objective’, and to produce the ‘universalization effect’: ‘designed to express the 
generality or omnitemporality of the rule of law’ (Bourdieu 1987: 820) – both techniques 
clearly deployed here.   
However, operating within the legal field is not something that can be taken for granted 
when some of the actors within it do not hold the qualifications that endow them with 
the necessary capital to be able to claim the status of lawyers.  But Bourdieu casts the 
net both wider and narrower than simply including those who have simply gained such 
qualifications: ‘Entry into the juridical field [and by extension the legal field38] implies 
the tacit acceptance of the field’s fundamental law, an essential tautology which 
requires that, within the field, conflicts can only be resolve juridically – that is, according 
to the rules and conventions of the field itself’ (1987: 831).  In doing so he recognises 
that it depends on the acceptance, usually unconscious, of the rules of the legal game.  
While non-lawyers may operate within the legal field, those who have qualified as 
lawyers may choose not to operate within it if they consciously do not accept the rules 
of the game.  The passage above clearly demonstrates a faith in the law both to bestow 
power and to limit power.  So, even though such activist human rights lawyers may 
express hostility to other actors in the legal field operating under apartheid, as 
recognised by Bourdieu, through ‘the complementary exercise of their functions’ (1987: 
823), they mutually support the relative autonomy of the legal field.  On the other hand, 
the autonomy of the legal field can be called into question in interactions with those 
operating outside it who do not accept the rules of the game.  The following section 
considers such interactions in relation to the ‘rights-based’ approach adopted to deal 
with tenure reform. 
5.2 – Will law trump politics? 
When the TRCG was convened to decide on the model on which post-apartheid tenure 
reform should be based, the ‘rights-based approach’ was adopted.  While this was a 
legal interpretation of the system of tenure in place in the former homeland areas, there 
remained the crucial decision, to whom should the legally recognised rights be given.  
This, however, was a political decision but one which, in turn, involves further legal 
difficulties of balancing individual rights against group rights.  Inherent to the rights-
based approach is the recognition of individuals’ rights, but the recording and the 
registration of those rights involves making a decision as to whom the legal rights will 
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be transferred to, in this context that is whether the members of the group are to be 
the owners or whether the chief or traditional leader is to be the owner on behalf of the 
tribe or ‘community’.  Transferring ownership to the chief as the traditional leader would 
be politically untenable, picking up as it does on the various layers of discourses 
discussed above.  In any case, the legal grouping were acutely aware of the politics 
involved in this decision and so justification for transferring ownership to the members 
of the group was sought in the ‘customary’: 
 According to customary law there is little doubt that the “land belongs to 
people” and that the chief or council’s (kgotla’s) role is that of administering 
land rights.  This view of customary ownership of land is widely held and very 
few people dispute it. (Foundation Document, 1996: 34). 
But, in an attempt to avoid the decision altogether and avoid the inevitable political fall-
out, in the end they decided not to transfer ownership at all.  Instead, any registration 
of individuals’ rights would involve the creation (implying the rights are being newly 
created, rather than transfer which implies that they already exist) of ‘protected rights’ 
or: 
new individual rights [which] would be statutory rights as opposed to 
ownership.  In other words they would be created by law and not by transfer of 
ownership [and] … [t]he individual rights holders would receive a form of title … 
which would be registered within the deeds office system. (TRCG Submission to 
the Land Reform Policy Committee, undated [estimated date: early Oct. 1997]: 
19, 20). 
Such an approach is theoretically sound: 
[t]he law would provide for the immediate confirmation of the legal status of all 
the land rights described.  It would not need to be applied on a case by case 
basis.  Instead all qualifying rights holders will be guaranteed legally 
enforceable land rights by operation of law.  As such the rights are created by 
statute rather than by transfer of title which would involve a painstaking process 
of case by case investigation and transfer over many decades. (DLA, SDC 
Tenure Reform Fund Progress Report No. 3, prepared for the period July-
December 1997: 11).   
It also deals with the tricky problem of ‘fixing boundaries’ that the TRCG had come to 
recognise as having the major potential for sparking boundary disputes.  In addition, it 
was thought that pursuing this approach would obviate the need for either a rights 
enquiry or for the creation of the ‘criteria’ against which people’s rights can be judged, 
even though such a rights enquiry might still be necessary in ‘next step’ cases where 
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groups or individuals applied for registration or upgrading of their statutory rights to 
ownership. 
However, the thorny issue of the role of traditional leaders was not avoided altogether 
in the adoption of this ‘statutory rights’ model.  A position on the question of land 
administration in group situations had to be taken.  So as to prevent the unbridled 
administrative rule of old, separating the rights of administration of land from the rights 
of use and ownership, enabling the members of the group to choose the body to 
exercise the former rights and imposing democratic obligations on their exercise of the 
former, were together seen to provide the answer.  Although this may be an important 
theoretical separation of power to make on paper, it again represents great faith in law 
as providing ‘the answer’.  But, such faith was not held by everyone – as one researcher 
at PLAAS who looked into the potential for these kind of stipulations concluded frankly:  
[t]he legal definition of democratic tribal resolutions are likely simply to be 
ignored.  Even for “community resolutions”, democratic meetings of the kind 
envisaged are likely to be unwieldy, impossible to convene, and are no 
guarantee of informed consent (Memorandum from PLAAS researcher to DLA – 
marked ‘circulated to TRCG’ 17.3.1997). 
Moreover, in adopting this model, not only was it not possible to entirely avoid the need 
to tackle the question of the role of traditional leaders – in land administration – but nor 
did the ‘avoidance strategy’ work in not attracting opposition to its political approach.  
When the proposals were taken to be presented in March 1998 to a meeting of 34 
people in the Provincial DLA in the Northern (now Limpopo) Province, they were met 
with round opposition: 
 The distinction in the draft bill [‘between owners and people with protected 
rights’] was considered unnecessary and was expected to cause problems 
between people otherwise living in harmony on tribal land … What was 
important was allegiance to the chief.  The idea that people, when confirmed as 
owners would use their rights to evict people was unrealistic (‘ethnocentric’ in 
fact).  Africans living on tribal land did not treat their fellows in this manner.  If 
the land was transferred to the tribe, they would sort out any problems of 
entitlement according to customary law and practice. (Draft notes on visit to 
PDLA, Northern Province to consult on proposed tenure bill, 3.3.98) 
Carefully crafting arguments that are theoretically sound relies upon a labour of 
construction of social reality that may, in turn, contribute to the cultural capital 
possessed by each actor in the legal field.  Possession of cultural capital depends upon 
the extent of their ability, their competency and the success of their labour (Bourdieu 
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1987).  But in interactions with those outside the legal field, recognition of the holding 
of such capital will not be automatic and as here, such arguments are unconvincing for 
those who share a wholly different habitus.   While the view that rights deriving from 
statute are more secure than those granted on a case by case basis may amount to 
doxa in the legal field, it does not ‘ratif[y..] and sanctif[y..] the doxic view of the social 
world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 839) that exists apart from, or despite, the doxa within the legal 
field. 
Nor were these the only dissenting views received.  Eight months later, in November 
1998, the cracks between the views of various members of the TRCG began to show.  
In detailed draft minutes of comments made at a meeting of the TRCG on 13.11.98, an 
apparently heated discussion broke out between members of the group on the very 
issue of the ‘transfer of land to tribes’.  Although people in the meeting appear to have 
tried to quell dissent, indicating that ‘the topic had been debated before’ and warning 
that ‘it was also necessary to recognise that there were strong vested interests at work.  
The land tenure reform process was being hijacked by tribal leaders’, particular 
members of the Drafting Committee insisted that it should be raised again following the 
heated opposition the Bill had received in those visits to the Northern Province referred 
to above.  Visits to other provinces were also mentioned.  Extracts from the notes of 
that meeting give a good indication of the tenor of the discussions.  The first participant 
appears to try to employ the ‘neutralisation effect’, to depersonalise the issues and 
endow them with greater credibility: by referring to the ‘in-depth investigation’ and the 
conclusions formed by ‘the TRCG’, and to the ‘obligation’ on him/her to accept the ‘legal 
opinion’ of someone else.  Not adopting the ‘transfer of ownership model’ is therefore 
justified by this superior legal knowledge: 
 a39: The issue was the subject of in-depth investigation by the TRCG in the 
period 1995-96.  The TRCG had concluded that the transfer of land to tribes 
was not feasible as the interests of members could neither be protected in the 
title deed nor in law because it was not possible to codify customary law. … 
… 
b: Should ownership vest with the king, the chief or the headman? 
a: A tribal custodian was all very well provided he behaved fairly.  When he 
ceased to do so, then there was no recourse outside customary law.  Despite all 
the reservations x had about trusts, x was obliged to accept the legal opinion 
(by z?) that the only legally secure option for groups taking transfer of land was 
to hold the land in some form of trust. 
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Another participant meanwhile refers to understandings that s/he asserted can only be 
gained from the people on the ground: 
c:  People see themselves as members of nations.  …  It was necessary to 
understand how these groups operated; how their system worked; how 
decisions were taken in relation to land. 
As the meeting progresses there appears to be a faultline between various participants 
in the group disagreeing between the two models and a clash between the hierarchy of 
knowledge asserted; reason is contrasted with mere power.  This is then countered with 
a jibe about inappropriate power being exerted by bureaucrats becoming involved in 
politics; there is no neutrality in relation to these issues: 
 a:  The department had to persuade people to set out their view in terms of 
reasoned arguments.  It was not enough for them to demand that land be 
transferred to tribes.  These statements arose from the desire to exert power 
over people.  It was not an argument based on an acceptable principle.  It was 
about power. 
 c:  There has been a problem in South Africa of civil servants taking a political 
positions.  However, there is no way that one could be neutral.  The issue of 
power relations had to be factored in.  
 a:  In an attempt to be neutral, a stand had been made on the issue of the 
transfer of land to tribes. 
Finally, the politics inherent in the ‘transfer of ownership’ model is made explicit as it is 
linked to the ‘African Renaissance’ and thereby other discourses of racial politics: 
c:  It was important to recognise that much of the interest in customary 
systems arose from the growing interest in the African renaissance and 
traditional systems of land administration. (Draft minutes of TRCG meeting, 
10.11.98). 
Contestations around the hierarchy of knowledge also relate to the assertion of status 
that is linked to the contested delineation of boundaries between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’.  Here, an attempt is made to link legal knowledge to that based upon 
‘reason’ and is set against knowledge based upon ‘understanding’.  When these are 
bound up with racial politics, the dynamics of the tensions deeply felt in South Africa are 
clearer.  While the politics behind the thinly veiled ‘neutral stance’ could not be 
concealed, when such a stance was re-interpreted as being in conflict with the African 
Renaissance, this also involved a re-positioning of its protagonists as ‘outsiders’ and 
therefore unable to know or truly understand the issues.  So, just because the focus 
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here is on the actors in the legal field, those excluded from the legal field are not only 
defined as being ‘outside’ it, but are themselves positioned within another field with a 
different shared habitus.  They are just as likely as those actors within the legal field to 
claim monopoly of power to impose their version of the truth of the social world, but on 
different terms.  Recognising this overcomes any kind of unhelpful dichotomy between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, although this is not to say that such categories are not 
asserted, as they are here, by those actors in attempts at including or excluding others 
from succeeding in imposing their version of the social world.  Sometimes such attempts 
at positioning were executed in as crude terms as simply referring to relevant actors as 
‘white liberal lefties’ or as members of the ‘socks and sandals brigade’.  As a result, they 
are positioned in particular ways and in turn their knowledge, by being linked with such 
a framing, is cast as being incompatible with the African Renaissance, perhaps even 
with a more experiential understanding that can only be attained by being an ‘insider’. 
6 - CLARA: a betrayal of democracy 
When the CLRB was first leaked in 2001, it clearly adopted the ‘transfer of ownership’ 
model, stating its intention to transfer ownership to ‘African traditional communities’ that 
would, moreover, be elevated to the status of ‘juristic personas’ (in other words, able to 
pledge and sell land owned by them) (Sibanda 2004).  In response, the legal grouping 
were no longer able to continue with their stance of neutrality.  In the adoption of the 
‘transfer of ownership’ model, the ‘rights-based approach’ was seen to have been 
dropped.  As indicated above, this approach, embodied in the LRB, was seen to be 
intimately linked with the legitimacy of law, a legitimacy that many in the legal grouping 
cared passionately about – after all, many of them had devoted their lives to using the 
law, prior to 1994 to “nail them at their own game” and then, after 1994, to build a new 
country, a constitutional democracy founded upon human rights for all.  The tone of the 
reactions of one member of the legal grouping who became one of the key NLC/PLAAS 
Project organisers can be felt in the ‘Comments on the CLRB’ circulated to others: 
 The CLRB differs fundamentally from the previous LRB in this respect.  The LRB 
confirmed the status of existing de facto rights as property rights.  It was on the 
basis of their status as rights holders that rural people were guaranteed the 
right to participate in all decisions pertaining to future changes in the status of 
the land.  The CLRB changes this around entirely.  Undefined communities, led 
by undefined rights holders structures make all the decisions pertaining to the 
land, and to changes in the status of the underlying rights of the individuals 
who use and occupy the land.  Any person or group who objects to this on the 
basis that the ‘community’ or ‘structure’ does not have the right to make 
decisions pertaining to their land rights, runs the risk of being told that, by 
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virtue of denying the group, they no longer have any land rights.  (‘Comments 
re Communal Land Rights Bill’ - 15.11.01: 1) 
This interpretation of the Bill demonstrates the redefinition of ordinary experience 
proceeding from existing in the legal field.  The legal facts described here have been 
produced by a legal construction that has involved the retranslation of all aspects of the 
situation.  In the juridical context, as recognised by Bourdieu, the purpose of such 
retranslation is to ‘ponere causam (to “put” the case), that is to institute the controversy 
as a lawsuit, as a juridical problem that can become the object of juridically regulated 
debate’ (Bourdieu 1987: 832).  While what was being done here was not, at that stage, 
in order to institute a lawsuit40, putting the case as a legal problem that can become the 
object of legally regulated debate is an entirely natural act by those within the legal 
field.  The CLRB is being judged according to criteria defined by the legal interpretation 
of ‘the problem’ discussed above, and in turn compared with the LRB that provided ‘the 
solution’ to ‘the problem’.  That it did not fulfil such criteria and did not even accept ‘the 
problem’ as a starting point, is therefore seen in this light as the other extreme, in terms 
of a dichotomy.  It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was seen by members of 
the legal grouping as amounting to an utterly base betrayal.  But this dichotomy can 
only be pursued if the initial interpretation of ‘the problem’ is accepted.   
Law-making through legislative processes will involve the ‘confrontation of antagonistic 
rights’ between which a choice must be made (Bourdieu 1987: 826), but an analysis of 
that confrontation cannot only be reduced to an analysis of the technical application of 
particular theoretical reasoning but must also acknowledge that it involves a struggle to 
acquire symbolic capital perpetuated by individuals with different levels of competency 
and cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1987).  Going through the Bill, there were 
obvious legal and technical weaknesses in the drafting and every one of them was used 
by the legal grouping to undermine it.  It is not just the role of ‘the opposition’ in politics 
to criticise, it is the everyday work of lawyers going through any legal document, with a 
toothpick, looking for inconsistencies of language and of intent within the document, but 
also inconsistencies in relation to wider related issues.  A document might be considered 
to be ‘perfect’ in terms of its internal consistency and legal intent, but when the starting 
point is fundamental disagreement with the approach, there will always be criticisms to 
be made.  After the CLRB had been formally published, the LRC produced 76 pages of 
annotated comments of the Bill, the annotations being about three times the length of 
the Bill itself (LRC – Annotated comments per clauses of the CLRB, 25.10.02).  The 
annotations present a critical comment on nearly every clause in the Bill, and are dense 
and intimidating.   
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As indicated above, the PLAAS/NLC Project was supported by a number of renowned 
lawyers, some still working for the LRC, who applied their legal minds wholeheartedly to 
the analysis and criticism of the Bill.  A number of extremely well-renowned advocates 
drafted legal opinions that sufficiently impressed quasi-legal organisations such as the 
CGE and HRC that they agreed to put their own names to them.  In the context of a 
trial, ‘granting the status of judgement to a legal decision … the rationalization process 
provides the decision with the symbolic effectiveness possessed by any action which, 
assuming one ignores its arbitrariness, is recognised as legitimate’ (Bourdieu 1987: 
828).  Similar to a judgement, in law-making an advocate drafting a legal opinion is one 
of the steps towards such symbolic effectiveness and grants symbolic capital to those 
relying on it so as to grant weight to and even shape their arguments.   
Many of the legal minds within the legal grouping identified here were well known in 
South Africa and abroad as eminent human rights lawyers.  Having such esteemed 
lawyers supporting the project relates to points made above referring to contestations 
over the hierarchy of knowledge, and status that is linked to that knowledge.  Not only 
were the comments on the Bill intimidating, but the calibre of those on board was 
noted, even by a representative from the Parliamentary office of the HRC whose job 
description included making submissions to Parliament: 
So, on the CLRB, for a few months, I will become an expert, write something, 
present something and then move back to another piece of legislation.  As an 
aside, one never feels confident because I never have time to be able to 
immerse yourself so fully in a piece of legislation so as to really feel comfortable 
with it, and I must say, particularly with CLARA, I mean people we worked with 
… I came from a land background as well so, I know a lot of people, but there 
were some very, very good legal academic brains in this country working on this 
piece of legislation … just some wonderful [people] (HRC official, interview - 
30.6.05). 
As Bourdieu recognised, even though many other actors ‘may find themselves in the 
middle of [‘the game’, they] are in fact excluded by their inability to accomplish the 
conversion of mental space … which is presumed by entry into this social space’ 
(Bourdieu 1987: 828).  So although ‘one of the functions of … juridical labor … is to 
contribute to binding laypeople to the fundamental principle of the jurists’ professional 
ideology’ (ibid: 844), in contestations in the interactions between those included within 
the field and those excluded, such exclusivity is a double-edged sword.  In contestations 
that also involve the legitimacy of the law, those excluded or even those unequal in 
technical skills may deny or refuse to acknowledge that legitimacy41.  Nor may they 
accept the field’s fundamental law that ‘conflicts can only be resolved juridically’ (ibid: 
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831).  In doing so, they thereby deny also the symbolic power of those in the legal field.  
As Bourdieu recognises, ‘[t]he specific property of symbolic power is that it can be 
exercised only through the complicity of those who are dominated by it’ (ibid: 844).  The 
irony here is that those in the legal grouping involved in such disputes will deny that 
their attempts to stop the passing of the CLRB into law were attempts at ‘domination’, 
and that instead CLARA itself legitimises particular forms of domination.  Indeed, such a 
denial of the symbolic power of those in the legal field was in essence a denial of the 
power of a grouping of people working to subvert the power relations and established 
order in the wider field of power.  In 2004, the South African Parliament passed CLARA 
into law, unopposed by any party in Parliament.  In the context of the contestation over 
CLARA in South Africa, it was the structure of the power relations in the wider field of 
power that ensured its dominance over any efforts by lawyers operating in a legal field 
whose autonomy was limited. 
7 - Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the way the legal grouping has engaged in tenure debates 
during the ten years and more that policies relating to tenure reform were on the 
agenda in South Africa.  Their influence in shaping the approach adopted by the 
Constitution and early land reform policies has been significant.  This chapter has 
discussed how their particular interpretation of tenure in the former homelands in South 
Africa – as being marked by illegal informal chaos – led to their assumption that it is this 
that has led to problems existing in the former homeland areas, and that it is this that 
must be reformed by way of legislation.  They united in their adoption of a ‘rights-based 
approach’ to reform and an opposition of a ‘transfer of ownership’ model.  The legal 
grouping’s adoption of this model and their opposition to the model embodied in the 
form of CLARA, were shaped by wider discourses such as those relating to human 
rights, gender, ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’.  Struggles emerged over meaning and the 
hierarchy between particular forms of knowledge.  Their adoption of a ‘rights-based 
approach’ linked to their fundamental opposition to apartheid, shaped in turn their 
opposition of ‘reforms’ that represented to them an endorsement of evidence existing 
today of wrongs introduced by apartheid.  Importantly, such evidence was starkly 
provided by the continuing existence of chiefs.  Arguing against chiefs, however, tapped 
into groundswells of opinion and political currents supporting an ‘African Renaissance’ or 
resurrected ‘black consciousness’ movements.  So as to distance themselves from any 
aspersions that cast doubt on their non-racial credentials, they sought justification for 
their approach in a ‘tradition’ and in a ‘customary tenure’ that pre-dated the wrongs of 
apartheid.  Rather than achieving this, however, such attempts to (re-)interpret 
‘tradition’ antagonised many others who thought of themselves as having far greater 
legitimacy due to their background and history, in interpreting African ‘tradition’.   
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In seeking social and ultimately symbolic capital so as to be able to grant legitimacy to 
their ‘version of the social world’, the legal grouping also adopted particular strategies of 
legitimation for their approach.  Their arguments were supported by legal opinions 
based upon legally sound theoretical arguments and their critiques of the draft 
legislation displayed impressive technical critique.  In law-making, however, when it 
might be thought that it is the legal field setting out the ‘rules of the game’, many 
contestations involve interactions with actors outside the legal field.  Considering such 
interactions sheds light on faultlines that emerged at points where particular forms of 
knowledge were incompatible with others and on the extent to which the processes of 
legitimation pursued were successful, or not, in smoothing over some of these cracks.   
When the autonomy of the law is not a given, as in post-apartheid South Africa, the 
effect of wider political change affecting the legal field and the extent of its autonomy 
will have more resonance.  While many have noted that the state in South Africa, and 
the apartheid state before 1994, is highly ‘legalised’, the contested autonomy of the law 
in South Africa’s transition has not been sufficiently explored.  This is important, 
particularly for those ‘heretical, anti-institutional, subversive’ lawyers (Bourdieu 1987: 
839) struggling to re-ground the law in its proper legitimacy.  As Bourdieu reminds us, 
the law ‘creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which first 
creates the law’ (ibid: 839).  Strategies of legitimation are unlikely to be successful if 
they fail to acknowledge the influence of the wider field of power that ensures that 
‘society cannot be transformed by decree’ alone (Bourdieu 1987: 840, referring to 
Montesquieu).  Moreover, that wider field of power also shapes the hierarchy within the 
legal field; contestations both within the legal field and with other fields will shape the 
extent to which complicity is granted to the exercise of symbolic power.  In the end, the 
political struggles that played out in the wider field of power was what determined 
whether or not the CLRB would be passed into law.  And so, the energy and 
commitment of everyone in drawing up legal opinions and analysing particular clauses 
of the legislation hardly made any significant changes to the Bill that was to serve other 
political ends.  The following chapter goes on to consider the influence and involvement 
of land sector activists who were outside the legal field, but many of whom nevertheless 
joined forces with the legal grouping in opposing the legislaton.  Rather than uniting in 
opposition to CLARA, however, the activist field were split on many fronts, such splits 
often overriding their unity in opposition. 
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CHAPTER 6 - STRUGGLES WITH ACTIVISM: NGO RELATIONS AND CLARA 
1 - Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the involvement of the legal grouping in organising 
opposition to CLARA and the way they interpreted the ‘model’ for reform.  Although 
many land sector NGOs participated in that organised ‘coalition’ of opposition, many of 
them interpreted the issues differently.  Nevertheless, many of the same discourses 
identified in the previous chapter have similarly structured the debates and networks 
and coalitions have formed around these.  This chapter considers the extent to which 
particular discourses shaping NGOs’ engagements with policy-makers in relation to 
CLARA, have enabled differential, more nuanced understandings of tenure to filter 
through.  It also considers how they have shaped the ways individuals working for NGOs 
have consequently positioned themselves in relation to their constituents.  Over the time 
that NGOs engaged with government in relation to CLARA, as outlined in Chapter 3, 
there were changes unfolding in the relations between those NGOs, amongst people 
working within them, and between them and their constituents.  These were shaped by 
reduced amounts of funding for NGOs and an increasingly ambivalent relationship 
between ‘civil society’ and government.  Debates concerning the positioning of NGOs in 
relation to their constituents and the LPM, were brought to the fore by ongoing and 
public debates going on within the NLC.  In 2001, the LPM was launched with the 
support of the NLC, but the atmosphere at the NLC offices at the time was structured by 
the differing visions of activism held by different individuals.  Splits appeared between 
actors depending on age, experience, personal histories and sometimes race – which 
came to be seen as a form of capital to be played in the activist field, interweaving in 
turn with discourses playing out at a national level.  At the same time, NGOs were 
forced to reposition themselves following the 1999 elections as a result of changes that 
took place in the government and in its approach to its own relations with ‘civil society’.  
This affected relationships between those working for or affiliated to the NLC and their 
engagements with government and other policy-makers.  With such changes playing out 
in the hierarchy of the activist field, the time was characterised by conflict, between 
individuals within it struggling to maintain their position and influence. 
All of these changes have had various effects on actors’ personal responses and ongoing 
relationships with current, and former, friends and colleagues.  At times people’s 
engagements with policy, or with others within the activist field, the ways they have 
consequently positioned themselves or been positioned, have been shaped by assumed 
affiliations, and by their personal and emotional responses to these.  For fieldworkers 
working in particular localities, discourses shaping the positions particular NGOs have 
taken in relation to tenure reform have sometimes also shaped their engagements with 
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their constituents.  At other times, it has not proved easy for their work to fit so neatly 
within them.  This chapter considers how particular discourses have shaped and been 
shaped by the practices of individuals working for NGOs, discourses that have in turn 
‘produced’ particular identities and marginalised others (Ferguson 1994; Robins 2001).   
2 - Chiefs, democracy and tenure – a collective habitus? 
Around the time of the CLRB going through the Portfolio Committee, the media widely 
reported on ‘civil society’ organisations strategically combining to form a ‘coalition’ to 
speak out with one voice in opposition to the CLRB: 
 A coalition of land-rights organisations launched a national campaign in Cape 
Town yesterday to scrap the controversial CLRB and threatened to take to the 
streets if their demands were not met. 
Campaign co-ordinator, the National Land Committee (NLC), has accused the 
government of making last-minute changes to the Bill which it says gives chiefs 
in the former homelands ‘unprecedented powers’. 
 Representatives from 18 land rights NGOs formulated a national strategy in 
Cape Town yesterday.   
The representatives will publicise the amendments in the provinces at 
parliamentary hearings on the Bill, which are likely in November. 
 … 
 Their campaign is backed by the Black Sash and the South African Council of 
Churches. (Hofstatter – This Day, 23.10.03). 
Over the next few weeks, newspapers from the Sunday Independent to IOL news 
online, from the Mail & Guardian to This Day conjured up a picture of ‘the coalition’s’ 
outrage at the betrayal of democracy by government as a result of the Bill’s transfer of 
unprecedented power to traditional leaders to the detriment of women.  But this picture 
of a coherent coalition all speaking with one voice conceals a much more heterogeneous 
grouping – hardly surprising given that they were bringing together experiences from as 
diverse a country as South Africa.  To a certain extent, however, such a misleading 
picture was not the fault of the media, but was the result of a strategic compromise by 
land sector NGOs to come together in their opposition to the Bill.  But nor was this really 
to blame in displacing other voices in the debates and concealing the messier reality.  
Instead, the discourse that came to frame the coalition’s opposition to the Bill largely 
contributed to squeezing out more nuanced, differential readings of legitimate 
knowledge. 
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Nkuzi was one of the NGOs that joined the ‘coalition’ opposing CLARA.  It made a 
submission to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee and called for the Bill’s rejection.  Nkuzi’s 
submission begins by setting out its central thesis: 
 … Mamdani shows in his book Citizen and Subject (Mamdani, 1996) that the 
traditional authority structures as they are now in South Africa, and many other 
parts of Africa, are a construct of the colonial regimes specifically established to 
solve the ‘native problem’ through indirect rule and what Mamdani describes as 
‘decentralised despotism’.  … An essential characteristic of the decentralised 
despotism is the ‘clenched fist’ of the chief who combines legislative, judicial, 
administrative and policing powers in one institution and even in one person. 
 Building democracy in South Africa requires the dismantling of the bifurcated 
state, overcoming the tribalisation of rural citizens, and ending the subjugation 
of rural people to the ‘clenched fist’ rule of chiefs and farm owners.  Rural 
people need to be allowed to participate as full citizens in the modern 
democratic state with the separation of the legislative, judicial and executive 
powers, just as the Constitution requires (Constitution, 1996, p. 89).  A key test 
of any new tenure legislation must be the extent to which it contributes to this 
process. (Nkuzi – Submission, 14.11.03). 
Although the Portfolio Committee hearings did attract quite an audience of non-
Parliamentarians, many of whom may well also have been similarly highly educated elite 
activists (see Chapter 3), these did not make up the audience to be persuaded by 
quoting Mamdani, the renowned historian of Africa’s colonial history (see Mamdani 
1996).  Instead, those to be impressed or convinced by submissions opposing CLARA 
were Parliamentarians from diverse backgrounds who had all come to be sitting on the 
Portfolio Committee for Land and Agriculture.  Nevertheless, even though the pitch of 
this submission may have come across as somewhat obscure for a non-academic 
audience of Parliamentarians who may not have read Mamdani or heard of him, it is 
non-compromising in its view of the chieftaincy.  From this starting point, however, 
traditional leaders are per se undemocratic – only elected leaders are democratic – and 
so any recognition of their current role in land administration, and support of that role in 
legislation is a non-starter, being automatically tarnished with an anti-democratic stamp.  
The unassailability of the Constitution is brought in here to support further the 
legitimacy of these views.  This approach renders the issues black and white (using the 
words critically), the undemocratic chiefs in the former homeland areas and the 
democratic elected leaders in the rest of the country42.  But in doing so, it pushes out 
questions of nuance about the status of ‘subjects’.  As Oomen argues: 
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 What Mamdani’s dualistic analysis fails to recognise is the wide variety of local 
power configurations, structures of rule and degrees of democratisation that 
occurred as a result of segregationist policies … While traditional leaders were 
given large powers on paper, these, in practice, had to be exercised within the 
confines drawn by the bureaucracy.  This created differences in the degree of 
popular political participation in traditional authority areas, and thus in the 
degree to which people were citizens or subjects. (Oomen 2005: 39)43. 
So when it comes to reform, it is a question of ‘away with the old’ and ‘in with the new’, 
anything less being unacceptable.  This approach, while not being identical with that of 
the legal grouping, is no more nuanced, if less complex, in the basis for its critique.  It 
also pushes out questions of nuance about the nature and extent of the form of 
democracy that is to be created in its place, that it is to be supplanted by.  Democracy 
here seems to derive its legitimacy from merely elections (other sources of legitimacy 
could, however, be seen to derive from real participation in policy-making processes, for 
example).  Although the submission prepared by Nkuzi goes on to present a textured 
understanding of ‘Current tenure arrangements in Communal Areas’, it concludes the 
section in accordance with the Mamdani ‘model’ with the statement that ‘the system is 
inherently undemocratic and strengthening this runs counter to the need for 
democratisation and empowerment of people as citizens with full citizenship rights’44. 
Questions can be asked of such systems in both the former homeland areas and in the 
accepted institutions of the state operating in the rest of the country.  Bourdieu saw 
doxa as being ‘the relationship of immediated adherence that is established in practice 
between a habitus and a field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of 
the world that flows from practical sense’ (Bourdieu 1990: 68).  Combining ‘legislative, 
judicial, administrative and policing powers in one institution and even in one person’ is 
counterposed with the ‘separation of powers’, the pillar of a democratic state, here 
accepted as common sense or doxa.  But such clear-cut political models also limit the 
questions that can be asked that might challenge the extent of democracy that the 
current formal and legalised political and even democratically legitimised land system 
achieves.  There are, moreover, other rarely challenged aspects of the 'democratic state' 
relating to property ownership, such as racially defined and gendered inequality 
institutionalised through property and upheld in the ‘rule of law’ that CLARA, that was to 
meet the Constitutional imperative of dealing discretely with ‘tenure reform’, was not to 
address45.  Other more mundane aspects can be seen operating in the bureaucracy of 
the land registry and the imposition of particular monetary charges that disallow the 
participation of huge numbers of people whose level of financial well-being is below a 
particular threshold.  To be fair to Nkuzi’s submission, it does call for ‘a national debate’ 
that ‘should not be limited to dealing with communal areas, but deal with land tenure 
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for the country as a whole’.  Nevertheless, as seen in the newspaper extract quoted 
above, as well as in many, many others around the time, the undemocratic chieftaincy 
model, while being apparently radical and progressive, accepts a particular doxa and is 
thereby powerful in limiting the questions that can be asked.  
Such an opposition to the chieftaincy, as indicated in the previous chapter, had a long 
history with land sector activists and also with many ANC supporters.  When speaking to 
a former director of another prominent land NGO, his views of the chieftaincy were 
clearly generated through his shared history, growing up in a particular time and place:   
I was from a rural area but at a young age I left and went to live in the 
township where I was brainwashed – I was one of the student activists so I 
disliked traditional leaders.  I felt that they were part of the old order 
instruments that were used by apartheid – if you talk of struggle politics, 
traditional leaders were just manipulated and those who tried to defy were 
killed, or sent away to jail … (Former director of land NGO, interview - 3.3.06). 
While this individual’s habitus had been shaped by his upbringing living as an activist in 
a township, many others were shaped by their former involvement in the land struggle.  
Prior to 1994, many individuals working for NGOs participated in the countrywide SPP, 
undertaking research so as to bolster legal challenges against forced removals of people 
from ‘black spots’ in the former ‘white areas’ into the homelands.  Many of them then 
went on to fight the state’s imposition of chiefs and Tribal Authorities on such 
‘communities’.  Amongst NGOs in the early-1990s, knowledge of the homelands and the 
nature of the ‘insecurity’ of tenure within such areas was relatively thin on the ground46.  
Knowledge such as there was, derived from NGOs’ work with communities who had 
been forcefully removed from blackspots into the homelands.  Some had also formed 
linkages with people fighting the independence of KwaNdebele in the 1980s.  There 
were of course some working for NGOs who were themselves from such rural areas, but 
few of these people secured policy-making positions in government after 1994.  This 
manifested itself both in the government and in NGOs.  Understanding tenure in the 
former homelands for those whose habitus was not shaped by growing up in such a 
context was not easy; a former prominent land activist said of redistribution and 
restitution:   
that was easy land reform.  But it hadn’t taken off.  We hadn’t had to deal with 
common ownership of land – that nightmare … that’s what brought to the fore 
some of the tensions because both us and the government realised what a 
difficult fucking process it is.  What is our role here? – because all our resources 
could be swallowed in one community.  Then it would be better used in focusing 
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on advocacy but how can you shout about something if you don’t know what is 
happening on the ground. (former NLC Director, interview – 22.2.06)  
Moreover, the politics relating to the stark inequalities in land holding and the 
restoration of stolen land rights as a result of the forced removals, dealt with in the 
redistribution and restitution programmes respectively, were easier to grasp politically.  
He went on to tell me that “back then” it was easy to be radical but that the reform of 
tenure in the former homelands was a different ball game.  Nevertheless, tenure reform 
had been incorporated into the Constitution and, as a result, the government became 
constitutionally mandated to adopt legislation that would provide ‘tenure which is legally 
secure or … comparable redress’ and so NGOs had to respond to whatever it came up 
with. 
One of the first calls from the LPM after its launch, was for the government to hold a 
Land Summit.  “Instead”, in November 2001, a Tenure Conference took place in 
Durban: “a big flashy conference with landless ‘representatives’ at this beachfront hotel, 
and everyone ‘living well’” (former NLC employee, interview – 19.12.05).  It was here 
that the Director of the Tenure Directorate briefed the audience on the first details of 
the new plans for a ‘CLRB’.  The conference itself was a turning point for a number of 
reasons.  But for the NGO network, the ‘turning point’ did not relate to tenure at all.  It 
was at the Conference that “the fissures started to grow more obvious” – the conflicts 
between different individuals and factions of individuals within the activist field became 
more pronounced.  In addition to the ‘black=radical’ vs. ‘white=liberal’ framings 
discussed in Chapter 3, people’s political affiliations also became more prominent and, in 
turn, were interpreted as motives for their opposition to, or support of, a more or less 
‘radical’ approach towards social movements.  While the stamps ‘pro-ANC’ vs. ‘anti-ANC’ 
do not neatly fall into those ‘black=radical’ vs. ‘white=liberal’ framings, interests based 
upon political affiliation were used by some as a useful explanatory tool, or additional 
ammunition, in the fight to support the LPM.   
To the proposed CLRB, however, according to the now director of the Association for 
Rural Advancement (AFRA), an NLC affiliate based in KZN, the response from NGOs 
“was just nothing.  No reaction.” (AFRA director, interview - 28.02.06).  The importance 
of the government setting out its proposals, for the first time since the LRB had been 
dropped by Thoko Didiza, had somehow been displaced by these other politics 
structuring positions held within the activist field.  And so it was PLAAS, not the NLC, 
that put together the funding proposal to support the PLAAS/NLC Project, even though 
the NLC was strategically included as a non-academic partner – and one that was not 
obviously aligned with the drafters of the pre-1999 Land Rights Bill (who were in fact 
running the project).  But with tensions over other issues already high at the NLC, the 
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PLAAS/NLC ‘Community Consultation’ project soon ran into predictable difficulties with 
different people holding onto strong different opinions over the nature of consultation, 
the role of advocacy, of NGOs and competition between the two organisations as to 
what the project should involve.  
3 – The failure of strategic positioning in the activist field 
Although land sector internal politics in 2002-3 to a certain extent displaced the issues 
of tenure reform from their agenda, many land sector NGOs were involved in the 
PLAAS/NLC Project, and many did end up rallying around the ‘coalition’ of opposition to 
CLARA that so impressed the media at that time.  But the adoption of the ‘anti-
chieftaincy’ model to frame the debate was not uncontested.  Furthermore, its adoption 
marked the end of a progression away from the nuance with which different groups 
within the coalition approached the issues earlier in the debates.  As time progressed 
towards the CLRB’s passage through Parliament, and the threat of losing the struggle 
with government increased, and with it authority to represent and name the issues to be 
dealt with by the reforms, so people and groups participating in the coalition 
approached their opposition to the Bill with increasing urgency and passion.  In turn, the 
debates became framed in increasingly dichotomous terms and people became less able 
to choose their own positioning.  Some groups did not subscribe to the model at all but, 
because it had come to frame the issues relating to the reforms, their opposition to the 
legislation, even if for other more nuanced reasons, was interpreted by others as 
automatically assuming the anti-chieftaincy model. 
The Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) based in KZN had been undertaking a 
tenure project since 1998, focusing all the time on Ekuthuleni, a village outside the 
Ingonyama Trust land.  Even though AFRA participated in the coalition (“in the end, we 
did all agree on ‘How do we go to Parliament to stop this Bill going through?’” (AFRA 
director, interview – 28.2.06)), the organisation did not actively adopt the undemocratic 
chieftaincy model: 
the fundamental one [bone of contention] was the issue of the Traditional 
Authorities.  The issue of whether they are democratic or not, for us, is not the 
issue.  The issues are about what gives people secure tenure and one of the 
things that does that is a well functioning tenure committee which is made up of 
a body of people who are constant, and the rules are clear so that they can 
administer it.  If you’re going to re-elect them every few years you can’t expect 
that they will administer it well.  If you compare it to something like the Deeds 
office, why would you want to re-elect them.  Yes, we understand the issue of 
abuse, but that’s a governance issue. (ibid). 
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In the height of the passion in the build up to the Portfolio Committee hearings, holding 
to such a position was not easy; former allies fell out over it – those wanting to 
challenge the assumptions about traditional leaders were branded as ‘conservative’ – 
and with activists, many of whom were white, some of whom were at the forefront in 
planning ‘the coalition’s’ full frontal attack, not accepting positions outside the model, 
racial sensitivities and anger were inflamed.  When it came to the Parliamentary 
hearings, AFRA did not in the end present its submission – a move that was explained 
away by various rumours amongst those in other NGOs that in any case shed bad light 
on the ‘decision’. 
Ongoing contestations between and amongst NGOs have shaped their practices that in 
turn have produced particular readings of legitimate knowledge and shaped accepted 
identities of those they claim to represent.  The word ‘claim’ is not used to undermine 
the perspectives of actors within NGOs, but to draw attention to the way that such 
representation is in itself a strategic action.  Here, attention is drawn to the difficulties 
encountered in an attempt to represent issues that individuals at AFRA believed were 
most important to their constituents; doing so would have positioned them in a 
particular way.  But not doing so, similarly positioned them negatively precisely because 
the issues they wished to represent posited knowledge that was not considered to be 
legitimate, and identities that were not acceptable within the terms of the debates. 
In their relations with their constituents, NGOs may not have to act ‘strategically’, but in 
relation to the politics of CLARA they could not avoid it.  This draws attention towards 
the contradiction inherent in this field.  The label ‘activist field’ is not ironic.  Rather than 
simply distinguishing a realm apart from the state and the market – that might be 
labelled ‘the field of civil society’ – ‘activist’ instead implies a particular role for such 
supposedly, perhaps idealistically, non-state, non-market actors, but a role that is 
constantly negotiated and contested by those operating within the field.  So the activist 
field lies between the ‘local’ and the ‘national’, engaging with both; strategies and 
practices are conceived on the basis of its mediating position.  To a certain extent, 
NGOs within the activist field act as bridges between those people who are often 
marginalised in terms of their material reality and in their access to information about 
political and policy changes that are to affect their lives, and those in the government 
and in wider policy-making spheres.  In this mediating position they have access to 
knowledge conceived within these two very different fields and claim to use it in order 
to improve the lives of those who are marginalised.  And this is where the contradiction 
lies, and where the root of so much anguish and conflicts within the field lies: how to 
strategise positioning themselves in relation to the wider field of power at the same time 
as representing honestly the voices of its marginalised constituents?  Responding to this 
involves ongoing contestations, but such contestations sometimes displace the 
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knowledge of people ‘on the ground’.  So while NGOs are uniquely positioned to fulfil 
this potential – ‘to add real insight to local grassroots and political strategies’ (Mitlin, 
Hickey et al. 2006: 35 - my italics) – whether or not they are able to do so will depend 
on the strategies they adopt, the relationships they choose to build with politicians, 
bureaucrats, other NGOs, people in social movements etc. and the extent to which they 
manage to ‘help[..] people see things differently’ (Mitlin, Hickey et al. 2006: 35).  Their 
engagement with people ‘on the ground’ is essential to their role. 
After the changes in government in 1999, the extent to which different individuals and 
NGOs could position themselves, or found themselves to be positioned by others, 
sometimes unfavourably, was not only called into question in relation to CLARA.  As 
recognised in Chapter 3, the extent to which individuals, maybe even NGOs could claim 
‘activist capital’ depended upon how ‘radical’ or ‘liberal’ they were seen to be, linked 
variously how to they managed to position themselves in terms of class, politics, race, 
gender etc.  But the changes in actors’ and NGOs’ positioning after 1999, did not play 
out consistently within the activist field.  Many were competing with each other to 
change their position, and that of their NGO, in the ‘hierarchy’ of the field, in order (and 
I am taking their assertions seriously) to be able to exercise greater political sway over 
the outcome of the political process – here in relation to CLARA – for the benefit of their 
constituents.  But that hierarchy is closely, albeit paradoxically, connected with relations 
to the wider field of power; as activists they are on the one hand working to subvert, or 
at least change, power relations within the wider field of power, but at the same time 
they often rely on those positioned within it to secure government contracts or donor 
funding.  They therefore need to secure recognition from those within that wider field so 
as to bolster their own legitimacy.  Not managing to do so, however, may involve a 
certain amount of personal anguish. 
While individuals work to position their NGO strategically in particular ways, in turn, and 
sometimes as a result, they are seen and positioned by others in other ways, often ways 
that they would not choose.  Before going to either KZN or to Limpopo to carry out 
fieldwork with NGOs operating in those Provinces, I was warned that I should be careful 
about letting the DLA know that I was planning to spend any time with AFRA, because: 
it is seen in a certain kind of way – unjustifiably – in national circles but it [the 
DLA] seems to be taking a funny position.  But AFRA in relation to CLARA, out 
of all the NGOs, has been trying to accommodate CLARA (NGO consultant, 
interview – 21.7.05). 
The prelude to this person’s understanding of the positioning of AFRA by the DLA was 
her experience of changes that happened in the Department since 1999: 
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 When Hanekom got kicked out as Minister there was a huge backlash against 
lefty white intellectuals in the DLA and it was the same time as the first attempt 
to draft the Land Rights Act, and X and Y were centrally involved in that, with Z 
… None of us escaped the label. … we were seen to be part of people who were 
thought to be a thorn in the flesh of the new power strata and our opinions 
thereafter were not sought.  It was as simple as that.  Even people like me in a 
very marginal role … (ibid). 
This had affected her in a project that she was working on that was funded by DFID 
which had an international policy of insisting on working with governments in whatever 
country their projects were based: 
 I didn’t want to be seen in any particular light … but what we hadn’t bargained 
for was the hellish climate at the time [2003] that we were all in.  As co-
ordinator, a top brass at the DLA refused to talk to me.  X whom I knew very 
well in the old days, refused to give me an interview.  … He never said he won’t 
talk to me but then he said ‘We should have been consulted’.  And then 
eventually he came out explicitly, and I got hold of DFID and said ‘You will have 
to talk to them’. … What they did, they called the DLA and tried to have a 
meeting to patch things up, but I didn’t go, I didn’t want to go … (ibid). 
Many people during the course of the year similarly told me how personally hurt they 
felt that they had been excluded from former relationships with ‘comrades’, friends and 
colleagues.  They read such exclusions as arising from people perceiving their affiliation 
with others in particular ways, in many cases depending upon their political affiliation or 
race.  And the ‘strategies’ that actors pursued in relation to the politics over CLARA were 
to a certain extent determined by their appreciation of their own position within the field 
and in relation to the wider field of power.  However, while their strategies were 
conditional upon their perceptions of particular possibilities and limitations, the likelihood 
of their success was also objectively defined by relations of power determined according 
to differentiation along multiple (race, gender, class etc.) axes. 
The ambivalence in NGOs’ relationship with government after 1994 created spaces in 
which struggles were fought between actors for maintaining their positions within the 
hierarchical relations of the activist field, struggles around the value claimed for both 
new and old resources and the generation of capital.  The meanings of, and even the 
perceived need for, ‘consultation’ and ‘engagement’ as opposed to ‘protest’ and 
‘struggle’ changed significantly over that time, each one up for negotiation as different 
actors claimed different constructions of reality.  But the struggles going on within the 
activist field also relate to the habitus of individuals competing for positions within it, 
and in South Africa, where race still largely structures the vast inequalities in economic 
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well-being and education, vast differences also in the habitus of individuals coming 
together in different fields cannot be ignored.  Furthermore, differences in financial, 
social and cultural capital in turn structure the potential positions, subjectively and 
objectively structured, of individuals within society.  In the activist field, no less so.  Jobs 
in Limpopo province are scarce for young people qualified with diplomas and degrees, 
and jobs in an NGO are sought after, perhaps not as sought after as jobs in government 
in terms of the security offered, but in areas that have unemployment reaching levels of 
nearly 80%, the realities of the alternative, with responsibilities of children, of sickness, 
of rural poverty, are pressing.  I attended many meetings and interviews with NGO 
workers at their homes contrasting between ‘four-rooms’ in townships with corrugated 
iron roofs and beautifully designed, spacious suburban homes with grassy gardens and 
swimming pools.  These activists come together in their work in NGOs, all of them 
expressing a commitment to the improvement of people’s lives whose poverty resulted 
from such obvious and ongoing injustice.  Such objective social conditions, historically 
generated structural properties based upon the interrelationship between class and race, 
will undoubtedly influence the individual (and collective) habitus of different actors (and 
groups of actors) in the field and the struggle for positions in it.   
Furthermore, such inconsistencies and differences in the activist habitus are also likely 
to contribute to inconsistencies in the practices generated through the activist field 
(Bourdieu 1990: 58).  Therefore, it is important to consider how such access shapes 
relations of power within the activist field.  In light of the harsh reality of the alternative, 
it is not surprising that many of Nkuzi’s fieldworkers expressed ongoing concerns about 
the NGO’s funding and about their monetary ‘incentives’.  Moreover, many admitted that 
they were consistently looking for jobs elsewhere.  Amongst many of those working for 
NGOs, at this time, the instinct to ‘protest against’ was not automatic; sometimes it was 
replaced by a choice to ‘work with’, at other times it was displaced by other actors or 
groupings positioning them in particular ways.  In the context of a lack of state capacity 
in the implementation of its own programmes, NGOs were cast sometimes as 
‘programme implementers’, at other times as ‘mediators’ to smooth things over between 
the landless and government. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, during this same post-1999 period, questioning the 
‘representativeness’ of NGOs was one of the key preoccupations of many of those self-
named activists I spoke to.  With the launch of the LPM in 2001, and perhaps to a 
certain extent inspired by the government denying their former taken-for-granted 
inclusion in policy-making, concerns relating to the legitimacy of ‘speaking for the 
oppressed’ began to appear more prominently amongst many working for NGOs and for 
the NLC, and contributed to the crisis that led to the closing of its national office in 2005 
(Mngxitama 2006; James 2007).  The staff member from Nkuzi who had worked on the 
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PLAAS/NLC Project workshops had left the organisation by the time I came there, but 
was remembered warmly by one participant of the workshops that I spoke to – he was 
from a village not far from Chavani, where I had been doing my research – and was not 
difficult to track down.  When I arrived in Y’s office in Polokwane, it was a small room 
with three desks and four people in it.  I was the fifth, and we brought in an extra chair 
and pulled it up to his crowded desk.  He had moved away from working exclusively on 
land issues and was now pursuing government grants for small-scale tourism and 
development projects in the rural areas he had previously been working in.  He talked to 
me about his involvement in the workshops that he had participated in and expressed 
concerns about the extent to which those actually attending them were ‘representative’ 
of ‘the community’, being predominantly those involved in formal ANC politics and 
teachers.  While this is a criticism relating to the linkages forged between NGOs and 
‘their communities’ and representatives of the communities, and reflect criticisms made 
elsewhere (Nauta 2004; James 2007), he went on to criticise the attitude of the 
organisers that he perceived to amount to a dismissal of the knowledge and experience 
of those who attended the workshops, based upon their ‘racial’ superiority (again, these 
were his perceptions of the way the organisers related to those who attended the 
workshops).  But his concerns here, also clearly related to his own perceptions of the 
way he felt that he had also been positioned by the organisers: 
The people at the forefront of this thing […] – they’re white.  It’s the only way 
they see these things: ‘They cannot think for themselves’.  I assure you that 
those racial politics were at play.  To just criticise just one thing – that 
characterised the whole thing.  When I went to a meeting and suggested 
certain things they were ignored.  And I expect these suggestions to be taken 
as the meeting was of the CLR group.  But the leadership, mainly because it 
was white, were feeling that the leadership should take responsibility.  But that 
feeling came from the leadership.  A specific report came out that I feel 
personally does not represent me personally.  … But after that report, we 
waited 8 months for the Department to come up with a new draft – and they 
started criticising them again.  The leadership were thinking the black members 
were becoming unreasonable – you sit with people and disagree on certain 
things and people will think you’re being too unreasonable. (Former NGO 
employee, interview – 13.1.06) 
I apologised that I seemed to have made him angry and he rejoindered that he was 
angry.  He had conveyed to me the almost personal slight he felt in response to what he 
perceived to be endless, but not constructive, criticisms by the white project leaders of 
black people in government and his feeling that, in publishing a report that did not 
represent his own interpretation of the situation, the white leaders were riding 
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roughshod over his views.  Again, he was reacting against others in the field positioning 
him in particular ways, compromising the extent to which his voice was heard or even 
listened to.   
There are understandably deep-rooted sensitivities relating to race in South Africa and 
even though inequality drawn along racial lines is increasingly differentiated in terms of 
class, such inequality remains stark for the majority of people in the country.  
Furthermore, access to different forms of capital is similarly structured and, as indicated 
above, in turn shapes vast differences in terms of habitus.  In many aspects of life in 
South Africa, individuals with such different embodied histories rarely come together, 
but in fields such as the activist field, they do.  And when they do, the two examples of 
how sensitivities arising from such differences and inequalities can be brought to bear 
on individuals’ personal relationships with colleagues or (former) friends underline the 
impossibility of ignoring them.  Just as that participant who had been so hurt by the way 
former colleagues and friends had assumed her affiliations based upon perhaps her age, 
her gender and the colour of her skin, when so far as she was concerned she had done 
nothing to promote such an assumption, Y similarly felt undervalued, that he had not 
been listened to, that his knowledge was undervalued – a knowledge that he felt should 
have been accepted, being based as it was from his own experiences of living and 
growing up in such an area.  The result for both of them was a build-up of resentment 
and anger, and they both reacted against it, reacting against their positioning by other 
actors in the activist and other fields; even in talking to me they again endeavoured to 
re-position themselves again.  As Fisher has argued, ‘[i]ndividuals and groups struggle 
for the freedom to define themselves and their relationships with others on their own 
terms’ but that ‘[c]hanging the self and changing society both require a rejection of the 
representation of self imposed by relationships with others’ (Fisher 1997: 457).  Both of 
these individuals, however, were in a position to attempt to do this.  However, the 
extent to which these very struggles, for positions in the activist field through the 
assertion of particular representations of ‘truth’, may displace the knowledge of those 
who they undertake or claim to represent, and even the freedom that they have to 
define themselves on their own terms, remains the key question. 
4 – From mediating politics to the politics of mediation 
As indicated in the previous section, NGOs’ engagements with people ‘on the ground’ 
are essential to their role: in shaping the knowledge that will inform the organisation’s 
positioning in policy debates, but also in legitimising their claimed position as mediating 
the ‘local’ and the ‘national’ and influencing those debates.  So while there are 
individuals working for NGOs who are working to strategically position themselves, and 
the NGO, in relation to the wider field of power, there are also many whose everyday 
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work is relatively unconnected with (albeit not unaffected by) the wider ‘field of power’.  
While through their employment they are positioned squarely within the activist field, 
their day-to-day relations with their constituents relate more to the relations of power 
that structure the rural field.  Perhaps because they are not really involved in mediating 
the wider politics of positioning the NGO – they are more involved with the politics of 
mediating the day-to-day conflicts and disputes that arise in their everyday work as 
fieldworkers – most of these individuals are relatively low in the ‘pecking order’ of NGOs, 
their cultural capital and knowledge of rural areas not valued as much as that of those 
individuals who have made themselves essential to positioning the NGO, successfully or 
unsuccessfully, within the hierarchy of the activist field or even in relation to the wider 
field of power.  Nevertheless, their positioning within the NGO will also be structured by 
their qualifications, their personal relations, their career aspirations, structured in turn 
by their habitus.  This section, however, discusses how NGOs’ engagements with people 
‘on the ground’ became more important as a means to legitimise their claimed position 
as mediating the ‘local’ and the ‘national’ and influencing policy debates, than shaping 
the knowledge that informed the organisations’ positioning in those debates.  Rather 
than such knowledge filtering up from engagements between fieldworkers and people 
living in rural areas, instead particular readings of legitimate knowledge and accepted 
identities that were deployed by NGOs in relation to their strategic positioning in policy 
debates, shaped the practices of fieldworkers working in such areas with consequent 
contradictions left to be resolved at a personal level. 
Nkuzi was set up in 1998 and grew from just three people to having over 25 employees 
in 2005.  Its ‘head’ office was in Polokwane, but it had three other offices, one in Elim 
on the edge of the former Gazankulu and Venda homelands, dealing principally with 
restitution matters, one in Modimolle dealing principally with farm worker and labour 
tenant issues, and one in Pretoria dealing with ‘policy’.  I first came into contact with 
Nkuzi’s former director because it was due to be undertaking a joint project with IDS 
shortly before I was due to fly out to South Africa and he indicated that I could get in 
touch with the organisation if I wanted to undertake any local-level fieldwork in 
Limpopo.  I followed up on this offer and secured accommodation with a family known 
to him, who were living in a village next to the village of Chavani where I undertook 
research.  During my time spent living with the family, carrying out my research 
everyday, I used the Nkuzi office at Elim as a ‘base’.  It was good to have somewhere to 
come back to, to plan interviews, write up fieldnotes and chat to the administrator and 
those employed as fieldworkers on the projects based in the surrounding areas.  I 
accompanied many of them in their work, learning a lot from seeing them at work as 
they went out to local villages to meet their clients, members of land claims committees 
of local communities, CPAs and the Provincial LPM.  They were generous in inviting me 
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along to local community meetings that they knew were being held and even allowed 
me to attend the NGO’s week-long ‘Strategic Planning Meeting’ at the end of my time 
there.   
Nkuzi had no tenure project as such.  Nevertheless, many of its staff were from nearby 
rural areas – all of them working for Nkuzi’s Elim branch came from villages in the 
surrounding areas – and therefore had an ongoing experiential knowledge of tenure in 
those areas.  But in their capacity as Nkuzi staff, their contact with people living in those 
villages arose largely from those groups who had lodged land claims under the 
Restitution Act47, as well as people who had heard that there was a lawyer at Nkuzi 
offering free legal advice for anything from employment claims, to eviction cases. 
‘A’ had been involved in Nkuzi since the outset in 1997 and proudly regaled me with 
tales of early sit-ins at the Minister’s office, protests against evictions – at one he had 
been wrongfully arrested – and stories of being ‘tailed by the NIA’.  Not only did he 
assert such post-apartheid activist struggle credentials that were clearly important 
within the activist field, but he was also well-versed in the discourse of democracy and 
the law, often acting as a spokesperson for Nkuzi in contacting and relaying local stories 
to the national media – television and the press.  Despite his activist credentials, with 
the support of Nkuzi, he had gone back to studying law and he took seriously his 
advocacy training, or ‘articles’, and dreamed of opening up his own practice in one of 
the villages nearby where he lived.  He often turned up to work in a suit despite 
frequent trips along dusty unpaved roads to visit clients and sort out disputes.  When I 
arrived at Nkuzi and told him what I was interested in, he made sure to tell me about 
the ‘Communal Land Rights Act cases’ that he was dealing with.  Knowing that CLARA 
had not yet been implemented I was unsure as to what these might be and 
accompanied him to a meeting to resolve ‘a Communal Land Rights Act case’.  The 
meeting was with the Hosi and induna of Bungeni, the next village along from Chavani, 
and a woman from the village.  When I talked to the woman as we were waiting for the 
meeting to start, she scarcely held back tears as she told me of the decision by the 
induna to allocate a stand for a garage between her shop and the road thereby blocking 
access for any potential customers to her shop.  The meeting itself was resolved in her 
favour due to A’s knowledge of a bye-law that, in any case, forbade building at the 
proposed proximity to the road.  But this was a ‘Communal Land Rights Act case’ - 
showing that “the Communal Land Rights Act would be a terrible thing if left to the 
Chief” (Nkuzi employee, personal communication - 2.11.05).   
When we were talking about CLARA itself another time, however, A seemed to support 
the idea of some sort of committee comprising of chiefs and elected community 
members, so long as there were clear rules devolving more power to the community 
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and setting out clearly the obligations and rules that should govern them (Nkuzi 
employee, interview – 28.10.05).  Given that both an “LAC” and “Community Rules” 
were provisions of CLARA, it was therefore somewhat strange then that he seemed so 
opposed to it.  So that they would be easily translatable to the media, even to those 
working in the policy unit in Pretoria, A was used to fitting the details of his everyday 
encounters within the wider discourses and politics shaping high profile issues and cases 
that Nkuzi was engaged with.  But such wider discourses also had the potential to shape 
his approach to mediating tenure problems.  Furthermore, granting recognition only to 
those tenure problems arising from the actions of corrupt or wayward chiefs could limit 
the extent to which the complexity of tenure problems are brought to light. 
The NLC/PLAAS project carried out its first workshop in Mashamba, a village next to 
Chavani (see Chapter 7).  But while Chavani was well known to Nkuzi because of its 
involvement in working with people there on a number of land claims, when I asked A 
about Mashamba, he claimed not to know much about it – it was not one of Nkuzi’s 
‘communities’.  However, according to the PLAAS Research Report, ‘Community views 
on the Communal Land Rights Bill’ (8.03: 28), there were specific reasons for choosing 
Mashamba as a location for the first workshop: 
Mashamba village was chosen for the consultation site because of a serious 
tenure problem – a headman had entered into a contract with an investor in 
terms of which a large area of communal land had been fenced off as a 
potential game farm.  This has restricted the community’s rights to grazing, 
hunting and water on the land … However, apparently neither the chief not the 
community were adequately consulted about the contract, nor has any benefit 
emerged in the form of rent or jobs. 
During my time in the area, this story had become a bit of a legend, many people were 
aware of it, but its key protagonists and story changed depending on the teller – the 
person selling the land was not a headman but a rich businessman living in Mashamba, 
or the person was indeed a headman but the sale had not been completed.  The tenure 
problems in the area were complex, as were the changing dynamics of the chieftaincy 
(see Chapter 7).  Apparently, however, it was not this problem that produced the 
‘teething problems’ experienced in that workshop (ibid).  The people invited to the 
Mashamba workshop included people under both Mashamba Tribal Authority48 and 
Chavani Traditional Authority (TA), but Nkuzi had only before had contact with Chavani, 
through supporting its land claims.  One of those claims involved a group of people 
living in Chavani, under Hosi X, who were claiming land falling within the area governed 
by Mashamba TA.  Some seven or eight years since submitting the claim, according to 
the claimants, the Land Claims Commission (LCC) had hardly yet embarked on the case 
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and tensions between the two groups had heightened over this time.  Since claiming the 
land, the PLAAS/NLC Project workshop meeting was the first involvement of all 
interested parties and there was confusion amongst those people present as to what the 
meeting was for.  I spoke in depth to three people who had attended the meeting, two 
of whom had gone on to attend subsequent national meetings convened under the 
project.  One of them told me about the confusion that was stirred up by the holding of 
the meeting: 
they [the participants] accused the facilitators for being involved in settling the 
claim and x, the uncle of Hosi x … said to the facilitators ‘You people!  Why 
don’t you stop those people from Mashamba to plough?’  There was a lot of 
tension. … Some of the things people were putting as comments were ‘We don’t 
need this Bill because that land [where Mashamba is] belongs to us!’  and ‘Only 
our chiefs our governing us.’ – because with the committee which must be 
nominated, people felt that it was going to take away their powers [of the 
chiefs]. … When they talked about ‘Why now?’, we thought that the government 
were trying to run away from giving us land – how could they facilitate the 
[CLRB] without facilitating our claim? … So the tension was in the whole 
workshop. (Workshop participant, interview - 20.11.05) 
Much of this tension had clearly been generated simply by the convening of a meeting 
that included people from two villages, one that had an unresolved restitution claim over 
the land of the other.  This was a tenure problem that was certainly relevant to any 
tenure reform and even to an enquiry convened so to look into the existing de facto 
rights to be secured pursuant to tenure reform: any confirmation of people’s current 
rights pursuant to land reform legislation, when it is in fact former rights that they are 
actively seeking to re-secure, would not be welcome.  But the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ approach 
of progressive activists had somewhat eclipsed these other complexities that were not 
only paramount in the minds of the workshop participants but actually threatened to 
disrupt the whole proceedings, and understandably so, given the misunderstandings 
that arose. 
A number of people I met working for Nkuzi similarly strongly articulated the anti-
chieftaincy discourse, manifesting in a variety of practices in their encounters with local 
people but also in contradictions in their personal sense of identity.  One individual 
working at Nkuzi, ‘B’, had secured employment after becoming involved in facilitating 
the Mashamba workshop.  Although he now worked at the Polokwane office, I went to 
visit him at his family’s stand beyond Bungeni – he told me to stop and ask anyone if I 
got lost on the way, just ask for the stand of the headman.  B was known for being a bit 
of a talker, and certainly when I spoke to him he was confident and forthright in telling 
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me what he thought, regaling me with the ins and outs of the ANC’s neo-liberal turn, his 
disapproval of GEAR which “was not an ANC policy, it was drawn up by a neoliberal 
leadership that has taken over the ANC” and his anti-chieftaincy approach to tenure 
reform (Nkuzi employee, interview – 19.9.05).  But he also wanted people to be given 
more land, and he thought that whatever secure tenure rights they were to be given, 
they should not be allowed to sell their land.  In the end I asked him whether his father, 
the headman, knew of his views, and what he thought of them.  He told me that his 
father not only knew of them but supported him.  He surprised me further when he told 
me that he had been involved in the anti-chiefs’ uprisings in the area in the early 1990s, 
and by way of explanation he told me that he had been living in Soweto at the time and 
the ANC had been fighting with IFP supporters there.  It had been messy.  But he 
added, so far as there were still chiefs and headmen here, his father was a good one 
and was progressive and popular with his people – it wasn’t his father who the uprising 
had been against.  His father had even refused to take up the post of induna until there 
was a democracy.  So while in his day-to-day reality, B was able to reconcile the 
contradictions between his ‘anti-chieftaincy’ line and his family’s position within the 
community, doing so was perhaps not as necessary when working for an NGO that itself 
espoused such a discourse. 
Another of the individuals who had attended the Mashamba workshop, ‘C’, had gone on 
to participate in subsequent Provincial and National meetings and was proud to have 
been the one chosen to fly to Cape Town to participate in drawing up submissions to be 
made to Parliament.  C was a teacher, and proudly lent me a copy of his thesis that he 
had submitted towards his degree.  It was on the history of the chieftaincy in his village 
of Mashamba – a history that was strongly contested by those villagers in Bokisi whose 
land claim was over much of the territory now making up Mashamba.  He was softly 
spoken and thoughtful about the workshops and Parliamentary process, and told me 
that he himself had been unhappy with the submission that they had made that was so 
strongly against the chiefs.  The reason why C had agreed to the submission, however, 
was  because  he had felt that in a group, you have to compromise – there had been 
one person in the group (it happened to be B), who spoke very strongly and cared very 
deeply about these things.  He had gone along with this.  But he reflected:  
There were a lot of these NGOs in Cape Town, and somehow they were all 
speaking with one voice.  And they were very extreme.  Maybe it is that where 
you have grown up somehow shapes you. 
ERAF:  Like growing up in Cape Town? 
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Yes!  And like me, growing up here – maybe is somehow brainwashes you to 
think in some ways. (Mashamba informant, personal communication – 
18.11.06). 
Although the tangible repercussions on B’s specific engagements with policy in relation 
to CLARA happened to be traceable here, C’s personal difficulties in reconciling the 
stand he took participating in drawing up the submission to Parliament are perhaps, 
here, less important than simply recognising the extent to which the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ 
discourse pushed out more nuanced understandings of the chieftaincy in such areas.  
However, B’s practical acceptance of, or realism towards the existence of the 
chieftaincy, chimes with that of other employees at Nkuzi.   
I spent quite a lot of time with ‘D’, attending a number of meetings between him and 
groups of constituents during the time that I spent in Limpopo.  He was conscientious in 
his work, often stepping in to mediate tense situations, and was thoughtful about the 
starkly different ‘worlds’ he often found himself engaging with.  He was from a village in 
the former Venda, from a fairly wealthy family, but through his work with Nkuzi found 
himself engaging with politicians, government officials, land commissioners, activist 
academics, traditional leaders and village women’s groups – seemingly equally at ease 
with them all.  But he grappled with the incongruities arising from the introduction of a 
law, like IPILRA (the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 1996) that was so 
progressive at one level, but that then meant nothing to people on the ground: 
You find that TAs didn’t know a thing about it. … the structures involved in land 
administration didn’t know about it.  For example, a family went to bury their 
family in the graveyard and the TA decided not to let them.  But they said, it 
goes against our norms and our family.  With IPILRA, there has to be a process 
of consultation and people have to agree.  So we took IPILRA and they said 
‘What is that?  You are bringing division to the Community.’ (Nkuzi employee, 
interview – 19.9.05) 
For D, the problem with CLARA was not the chiefs – they could potentially be a problem 
if they were corrupt and took bribes and that of course needed to be dealt with – but 
the main problem was defining a community and territory in the first place.  He had 
ample experience of dealing with restitution cases in which ongoing disputes, sometimes 
years-long, had been rumbling on between ‘communities’ over defining their territorial 
boundaries that did not reflect those boundaries of property registered in the Deeds 
office.  But adhering to an ‘anti-chieftaincy’ line in this context was just not possible; 
such a line failed to grapple with a reality that could not be ignored: 
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The TA is there.  It has been there and is performing a role.  You need to be 
careful about establishing structures.  You currently have CPAs where TAs are 
involved ...  That’s what I see as a challenge – linkage with structures that 
existed before. (ibid) 
Such knowledge contrasts with the ‘anti-chieftaincy’, Mamdani-inspired discourse that 
was adopted by his NGO to try to further its strategic positioning in debates in relation 
to CLARA.  Rather than knowledge based upon engagements between fieldworkers and 
constituents ‘on the ground’ shaping its position in those debates, such a discourse has 
instead shaped the ‘everyday’ relations between some fieldworkers and their 
constituents.  This section has indicated the extent to which unthinking deployment of 
such a discourse can re-inscribe narrow readings of knowledge considered to be 
legitimate and accepted identities.  As recognised by Robins, ‘tradition, community and 
ethnicity, like nationalism, can be either emancipatory and progressive, or reactionary 
and exclusionary’ (Robins 2003: 275), but positioning ‘tradition’ within such a binary of 
‘undemocratic chiefs’ versus their ‘democratic other’ will exclude more nuanced 
understandings of an everyday, negotiated, often contested, reality that is unequal and 
messy in its democratic and undemocratic reach.   
5 - Conclusion 
Although the adoption of the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ discourse by NGOs in order to position 
themselves strategically in relation to CLARA enabled them to present themselves as a 
coalition speaking with one voice against the government, it also displaced more 
nuanced knowledge of the tenure of people living in such rural areas.  Their adoption of 
such a discourse in their engagements with policy-makers was at a time characterised 
by immense conflict in the activist field, with actors struggling, often unsuccessfully, to 
position themselves within a changing hierarchy of the field.  That hierarchy is 
structured by the different forms of capital brought by individuals coming together in 
the field, each also bringing a different background and habitus.  Such conflicts often 
brought to the fore issues relating to race, gender, class, politics, etc, striking to the 
heart of individuals’ identities, and affected their personal responses and ongoing 
relationships with current and former friends and colleagues.  Strategies they adopted in 
relation to the politics over CLARA were also shaped by this, as well as by their position 
within the activist field and in relation to the wider field of power.  In the end, rather 
than more nuanced understandings of a messier reality of people living in such rural 
areas informing NGOs’ engagements with policy, engagements with people ‘on the 
ground’ were simply used to legitimise their positions and the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ discourse 
instead came to shape particular readings of legitimate knowledge that then played out 
in the interactions of fieldworkers and their rural constituents. 
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This raises the key challenge of the activist field: to enable the articulation of different 
ways of thinking by people who share a different habitus.  But there is a paradoxical 
tension in achieving this.  Individuals within the activist field are relatively powerful in 
holding sufficient capital to participate in policy debates in South Africa, but enabling the 
articulation of such different ways of thinking may also challenge their legitimacy, as 
people struggling to represent the ‘official version of the social world’.  Individuals within 
the activist field are struggling with others both within and outside the field for symbolic 
capital to make such representations.  Raising questions that are as yet un-askable so 
as to challenge doxa may also challenge that power held by actors operating within the 
field.  However, even if we were to deny this challenge, as recognised by Bourdieu: 
undertakings of collective mobilization cannot succeed without a minimum of 
concordance between the habitus of the mobilizing agents … and the 
dispositions of those who recognise themselves in their practices or words 
(Bourdieu 1990: 59).   
In the formulation of reforms that are to improve the lives of millions of South Africans 
living in areas ‘to be reformed’, enabling such an articulation of an ‘alternative’ 
knowledge of tenure, that will itself be contested, may be the only way of shaping 
solutions that are likely to have any purchase in shaping positive change in such areas.  
The following chapter homes in on the case study of Chavani in the former Gazankulu 
homeland, considering the habitus of those living in such an area, and how this shapes 
their lived reality, the chieftaincy and notions of ‘tenure’ and ‘ownership’ there. 
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CHAPTER 7: A ‘RURAL AREA’: CHAVANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE (FORMER 
GAZANKULU) 
1 - Introduction 
The previous chapters have considered the ways different groupings have engaged with 
each other in relation to CLARA and the discourses and politics that have shaped that 
engagement.  They have each constructed different versions of the rural field.  This 
chapter now moves into a particular place that is to be reformed by CLARA – Chavani, a 
village in the Limpopo Province – and the relations of power ‘on the ground’ that shape 
notions of ‘tenure’, ‘ownership’ and the chieftaincy.  It considers change that has taken 
place since 1994, but also the continuity in practices that have built up in response to its 
particular history.  People living there can be said to be positioned within the rural field 
but, as in the other chapters, this chapter only considers a slice of those positioned 
within this field.  However, this slice is also complemented by the discussion in other 
chapters of the voices of all of those who, in contestations over CLARA, have claimed to 
have the authority, if not legitimacy, to ‘speak for’ those in the rural field.  Some of 
them, such as those in the RWM as well as high profile IFP or CONTRALESA MPs, have 
endeavoured to claim such authority from their own experiential knowledge of the rural 
field.  The extent to which they have achieved this, however, has depended upon their 
power within the hierarchy in the wider field of power (see Chapters 3 and 8).   
This chapter presents information that I gathered from a range of participants in a case-
study undertaken in Chavani between August and November 200549.  The many 
participants living there whom I talked to and interviewed over that time will be the 
‘subjects’ of any reform of tenure and so their voices should arguably be some of those 
at the core of any such reform.  So this chapter will explore ‘what is to be reformed?’ 
based upon my interactions with people over this period of my fieldwork.  Although the 
obvious answer to the question ‘What is to be reformed?’ is ‘tenure’, the purpose of this 
chapter is not simply to hold up an alternative, more ‘correct’ reading of tenure in the 
former homelands with which to criticise other representations of tenure.  Instead, its 
purpose is to reveal the extent to which understandings of tenure, in one such ‘rural 
area’, are messy and negotiated and, moreover, shaped by practice.  This builds on the 
previous chapters that demonstrated, in contrast, how particular models of tenure and 
discourses of reform constructed by those with the power to represent ‘the problem’ 
existing in the former homelands, have actually displaced such messiness, and in turn 
the identities of people living in such places and their knowledge have been displaced 
from such framings of ‘the truth’.  Many of such discourses have pitted different 
understandings of ‘tradition’ against each other, for example, those of high profile and 
politically powerful traditional leaders claiming to speak for people living in such areas 
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(Chapter 3) against lawyers and their views of what is to be reformed and how (Chapter 
5).  In doing so, however, any more nuanced understandings that they have had, of the 
interrelationships between land, authority and identity, have been replaced by 
increasingly polarised pro/anti views of the chieftaincy.  It is these that have come to 
define the terms on which the debates have been fought.  Although this chapter does 
not present a grounded ethnography of land tenure in Chavani, it does represent an 
attempt to withdraw from interpretations of land and tenure shaped by such powerful 
discourses, and to underline the importance of re-grounding such an understanding in 
practice; understandings of tenure in the rural field are shaped by practice, which is 
ever contested, always messy and not easily defined. 
For people living in Chavani, different notions and concepts have meanings that relate 
to people’s everyday lives.  And so, in this chapter, I have tried to build up a picture of 
aspects of life in such areas so as to convey that practical reality, which has also 
entailed delving into the practices that have built up around the chieftaincy.  Since 1994, 
these have been influenced by change taking place in the institutional landscape.  Such 
practices have shaped a collective habitus of people living in Chavani, which has also 
been shaped by the personal and collective histories specific to them.  Where necessary 
to gain a deeper understanding of concepts such as ‘tradition’ or ‘authority’ or 
‘ownership’, I have therefore also endeavoured to explore aspects of people’s ‘lived 
history’, that is, the history that for them is uppermost in their minds in explaining their 
present.  In undertaking the fieldwork for this chapter, it was therefore useful to try to 
find out what assumptions, based upon a collective habitus, make some questions, and 
their answers, obvious, and others even ridiculous.  Doing so is revealing in casting light 
upon meanings constructed within this rural field and between differences in different 
fields that have been explored in previous chapters.  In the last section, dealing with 
‘tenure’ and ‘ownership’, I have also gone beyond Chavani to consider one example of a 
restitution case in which such concepts were taken ‘outside’ such a rural field and 
interpreted elsewhere.  I consider the effect of forcing a particular reality into meanings 
and interpretations drawn up by people outside the rural field, rather than relating it to 
the reality of those who experienced the wrong.  In this particular example, it has 
resulted in unforeseen outcomes, some of which have involved re-inflaming old rivalries 
based upon the chieftaincy and ethnicity.  Such an outcome is discouraging given its 
purpose of redressing a wrong that was perpetuated under apartheid. 
2 - Introducing Chavani 
Until 1994, Chavani was classified as a ‘Shangaan’ area and lay within the former 
Gazankulu, the homeland for the so-called Shangaan or Tsonga-speaking tribe.  While 
Tsonga traders had settled amongst societies in the then Eastern Transvaal from the 
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middle of the eighteenth century (Delius 1984), in the 1880s and 1890s larger numbers 
of diverse Tsonga-speaking groups fled from the Luzo-Gaza wars in Portuguese East 
Africa to what is now known as Limpopo and Mpumalanga (Niehaus 2001).  And, after 
decades of movement, migration and assimilation with different groups (Delius 1984), 
the arbitrary carving out of Gazankulu from the landscape, with thousands of Shangaan-
speaking people being forcefully removed ‘back’ into the homeland so as to be settled 
within its borders, was particularly brutal (Harries 1989).  Meanwhile, the ongoing 
removal of thousands of people living in areas that had been demarcated as ‘white’ 
farms, and others who were made ‘redundant’ as farm labourers on those increasingly 
profitable, productive and mechanised Transvaal farms, contributed to increasing 
overcrowding in these areas.  This did not mark the beginning of such a process but 
was the culmination of ‘an intense struggle for control over resources and human labour’ 
that had been going on since before the passing of the Natives Land Act in 1913 
(Keegan 1985: 391).  But while such struggles have always been racially defined, they 
have also always involved gendered struggles ‘with women and men of a particular race 
or class experiencing differential access and control over resources, power and authority 
because of the way gender relations are constructed’ (Meer 1999:75)50.   
Delius (1984) has described the extent to which, in the nineteenth century, many white 
people secured titles to land that was already settled by Africans, and such ownership 
was then used, with greater or lesser success, to demand payment in labour, in kind, or 
in taxes from their ‘tenants’.  Subsequently, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 were 
passed, prohibiting Africans from owning land outside the reserves.  However, as 
indicated in the Introduction, even within many of the reserves, the land was formally 
‘owned’ by the state.  Instead, Permissions To Occupy (PTOs) were distributed, but only 
to men; women were considered to be minors and therefore not entitled to have such 
PTOs registered in their names.  The 1913 Act also prohibited any payment of rent in 
kind, that is, share-cropping tenancies (whereby the black tenant farmers paid half or 
less of their crop to the white landowner).  Its passing marked a point at the height of 
tensions between white landowners and black tenants.  While there was an ongoing 
demand for the labour of those black people living on the land, share-cropping not only 
failed to satisfy these demands, but also provided black tenants with opportunities for 
their own capital accumulation and, in turn, their own diminished dependency, other 
than for land (Keegan 1985; van Onselen 1997).  Labour tenancy, on the other hand, 
provided white farmers with labour, and commonly also the use of their draught 
animals, for a particular number of months each year; a number of elderly people living 
in the area told me of having to provide such labour on the farms around for no 
payment, or for salt.  However, while the passing of the 1913 Act resulted in a rash of 
evictions, it was not that Act but the tractor that eventually put an end to share-
 
 
 
 
 167 
cropping (Keegan 1985).  Such mechanisation, as well as the increasing forestry 
undertaken in the area, contributed to the ongoing evictions from ‘white’ farms and the 
dumping of people into, and subsequent overcrowding in villages such as Chavani.  
However, these evictions and ‘redundancies’ have continued through the 1990s and into 
the 2000s, not least due to the recent influx of Zimbabwean farm workers in this 
Northern part of Limpopo (Rutherford and Addison 2007).   
The brutal and widespread ‘mix-up’ of people took place alongside widespread 
‘betterment’ schemes and the appointment of large numbers of chiefs – hosis – and 
headmen – indunas – to rule over villages in the area.  Echoing some of my more 
elderly informants living in Chavani, Niehaus (2005) similarly describes the residential 
pattern in the Setlhare chiefdom of the South African lowveld as being of ‘scattered 
metse’ with ‘[f]ields … as large as households could cultivate’ (Niehaus 2005: 194).  
Betterment relocations of families in that area, however, redefined the nature of the 
‘metse’, comprising of ‘the homesteads, fields, and ancestral graves of a co-resident 
agnatic cluster [whose …] inhabitants were typically a grandfather, his sons, their wives, 
unmarried daughters, children, and grandchildren’ (ibid: 194), to ‘a heterogeneous 
collection of unrelated households’ (Niehaus 2001: 30).  Such individualisation 
‘destroyed networks of reciprocal co-operation that had been built up between 
neighbours over decades’ (ibid: 30).  Moreover, it also had: 
a profound effect on gender and generational relations.  It placed women in a 
powerless and precarious position.  Through working in the fields, women had 
made the most important contribution to household diets, but after relocation 
they came to rely, almost completely, upon the remittances of migrant men. 
(ibid: 140-1). 51  
However, given the former reliance on the land of these families, such migrant men 
‘carry with them, in their desperate search for urban employment, the enduring 
disadvantages of very little education, relative illiteracy and the non-transferability of 
limited skills’ (Murray 1987: 319).  And further changes were also wrought by such 
social engineering.  After the boundaries around ‘Gazankulu’ were drawn, gradually 
ethnicity came to be more important to people as it became a form of capital to be 
wielded in the struggle for access to resources, and land, in the area and Shangaan-
speaking people came also to refer to cultural and traditional practices as constituting 
their identity as ‘Shangaans’ as opposed to ‘Vendas’ (Harries 1989).  Nevertheless, 
unlike other areas in the Transvaal, according to Kirkcaldy (quoted in Schmid 2005: 4), 
politically, Gazankulu was considered in the 1980s to be ‘almost the sleepiest of the 
bantustans’. 
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After the release of Mandela in 1990, however, political feeling was awakened and, as in 
other places in Limpopo (Niehaus 1998), the ‘youth’, or ANC ‘Comrades’, were pitted 
against chiefs; after political ‘stayaways’, demanding the resignation of its Chief Minister, 
were organised by the youth, the South African Defence Force and the South African 
Police were sent in, with ensuing violence resulting in a number of deaths and mass 
detentions (Schmid 2005).  People were threatened and intimidated against going back 
to work, huts were burned and tyres set fire to so as to block the main roads (ibid; 
Personal communication - 11.05).  Although the youth organisations were fulfilling the 
ANC’s calls for ‘ungovernability’ in the bantustans, there appears to have been very little 
control exerted by the ANC over them at that time.  And, for many of the youth, 
‘apartheid’ was too vague a notion to fight against.  Living in such an area where 
people’s daily lives were constructed and controlled not by white people, but by other 
visible structures of authority and control, ‘parents, teachers and chiefs’ became those 
to rebel against – chiefs, particularly, all of whom as ex officio members of the 
Legislative Assembly ‘represented undemocratic structures’ (ibid 17; Personal 
communication – 19.9.05).  That is not to say that there was no awareness of the wider 
national politics, but such a stance also ‘fitted’ with the anti-chiefs ‘conscientising’ 
undertaken by a number of UDF activists who developed linkages with people in those 
areas, or by NGO development interventions (Personal communication - 7.05, and see 
Nauta 2004; Schmid 2005). 
Chavani now falls under the newly established Makhado Municipality, situated some 30 
miles away in Makhado.  The establishment of the Municipality has transformed the 
former all-white Louis Trichardt Local Council and it now includes many villages falling 
under the jurisdiction of chiefs in the former Venda and Gazankulu ‘independent’ 
homelands, or ‘rural areas’ as they are often referred to, within the Municipal 
boundaries.  On the road from Makhado to these homeland areas, there is a distinct line 
in the landscape between open veld, apparently uninhabited and thick with scrubby 
bushes, but fenced off from the road with barbed wire, and the suddenly crowded roads 
and densely packed stands of the villages in the former homelands, such as Chavani.  
Children are everywhere, goats plentiful, and shared taxis with their cracked 
windscreens and creaking rusty shells full to bursting point, shuttle between the villages 
and Makhado – the trip taking at least 30 minutes.  While people living in villages like 
Chavani often make the 30-minute shared taxi ride into Makhado, mulungus, or white 
people, rarely transgress such boundaries into these villages.  I spent the time that I 
was there living in the area with a family in ‘Shirley’ – the village just next to Chavani – 
a former Swiss Mission station whose chief had only been appointed in 1993.  Although 
many people claiming to be ‘Venda’ continued to live there, Shirley was thought of as a 
Shangaan area.  During most of my stay I secured the help of a local research assistant 
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from the area, Musa Kotane, a fluent Shangaan and Venda speaker and highly involved 
in community issues.  Musa helped me tremendously, to plan the logistics of arranging 
interviews and discussion groups, finding out about local community meetings and 
sometimes facilitating access to particular individuals.  She also acted as an invaluable 
interpreter, and teacher of language and cultural ‘do’s and don’ts’.   
   
 
The village of Chavani lies on the lower Southern slopes of the Ribolla Mountain, the dry 
ground dotted with small scrubby bushes.  Cattle often graze next to the one tarred 
road now forming the contested boundary between Chavani and Mashamba; as I was 
told time and again, “there is not enough land” and many people have no access to 
grazing land.  People live close together on square plots of land called ‘stands’, or 
bantustands, as many older people referred to.  These were first demarcated in the 
1960s as 50 x 50 yard plots, some as 75 x 75 yards – usually ones that are higher up 
the sides of the mountain and filled with huge boulders and rocks – but more recently 
they are just 35 x 35 metres.  Wooden and wire fences often run between them, and 
between a number of such plots lead paths like streets set out in a clearly planned, grid-
like fashion.  Many of the paths have been eroded into ditches, particularly on those 
paths on the grid that head straight down the slopes of the hilly ground at the foot of 
the mountain.  
Many of the plots have a number of dwellings within them, often joined together by low 
walls, sometimes painted in peeling patterns with pinks and greens and yellows that I 
was told were “the colours of the Shangaans”, and one or two painted in the earthy 
dark red and ochres “of the Vendas”.  The area inside these low walls forms a ‘terrace’ 
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between the dwellings which is often immaculately swept in the early hours of the 
morning.  The houses themselves range from the immeasurably poor small square or 
round mud-brick dwellings with roofs of thatch or scrap metal, to larger cement-brick 
houses, their roofs sheets of corrugated iron.  But not everyone is so poor in Chavani; 
there are some larger houses, brick built with tiled roofs, sometimes with garages.  
Some even have gates, and bars at the windows – but they stand out in their wealth.  
Only those who can afford it have electricity.  Few have phones – though cell phones 
are common.  Very few houses have running water or anything more than a dug-out 
drop toilet in the yard and most rely on women in the family fetching the family’s water, 
carrying containers on their heads from standpoints that are only turned on for a few 
hours each day.    Although the nearest river, the Klein Letaba, in the dry season only 
contains a trickle of brackish water, a few cattle are taken there to drink and some 
women from the area take their washing there, rather than having to deal with the 
headaches after carrying water in the searing Limpopo sun.   
3 – The contested legitimacy of the chieftaincy 
Chavani and a number of other neighbouring villages all fall under Nkhensani Traditional 
Authority (TA) – nkhensani meaning ‘thanks’.  The TA was established in the late 1960s 
when the chief (hosi) of Chavani was appointed as the only hosi over the TA, with 
authority over the headmen (indunas) of the other villages within its jurisdiction.  The 
establishment of the TA took place in the midst of extensive forced removals in the area 
(Platzky and Walker 1985): countless numbers of people were forced to abandon their 
former homes situated in the Venda homeland (separated from Gazankulu arbitrarily by 
the only now-tarred road in the area) before being rounded up by government forces 
and made to walk with their possessions, or were driven by ‘GGs’ – General Government 
trucks – to new villages miles away but in Gazankulu; families already living in the area 
were similarly ordered to abandon their former homes and their land, before being 
moved into rows of newly demarcated stands; and others were thrown off farms owned 
by white farmers (boers) or mulungus.  Meanwhile, Vendas, former neighbours, were 
moved out of the area.  There was a constant arrival to the village of more and more 
families, and the sizes of stands gradually decreased.  With such a historical context, the 
legitimacy of the TA and the hosi and indunas making up Nkhensani Traditional Council 
(TC), being one contested outcome of the clumsy implementation of the Bantu 
Authorities Act 1951, continues to be challenged by those who feel grievances and 
bitterness that they now fall under the jurisdiction of a hosi who, in their eyes, is not the 
‘real’ one.   
On the one hand, people time and again told me that a fundamental tenet of the 
chieftaincy is that “a hosi is not chosen, he only becomes a hosi because of inheritance, 
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and the older son is the one chosen to be a hosi, from the first wife.” (N’wa-Xinyamani 
Induna, interview - 1.9.05).  On the other, hosis had clearly been ‘chosen’ by apartheid 
leaders, appointments that were often subject to great local contestation in terms of 
their legitimacy52: “a lot were afraid to become a hosi because there was a risk.  You 
could become bewitched because of that.” (ibid).  Becoming bewitched during a time 
when witch hunts and witch killings were prolific in the homelands of the former 
Northern Transvaal53, was not a matter of little concern.  Even in October 2005, some 
20 people in Chavani were arrested for an incident of stoning a man for carrying out 
witchcraft and accusations that he used tokoloshi54 to carry out his evil deeds for him.  
Niehaus (2001: 195) describes the extent to which ‘[f]ears of bewitchment escalated as 
population removals and migrant labour generated new inequalities and tensions’.  As 
discussed above, Chavani had also undergone a huge influx of people as a village lying 
on the Gazankulu/Venda border.  Moreover, in the Northern Transvaal, as the youth or 
Comrades assumed the forefront in the struggle against structures they perceived to be 
undemocratic, such as the chiefs, they also assumed the mantle in conducting 
‘witchcraft-eradication campaigns to cleanse the countryside of immorality, misfortune, 
and evil’ (ibid: 195).  While formal statements of what might be accepted as an ideal – 
that a hosi is not chosen but born into the chieftaincy – and in the same manner 
legislation, might describe clear-cut social relations, practice always deviates from such 
an ideal and in turn, is shaped by local contestations over legitimacy. 
Stories abound around the chieftaincy in all of these areas: I was told of bribery that 
went on between the Native Commissioner and a headman who ‘bought’ land and 
became a chief; a chief who obtained more land after handing over a cow or some 
goats; a layman who was appointed as a chief because he had particular skills of ruling 
(or was known for treating people badly) having been a foreman of a powerful white 
farmer in the area; and a man, who was thought to have been a layman, who was 
appointed as a Shangaan chief in Gazankulu because he was known to have Royal blood 
as a result of secret trysts between his Shangaan mother and the ‘true’ Venda Nkosi.  
Nevertheless, chiefs were appointed and, whether or not their royal lineage or the 
boundaries of their land were disputed, such appointments contributed to the unfolding 
of a practical reality in the lives of people living within their jurisdiction.  This reality has 
given birth to a collective habitus that has in turn shaped the way contrasting and 
contradictory views and interpretations of the chieftaincy are granted legitimacy.  While 
some argued that the true genealogy of the chief remained important – perhaps those 
whose family had in some way been undermined by the arrangements put into place 
when they were ‘stabilised’ in the institution of Nkhensani TA in the 1960s – others were 
more concerned about the extent to which those in such positions of authority were 
deserving of their respect.  However, the extent to which people can influence the 
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legitimacy granted to those meanings, depends on their holding of symbolic capital 
within such a rural field.  This in turn depends on their access to other kinds of capital, 
such as financial, cultural, and social capital, which is in turn, shaped by gender and 
age. 
Despite their formally held positions of authority in the hierarchy of the village, 
supported by the bureaucratisation and support of the chieftaincy granted by the state 
under apartheid, those in conferred positions of authority, such as chiefs and headmen, 
have also had to struggle to maintain their practical authority over the villagers.  Some 
commanded approval for their inclusion of the community in their decisions.  Some 
seemed genuinely concerned to help sort out daily problems arising in the village with 
their time taken up by villagers who would come to them to seek their advice.  Others, 
however, attracted rumours, gossip and mocking laughter for their drunkenness, or for 
their improper behaviour with other men’s wives.  In spite of their formally recognised 
bureaucratic authority granted by the state, in the day-to-day politics unfolding in the 
villages, whether hosis and indunas were granted ‘respect’, or hlonipho, and thereby 
legitimacy, to a certain extent also determined the extent of their authority and power 
over the villagers. 
4 - Bureaucratic practices: a ‘new democratic dispensation’? 
The impact of poverty shaping the lives of people living in Chavani has very real effects 
on local governance structures.  Today, Chavani is very isolated in terms of the extent 
to which such structures are supported by, or even fall under the radar of, local 
government and the state.  So, while there are other institutions in addition to the 
chieftaincy that contribute to the governance of the village, the reach of their power is 
limited and, importantly, ambiguous.  After 1994, significant changes were introduced 
into the playing field of local politics in such ‘rural areas’.  For example, in 1995 a 
Transitional Local Council was created, followed in 2000 by a fully fledged Municipality.  
These new institutions opened up new opportunities for changing the relations of power 
in the area (Niehaus 1998), but there was also remarkable continuity (Oomen 2005).  
Not only were the web of laws and regulations governing the TAs in such areas in the 
main not repealed in 1994, or since, but the bureaucratic practices, and in some cases 
institutional support for such practices, that built up around them have continued.  
Nevertheless, the more pluralised institutional landscape existing today, in many ways 
enables contestations over the extent to which each exercises power over local politics 
in the rural field and provides opportunities for different actors to participate in changing 
the local relations of power. 
In 1987, a group of women who had formed a care group in the village were supported 
by the Department of Health and obtained a large field in Chavani.  They had farmed 
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there until recently.  They had built a small reservoir on some unused land to which 
they had pumped water from a borehole in the village to the field.  They told me that 
recently both pipes to and from the reservoir had been cut through, one by some 
Municipal workers building a much larger reservoir for use by the whole village, and the 
other by someone on a stand which had been demarcated right next to the reservoir 
who had cut through the pipe when building the foundations of their home.  They 
claimed that neither the Municipality, the family, nor the chief had done anything to 
remedy the damage they had caused or compensate them for the loss. 
ERAF:  Would the Municipality do anything for you? 
We are still trying to get access to the Municipality but there’s no way.  I don’t 
understand how to get to the Municipality.  
ERAF:  Could you ask your Councillor? 
They just say they’ll fix it but even in the village there’s no water.  ...  The water 
is there, the problem is, it can’t come out of the taps.              
 ERAF: Could you approach the SANCO? 
 [She laughed seemingly without much humour.] 
In this village there are still difficulties because even the SANCOs, these things 
need money, but without money they can’t do anything.  We are trying to 
plough but SANCO says they need funds, so nothing happens. 
ERAF: [I persisted] What about the Chief? 
We have not yet tried approaching the hosi because we have not ever heard of 
him talk anything about water.  I don’t want to lie, we don’t have a problem 
with the hosi because water was there, so we won’t say that there’s a problem 
with the hosi, so don’t write that I said that.  Even the Department of Health 
came and wrote like this [she gesticulated towards Musa and me, sitting in her 
home writing in a notebook] but we don’t see anything.  Even you, you come to 
write ... 
 … 
If the Municipality can get involved in water maybe something will happen.  … 
The standpipes stopped a long time ago.  There are taps at the road which they 
only switch on at certain times.  There’s not enough water so they switch it off.  
(Chavani informant, interview - 5.9.05 (translation)) 
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Because of the lack of water, the group were simply no longer farming there, but some 
animals were grazing on the plot.  This was one of the last remaining centrally situated 
fields in Chavani and, with the pressure of people wanting stands, the group was 
worried that, like the other fields that had been in the village as opposed to being on 
the lower slopes of the Ribolla Mountain, it would be needed by people for stands and 
so taken back and re-demarcated by the TA.  Clearly, the extent to which different 
people – women, youth, men, those within the Royal Council, school teachers, SANCO 
members etc. – may be able to grasp opportunities provided by a more pluralised 
institutional landscape to participate in changing local relations of power depends on the 
extent to which they can access capital.  In this case, those within the group seemed 
effectively powerless in holding anyone to account for their woes. 
There were many who felt equally let down by post-1994 promises of ‘development’, but 
in her disillusion the spokesperson of this group was also realistic about the impact of 
poverty on local governance structures such as the SANCO, and of their isolation in 
terms of the extent to which they are supported by, or even fall under the radar of, local 
government and the state.  As she acknowledged, there are other institutions in addition 
to the chieftaincy that contribute to the governance of the village.  Chavani falls under 
Ward 17 of Makhado Municipality55 and so its Ward Councillor and team of volunteer 
Ward Committee members have the responsibility of taking local people’s concerns to 
the Municipality and in turn updating them on local government developments affecting 
them.  There is also the SANCO with its ANC affiliation and locally elected committee 
members who claim to take it upon themselves to act as a “champion of development” 
and work as intermediaries, taking the voice of the people to the Traditional Leaders, or 
to the Municipality, or to Eskom the electricity company, or to Provincial structures 
(SANCO Committee member, Bokisi, interview - 3.11.05).  Other groups such as the 
ANC Women’s League, involve themselves in local politics and are supported by an ANC 
constituency office based at the nearby village of Elim.  There is also the District Control 
Office (referred to by everyone as the ‘DCO’), a ‘leftover’ apartheid institution (discussed 
below), also situated just outside Elim, with oversight functions of 16 TAs, its power 
now delegated from the District Council and the Office of the Premier at a Provincial 
level. 
4.1 - The Traditional Authority bureaucracy 
The Senior Administrator of the TA has worked in the TA’s offices for 22 years.  There is 
also a Treasurer, the ‘police’ or ‘securities’ of the TA and a couple of other people 
working at the office carrying out odd-jobs as and when they were needed.  Collecting 
money from villagers for tribal levies, for fines, for registering a birth or death and for 
stands, recording debts and accounting for credits is key to the administration of the TA 
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and the administrators seemed efficient with their books, receipt slips and records of 
transactions.  The Senior Administrator obligingly showed me a copy of a ruled A4 
exercise ledger book in which “they keep all the records … the ID number, the stand 
number …” (Senior Administrator TA, interview – 18.8.05 (translated)).  It had pages 
and pages recording the names of people, stands allocated, amount paid, and another 
book with offences recorded against the person, the stand number and the amount they 
were fined – not building a toilet on their stand was the most frequent offence recorded.   
Tax collection in the village began under the NP and then continued after the formation 
of the Gazankulu government, acting as both a carrot and a stick to its ‘citizens’ (see 
below).  Today, the rates are set by the TA, and I was given a photocopy of Nkhensani 
TA headed paper with a list of administrative procedures and their costs.  When I asked 
how much they charged people, the answer from the Treasurer was clear and 
immediate: 
60R per stand holder but R25 for pensioners.  These amounts have not changed 
unless the chief and [traditional] councillors discuss it.  Big businesses are 
charged R750 and small ones is R350.  The big business is a general shop or 
café or bottle store.  A small one is a spaza shop or someone selling something 
next to the road – they have to get permission.  (TA Treasurer, interview - 
26.8.05 (translated)) 
In practice, however, there is some discretion in the hands of the administrators as to 
how strict they will be with particular individuals.  In a time of uncertainty and change, 
there is likely also to be a change of political awareness and the creation of different 
identities (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001) and, in this case, the status of the chieftaincy, 
even though it is supported by particular bureaucratic procedures, is not unassailable or 
unchanging.  While the TA used to be supported in its wielding of power by the state, 
the Senior Administrator admitted that in the face of rebellious behaviour, or struggles 
against undemocratic or unaccountable practices by members of the community – such 
as “striking … for ‘Freedom time’” – “we don’t have that much power, we just leave it” 
(Senior Administrator, interview – 18.8.05 (translated)).  Nevertheless, both the Hosi 
and Indunas roundly asserted to me their ability to use money as a way of aggressively 
exercising power over people falling under their jurisdiction. 
Where legitimacy is contested, the successful exercise of power and authority often 
depends upon the extent to which an assertion of that power is accepted.  Here the 
successful exercise of that power also depends on the continuation of the TA’s 
bureaucratic practices that in turn depend upon the extent to which it can continue to 
charge people for carrying out those practices. So there is a paradoxical need for the TA 
to continue paying the administrators’ salaries, which relies upon the collection of the 
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unpopular tribal levies and fines.  These days such charges are sometimes challenged, 
and often simply remain unpaid.  This challenge to the legitimacy of the chieftaincy has 
been facilitated by the withdrawal of the state from such areas in 1994.  But this 
withdrawal has not been wholesale and the amounts collected from villagers are also 
supplemented by the payment of ‘stipends’ by the Office of the Premier via the local 
DCO.  Nevertheless, for the two permanent bureaucrats employed by the TA, changes 
introduced in 1994 have had very little effect on their working lives.  The only real 
change since 1994 to their roles was that it now employs fewer staff so they have a 
heavier workload with no increase in pay.  And they recognise that the ‘new’ democratic 
state does not continue to support them in the same way as before – they ‘still’ do not 
receive proper ‘salaries’ because they have not yet registered with the state as working: 
“They don’t want to register us because we were under the Chief” (TA Treasurer, 
interview - 26.8.05 (translated)).  Whether or not it is the contested politics of the 
chieftaincy at a national level has influenced this oversight, the relationship between the 
state and the TA is ambivalent.  This also highlights the difficult relationship that often 
exists between the TA and other institutions. 
Other institutions participating in the governance of Chavani often appear to be in 
competition with the chieftaincy, sometimes creating mutual antagonism between them, 
but they nevertheless often also support the chieftaincy in unpredictable ways.  Oomen 
similarly recognised such ‘fluidity of local rule’ and ‘constant debate and negotiations 
surrounding it’, seeing in it what Chabal and Daloz argued is the ‘‘political 
instrumentalisation of disorder’, in which political actors seek to maximise their returns 
on the state of confusion’ (2005: 163 quoting Chabal and Daloz 1999: xviii, 155).  
Political actors in the rural field, those who are contesting the balance of power in such 
areas, indeed seek to maximise the extent to which they can successfully exercise 
symbolic capital over the field that has changed since 1994.  The ‘disorder’, however, 
that happens to exist in such areas no doubt derives from their extreme marginalisation 
from the wider field of power in South Africa; impoverishment goes with that.  Further 
disorder has been introduced with the introduction of ‘new’ but also marginalised 
institutions such as the Municipality, whose own lack of capital – not only financial but 
also other forms of locally recognised capital and therefore legitimacy – has complicated 
the reach of its authority in such areas.  Meanwhile, the continuing existence of former 
apartheid institutions, such as the DCO, that in the past exerted some authority over 
TAs such as Nkhensani, means that it continues to influence the contestations over 
capital that take place in the field. 
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4.2 - The ‘DCO’ 
After 1994 and a scaling back of particular apartheid government structures operating 
under the Gazankulu homeland and elsewhere, apart from the District Control Office – 
or DCO – other  structures appear no longer to be active in the governance of Chavani.  
Since the time of the first demarcations of fields and stands in Chavani, the hated 
‘rangers’ or ‘Springboks’, working for the DOA under the Gazankulu government and 
formerly under the apartheid government, worked with the ‘securities’ or ‘police’ of the 
TA in allocating stands, marking them with a number and receiving money for them.  
Although the DOA may still from time to time provide extension services in the area, and 
the DLA through the Land Claims Commission (LCC) may get involved with communities 
who have claimed land under the land reform programme, there appears to be no other 
regular contact between Chavani’s TA, and provincial or national government offices.  
The DCO is the exception.   
The DCO is an apartheid-era bureaucratic structure, formerly falling under the 
Gazankulu authorities, which has continued its existence under the Provincial Office of 
the Premier, its responsibilities delegated by Vhembe District Council. Its role is to 
oversee the financial affairs of the TAs under its ambit, but since 1994 its capacity has 
been significantly scaled back: its staff have gone from 16 to five but it has meanwhile 
increased the number of TAs under its authority so as to include two additional villages 
that used to be in the former Venda homeland.  Nevertheless, it is the one institution 
that both the administrators of the TA and the TC (made up of the Hosi and Indunas 
falling under Nkhensani TA) referred to as exercising authority and control over them.  
The manager of the DCO also saw her role as one of ‘control’ in terms of the money 
spent by TAs and the ‘crowning’ of chiefs.  She later admitted, however, that the DCO’s 
exercise of authority over the TAs was limited and when I asked about the nature of 
that authority it soon became clear that the DCO fulfils more of an oversight role rather 
than the exercise of any substantive authority; both the fines and taxes charged by TAs 
are decided by the TAs having indicated that the decision has been taken by the TC. 
The Senior Administrator and the Accountant of the TA had both raised the failure of the 
DCO, and in turn the Office of the Premier, to register them as working for the state.  
When I raised this with the Office Manager of the DCO, she clearly did not believe that 
her office should be held accountable when it was merely implementing the instructions 
handed down by the Office of the Premier.  Although the power delegated to the DCO 
by that Office is circumscribed to an oversight role, which itself is limited - “The auditors 
go around, but they never come here this year from Petersberg.” (Ms. N, personal 
communication - 9.05) – both the staff of the DCO and the administrators of Nkhensani 
TA continue to recognise its authority which contributes to shaping their ongoing 
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practices.  Now that the DCO no longer sends cars to the TA to pick up the reports and 
the money collected, the administrators feel obligated to dip into their own funds and 
time in order to fulfil their roles in terms of the filing of reports and the banking of 
money.  Meanwhile, the fines imposed and charges for land remain unpopular but are 
essential to the bureaucracy of the TA.  The TC, however, which today has the power to 
decide on how much such fines and charges will be without the intervention from the 
Gazankulu government in Giyani, refers to the DCO’s authority as the source of the its 
own ‘delegated’ authority: 
We don’t have the power to change anything, even if we want something 
to be changed because there are DCOs where the laws are coming from.  
The laws come from the House of Traditional Leaders who call all the 
Chiefs who then give them the law.  (Chavani TC, interview - 6.9.05 
(translated)). 
With its now ambivalent relationship with the state, that in some ways has the potential 
to tip the balance of power in Chavani away from the TA, those on the TC presumably 
see it as useful to employ such references to wider spheres of authority in the 
implementation of such unpopular ‘laws’, in order to bolster its own legitimacy. 
4.3 - The Municipality: a new democratic local government? 
Unlike the DCO, the Municipality only came into existence in 2000, after the replacement 
of the Transitional Local Council that transformed the formerly all-white apartheid Local 
Authority of Louis Trichardt, incorporating within it the ‘rural areas’ of Nzhelele (formerly 
under Venda), Vuwani and Hlanganani (formerly under Gazankulu).  By 2005, one 
Municipal Manager had already been replaced with another after such severe financial 
difficulties that the Municipality nearly went into insolvency.  When I asked the Municipal 
Manager what the Municipality’s role was in relation to the TAs within the area, she 
admitted that: 
We don’t have any role.  We are seated with a problem.  The TAs are 
demarcating sites without involving us.  On behalf of the Minister of Land 
Affairs, they are continuing to demarcate sites without involving us and then will 
start to complain that we did not include it in the IDP [Integrated Development 
Plan].  That is because we didn’t know they would extend so much.  The TAs 
have no obligation to consult us.  It’s their land, and they don’t consult us.  And 
then the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act doesn’t include 
us.  It’s silent.  It’s an issue.  But it’s a controversy, because it gives them rights 
as TAs and then gives them the rights again [but] if we have to develop them 
as a Municipality, we can’t. 
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ERAF:  Do the Councillors link the Municipality to those areas? 
The Councillors don’t have a say.  …  There are a lot of villages that have to 
consult us – and that are not in our IDP (Municipal Manager, Makhado 
Municipality, interview - 19.09.05) 
An IDP is a document which every Municipality should have adopted showing its 
development policies relating to every village and town and township falling under the 
jurisdiction of that Municipality.  Indeed the IDP document said very little of any 
substance about land in villages like Chavani. 
As might be expected, and as the Municipal Manager implied, there was an 
understandable reticence on the side of the Hosi in relation to the involvement of the 
Municipality in the decision-making of the TA.  While the TA has not been unused to 
organs of the state, such as the DCO and the DOA, collaborating with them in their 
functions, the Municipality is an entirely new creation.  Under apartheid, the DOA had 
participated in decisions closely with the TC and even used one of the offices in the TA.  
The Municipality, however, is situated some 30 minutes away in Makhado and its only 
contact with Chavani is through its Ward Councillor and Ward Committee.  But the 
introduction of the Municipality still has the potential to threaten the relations of power 
that are in existence in the area, bringing with it change, uncertainty and sometimes, as 
above, criticism, that in turn threatens their successful assertion of symbolic capital.   
The Hosi expressed his wariness about the Municipality’s involvement, for the reason, he 
said, that he was worried that it would introduce increased taxes for people living there.  
The possibility of the Municipality introducing taxes into such an area, where the 
majority of its inhabitants are poor and that has a history of the introduction of 
draconian apartheid taxes, was indeed a concern of many.  But while the success of the 
integration of ‘rural areas’ with local government depends upon the willingness of the 
TA to involve representatives from the Municipality in decision-making, it also depends 
on the level of engagement of those representatives and the quality of the work carried 
out within the bureaucracy of the Municipality.  The Municipal Manager of the 
Municipality felt excluded, seeing the problem as deriving from a lack of co-operation of 
the TAs with the Municipality and the Councillor, who had been Councillor over Ward 17 
already for four years, agreed.  He referred to numerous examples where the TA had 
acted without consulting the Municipality and problems had ensued.  But he had good 
reason for deflecting attention from his own role in relation to the problems arising 
between the Municipality and the TA.   
Many people living in Chavani expressed frustration and even anger at the 
ineffectiveness of the Councillor and at him being paid for “doing nothing” during the 
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four years of his tenure.  For many living in such areas, ‘the Municipality’ and ‘the 
Councillor’ amount to the same thing.  And so, if a village has an ineffective Councillor, 
so will people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of the Municipality be poor.  Even the 
Ward Committee members have limited contact with the Municipality and rely on the 
Councillor for outlining their appropriate role.  Ward Committee members are at the 
lowest rung of the recognised formal political structures in the village and the extent to 
which they are likely to be able to hold the Councillor, if not the Municipality, directly to 
account is very limited.  Moreover, many of them expressed frustration that they are not 
remunerated by the government, such frustration contributing in turn to undermining 
their willingness to cooperate in fulfilling their intended roles.    Furthermore, when 
there are as many as five rural villages in some Wards, Ward Committee members are 
elected to represent the views of villagers from outlying parts of the Ward.  But their 
waning commitment can mean simply that those living in villages at a distance from the 
Councillor’s own, rarely see any sign of ‘the Municipality’.  While the mandate granted to 
Councillors from their constituents to make political decisions affecting them depends 
upon their ongoing legitimacy and acceptance by those constituents, particularly in a 
small village where a Councillor is a visible member of the community, poor gravel roads 
and communication links between the villages also hinder the accountability of the 
Municipality to villagers living in outlying villages.  The successful involvement of 
Municipalities in such rural areas clearly depends to a large extent on the commitment, 
and the sensitivity, of the Councillors and Ward Committee members.  It also depends 
on the extent to which they hold cultural and social capital within their villages, and 
obviously the financial capital that can be drawn upon by the Municipality. 
5 – Constructing democratic change in the rural field 
The day-to-day lives of people in Chavani have been shaped by the changing laws and 
regulations of apartheid which imposed strictures on their way of life.  While many of 
the ‘aws, regulations, proclamations and decrees defining TAs and their functions 
remained in force after the advent of democracy’ (Oomen 2005: 137), reforms 
introduced since 1994 have changed the way governance happens in such places.  But, 
as Oomen reminds us, the ways those laws and regulations have influenced peoples 
lives is by no means obvious: ‘Legal categorisations impact, in a multitude of ways and 
in conjunction with a myriad of other forces, on the way people … constitute themselves 
and their relations with others.’ (2005: 241, and see Keegan 1985).  In turn, nor may 
the ‘implementation’ of reforms happen quite as envisaged by policy-makers.  Instead, it 
is just as likely that change may be introduced through people living in such areas 
coming to know about it – maybe information is heard on the radio or spread through 
political networks – and individuals, who are sufficiently powerful to do so, deploying 
such knowledge for particular purposes at particular times.  For many people living in 
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Chavani, their lived reality does not relate directly to those changing laws, and nor are 
they aware of them.  So governance practices in Chavani and the surrounding villages 
have also been shaped by a mishmash of ‘leftovers’ of pre-1994, deriving from the 
bureaucratic practices that have been shaped by the laws and regulations implemented 
through the Gazankulu homeland, and ‘reforms’ introduced since then. 
The following section considers the meaning of notions such as ‘gender equality’ and 
‘democracy’ within the rural field.  Such concepts may sometimes be influenced by 
information coming from outside the field (such as from the television) or through actors 
coming from outside the field with a different habitus, bringing with them their own 
interpretations of such words (such as family members living in Johannesburg, or NGO 
fieldworkers).  And their meanings are then shaped by contestations within the rural 
field, shaped by the habitus of and capital wielded by different participants in such 
struggles, which in turn will be influenced by those interactions between actors within 
and outside the field.  This discussion therefore challenges assumptions that are often 
made about the universal meaning of such notions 
5.1 – ‘Participation and ‘gender equality’ 
Nkhensani TA has its own offices housing a courtroom complete with a raised wooden 
witness (or judge’s) box, the office of the Hosi, the Senior Administrator’s office, that of 
the Treasurer, and a public space and counter where people arrive to attend to various 
bureaucratic procedures.  There are also a number of other rooms which have at one 
time been used as meeting rooms or offices – the administrator showed me some of the 
DOA’s dusty files left to one side since their last visit years before.  In the heat of the 
Limpopo sun, villagers – who often mill around sharing gossip in the shade of the 
veranda – move into these other outer rooms of the building, deeper into the cooler 
shadows.  Most of the walls are painted a cream colour but it is dirty and dull.  The few 
posters taped up, announcing their messages of post-apartheid modernism, appear 
incongruous.  Outside is a huge tree providing shade under its branches spread wide for 
community meetings (khorhos) which take place approximately every month enabling 
community members to raise issues or problems with the Hosi and Royal Council.  Hosi  
X told me about about two committees that advise him: “a Tribal Council and a Royal 
Council.  Some things would only go to the Royal Council, for example, how to co-
ordinate the land.” (Hosi X, interview - 18.8.05 (translated)).  A hosi is surrounded by a 
contingent of advisers, many of whom are related to him, in the ‘Royal Family’ (Oomen 
2005): the chief’s brothers, uncle and maybe a few others who manage to negotiate 
their positions into such structures.  The ‘Tribal Council’ is part of the Tribal Authorities 
system introduced under apartheid and includes the other indunas appointed to the 
Tribal Authority, but the ‘Royal Council’ is based more upon kinship relations, often not 
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only advising the chief, but acting as a buffer between the decisions of the chief – pre-
1994 often passed down from Pretoria – and the community: “if someone in the Tribal 
Council has a dispute with the hosi … they must go to the Royal Council …” (Hosi X, 
interview - 18.8.05 (translated)).  On the other hand, khorhos are held in order to 
“consult the community in making decisions”.  When I told the Hosi about CLARA he 
was interested, but assured me: “The community, they don’t have a problem about the 
land because we currently call them for a meeting under the tree about land.” (ibid). 
Khorhos are often held monthly on Sunday mornings under the tree outside the TA.  
Problems that cannot be resolved by the indunas over the other villages will be referred 
on to the hosi and raised here.   The exact dates of the meetings are decided upon by 
the Royal Council.  Musa and I were invited to Nkhensani’s September Khorho, but 
when we arrived at the appointed hour we found the space outside the TA under the 
tree deserted.  There were the obvious difficulties in finding times for community 
meetings that were appropriate for everyone – funerals are big community events 
taking place most Saturdays, otherwise on Sundays many people attend church, or like 
Musa, have household and childcare responsibilities during the weekend when they are 
not working at home.  Such work was onerous.  At the homestead where I lived, apart 
from the occasional help secured from a couple of young village boys, all of the 
household labour was undertaken by the woman household head, her daughter-in-law 
and her daughter, from earlier than five in the morning, every day: chopping the wood 
for the fire, lighting and keeping the fire stoked, boiling water for bathing, washing and 
cooking – no small task involving the lifting of a 100-litre container and pouring it into a 
cooking pot over the fire, – sweeping, collecting water and wood, ploughing, sowing 
and weeding, childcare, cooking, cleaning, and washing of clothes, pots, children and 
selves.  All of these day-to-day, sometimes seasonal, tasks involved in running a 
household in the rural field had to take priority over attendance at community meetings. 
The times of the meetings, however, were not the only thing hindering the participation 
of women and other community members.  There have been changes since the end of 
apartheid, but many older people remembered vividly how the implementation of 
decisions coming “from Pretoria” was carried out by some chiefs and headmen.  One 
group of fairly elderly women who had teamed together in the hope of starting a poultry 
project and raising some income had been asked to pay the price of R750 for a 
‘business’ stand.  They had indeed paid over the money, but they were now next to 
destitute and critical of the Tribale.  But when I asked whether they could raise it at a 
khorho, one woman responded: 
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We know about khorhos, but we didn’t raise it.  We are afraid.  We will try to 
raise it at one of the structures of the Ward Committee and SANCOs – those 
structures will take it to the khorho. 
… The chiefs used to pressurise the people and they are still pressurising the 
people now.  [Sometimes] there is a place and you can see that stand, and the 
chief won’t allow you to have that stand [because] he has reserved that place 
for his own relatives [and] he won’t give it to you, [or] he will charge you more 
price. (Chavani informant, group discussion - 8.9.05 (translation)) 
A khoro has, along with other practices, changed over time.  But the extent of that 
change does not simply depend on rules being passed from above governing how it is to 
be run and who is to attend.  For one thing, its public nature will limit what can be 
spoken about.  Moreover, as recognised by Bloch (1975: 23), successful oratorical 
speaking, ‘often seen as an innate skill’ will only be achieved by a person who is 
practiced in being in authority:  
In other words, only somebody with high standing and who has found himself 
again and again in positions of authority is likely to succeed in any large 
gathering, because only such a man will have gained the essential practice.   
Furthermore, Kompe and Small (1991: 144) write of kgotlas – the equivalent Setswana 
term: ‘[w]omen are not allowed to attend kgotla meetings unless called to give 
“evidence” at a disciplinary hearing … But she may only speak when asked to do so by 
the men’.  While women might nowadays be entitled to attend the khoro – “[given] that 
we are living in a new democracy” (Mashamba Khorho – 23.8.05), – such  entitlement 
will not on its own change practice.   
The wife of a headman in the neighbouring village of Mashamba spoke about the 
reductions in the power enjoyed by those in the TC since the Venda government ceased 
to exist.  She told me that now, “They are given laws to follow.  Before, they could do 
anything.” (Mashamba induna’s wife, interview – 29.8.05 (translation)).  She spoke with 
regret of this loss to her husband’s authority, that now they were no longer able to take 
away people’s land, to detain people; she told me openly of the force and whippings 
they used to inflict on people and the strong men at the tribal office they got “to 
frighten them” (ibid).  In the light of such practices, spoken about by her with such 
candour, it is not surprising that a number of people, particularly older women who 
could remember such practices, spoke of their trepidation in raising issues in a khorho.  
But in the khoros that I attended, those women who did attend were usually middle-
aged, were very much outnumbered by men and hardly ever spoke.  And this, in itself, 
may be self-perpetuating in so far as it fuels the view, which I often heard, that because 
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women do not participate, they have nothing to contribute.  As a result, women’s 
interests, knowledge and experience will become invisible in relation to the issues raised 
and decisions made in the formal public decisions of the community (Meer 1997). 
Even though relatively few women attend khorhos, they sometimes do manage to 
participate in and influence community decision-making in other, often more private, 
ways.  During the time I carried out the research in Chavani, as indicated, the family I 
lived with could be described as a ‘female-headed household’, the expression masking 
the variety within such homes.  The household head had a paid job as a cleaner at Elim 
Hospital, but neither her eldest son nor his pregnant wife, despite a secretarial 
qualification, had work.  They also lived in the homestead, as did her youngest 
daughter, who was in the final class at school, and, from time to time, her other son 
and daughter, her granddaughters, her mother and her husband would come to stay – 
the matriarch was his third wife and he did not often turn up at the homestead.  In all 
of the informal chats that I observed at the home where I was living – that seemed to 
attract a stream of meetings of groups of women participating in traditional dancing, 
church politics, credit schemes and just chats – women were not afraid to assertively 
share their views on the chief, the Tribale and local politics, often in rumbustious ways.  
This was also the case in most of the all-women group discussions and individual 
interviews I had with women.  I once obseved the matriarch’s brother, the Chairman of 
the Tribale, being harangued by her and three other village women about decisions that 
the Tribale was making about the payment of tribal dues for funerals.  So while people 
working for NGOs, such as Nkuzi, complained about the difficulties of even ‘getting 
women to speak in public’, women’s participation in community decisions may be more 
complex than may first appear visually evident from attending public khorhos. 
But for all the stories of successful informal haranguing by particular women, there are 
countless numbers of others which counter such a rosy picture of the success that 
women may achieve in equalising gender relations in the private, as opposed to public, 
sphere.  One day I arranged to meet a woman at an agreed time and place in the 
village.  Having waited for half an hour for her, I decided to go to her home to find her.  
There was a big stand on the corner, with well-ploughed earth stretching back to the 
river.  Although there was an old-looking, white-painted, cement-brick house, there was 
another half-built brick structure on the same stand.  We were greeted by a man who 
loped towards us without a smile before disappearing round the back.  We followed and 
the woman we had arranged to meet emerged from the darkened doorway of another 
tumble-down dwelling, smoke filtering out behind her.  She was looking tired, her 
clothes scruffy and a little boy in a torn t-shirt with a big tummy poking through clinging 
to her skirt.  She told us that she couldn’t speak to us because her husband had come 
home unexpectedly from the city and she had to cook for him.  Her husband said that 
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he would speak to me instead.  After this episode I went on to have another encounter 
that was the complete contrast to this one, but had depressing reverberations of the 
ongoing existence of practices based upon gender inequality.  It was with a man I had 
met before, really warm, open and enthusiastic to talk to me, and when I arrived at his 
house he was openly affectionate with his wife and children who were shyly crowding 
into the living room to meet me.  But when I told him what had happened before, he 
agreed that her husband should have spoken to us because “in our culture the husband 
will know things and have to speak for the wife” (Mashamba informant, personal 
communication – 25.8.05).  In spite of the informal haranguing that some women, who 
have sufficient cultural and social capital in the rural field, may be able to enter into with 
men to change the inequalities in gendered relations of power within the rural field, or 
even in the home, such words simply reaffirm the ongoing, and as yet unsuccessfully 
challenged, legitimacy of such patriarchal practices. 
5.2 - ‘Democracy’ 
As some changes introduced after 1994 slowly have an impact upon relations of power, 
the meaning of ‘new’ words like ‘democracy’ become contested, their meaning gradually 
incorporated into, and in turn changed by, practice.  We met the Hosi over Bokisi56 on 
his steeply sloping stand.  He pulled over three rickety metal chairs into the shade of the 
cleanly swept mud ‘terrace’ forming the living space between a very old looking 
rondavula (a round mud brick, straw roofed, single roomed building), a ‘two-room’57, its 
blue paint peeling, and a slightly larger but no less shabby main building built on a level 
higher up the hill.  As indicated in Chapter 6, the Hosi and some of his people had been 
waiting some seven or eight years for the resolution of a land claim after having been 
forcefully removed from Mashamba in Venda, across the road into the Gazankulu 
homeland.  The view from here was striking; it was of Mashamba’s land stretching, 
expansive, over the flatter plains across the road that now separated it from the 
steeper, rocky slopes of the Ribolla mountain to where they had been moved.  It could 
only serve as an ever bitter reminder of this forced removal.  In relation to the Hosi’s 
views of tradition and democracy, he claimed that the way he carried out his chiefly 
responsibilities had changed little in the new dispensation: 
When it comes to democracy, in my ‘family’, democracy doesn’t work – they use 
my democracy.  When they leave my gate, they can have democracy.  What I’m 
saying, for people, they have voted three times, but when it comes to the chief, 
there’s no hosi [who] is politically minded – when it comes to the law of the 
chief, it does not change. (Bokisi Hosi, interview - 14.9.05 (translated)) 
In a group discussion in which the uncle of the Hosi stridently participated, I raised 
CLARA and with it the prospect of the establishment of a ‘committee’ which would 
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include members of the community alongside the members of the TC, to be involved in 
making decisions about land.  He responded immediately: 
The Hosi will call the community and tell the community what they want to do.  
We won’t change anything from what the Hosi is doing at the moment.  They 
won’t be like ‘boers’ who used to say ‘You must do this’.  … We didn’t want 
those laws of apartheid, we wanted to be ruled by democracy.  We must be the 
same.  We must not do anything in the country without informing the Hosi and 
the Hosi must not do anything without the community.  (Bokisi group discussion 
- 26.09.05 (translated)) 
While on the one hand, discourses of one-nation democracy had clearly influenced this 
old man and the Hosi, on the other, their interpretations of ‘democracy’ lay rather 
uncomfortably with practices and expectations that had built up around the chieftaincy 
and that could fall under the umbrella ‘tradition’.  However, some informants did grant 
that things were changing for the better in the way the Hosi was governing.  M was a 
very old woman, some of whose grandchildren in their twenties were living with her: 
We can agree with the Hosi.  The Hosi now has less power.  Now the 
community can argue with the Hosi, whereas in the past people couldn’t argue 
with the hosi.  … Even if he’s not happy, there’s nothing he can do [now] 
because we have powers, like the dispute at Shividuli – if we didn’t argue with 
the chief we would have lost our land.  Before the Hosi was above us and we 
didn’t have these rights to speak to the chief.  (Chavani informant, interview - 
1.9.05 (translated)) 
Whether or not such change can be said to be a result of the advent of ‘democracy’ that 
now means that the villagers feel more able to challenge decisions of the TA, it 
exemplifies the extent to which change affects the relations between the Hosi, the 
Tribale and the people living within its jurisdiction, but also the extent to which those 
relations are negotiated.  When I went on to ask M whether she was happy with the 
way decisions are taken by the Royal Council and TC, Musa said to me: 
This question of decision-making – she doesn’t understand.  She doesn’t know 
what to answer – she just said, “We will listen to the decision that they take at 
the office, but [referring again to the appointment in the 1960s of one hosi over 
the other indunas] we were not used to the decision of that Hosi – we want our 
own. (ibid). 
Sometimes, no amount of change will endow legitimacy on a hosi who has been 
imposed on people by the implementation of apartheid engineering.  However, what 
someone with M’s extremely limited access to capital can do about this, is limited. 
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6 - Land and tenure 
The land where the villages of three of the five villages under Nkhensani TA, Chavani, 
Bokisi and N’waXinyamani, are situated has been surveyed and the ‘farms’ have been 
registered in the Deeds Registry as: Zeekoegat to the West comprising some of the land 
where Bokisi is situated, Middelfontein comprising most of Chavani, and Dreifontein 
comprising most of the land where N’wa-Xinyamani lies.  All of the land is legally owned 
by the SADT58.  But this vague correlation between the farms that have been surveyed 
and the villages under Nkhensani TA is purely coincidental.  The harshly straight lines 
drawn on the map would cut through the landscape without any relation to the natural 
boundaries of the mountain on one side and sometimes the river, sometimes the fields, 
on the other, that people would gesture towards as marking the boundaries of the sava, 
their ‘country’.  The meaning of ‘ownership’ too is not as clear as those documents in 
the Deeds Registry would have us believe. 
6.1 - ‘Just a piece of land’ 
Three families were using the land – there is my father’s grave up on the 
hill.  They lived there before the Group Areas Act was implemented – the 
Mashele family, the Kubayi family and the Baloyi family.  Then everyone 
could just open a place and plough without any documents.  Mr. Liam 
bought the farm and called it Middelfontein.  Then it was bought by the 
government.  We used to pay R1 for the site and R2 [tax].  Before, we used 
the land with no documents – it was not a [commercial] farming area.  
[When] Mr. Liam [bought] the land ... we were just given the documents, 
but we were already using the land. (Chavani informant, personal 
communication - 8.05) 
This story resonated with the tales of many others.  In the past, I was told by many 
people, they used to live ‘in a scattered way’ on homestead plots that were spaced far 
apart from one another (see Niehaus 2001).  The plots were large enough both for 
agriculture and for numerous buildings, including a cooking hut and sleeping quarters 
for different generations of the same family who would continue to live there after 
marriage.  In the early 1960s, people were forced from their homes into demarcated 
plots of land, bantustands – “just a piece of land” (Chavani informant, interview – 
13.9.05 (translated)), in the now ‘village’.  As the village became increasingly crowded, 
the boundaries between the sava or ‘countries’ of different chiefs came under pressure 
with increasing contestations between the chieftaincies and consequent uncertainty and 
insecurity for people falling within them.  One group of women who had been trying to 
start a poultry project, but had spent all their savings on paying twice for a ‘business 
stand’, told me of having had a plot allocated to them before a dispute with the 
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neighbouring chief meant that they had to move to the other side of the village, and pay 
for another stand.   
Towards the end of my fieldwork, when discussing the meaning of ‘tenure’ with a town 
planner who has worked as a consultant to the DLA, he told me, “Tenure is not just 
about how people relate to the land, it is also about what they can do with the land” 
(DLA consultant, interview - 6.3.06).  So, as Archer and Meer recognised in a different 
context is also relevant here: ‘[the] link between access to resources and authority 
should not be oversimplified … [and] having ownership of land, in itself, has not 
necessarily meant an improved status’ (Archer and Meer 1997: 94).  Status, as seen in 
the discussion above, is mediated by a whole host of factors including gender, age, 
access to finance, to social networks, to educational capital.  However, while secure 
access to ‘just a piece of land’ in a village such as Chavani is unlikely to confer much 
status in and of itself, lack of access to land, or insecurity in relation to that access land, 
can be extremely harmful.  Such security and insecurity is also mediated by unequal 
power relations, and practices that have built up around them.  Therefore, although 
someone may be said to have formal ‘rights to land’ or a registered ‘permission to 
occupy’ land in Chavani, this does not necessarily translate to security in practice.  In 
the rural field, how people relate to the land today is deeply bound to their history.  
What people can do with the ‘piece of land’ they have been allocated and are living on 
today have been regulated by some forty years of bureaucratic practices that have built 
up around people’s relationship to Nkhensani TA.  Such historicised practices are further 
shaped by everyday materialities of life in the village, such as the size of the plots and 
the numbers of people living in the village.   
6.2 - Land Administration 
Many people’s accounts of the procedures to be followed in order to access land 
concurred with those of the Hosi: business people have to approach the offices of the 
TA with the required money for a stand and a letter to the Hosi that has to be approved 
by the District, residential stands of 35 x 35 metres are allocated for a smaller fee to 
‘insiders’ than ‘outsiders’, ‘outsiders’ applying for residential stands need a trekpas – a 
letter of recommendation from the chief on the land where they formerly lived.  As with 
the practices relating to tribal levies and fines, such definite assertions of rules can be 
seen to become shaped by some discretion in practice.  Such discretion is shaped, in 
turn, by the changing material realities of increasing pressure on land in Chavani, as 
well as the relative power of those seeking to access land in relation to those in the TA.  
The TA, in contrast, derive their power from their position as gatekeepers to the village, 
their legitimacy in such roles supported by decades of apartheid practices bolstered by 
ongoing state sanction and support by the post-apartheid state.  So while the 
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procedures that insiders and outsiders, men and women have followed in order to have 
a stand allocated to them, and the practices relating to land that have built up around 
them, are changing over time, the extent of that change is limited by that practical 
historicised reality. 
One example of such limitations can be drawn from the example of differences between 
men and women and their ability to access a stand.  Until marriage, it is usual for both 
men and women to continue living with their parents; the cost of building or even 
maintaining a home on one’s own stand is onerous.  There are, however, undoubtedly 
times – on divorce, on falling out with ones family, on having children unsupported by 
one’s partner, or even should someone simply want their own home – when either men 
or women may want to have a stand allocated to them in their own right.  The Hosi 
asserted that “we don’t give a stand to a woman if she is not married” (Hosi X, interview 
- 8.8.05 (translated)).  He later indicated, however, that the same rule would apply to 
men.  Those on the TC also supported this statement, but with regards to men, in the 
next breath said, “but if ever there is no marriage … we give it to him if we know he will 
marry” (TC, interview - 6.9.05 (translated)).  None of them gave a clear response about 
women.  While they acknowledged that it was quite possible for a woman to be 
allocated a stand in a male relative’s name, they discussed at some length that it was 
children that was important rather than marriage: a woman is supposed to be 
childbearing and so, if they do not give her a stand unless she has children and is 
married, this will apparently be a negative incentive for her to have children.  However, 
financial independence – a prohibitively onerous barrier to obtaining a stand in itself, 
particularly for women with unemployment being higher amongst women than men – 
does not appear to be a sufficient condition for obtaining a stand.  Nevertheless, a 
number of women in the village told me that their stand was registered in their own 
names; clearly some women have sufficient capital, aside from financial capital, such as 
social capital, through her connection to networks of political or perhaps genealogical 
(for example, being born within the Royal family) power, or cultural capital through her 
education or employment, to negotiate access to a stand.  Achieving access to a stand, 
however, depends upon her successful translation of that capital in the space of 
uncertainty deriving from interaction between rules and the varying notions of men on 
the TC of what it means to be ‘a Shangaan woman’.  While these may change over time 
– demonstrated by anomalous cases such as one elderly woman’s stand being 
registered in her son’s name but her daughter’s stand being registered in her own – any 
such change will be constrained by a highly patriarchal collective habitus that continues 
to shape practice.  In contrast, the task of an unmarried man to be able to persuade the 
TC that he is likely to have children does not seem to be particularly difficult. 
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Another example of such limitations can be drawn from recognising the significance of 
the material reality of life in Chavani.  While the sizes of the stands have over time been 
reduced to just 35 x 35 metres, there is still some element of choice in relation to where 
someone may live.  People would be shown to one of the new stands that had been 
demarcated and if someone did not like a particular site, then they would be shown to 
another.  Today, however, this ‘choice’ is largely prescribed by the reality that there is 
very little suitable land left that is available for more stands.  So, although Chavani has 
for a long time accepted “a lot of people coming from the side of Makhado, from farms, 
and … from the mountain” and it seems to be a place full of people from somewhere 
else, today “[t]hey sometimes do not allow people from outside because there’s no 
longer space” (TA Senior Administrator, interview - 18.8.05 (translated)).  In the face of 
pressure for land from both within and from outside the area, there are good reasons 
for the assertion of rules.  Not only will their successful assertion bolster the legitimacy 
of the chieftaincy, but the material realities of the limitations of space in Chavani curtails 
the extent to which such success is likely.  Such materialities have been determined by a 
history of vastly unequal property relations in South Africa, a history that, for people 
living in Chavani and elsewhere in the rural field, has in no way been overturned since 
the end of apartheid despite the government’s land redistribution or restitution 
programmes. 
6.3 - ‘Tenure’ 
What people can do with the land has also been shaped by changes in laws and 
regulations that have been differentially appropriated and which in turn have resulted in 
changing local practices.  As argued by Oomen: ‘[legal] categories were accepted, 
rejected or redefined in line with both local values and interests and as such did not 
determine the local power landscape, even if they did have an effect on it’ (2005: 243).  
After people in the village were forced into bantustands and graveyards were 
introduced, people were prohibited from burying their dead on their stands; the linkage 
between ‘ownership’ of land by families and their ancestors was officially broken.  
Instead, people were given documents, PTOs – Permissions to Occupy – that officially 
recognised their rights to the land.  Such documents, however, simply confirmed that 
they had paid their taxes due annually to the apartheid, and then Gazankulu, 
governments for their stands, for their fields and for the numbers of animals they kept.  
Unlike a title deed that formally recognises one’s rights over registered land, rights that 
may be abrogated only by other registered ‘real’ rights over the same land (meant in the 
legal sense of the term), and sometimes by legislation, the meaning of these documents 
not only related to people’s ‘rights’ over their stand, but also to the recognition of their 
‘rights’ by apartheid institutions of governance, the extent of which always depending 
upon their payment of taxes and fines to those institutions.  So while the fines and taxes 
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were unpopular, people recognised that if they did not pay them, the extent of the 
recognition of their ‘rights’ would be diminished or even extinguished.   
People living in the bantustans also had their ‘rights’ abrogated on another front.  Living 
under the jurisdiction of a TA meant that they also had to comply with particular 
standards of behaviour set down by it; not doing so would also curtail their ‘citizenship’ 
of the village.  The documents, however, bore no relation to any such compliance other 
than to the payment of taxes obliged under laws laid down by the apartheid and 
Gazankulu authorities.  Moroever, a number of people bemoaned that “documents do 
not mean anything to the chief – it was only meaning something for problems that 
happened from other people” (Chavani informant, interview - 5.9.05).  Therefore, in 
terms of the reality of those ‘rights’ and the security they endowed on the holder, this 
was, and is, also curtailed by the extent of the endorsement and support received from 
the wider institutions of state, such as providing people with recourse to appeal against 
unjust decisions by a traditional leader.  Although this would be permitted today, the 
withdrawal of institutions linking the chieftaincy and other state institutions supporting 
or overseeing its decisions, has created an institutional vacuum and, for people living in 
the area, the only option in appealing such a decision is to take or threaten to take the 
case to (a non-traditional) court.  As recognised by the Hosi, however, this would be 
unlikely:  
They might have the power if they have money for a lawyer.  If we explain why 
we’ve moved them out and then the person can move .. out, but without a 
lawyer … It is not very easy to go to the police station. (Hosi X, interview - 
18.8.05 (translated)). 
So, realistically, whether or not, as asserted by a lawyer working for local land sector 
NGO, such documents could be used as evidence in asserting that a particular person 
‘owned’ a stand in a court case, in practice, in an area such as Chavani, any such 
dispute is unlikely to be resolved by an institution other than the TA.   
The position with regards to fields appears to be even more uncertain than in relation to 
stands.  With pressure coming from both insiders and outsiders for residential stands, 
many people who had had fields in the past had since had them taken away from them 
and re-allocated as stands.  Those who still had fields seemed aware of this threat and 
conscious of a certain pressure to prove that the field belonged to them.  They either 
referred to continuously cultivating crops (apparently, keeping animals in the fields was 
not sufficient to prevent the chief taking back the land, or was not allowed on such 
land) or, again, to ‘documents’.  For many, a ‘deed of grant’ or ‘title deed’, rather than a 
PTO seemed like a panacea to such problems.  Similarly, people often referred to 
documents that they had been given for their land, knowing that they confirm their 
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‘rights’ to that land.  The ongoing importance of documents in the face of difficulties in 
asserting one’s rights is ironic, given their oppressive symbolism, but somewhat 
unsurprising; at some point the meaning of such documents became normalised.  Such 
a normalisation of particular practices contains within it its own paradox.  While people’s 
‘rights’ may now be asserted through the use of such documents, such potential 
avenues of action also frame within them ‘[w]hat counts as justified belief and valid 
knowledge’ and so in turn circumscribe the opportunities for future actions by hiding the 
kind of questions that can be asked (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 13), here about their 
‘ownership’ of the land and what that means.  As Bourdieu argued, doxa is ‘the point of 
view of the dominant, when it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view’ 
(Bourdieu 1994: 15).  The domination unseen in that ‘universal point of view’ is in fact 
arbitrary, but is ‘misconstrued as self-evidently correct’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 16). 
Since 1994, other things have also changed.  While people are still charged annual tribal 
levies and given receipts for them, this is now undertaken by the TA which is no longer 
supported in this by the Gazankulu authorities; the wider institutional state support of 
the linkage between the recognition of their rights to the land and those payments has 
been broken.  This has very real but also unpredictable consequences for the 
chieftaincy.  Today, people are very aware that they no longer have to go to the 
magistrates’ offices in Giyani to pay their taxes and many people are not bothering to 
pay their tribal dues.  Nevertheless, they still look to the TA for support and protection 
in case of problems or disputes.  Such a breakdown in compliance, however, has 
uncertain outcomes, particularly in terms of the extent to which people can call on the 
support of the TA in times of need.  While a stand will almost certainly not be taken 
away from someone who has not paid, the TA might not offer support to those people 
should they need it.  This is also likely to be the case, even if a family had simply failed 
to pay their dues into the communal fund to be distributed in the cases of funerals.  As 
discussed above, there is clearly some discretion that is applied by those working for the 
TA in such cases but such discretion goes hand in hand with uncertainty; those in 
positions of weakness and those affected by such hardship, are less likely to be able to 
negotiate successful outcomes. 
On the one hand, while the documents that people have been given as receipts by the 
TA for their annual tribal dues do not amount to PTOs, in the eyes of many people living 
in the village they continue to retain some importance in the face of uncertainty and 
pressure on the land.  On the other hand, although the introduction of graveyards 
officially broke the link between formally recognised ‘ownership’ of land by families and 
their ancestors, in the minds of many, not even documents extinguish those ancestral 
‘rights’ – or if not ‘rights’, at least ongoing understandings of ‘ownership’: 
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If you have a document for a field, it means no one can take that place.  But 
you would not take that place 100 years ago even if you didn’t have a document 
because people used to know their places by their graves.  The things of the 
graveyards, it’s for nowadays.  If you have to plough in the field and you find 
that there’s a grave there, what would happen?  Even if you don’t have a 
document you can claim that land because of that grave. (Chavani informant, 
group discussion - 28.10.05 (translated)). 
So even though official changes that have been introduced through laws and regulations 
may have changed what people can and cannot do, until those changes have gained 
legitimacy, the meanings of terms like ‘ownership’ will not automatically change 
alongside them.  And so long as those in positions of authority fail to achieve symbolic 
capital over such meanings, their legitimacy, and in turn the extent of the power that 
may be exercised over people living in such areas by those introducing such change, will 
continue to be contested.  This leads on to a fuller discussion of the meaning of 
‘ownership’. 
6.4 - ‘Ownership’ 
People already know they ‘own’ the land. … the aged ones are the ones who 
‘own’ the land – most of us do not ‘own’ the land – I have said ‘own’ in quotes 
because it in fact belongs to the Chiefs.  … most people if you ask them will say 
‘It is ok – we live here.  We own here.’ (Chavani informant, interview - 
31.10.05). 
In relation to the land people are living on today, the stands they have been allocated 
since the prohibition of burying one’s dead within a stand, the meaning of ‘ownership’ is 
more complicated.  For the rest of this section I refer to ‘practical notions of ‘ownership’’ 
to denote those notions of ownership of people living in Chavani.  This is not to imply 
that such notions are uncontested; practices that have built up around them are shaped 
by contestations between people struggling to claim symbolic capital in defining such 
notions, in turn shaped by the collective habitus of people living in such areas.  That 
habitus embodies the violence that people lived through in the forced removals into 
their bantustands.  Although the exercise of one’s rights over such a small stand – “just 
a piece of land” – can never really be described as a ‘freedom’ (van Krieken 2001), it 
has become a reality.  So while living in such stands for many might never amount to 
doxa, in that it will not be accepted, let alone ‘misrecognised’ as being ‘self-evidently 
correct’ (Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 16), nevertheless, particular practices and the 
structure of the field have built up around the existence of a particular reality and the 
orthodoxy accepted within the field, albeit externally imposed.  In turn, the habitus of 
people within the field will propose possible questions which orient the activities that 
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occur within the field, and renders others unaskable (Bourdieu 1990).  And, even 
though people have rebelled against some of the practices that have built up around 
that reality in myriad ways before 1994, and probably more manifestly after 1994, for 
people sharing that habitus many other practices have become to a certain extent 
unquestioned. 
When I first went to the area in July 2005, someone took me to Waterval, a location (or 
township) close to Elim, and contrasted it with a village like Chavani under a TA in a so-
called ‘communal’ area.  But the label ‘communal’ is misguiding and does not point 
towards the difference between such similar areas.  While there were visual differences 
between the two – many of the houses in Waterval were bigger and smarter than those 
in Chavani and there were some tarred roads between them rather than just unmade up 
gravel roads and rutted dirt paths – there seemed to be many more similarities.  People 
told me of other differences:  
In Pretoria and Waterval – they pay tax every month – here we pay once a 
year.  They pay for electricity, water, roads, sanitation and bins.  We [have] big 
holes [dug on stands for the rubbish] which we burn and then the ashes stay in 
our stands. (Bokisi informant, group discussion - 26.9.05 (translated)).   
And, “in Waterval, people have ‘Deeds of Grant’59 over their stands - but in Chavani they 
just have ‘PTOs’” (ibid).  The most fundamental difference between the two areas, 
however, is that in Waterval there is no chief, but in Chavani there is.  This chapter has 
gone to some length to describe just some of the practices that have built up around 
the chieftaincy and how these have been shaped by, and shape, the habitus of people 
living in such areas.  Importantly, they have also shaped practices surrounding land and 
tenure. 
When I asked S, who lived on her own stand, the last stand demarcated, fenced off 
from the veld and first fields on the lower slopes of the mountain, what she was allowed 
to do on the land, she responded: 
I can plough.  And if I want to move away from this stand I can also sell it.  But 
I must go to the chief and say that I am moving away and then I can only sell 
the house and the trees, not the land. (Chavani informant, interview - 22.8.05 
(translated)). 
I had come to predict the pat phrase that people would respond with: “I can build a 
house, I can plough, I can grow trees, I can do anything I want on it …”.  But people’s 
ability to fulfil these ideals is also curbed by the fact that the stands today are “just a 
piece of land”.  Moreover, as indicated above, in Chavani, ‘ownership’ is not 
unconditional and depends on their “follow[ing] the rules of the chief, plough[ing] and 
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liv[ing] well within the community” (Hosi X, interview - 18.8.05 (translated)).  There 
were also particular things people must not do on their stands, such as cutting down 
trees.  The punishment for doing things not allowed, is often a fine.  But any decision as 
to as to whether or not someone acted within the rules of the chief, will ultimately 
depend on their relative power in negotiating with those in the TA.  Although people 
claimed that no one had received a trekpas, or eviction order for them to leave Chavani 
for many years, people had lost their fields when land has been reclaimed by the chief 
for demarcating more stands.  Furthermore, although many people talked about 
‘ownership’ and had successfully managed to have a stand allocated to them in the face 
of potential difficulties, I also heard many stories of systems breaking down and of the 
consequences that could have in obstructing their access to other services.  While they 
did not explicitly talk about the need for institutional recognition of their property, I 
nevertheless heard of the stress of such problems and of trying to withstand an unfair 
decision without recourse to other authorities that could offer support.  As Berry 
recognises, ‘Contests over land involve contests over authority as well as resources: 
they draw on and reshape relations of power as well as property’ (Berry 2002: 656). 
6.5 – (Mis)understanding practical notions of ‘ownership’ 
Questions that can be asked of ‘ownership’ might be very different for people living 
outside Chavani, outside the former Gazankulu, outside the rural field, but opportunities 
that exist for asking them are few and far between.  Although there were some living in 
Chavani who were concerned that institutional recognition be given to the ‘ownership’ 
that they already had over their stands, usually because they wanted banks to accept 
their house as security for a loan, those who mentioned this unsurprisingly tended to be 
richer, better educated and had been turned away by a financial institution for a loan, or 
realised that they would be, because the smart house that they had built was 
considered to have ‘no market value’ and so could not be accepted as security.  Another 
instance when practical notions of ‘ownership’ would require some kind of wider 
institutional recognition would be cases, as indicated above, in which someone wanted 
to appeal against a particular decision made by the TA.   
Since 1998, practical notions of ‘ownership’ have also been brought to the fore by the 
restitution leg of the land reform programme which has enabled groups to claim back 
their ‘rights in land’ having been ‘dispossessed … as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices’ (Restitution Act 1994).  According to a local land sector 
NGO, at the time I was undertaking my research there were 56 key claims in Makhado 
Municipality’s area, covering 90 percent of the land60.  I spoke to people from three 
groups, or ‘communities’, currently falling under Nkhensani TA that were claiming land.  
But, just as the lines that are demarcated and registered in the Deeds Registry in the 
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area of Chavani bear no relation to how people live today, nor do those farms that are 
registered and being claimed back bear any relation (probably even less) to how groups 
of claimants lived prior to their dispossession.  In many cases, there were a number of 
groups under different chiefs living in an area demarcated and registered as one ‘farm’. 
One of the meetings held by the LCC that I attended involved claims by five 
communities over one ‘farm’ that had been grouped together.  It was held in an area of 
privately owned prime agricultural land (most of which was also, ironically, under land 
claim).  Four groups were present: three of the four groups there were ‘Vendas’, one 
group were ‘Shangaans’.  The official from the LCC running the meeting spoke in English 
with another from the Commission translating into Venda.  The principal issue of 
contention between the communities was over internal ‘boundaries’, the portions they 
were claiming, counter-claiming and arguing about.  The meeting lasted some four 
hours. 
On the way to the meeting, a Project Officer with NGO explained to me the difficulties 
caused by the imposition of a (re-)interpretation of practical notions of ‘ownership’ by 
the Act as ‘rights in land’: 
 the way people used to live before, it was not easy to define the rights they 
had.  They had overlapping rights and were living in one place but submitting to 
the authority of another chief. … For example, say there’s a road and one chief 
has jurisdiction over one side of the road and another over the other side but 
one person lives on the other side of the road from their chief so will not submit 
to the jurisdiction of the other chief and so will say they just came to stay there 
… so for the sake of progress, for the sake of rights and restoration of people’s 
rights, they have to compromise.  But it’s not easy.  Maybe I am staying deep 
inside the other’s land, how do I restore that right?  And with the farm 
boundaries, you will find that they just cut that land where they were living and 
you will take a long time to re-survey all that land. (Nkuzi Project Officer, 
personal communication – 4.11.05) 
This turned out to be the main factor in instigating conflict between the communities.  It 
was further exacerbated because the resolution of the restitution case was not going to 
involve re-demarcating the land so as to re-draw those straight lines of farm boundaries 
on the map to something more resembling how people used to be living there, it would 
simply involve a re-registration of the names of the owners of the ‘new’ farms.   And, 
rather than resolving or remedying a brutal forced removal that had been perpetuated 
on such people in the name of apartheid, it inspired new disputes over the chieftaincy 
and over ethnicity.  By the end of the meeting, tempers were frayed and the groups of 
‘Vendas’ accused the studiously English-speaking (but ‘Shangaan’) Commission official of 
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being biased towards the ‘Shangaans’.  The Commission official made a final desperate 
bid to inspire people to resolve the irresolvable: 
We know very well that it might be true that the chief might have had 
jurisdiction over that area but this is the Restitution Act and … it doesn’t talk 
about jurisdiction it talks about rights – we don’t know the rights … 
(Commission official, LCC meeting, Levubu – 4.11.05 (Fieldwork notebook)). 
But practical notions of ‘ownership’ as multi-dimensional, relating land to the 
relationships between people and groups living there, are inadequately captured in the 
description of a one-dimensional right between a person and a piece of land. 
7 - Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some of the contestations over legitimacy, land and authority 
in Chavani, one rural area in South Africa.  Through a snapshot of this slice of the rural 
field, it has become clear that how people relate to their land and what they can do with 
it is shaped by the legitimacy and the governance of the chieftaincy and practices that 
have built up around it.  Therefore, understanding ‘tenure’ in the rural field requires an 
understanding of practices shaped by the chieftaincy that, in turn, is both structuring 
and structured by the habitus of people living in such areas.  The process of the 
construction of a practical reality is a continuous one, built upon an ongoing process of 
adaptation, negotiation and contestation in response to change coming from the outside 
and from within.  Such processes have produced ambiguities and inconsistencies that 
can be and have been exploited by different constituencies depending on their relative 
power.  In Chavani, this has also been influenced by change and constancy: laws have 
been reformed and others have been revoked, but people’s lives cannot be assumed to 
be relate directly to the changing laws and regulations that are passed at national or 
regional levels.  Meanwhile, a highly patriarchal collective habitus continues to shape 
practice, as do the increasing pressure for land in Chavani and the decreasing support 
received from the state by the chieftaincy. 
In the controversy surrounding CLARA, both the government and its critics bandied 
about terms like the ‘new democratic dispensation’, ‘tenure’ and ‘security’, and binaries 
became politically constructed, such as those between ‘tradition’ and ‘human rights’ and 
between ‘traditional leaders’ and ‘women’.  While particular high profile political leaders 
attempted to claim a monopoly on the ability to define ‘tradition’ due to their 
‘supposedly privileged access to ‘traditional’ capital’ (van Rouvery van Nieuwaal 1996: 
67) (see Chapter 3), they were doing so, not in the rural field, where most of the (less 
high-profile) traditional leaders and laypeople were unlikely to have even been aware of 
such contestations over CLARA, but in the political field.  Meanwhile, others struggled to 
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delegitimise such versions (see Chapters 5 and 6).  However, in the process, together, 
in arenas beyond the rural field, they contributed to a greater polarisation between such 
concepts.  However, in the everyday practices of those living within the rural field, such 
concepts are much more messily intertwined, and consistently negotiated.  But in the 
contestations taking place elsewhere, both sides claimed to be presenting ‘the truth’ 
and, in doing so, turned to ‘representatives’ from villages in ‘rural areas’ around the 
country to provide evidence of that truth depending on the discourses that shaped it.  
Robins recognised that: ‘[many post-development critics] tend to valorise peasant 
cultural autonomy and authenticity as part of a radical (and romantic) commitment to 
subaltern popular resistance to development, capitalism and modernity’ (Robins 2001: 
267).  So did many of those participating in these debates do the same, particularly in 
relation to women’s authenticity.   
Neither the government nor its critics acknowledged that the meanings of such words 
are different to different people in different places, shaped by a practical reality, relating 
to a shared habitus.  But when particular words alone, and in turn versions of reality, 
are taken outside a particular field, they do not automatically take with them the 
meanings that are embodied in those practices.  If policy processes are to become more 
inclusive, more based upon knowledge that derives from those who are to be subjected 
to ‘reforms’ – which after all should be a goal of a progressive post-apartheid 
democratic dispensation – then recognition of such a messy reality in which different 
concepts are negotiated and intertwined somehow needs to be taken seriously.  
Otherwise, introducing policies that ignore the negotiated meanings of such notions will 
simply fail to achieve the ‘security’ or ‘gender equality’ that are envisaged by either 
policy reformers, or their critics.  But the ‘somehow’ therefore will have to be 
considered.  The following chapter considers these questions when looking at the 
‘strategies of legitimation’ of different groupings participating in such policy processes. 
 
 
 
 
 199 
CHAPTER 8 - CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION: STRATEGIES OF 
LEGITIMATION 
1 - Introduction 
This chapter considers the interactions between individuals and groupings within 
different fields coming together in debates over CLARA.  In the contestations that arose, 
what was at stake was the ‘monopoly of the power to impose a universally recognized 
principle of knowledge of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 837), but knowledge of 
tenure in the former homelands was shaped by the habitus of those engaging in the 
debates, as well as the demands and constraints of the fields that they were positioned 
within.  Their relationships with other actors in that field were also shaped by their 
habitus, and so were their engagements in relation to CLARA.  And, in order to influence 
those debates, they adopted strategies to legitimise their particular take on what was to 
be reformed and how.   Therefore, although they were all focused on the reform of 
tenure in the former homelands, the differences between the fields in which they were 
positioned and the differences in habitus that each person brought to the table shaped 
the strategies that they adopted in relation to those debates.  This chapter is therefore 
important in understanding the extent to which those strategies were successful or not, 
but, more importantly, the extent to which they enabled the plurality of voices shaping 
knowledge in the rural field – the field to be reformed – to shape the debates. 
As indicated in previous chapters, both the government and those in civil society 
undertook extensive consultation exercises in relation to CLARA, both apparently 
supporting their particular framings of the issues.  This chapter considers first the 
bureaucratic field between 1994 and 2004 and the ways those positioned within it 
viewed their engagements with others in relation to tenure, the consultation exercises 
they embarked upon and the awareness-raising they undertook.  Given that those 
within this field had very little ‘room for manoeuvre’ in either shaping CLARA or in 
responding to their critics, the following section then considers the extent to which 
those engagements, rather than feeding into the process of formulating legislation to 
reform tenure, instead became adopted as a strategy for legitimating their position.  
The chapter then considers those within civil society, made up of more differentiated 
organisations and groupings, but many of whom had come together as a result of 
particular shared backgrounds, those in the legal grouping, as well those within 
organisations that united in their activism or opposition to government.  For the 
purposes of uniting as one against CLARA, to a greater or lesser extent they overcame 
those differences and participated together under the NLC/PLAAS Project.  For the 
organisers, the run-up to CLARA’s Portfolio Committee hearings was an extremely tense 
time and they had very little control over, or information in relation to, the way things 
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were unfolding in relation to the Bill’s political passage through the networks of power.  
In the excitement and stress of that time, the importance of designing consultation 
processes that were to be anything more than a strategy of legitimation – keenly 
understood at the time of designing the Project by those who ran it and by those NGOs 
participating in it – was cast to one side.  Lastly, the chapter discusses the Portfolio 
Committee: a formal participatory space in which members of the public, as well as the 
various groups lobbying for change to the legislation, were able to bring their objections 
directly to Members of Parliament (MPs) overseeing the passage of the Bill through 
Parliament.  These hearings really did bring together those positioned within different 
fields, but in the end, in this process too, those participating simply ended up talking 
across each other – all of them apparently utterly committed to the reform of tenure in 
the former homelands. 
2 – The bureaucratic field in transition: From the euphoria of democracy to 
the practice of governing 
We were affected by the pre-occupation of consultation and participation, and 
giving ear to local process – I suppose our current pre-occupation is from then.  
It’s not simply a matter of good governance but it’s the principles of 
understanding decision-making processes.  
… 
I wrote a lot of policy – we had to write policies.  The farmworker policy I wrote 
late one night – because we had a meeting the next day. [Reference to the 
early days of democracy] (LRC Lawyer, personal communication - 26.6.05) 
When the ANC won the elections in 1994, there was elation; the new government had 
not only replaced the draconian apartheid state, but it was finally going to be inclusive 
and participatory, respecting the rights of the poorest people in society, bringing their 
voices to the table.  ‘Consultation’ was considered to be one of the fundamental tenets 
of the new democracy and was even embodied in the Constitution.  But, in the early 
years of the new democracy, it soon became clear that, although the principles and 
ideals of participation and democracy were all very good, there were practical limitations 
to governmental consultation processes.  Time pressures, resource constraints and 
capacity limitations all meant that in the end, those people who were sufficiently 
experienced, competent and appeared to understand the complexities of the issues, 
often requiring legal expertise just as much as knowledge of the realities ‘on the 
ground’, ended up being the ones who ‘wrote policies’.  Moreover, it was acknowledged 
by members of the Tenure Directorate, therefore, that ‘consultation’ should be focused 
on those problems that lacked ‘clarity’ and ‘direction’ (DLA – Discussion Paper, 7.8.95: 
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8).  Nevertheless, for those working in government, it was still essential that the 
government showed Parliament that proper consultation had been carried out.  Their 
energy was therefore directed into pilot studies looking at solutions to the tenure 
problems in particular ‘test cases’ around the country so as to contribute to a greater 
understanding of that problem.  This was then elaborated in the White Paper.  In 
relation to the consultation process designed for the LRB, when it was first released to 
the Cabinet in 1998, it was made clear to the Drafting Team that it was extremely 
important that they were seen to have consulted widely (Minutes of Drafting Meeting – 
13.3.98).  But, knowing the potential political backlash that could be generated by the 
reforms that they had formulated to deal with the problem of tenure in the former 
homelands, a problem that lacked neither clarity nor direction, the team responded 
accordingly: 
 X noted that the format of the consultative meetings and how they were 
planned and organised was absolutely critical to the success of the consultation 
process.  X warned of the danger of it being hi-jacked by self-defined interest 
groups.  It was important to think through how a topic was to be presented and 
dissenting views addressed in advance of the meeting. (ibid: 2). 
In relation to CLARA, it was similarly essential that the government showed Parliament 
that proper consultation had been carried out.  Furthermore, as indicated in previous 
chapters, land NGOs and those within the ‘legal grouping’ directed some of their 
strongest criticisms towards the Department’s consultation processes.  But, after the Bill 
had eventually been leaked at the Tenure Conference, government officials working on 
tenure had a good idea of many of the issues that civil society was concerned about.  
And, similar to the LRC lawyer above, one of the consultants on the drafting team was 
confident that the early, and important, period of the Bill’s history “started as broadly 
inclusive” (DLA consultant, interview - 12.1.06), with “a whole range of issues that came 
out of the Land Summit [Tenure Conference] in 2001” (ibid) for them to deal with. 
Another official in the DLA who had been closely involved with both the pre- and post-
1999 processes thought that the government’s external openness in the latter period 
could be seen in their willingness to consult with their detractors: 
 We thought, ‘Let’s not limit who we can interact with’.  He speculated that in 
the former group [they had thought] in order to consult you had to have 
something as a basis of what to consult with.  … [Later,] we thought, ‘Let’s be 
open about the contesting views of traditional leaders.  We had no problems 
saying, ‘We’ve drafted this, criticise us.’  We were more open.  There were 
varied sets of ideas so we thought, ‘Let’s get all of them’. (former DLA official, 
interview - 18.1.06) 
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While this official indicates that in the latter period the department was more open to 
criticism, when I asked him/her about the relationship between the Department and 
NGOs, s/he responded with a little more ambivalence: 
 There was a change in the relationship between the DLA and NGOs but they 
were not fully supportive of some of the changes proposed. … The important 
point is that, at the end of the day, you’ve got to find a product that is 
satisfactory to all.  Traditional leaders would say ‘Just give us the land’ and 
NGOs would emphasise you need to bring in elements of democracy … the 
question is, how to balance this. (ibid) 
After the draft Bill had been published in August 2002, officials in the National office 
took the issues to the Provincial offices of the DLA and together they held consultation 
workshops in most of the provinces around the country.  According to the Directorate:  
a total of 50 workshops were organized at the national, provincial and 
community levels.  These workshops were conducted in consultation with civil 
society.  The workshops involved traditional leaders and their communities, the 
national House of Traditional Leaders with representation from the Provincial 
House of Traditional Leaders, the Coalition of Traditional Leaders and 
CONTRALESA and the Ingonyama Trust Board. (DLA - Memorandum on the 
Objects of the CLRB, 22.9.03) 
Alongside these workshops, a formal ‘CLRB Communication Campaign’ was launched in 
2002/3.  This involved advertisements published in newspapers as well as radio bulletins 
put out on local radio stations ‘to inform individuals, communities and persons residing 
on communal land in the rural areas of KZN l about the objects and purpose of the 
Communal Land Rights Bill and to direct them to where additional information can be 
obtained queries forwarded [sic]’ (National Assembly - Written Reply, Question 1247, 
8.8.03).  Of a total of R1,288,308.19 (~ £80,000) spent by both the DOA and the DLA in 
2002 on advertising in the electronic and print media, 95% was spent on the CLRB 
Campaign (ibid).  Such ‘advertisements’ were bolstered by various Departmental 
publications such as ‘The A-Z of the Communal Land Rights Bill, 2003’.  In spite of the 
‘communication campaign’, dissent from traditional leaders to the Bill was strong.  In the 
now infamous consultations that were to take place in KZN, the departmental officials 
were ‘chased away’: they had arranged buses to transport people but “the buses were 
stopped and people were pulled out of the busses by the IFP!” (DLA official, interview - 
11.1.06).  However, even without managing to undertake actual ‘consultation’ on the Bill 
there, this would have conveyed a strong impression of the unpopularity of the Bill 
amongst particular constituencies.  These mirrored the response given to the Bill in 
Limpopo province, where consultations were successfully held.  I spoke to a number of 
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DLA officials from both the Provincial and National Offices, who had participated in 
them.  One of them referred to the “terrible debate” that the Bill caused, particularly 
amongst the “older people” – “when I would explain the same thing to them, they 
would say, ‘We don’t want this’ – all their allegiance is to the chief” (Provincial DLA 
official, interview - 31.1.06).  According to him/her, only “those who are business or 
developmentally minded would understand what we wanted to do.  People who are with 
PTOs – and they would apply for full title.” (ibid).  Another Provincial DLA official 
similarly acknowledged that: 
It’s common knowledge that chiefs were not happy around the way it was 
introduced and that they were feeling that there was not enough consultation 
done with them.  And also the way it was done – it was felt that it was done 
after the document was drafted rather than consulting them before that about 
how to do the reforms. (Provincial DLA official, interview - 6.12.05).   
Given the strength of the views received through the consultation workshops that did 
(and did not) take place around the country, these may well have contributed to 
shaping the views of those within the Tenure Directorate who were closely involved in 
the CLRB policy-making processes, perhaps because it was not possible to ignore them.  
Moreover, the ‘willingness to consult with detractors’ may have contributed to an 
overemphasis on consulting with the obvious detractors, in order to defend the 
approach taken.  After all, there was heavy political pressure to quell the criticisms of 
those detractors.  And overemphasising consultation with such obvious, and politically 
prominent, detractors also perhaps made it easier to hold them up as some kind of 
counterweight to the endless criticism received from civil society.  If doing so did not 
enable the bureaucrats in the firing line to bypass such criticisms from these detractors 
– less politically prominent, but more professionally awkward – at least it would justify 
to them why they could not just ‘change the model’. 
Nevertheless, the consultation processes convened by the Department did not only 
involve the workshops around the country.  And from May 2002, the government also 
convened a number of ‘Reference Group’ meetings inviting all of their detractors to 
formally come together and discuss the proposed CLRB.  Convening these meetings 
might have managed to quell criticisms and defend the approach taken, but at this time, 
and not just because of the furore over CLARA, the government’s relationship with these 
other detractors was “at an all time low” (former DLA official, interview - 9.12.05).  And 
the bureaucrats working on CLARA were simply unable to really do much to appease 
their less politically prominent detractors.  The political spotlight shone elsewhere – 
towards the precarious relationship between the ANC and traditional leaders, not just in 
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KZN but, thanks to CONTRALESA, even in Limpopo – hardly an anti-ANC hotbed of 
dissent. 
Even though one former Provincial official admitted that the ‘consultations’ undertaken 
by government may have been more of an exercise in ‘communication’, involving the 
DLA officials “present[ing] whatever [draft of the] Bill was drafted” (former Provincial 
official, interview - 31.1.06), Departmental officials carrying out those presentations, are 
still likely to take away with them a sense of issues of concern to those involved.  The 
extent to which such bureaucrats are able, or willing, to feed those issues into shaping 
the Bill, or even prior to drafting a Bill, however, will not only depend on the strength of 
their own convictions in relation to their superiors, but also on their position within the 
hierarchy of the bureaucratic field.  But, within that field, such a position is determined 
to a large extent by the tightly prescribed structure of the bureaucratic hierarchy that 
constrains the extent of an individual’s influence through the imposition of set 
procedures channelling communication and limiting action.  For particular officials who 
are sufficiently superior, however, it might also depend on their relationship with their 
political masters, that is, their position in relation to the wider field of power. 
3 – ‘Consultation’ as a strategy of legitimation 
It is easy to find cases of problems of tenure in the former homelands, but what those 
problems demonstrate is, or should be, an open question.  In relation to CLARA, 
however, one senior official in the DLA frankly told me: 
 On the policy development process, that’s one area that we can learn from – 
how was the agenda set in the process?  The agenda-setting process in a 
democratic country must be one that is coming from the people.  And once that 
has happened, then you have to ask how you can communicate that with the 
people?  How can you communicate externally and internally?  And when there 
are changes, how can you speak with one voice?  Also the communication 
process is also communicating what the legislative process is all about. (DLA 
official, interview - 11.1.06) 
And for those working on tenure in the government in those early days of democracy, 
what ‘the problem’ demonstrated, that there was a lacuna between people’s de facto 
‘rights’ and their de jure rights, had already been decided upon as far back as 1991, and 
that was the problem that became concretised in the Constitution.  As indicated above, 
the energy of Departmental officials and consultants at this time was therefore directed 
into pilot studies looking at solutions to the tenure problems in particular ‘test cases’ 
around the country, so as to contribute to a greater understanding of that problem.  It 
was then elaborated in the White Paper.  But, rather than being designed so as to find 
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out the extent to which such problems support or undermine this ‘model’ of interpreting 
‘the problem’, the research was designed to support it.  Certainly such research, or 
‘consultation’, carried out on that basis, is unlikely to elicit information that conflicts with 
such a framing of the problem, partly because it will in turn be interpreted through the 
same lens and shaped by layers of discourses that further shape the non-negotiability of 
particular reforms that fall outside the model adopted.  And on that basis, solutions 
formulated according to such research are likely to write themselves, particularly when 
they also are structured by the same discourses.  And so, the possibility of more 
pluralistic notions of core concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘accountability’ may also be 
pushed out.  
Both of the teams working on the reforms prior to 1999 and after 2001 claimed that 
their Bill was what was wanted by ‘communities’.  In relation to the 2001 model, a draft 
paper written by the Director of the Tenure Directorate prepared for the Chief 
Directorate: LRSSS Colloquium in March 2003, makes it clear that the draft Bill that the 
Department had been working on since January 2001, had been ‘fundamentally 
revamped’ after the LRB had been put ‘on ice … following the Minister’s direction 
concerning what had to be done’ (2.3.03: 7).  When the ‘revamped’ Bill was released, 
however, a number of people referred to the consultation that had gone on prior to 
1999 – even Thoko Didiza indicated that ‘the process started in 1995.  Since then we’ve 
had consultations with all stakeholders and interested parties’ (Barron – Sunday Times, 
22.2.04).  But the ‘model’ of reform had changed dramatically between 1999 and 2001, 
and could be said to have changed again in 2003.  According to the ‘Frequently Asked 
Questions’ section on CLARA in the Department’s Tenure Newsletter published in July 
2004, in response to ‘Has there been adequate public consultation on the CLRA?’ it 
states:  
The answer to the question is affirmative.  The public consultation process on 
the Bill commenced in May 2001 following the production of third draft [sic] of 
the Bill.  … Between 14 August 2002 when the Bill was gazetted and 22 
September 2003, there was also a thorough consultation process on the Bill.   
It ends: 
Never in the history of the Department of Land Affairs has a single Bill been so 
widely and extensively consulted on.  It is abundantly clear that the National 
Government has made special effort to accommodate the interests of the 
various stakeholders in the consultation process. (Tenure Newsletter, 7.04: 14) 
In the case of both Bills, however, the form of consultation, the people who were 
consulted and the extent to which different views of those consulted, rather than those 
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of the policy-makers, drafters or politicians, shaped the outcome in the form of a Bill, 
can be called into question. 
Although consultation should of course be taking place during the agenda-setting 
process, even after that, once that agenda has been incorporated into a draft Bill, 
consultation should presumably continue, at least until it has received Parliamentary 
approval during the so-called ‘communication’ process.  However, the consultation 
process adopted by the government began after the third draft of a Bill had been 
drafted, after the agenda-setting stage, after the ‘model’ of reform had been decided 
upon.  But, between the publication of the Bill in August 2002 and the version that 
proved to be acceptable to CONTRALESA and Mzimela in September 2003, there was 
almost a complete turnaround.  Was this turnaround driven by ‘consultation’?  Although 
the Reference Group meetings might well have been useful to DLA officials in gauging 
the response of these different groupings to the Bill, at the times that the substantial re-
drafting of the Bill was done, this was not after referral to the Reference Group61.  And, 
although government bureaucrats may have gained a strong impression through the 
consultation workshops undertaken around the country of the antagonism of many 
groups, particularly traditional leaders and older people, to the Bill, they hardly seemed 
responsible for shaping, let alone driving, the reforms beyond the directions laid down 
by their political masters.  Instead, the drafts had fully shifted so as to fully reflect the 
comments made by those more vocal groups of traditional leaders through lobbying 
directly to influential ANC Parliamentarians and Ministers.  As a result, such consultation 
processes came to be nothing more than a strategy for legitimation, a shield to ward off 
criticism from the government’s less politically prominent critics within civil society. 
4 - Strategising ‘representation’ by civil society 
As indicated above, land sector NGOs, perhaps aware of their own weakness in relations 
with the government, and aggrieved that they had not been informed even as to the 
government’s plans for tenure reform prior to their being embodied in a Bill, directed 
some of their strongest criticisms towards the inadequacy of the Department’s 
consultation exercise.  When the model of reform taken by the Bill came out, the ‘legal 
grouping’ was also furious that they had also not been consulted.  As described in the 
earlier chapters, together these two groups of critics combined to rally round, alerting 
communities of the contents of the Bill in the hope that, given their deteriorating 
relationship with the DLA, even if they could not influence the government, people to be 
affected by the reforms might manage to do so. 
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4.1 - Enlisting voices from below 
As indicated in previous chapters, the NLC/PLAAS Project seemed to have been so 
successful: it enabled some 24 submissions to be made in the hearings of the Bill by the 
Portfolio Committee, at least 12 of which were made by representatives from 
‘communities’ around the country who had participated in the workshops over the 
previous year.  Moreover, one of those submissions was from the KZN Rural Women’s 
Movement.  Given the relative weakness of the women’s movement as a lobbying force 
at the time of the NLC/PLAAS Project, relative to its strength during the negotiations 
over the Interim Constitution, when women had triumphed against traditional leaders, if 
the Project was to mobilise those voices to support the coalition, it fell on the Project to 
unite them behind it.  As indicated in Chapter 3, by the late 1990s, AFRA had facilitated 
the formation of a KZN RWM.  However, even though one of AFRA’s own project leaders 
had in 2000 taken over the mantle in directing this movement, and was a prominent 
exponent of women’s rights in relation to land (see e.g. Ngubane 1999), by 2002, the 
movement itself was not seen to have ‘addressed land issues with any seriousness’ 
(Cross and Hornby 2002: 139).  However, given the potential for CLARA to resolve, 
albeit controversially, the contestation between the claims for equality and cultural 
rights, the triumphal precedent set in the early 1990s of what the mobilisation of rural 
women could achieve, and the feminist convictions of the Project’s organisers, they 
were obviously not going to pass up the challenge.  The outcome of their efforts was 
the holding of two Provincial workshops with women by NGO partners AFRA62 and 
TRALSO, the writing of a joint paper by the director of the KZN RWM and one of the 
organisers of the NLC/PLAAS Project and, as indicated above, the KZN RWM’s 
submission to the Portfolio Committee.  The Transvaal RWM (which by then had 
changed its name to the National Movement for Rural Women), that had been so 
successful in driving such campaigns in the early 1990s, did not make such a 
submission.  In addition to women and other representatives from the rural areas, once 
the Community Consultation part of the project was up and running, the project team 
worked hard to widen the grouping of ‘stakeholders’ and in March 2003 a ‘Stakeholders’ 
Workshop’ was held, including representatives from COSATU, the HRC, the CGE, the 
SACC and the Black Sash (NLC/PLAAS Project – 3rd Quarter Report, 2-4.03: 7).  All of 
these organisations also went on to make submissions to the Portfolio Committee 
against the Bill, some supporting them with legal opinions drafted by lawyers from the 
LRC.  The project team had also put some effort into raising awareness of the issues 
with the South African Local Government Association that in turn became actively and 
independently involved.  This all gave them potentially more opportunities for 
influencing MPs than just the few with whom those within the legal grouping had 
personal contact.  Furthermore, COSATU, being one of the ANC’s tripartite alliance 
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partners, would be included in ANC study group meetings – an inside lead to influence 
the real movers and the shakers in the ANC. 
Although rumours abounded, those in the legal grouping and their contacts remained in 
the dark as to the intentions for the Parliamentary process.  Nevertheless, in March 
2003 and again in June, further drafts of the Bill had been leaked.  According to the 
NLC/PLAAS Project’s ‘3rd Quarter Report’: 
Following a flurry of behind-the-scenes meetings, the most recent draft of the 
Bill was rejected by both the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
and the South African Local Government Association.  It is rumoured that 
serious objections had also been raised by certain cabinet ministers.  The short 
of it is that the drafting process was sent back to the Department of Land 
Affairs where two alternative versions of the bill are now being prepared to be 
put before the land Minister.  This was announced late May 2003 by [X] of the 
tenure reform directorate. (ibid: 2)   
The report goes on to state that ‘the framework [of the March version of the Bill] 
remained the same – ie. transfer of large tracts of land from nominal state ownership to 
“communities”.’ (ibid: 1).  However, the June version represented a much bigger 
disappointment for those who had been working for over a year on influencing the 
government.  The project team had been working hard to sensitise stakeholders and 
community representatives to the gender implications of the Bill and given the lack of 
acceptance by Departmental representatives of invitations to attend project sessions 
and their ongoing lack of clarity on the intended timeframes for the Bill, this setback 
was hugely frustrating.  Nevertheless, helped by emails from contacts working in NGOs 
and other organisations around the country, the legal grouping was informed of a 
meeting that took place in Durban at which the Minister made clear that she had every 
intention of pushing through the Bill ‘this year’. 
The project team pulled together a timetable of activities on the basis that the Bill would 
go to the Cabinet in July and through the Portfolio Committee in August.  In a burst of 
activity, a ‘media strategy’ was drawn up, a request was sent to the Minister to hear 
views from the community representatives, the report of the community consultation 
meetings was published and plans were made to bring community representatives to 
Cape Town for the Portfolio Committee hearings.  With the approach of the national 
elections to be held in April the following year, the team anticipated growing political 
pressure influencing the passage of the Bill with the wider political issues that they were 
so aware were caught by the Bill. 
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At the beginning of June 2003 ten people from each of the communities that had 
participated in the local meetings were invited to attend a national meeting in 
Johannesburg, bringing together people and their insights from around the country 
(NLC/PLAAS project - ‘4th Quarter Report, 5-7.03).  Then in July, the project team 
secured a meeting with the deputy Minister, for community representatives to express 
their views in relation to the Bill.  At another two-day meeting convened prior to the 
meeting with the Deputy Minister, summaries of the June version of the Bill were 
circulated for participants and it was summarised in the plenary session (ibid).  The 
organisers were utterly committed to this being a success – according to one 
participant, “A and B didn’t go to sleep because they had to type all the suggested 
issues so each and every community had made some representation” (Bokisi informant, 
interview - 20.11.05).  One of the participants gave me a copy of the summary he had 
received.  The frustration on the part of those who prepared it is clear.  The 
‘Introduction’ sets the tone: 
 … all the provisions requiring or providing community consultation have been 
scrapped.  The community is no longer consulted, or their views established 
about whether or how they want their land transferred, or what form they want 
their rights to take.  The land rights enquirer makes recommendations to the 
Minister, and the Minister decides … the chapter dealing with “comparable 
redress” has been drastically shortened.  The bill no longer sets out human 
rights standards governing land administration.  (NLC/PLAAS Project – June 
2003 draft of the CLRB: 1). 
The section on ‘Problems women face in communal areas’ continues: 
 … The tenure system, together with racially specific laws, condemns women, 
particularly rural women, to unequal and subservient land and property rights. 
 Not only does the bill ignore this serious problem, it makes it worse.  It provides 
that (male only) PTOs will be upgraded to registered land tenure rights, without 
any provision that they must be registered in both the name of husband and 
wife.  It provides for the registration of existing rights (which generally vest in 
men) without any proviso that women’s rights must be asserted or registered.  
The bill’s reference to the option of registering family rights is useless, because 
nowhere does it prescribe when and how existing individual rights must be 
converted to, or registered as family rights. … (ibid). 
With the project team’s infuriation with the Department and their unfloundering resolve 
to have their voices heard, the meeting with the Deputy Minister presented an 
unprecedented opportunity for community representatives to make representations 
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before him.  When the project documents were first drafted, great care was taken and, 
in the document setting out a ‘Summary of the Bill’, attention was given so as not to 
include within it any analysis or criticism of the Bill that would influence the participants’ 
responses to it.  Analysis was to be set out in a separate document.  Although the issues 
set out in this first ‘Summary’ are still complex and not easy to grasp, it is certainly 
easier to read than would be a draft Bill.  By the time the Bill had been reissued in June 
2003, however, the significantly shortened version, that omitted so many of those 
provisions that had, at least until then, dampened their concerns relating to human 
rights and participation (CLRB, 6.03), had been circulated.  The project team’s concerns 
relating to unduly influencing the participants with their own analysis of the issues, 
however, were this time clearly overlooked. 
Prior to the TLGFB’s passage through Parliament there were reports of the government 
‘cozying up’ to traditional leaders with ‘the promise of a possible constitutional 
amendment to restore their powers’ (Terreblanche – draft article circulated to the legal 
grouping, to be published on 8.10.03).  At the same time, the legal grouping was aware 
that the CLRB was going through Cabinet.  Information was then leaked to them that 
the Cabinet had approved a version that had ‘changed significantly’ from the version of 
the Bill that had been gazetted.  Meanwhile, the legal grouping had not yet accessed a 
copy of the cabinet-approved CLRB that was rumoured to be ‘significantly different’ and 
were kept completely in the dark as to its timing through Parliament.  When they did so, 
it became clear that the TLGFB was much more significant than anticipated: 
[W]here traditional councils currently exist, these must become the land 
administration committee responsible for representing the community and 
carrying out ownership and allocation functions in respect of the land.  … Tribal 
Authorities were created by the Bantu Authorities Act, which sparked rural 
rebellions and mass arrests throughout South Africa when it was enacted.  The 
TLGFB gives Tribal Authorities perpetual life and the CLRB gives them powers 
over land that surpass any that they previously enjoyed. (NLC/PLAAS - 
Summary and Analysis of the Cabinet approved version of the CLRB, 20.10.03 
(emphasis in original): 6). 
The tenor of this final version of the ‘Summary [this time] and Analysis’ (- my italics) 
clearly conveys the dismay and fury felt by those who wrote it. 
4.2 Playing with the media: a double-edged sword 
Weak leadership by Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs Thoko Didiza, with 
lack of clarity on key policy issues and a de facto takeover of the leadership of 
land reform by the Department of Agriculture, have led to a loss of morale 
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throughout the department, and a large number of key staff members have 
resigned.  This has undermined the capacity of the government to implement 
effective land reform, and constitutes an irresponsible waste of taxpayers’ and 
donors’ monies. 
… 
Why has the minister chosen instead to alienate committed staff with long 
experience of land reform, run a vibrant department into the ground and led 
South Africa a long way down the road already trodden by Zimbabwe? 
… 
One clue may lie in the quality of the new senior officials and advisers the 
minister has appointed.  Many in the sector express deep concerns over their 
administrative skills, experience and capacity.  It may be that Didiza is more 
concerned to surround herself with “yes-people” than with real expertise and 
skills – perhaps because she is insecure about her own lack of experience.  
(Cousins – Mail & Guardian, 18-24.8.00) 
Well, after 1999, after X and Y were ‘out’, if you were to read the Mail & 
Guardian, and so on, you would think that there was … almost ‘vengeance’.  A 
lot of public debate characterised the post-Hanekom period, but it was the 
general impression it gave … there was a lot of … dialogue – perhaps that’s too 
modest a word – it was acrimonious … But … the policies they were trying to 
achieve under Hanekom, they were problematic in themselves.  And they 
received criticism, but that criticism was never really taken seriously, even 
within PLAAS.  But then Hanekom was removed and the debates all moved into 
the public arena.  And the DLA also attacked them.  But in PLAAS, there was 
very close monitoring of the CLRA process.  Each draft that was produced for 
internal discussion, PLAAS got copies of.  But it seemed to be done by people 
who felt that their project had been undermined. (Informant, interview - 
6.5.05). 
As indicated in previous chapters, in response to the leaking of a draft of the 
government’s plans for tenure reform in the former homelands prior to the Tenure 
Conference in 2001, lawyers and others in the legal grouping reacted with fury to the 
model adopted, its lack of formal release and lack of consultation in relation to its 
approach.  As indicated in Chapter 5, the TRCG’s careful formulation of its model of 
statutorily protected rights rather than ‘transfer of ownership’, had been turned on its 
head; the CLRB unashamedly adopted the ‘transfer of ownership’ model, pulling no 
punches in its stated intention of transfer of ownership to ‘African traditional 
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communities’ (Sibanda 2004: 160).  So, meeting this attack head on, an article for the 
Mail & Guardian was promptly drafted, pitting ‘a democratic and rights based system’ 
against the re-creation of ‘the ‘neo-feudalism’ of the apartheid era?’ (Cousins – Mail & 
Guardian, 23.11.01).  From that moment on, the battle lines had been drawn and the 
two sides, or at least those on this side, were unlikely to be able to recapture a 
differentiated or nuanced middle ground between them.  Unsurprisingly, after the 
Tenure Conference, other media stories presented the draft legislation as ‘provid[ing] 
for the handover of land to chiefs’ (Ministerial Report Cards for 2001 – Mail & Guardian - 
22.12.01) leading to the conclusion that ‘there can be no compromise between the land 
interests of traditional rulers and the rural masses, and no middle way between 
constitutional democracy and hereditary rule’ (ibid).  Meanwhile, fuelling the hostilities, 
CONTRALESA was reported as being ‘‘happy’ with proposed new legislation …’ and its 
chairperson, Holomisa, quoted as saying “‘The key improvement proposed in the bill, is 
the restoration of communal property rights and the fact that the bill recognises the role 
of traditional authorities’” (Cook – Business Day, 3.12.01).  In a counter-attack, given 
that many within the legal grouping and within the activist field were well connected 
with a number of journalists, they managed to have the pronouncements of ‘their’ 
representative – the Director of PLAAS, or if not him personally, PLAAS – similarly 
quoted: ‘[PLAAS] has voiced its concern about the latest draft and warned about the 
transfer of ground to ‘powerful and unaccountable traditional leaders’ and how it will 
impact on the rights of individual land ownership’ (Leader - Farmer’s Weekly, 7.12.01). 
When the linkage was made between the TLGFB and the CLRB by those organising the 
Project, they were dismayed.  It represented an unacceptable betrayal, ‘[f]or rural 
people, … an unmitigated disaster’ (Cousins and Claassens - Mail & Guardian, 31.10-
6.11.03).  There was a scramble for lawyers to re-draft legal opinions, for press releases 
and newspaper articles to be written, journalists to be contacted and organisational 
arrangements to be put in place for the community representatives to come to Cape 
Town to be briefed on the new version of the Bill and helped to draft their submissions 
for the Portfolio Committee hearings.  Particular journalists became key contacts and, 
given the subject matter, perhaps a surprising number of articles were published in the 
run-up to the hearings in supposedly ‘blue-chip’ newspapers.   
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Findlay Cartoon accompanying Cousins and Claassens - ‘Looming Land Disaster’, Mail & 
Guardian, 31.10-6.11.03 
With the released dates for Portfolio Committee hearings scheduled for the beginning of 
November, there was not long for the group to strategise but the commitment of the 
grouping had been re-galvanised by these final outrageous developments.  After a 
meeting of wider stakeholders on the 21st and 22nd October 2003, it was agreed that 
civil society would unite in calling for the Bill to be scrapped.  On the day before the 
hearings started, the 10th October 2003, an advertisement was placed in the national 
daily Business Day headed by the NLC and PLAAS, under the banner ‘STOP THE CLRB’ 
beginning ‘We, a group of civil society organizations concerned with the land rights of 
people living in communal areas, call for the shelving of the CLRB …’. 
5 - Representing knowledge 
At the first planning meeting of the PLAAS/NLC Project, participants from NGOs around 
the country gathered in Johannesburg, all bringing with them wide ranging tenure 
issues and problems that they saw arising in communities they worked in and that they 
wanted to be resolved in any forthcoming tenure legislation.  Potentially problematic 
issues were discussed, including the difficulty of reconciling: ‘problem solving (ie. 
analysing and understanding people’s problems) and engagement with what the Bill 
provides’, and the difficulty of ‘balanc[ing] the desire to focus consultation through pre-
identification of issues and problems, and the need to capture experiences and 
understandings’ (NLC/PLAAS Project - Minutes CLRB Planning Meeting, 14.8.02 (Draft)).  
Nevertheless, amongst the key ‘Expectations of participants’ was the resolution ‘[t]hat 
the outcome of the consultation process is a legitimate record of community demand for 
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tenure reform’ (ibid).  Meanwhile, it was admitted that ‘project consultants need to 
assist local partners (and communities) to understand approach and content of the Bill’ 
(ibid).  As recognised by one of the project consultants, this is not an easy thing to do: 
 to tell people what the Bill was about, and to get their views on the issues … – 
to get people’s views is difficult, it takes time, although you can get their views 
by holding workshops, but doing it like that ends up influencing them.  
(PLAAS/NLC Project Consultant, interview - 6.5.05) 
Inherent in any ‘consultation’ or ‘participation’ exercise these are all valid concerns and 
real difficulties that need to be acknowledged and attempts made to tackle them in 
order for there to be any hope of overcoming them.  The members of the project team 
were very aware of these issues requiring subtlety of approach, discussing what might 
be the appropriate format of a summary of the Bill for the PLAAS/NLC project 
workshops.  On the one hand, it was argued that it was important to include analysis 
within such a summary so that the full significance of the Bill’s approach would not be 
lost, but on the other, it was thought that raising questions, instead of presenting their 
analysis of its significance, would facilitate a diversity of inputs, as well as countering 
potential accusations of ‘manipulation’.  But whether or not analysis and criticism is set 
out in the same document as a plain summary, albeit clearly separated through the use 
of colour coding or otherwise, or in another document, to begin with a presentation of 
either the proposed changes or the analysis of those changes as a starting point for 
consultation, is likely to influence people’s views on the issues.  This, to a certain extent, 
builds on the comments above in relation to designing a consultation exercise so as not 
to frame one’s interpretation of ‘the problem’ in a particular way.  But it goes beyond 
this in grappling with an appropriate methodology for eliciting knowledge that responds 
to and relates to changes that have already been proposed.  Here, indeed the agenda 
has already been set by the government, but in order to carry out real consultation, it 
would, arguably, first be necessary to go back one step, to leave that agenda aside so 
as to elicit the kinds of questions that I referred to in Chapter 2 when discussing what I 
would need to find out, as a researcher bringing with me a particular habitus that is 
different from that of those whom I am researching:  
What, for individuals being consulted, is their orthodoxy or doxa?  What for these actors 
may not happen? What questions have been rendered unaskable?  What is conceivable 
within their reality? and, in turn, What is inconceivable?  And, What is considered to 
shape the legitimacy of that orthodoxy, to determine whether or not a particular state of 
affairs is considered to be legitimate? 
These questions cannot be answered without recognising that power is contested, that 
there will always be a diversity in responses to analysing problems, and in such diversity 
 
 
 
 
 215 
there will also be conflict.  There is also recognition that people will see issues 
differently, depending upon their different habitus.  Only after considering such 
questions would it then be appropriate to introduce the agenda, an agenda which would 
challenge that orthodoxy, even doxa, and be likely therefore to raise further 
contestation. 
Contestations over the hierarchy of knowledge are also relevant here.  Those involved in 
the PLAAS/NLC project were also acutely aware of the intricate legal and academic 
complexity of many of the issues involving the reform of tenure.  The subject is 
undeniably complex and any attempt at legislative reform will be difficult to understand.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, this influenced the project team’s engagement with the wider 
stakeholders, but it is also likely to have influenced their engagement with the 
‘community’ participants.  As indicated in Chapter 6, I spoke in depth to three people 
who had attended the Mashamba meeting, two of whom had gone on to attend 
subsequent national meetings convened under the project, one of whom was a school 
teacher who lived in Mashamba and the other an ex-university student from Bokisi who 
had failed to complete his studies because of financial difficulties.  Prior to the 
Johannesburg meeting, the potential for people having trouble understanding the issues 
was acknowledged; participants from the area were told by Nkuzi that “they are 
expecting people to be able to read and write, and also to hear what was being said – 
because they were going to be using all 11 languages they cannot translate.” 
(Participant of Mashamba and National workshops, interview - 20.11.05).  The result 
was that “some said, ‘No, they can’t make it’, so … all these people [were] youth … and 
able to read and write” (ibid).  Others, who had come to the meeting because of their 
link to Nkuzi through their land claim, understandably said “‘If we are not talking about 
when we are getting our land, we are not going.’” (ibid).  Although, based on the write-
up of the meeting that took place in Johannesburg, it sounds like it was a very dynamic 
and exciting meeting with real engagement from participants with the issues 
(NLC/PLAAS Project – 3rd Quarter Report, 2-4.03), this calls into question who is 
considered to be ‘representative’ of a particular ‘community’.  Here, the approach of 
Nkuzi, probably necessarily for the purposes of the project, automatically ‘filtered’ out 
particular people’s voices from being heard.  However, it also calls into question whether 
it is possible, when we know that knowledge and authority is consistently negotiated, to 
have ‘representatives’ presenting that knowledge at all.  The project organisers were 
criticised of bias, of selectivity, of racism and indeed, one of the project organisers 
reflected frankly and self-critically to me: 
Why are white South Africans speaking about these issues? … The question of 
‘whose voices are being represented?’ raises key issues.  That’s a key question. 
(PLAAS/NLC Project organiser, interview - 18.4.05) 
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But interrogating the extent to which individuals within particular groupings living in a 
particular village might represent ‘the’ authentic voice of ‘the community’ goes beyond 
asking whether it was appropriate to have those organising the project, whether or not 
they were white, as spokespeople for those whose voices they are supposedly 
representing.  While development academics have for a long time been critical of using 
the term ‘community’ to depict a heterogeneous conflictual grouping who happen to live 
in the same area, there is an ongoing practice by many, as recognised in the conclusion 
of Chapter 7, to valorise the authenticity of ‘the marginalised’ and ‘women’ (Robins 
2001).  As a result, consultation processes, and the legislation or policy, or critique of 
that policy, that they are designed to support, become legitimised as long as ‘the poor’ 
and ‘women’ are consulted.  They are to speak as authentic voices of ‘the poor’ and 
‘women’ and particular problems they might be experiencing are held up as representing 
the authentic problems experienced by all ‘the poor’ and all women, and in turn to 
exemplify a particular framing of ‘the problem’ and its proposed solution, or critique of 
it.  Similarly, apparently ignoring power relations that are shaped through ongoing local 
contestation, “LACs” set up by CLARA are to have ‘representatives’ on them from among 
the women, the youth and the disabled63.  And such practices have enabled both the 
government and those in civil society to claim that their consultation exercises 
supported their opposing framings of the issues relating to CLARA. 
6 - The Portfolio Committee process: Bringing the fields together? 
After a Bill has been approved by the Cabinet, it is subject to interrogation by members 
of all parties who hold seats in the Portfolio Committee in proportion to those held by 
the ruling party.  Such interrogation takes place in formal public hearings of the Portfolio 
Committees to which members of the public are entitled to make submissions.  
Following such hearings, MPs can either accept a Bill as drafted, or send it back to the 
relevant government department for amendment or redrafting.  Although many 
decisions and much lobbying takes place in other arenas, such as the ANC ‘study 
groups’, the Portfolio Committee hearings are nevertheless viewed as an important 
public forum, often attended by journalists. 
For the organisers of the PLAAS/NLC Project, the Portfolio Committee hearings 
represented a formal space in which their voices would be heard by influential members 
of the political establishment.  They had garnered sufficient interest and support from 
the press, they had put so much effort into organising the Project, this was to be its 
final moment when the Bill would be publicly held up as the betrayal of democracy that 
it was – and the government, as the drafter of the poorly drafted and shoddy Bill, for its 
weakness and incompetence.  With their own superior lawyers, with community 
representatives from around the country on their side, they could hardly fail. 
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For many participating, making their submissions to the Portfolio Committee was an 
intimidating experience.  This is understandable given that many of them were coming 
from vastly different fields and were likely never before to have stepped foot in a place 
defined by such power.  Someone working for an NGO that contributed to the process 
of helping people draw up and rehearse their submissions, indicated: 
 For a lot of people that [- to go to Cape Town and appear in Parliament] can be 
quite scary.  Some people don’t want to speak in public even if they are put 
forward, and they really have to be encouraged.  …  And if you’ve seen the Old 
Assembly Building, it’s a dingy dark old building and I was sitting at a desk, with 
a plaque on it saying ‘Prime Minister’ and I realised, ‘This is where Verwoerd 
must have sat.’ (NGO employee, interview - 13.5.05) 
Even a participant working for one of the ‘Chapter 9’ institutions64 who was practised at 
making submissions to Parliament expressed her dislike of the practice: 
 We were asked questions – I hate questions in Parliament because you never 
quite know.  Politicians asking questions and you don’t get asked them in a 
straightforward manner and often I do not understand the questions.  Because 
it’s like, they’re making statements and I’m left trying to work out how that 
relates to what I said.  And they’re sitting there with their own agendas and also 
they want us to say certain things and are trying to set us up. (Chapter 9 
institution employee, interview - 30.5.05).   
For many people, speaking in public, even in contexts and amongst people that are 
familiar, is daunting, but the community representatives making submissions in relation 
to CLARA were from places a world away from Cape Town and Parliament with a 
different habitus and lacking the cultural capital – the education and intellectual training 
– enjoyed by those circulating in such places of power.  Nevertheless, they were 
supposed to engage with a draft piece of legislation, probably never having seen one 
before, in a language that was not their first, and relate to erudite MPs and convince 
them of their points.  Moreover, those Parliamentarians were able to define the terms of 
the debate, to respond to whatever points made on their own terms, such as asking 
participants to exemplify their points by reference to particular sections of legislation, or 
asking for suggestions for improvements to the wording of the Bill, or additional clauses 
(PMG Minutes, 11-14.11.03). 
Recognising these aspects of the Portfolio Committee procedure that would constrain 
the extent to which people coming from a rural field could really engage with and 
influence the passage of such a complex piece of draft legislation through Parliament, 
this stage of the Consultation Project focused on helping them draft their submissions.  
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Although now they were to engage directly with the Bill, those who made it to Cape 
Town had already participated in a number of workshops and meetings with the 
organisers and the issues were at least familiar to them.  Some of the women there had 
also participated in one of the two Provincial workshops with women.  The purpose of 
these were: 
to concretise the general problems concerning women’s land rights with clear 
case studies and examples.  These examples would a) be a way of bringing the 
problem ‘to life’ for the broader public (many of whom don’t understand the 
problem, or its extent, and b) prove that the general points made in the 
meetings are founded on concrete, real life situations.  (PLAAS/NLC project 
document, undated [estimated date 8.03]: 1).   
Effort was made in organising these workshops to ensure that the issues raised at the 
community consultation meetings in relation to the Bill remained the focus: 
[T]he examples and case studies should relate to the problems that have been 
raised in the consultation so far.  For example the practice that women are not 
allocated land rights on the same basis as men, the fact that land is owned by 
the husband – not jointly by husband and wife, the problems women face at 
divorce, or on the death of their husbands (inheritance issues).  The restrictions 
on women being able to attend or speak at customary meetings – or being 
adequately represented in decision making structures.  Examples of women 
being evicted from land, or deprived of their inheritance would be very relevant, 
as would examples of women being thwarted in their attempts to access land 
(whether for personal residential sites, or for income generation projects) (ibid: 
2).   
According to one of the project organisers, ‘the examples were horrific, but common’ 
(Minutes of CLRB Teleconference meeting - 29.8.03).  The women participating were 
then to draw upon these examples ‘to prepare for the final submission to the Bill’ (ibid).  
Reading the submissions of the community representatives, each of them draws upon 
their specific tenure situation and refers also to particular provisions of the Bill.  In many 
of them, ‘gender’ is unsurprisingly pitted against ‘tradition’.  Given their involvement in 
the NLC/PLAAS Project, again it is unsurprising that many of them pick up the same 
points as those brought to their attention.  To take one example from the submission 
made by the RWM under ‘Vesting of Rights in Women’: 
 Section 18(4)(b) provides that the Minister may vest land rights jointly in men 
and women … However this like so many provisions of the Bill is discretionary.  
There is no guarantee that the Minister will do so, nor a requirement that the 
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land administration committee must allocate new order rights to women.  This 
Bill fails to include criteria to guide those who allocate new order rights as to 
when, and on what basis, women’s rights to land must be asserted and 
protected. 
 For example there is no provision requiring the joint registration of rights in the 
names of both spouses.  Nor is there a provision that requires that women must 
be allocated land on an equal basis to men. (RWM Submission, 10.11.03). 
The italics indicate where the language is identical, bar the omission of one or two 
words, to that used in the NLC/PLAAS Project document, ‘Summary and Analysis of the 
Cabinet approved version of the CLRB’ (20.10.03: 6).   
A number of people expressed anger in telling me how particular women who went on 
to tell their sometimes very personal stories to the Portfolio Committee were challenged 
by some of its members and that some government officials had accused some of the 
women, including the director of the RWM, of being round wound the little fingers of the 
white organisers.  Not only did they see such challenges to be belittling, but they also 
saw in them a denial of those experiences and in turn their experiential knowledge 
deriving from them.  While such a denial of any knowledge expressed by those women 
based upon their lived experiences of problems that in many cases have involved 
‘horrific’ abuse, would clearly be unfair, there were Parliamentarians who, rather than 
denying their experiences, instead disputed the meanings given to that knowledge and 
the model it was put forward to support.  The President of CONTRALESA, who, 
according to another member of the Portfolio Committee “lobbied over this” (ANC 
Portfolio Committee member, interview - 22.6.05), was also on the Portfolio Committee.  
During the course of my interview with him, I asked him why so many people were 
unhappy with the Bill: 
It was ideological.  They hate the idea of traditional authorities. 
ERAF:  Do you think they don’t understand the institutions of traditional 
authorities? 
They understand them, but they organised many of the submissions to support 
them.  They understand, but they go against their ideology that they espouse. 
ERAF: What ideology is that? 
Of classless societies.  They think that African culture is a way of bestowing 
authority on people who have not been elected.  He said that they were the 
ones who organised the submissions. 
ERAF:  Why do you think that people had been organised? 
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There were similarities in the way the submissions were written, and I think that 
the people who then made the submissions were beholden to those in a 
position to assist them. (President of CONTRALESA, interview - 22.6.05) 
In addition to the questions raised above in relation to the possibility of ‘representatives’ 
from particular communities positing the authentic voice of the people, the challenges 
directed towards the meanings of such stories also raise ethical questions about using 
‘representation’ as a strategy of legitimation, and even about the ‘use’ of knowledge.  It 
also demonstrates the cracks that were visible between the framings of such knowledge 
that this challenge brought to the fore and so demands an interrogation of the 
assumptions that such meanings are based on and of the discourses shaping them. 
The other side of the story is told by those who, like the President of CONTRALESA, are 
positioned within the hierarchy of the political field.  I spoke to many members of the 
Committee and, even within the ANC, people had very different interpretations of the 
hearings and subsequent process.  A number thought that the whole process was 
unfair.  Someone working for one of the ANC alliance partners told me that she thought 
particular members of the Portfolio Committee, those supporting COSATU’s opposition 
to the Bill: 
 just weren’t given a say.  It was clear that several members on the Portfolio 
Committee supported the points we were making, were listening to us, but they 
just didn’t have a chance.  I think it was just a higher authority that had just 
decided that politically it had to go through.  So members of the Portfolio 
Committee were unhappy but quietly.  That’s what was so frustrating, because 
we knew they supported us, but it had already been decided … (COSATU 
official, interview - 31.5.05). 
Even within the Portfolio Committee, power is obviously contested, with people 
positioned differently depending on different forms of capital distributed within the 
political field – so closely linked to the wider field of power.  Perhaps their political party 
might be more powerful than others, but even those positioned within the ruling party 
will have access to varying distributions of social capital, with networks of relations of 
support with others more powerful and influential than them.  One member of the 
Portfolio Committee, who asked to remain anonymous but who may well have been 
described as one of the members who was “unhappy but quietly”, spoke frankly about 
the whole process.  I asked, given the criticism the Bill received at the Portfolio 
Committee hearings and in the media, how people in the Portfolio Committee reacted to 
that: 
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Well, that’s what happens with a Bill.  The meetings are held and everyone is 
allowed to say their own minds.  But when you’re in a party that’s in power, you 
can say what’s on your mind in a study group, but not with other parties there.  
If you have issues, you can’t talk about it in public.  It’s like that, you can’t.  
Well you can but you get into trouble for it.  We were saying things in the 
Portfolio Committee.  If, you see, it was about women, that they have not been 
given enough power.  They are still seen like minors.  But in the group you can 
say your own mind.  But even there … 
ERAF:  Even with all this criticism the Bill got passed.  Why do you think that it 
did? 
There was public criticism and people spoke, but in Parliament, the majority 
rules.  And it got passed.  And if the ruling party says we have to pass this law 
… (ANC Portfolio Committee member, interview - 24.5.05) 
One member admitted his own limited knowledge of tenure in the former homelands 
and the difficulties of participating in the hearings as a member of the Portfolio 
Committee: “When the Act came to the study group, and the Committee, I knew that 
here, I knew too little, but not knowing all the nuances, the Committee will still be 
observed, so it still has to play a role.”  He went on: 
I would like to see land being more equitable in terms of ownership and tenure 
security.  And so I was just assisting the process.  But when it comes to 
traditional systems, honestly, you and I are outsiders and won’t understand, 
and sometimes I don’t understand.  We had traditional leaders, like x, coming to 
Committees, saying traditional leadership is completely democratic, and that it’s 
always recognised women’s rights, but women were climbing up the wall at 
that.  But you and I can’t say he’s generalising or are there exceptions where 
rights have been ignored.  Women’s rights across Africa are the result of 
centuries of oppression, and we can say that as a result of observation. (ANC 
Portfolio Committee member, interview - 22.6.05) 
Despite these limitations, he went on to speak about the reality of the changing political 
pressures relating to the Bill: 
… if you look at the original White Paper it took a much harder line against 
traditional leaders.  And also the ANC policy in the RDP document.  Was it 
opposed to it?  Well it was not much in favour of traditional leadership.  But 
there was a school of thought then that traditional leadership had to be phased 
out.  But then you look at KZN and it was an absolute hotbed pre-1994 when 
there was a struggle between a more traditional faction of Zulus supporting the 
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IFP and a more enlightened ANC, and although that has subsided, it still rears 
its ugly head, and I think the change of heart has much to do with consoling 
traditional leadership in KZN and successfully.  And neutralising Buthelezi.  KZN 
was regarded as a prize, which was won after 2004, after the election when 
they gained the majority there. (ibid) 
After the hearings, various amendments were made to the Bill that then went back to 
the Portfolio Committee at the end of November and again in January.  Finally, the 
Portfolio Committee ‘considered the CLRB and amendments and voted to adopt both.’ 
(PMG Minutes, 27.1.04).  The Bill was passed by Parliament unanimously in February 
2004. 
Many of those who organised the PLAAS/NLC Project expressed bitterness in relation to 
the whole Parliamentary process: 
We actually believed that the Parliamentary process would be meaningful and if 
we played the game right they would actually listen to us.  It became more 
evident as we went through that we were wrong.  And at the last minute there 
were fundamental changes.  But the Parliamentarians actually complimented us 
on how well we’d done.  And everyone was writing their own submissions – it 
was just beautiful to watch.  But it had zero impact. (PLAAS/NLC Project 
organiser, interview - 7.12.05) 
Although, thanks largely to all of the submissions organised by the PLAAS/NLC Project, 
some changes to the Bill were made subsequent to the Portfolio Committee hearings – 
principally those that strengthened the rights of women – the ‘model’ was not changed.  
Nor was the linkage between CLARA and the TLGFA broken.  So far as they were 
concerned, they had failed. 
7 - Conclusion 
Both government bureaucrats and those in civil society went to great lengths in 
undertaking consultation exercises in relation to CLARA, both claiming such consultation 
supported their particular framings of the issues.  None of them, however, in the end 
had sufficient capital in relation to the wider field of power to influence, let alone drive, 
the process in any real way.  As a result, such consultation processes came to be 
nothing more than strategies of legitimation, for the government, an attempt to ward 
off criticism from those within civil society, and for civil society, to support those 
criticisms.  While criticism from civil society may have been professionally embarrassing 
to government bureaucrats, such non-governmental actors, nevertheless, lacked 
sufficient political influence over those who were driving the political process, and in any 
case failed to focus their attacks in that direction.  With their growing frustration 
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directed towards those in the Department, the care that they had initially taken in 
designing the PLAAS/NLC Project so as to try and reduce their influence on the 
participants, fell by the wayside.  Instead, in their unfloundering resolve to have their 
voices heard, the Project became a way of enlisting voices ‘from below’ – from ‘the poor’ 
and ‘women’ who had clearly been marginalised in the government’s own consultation 
processes.  Meanwhile, the debates, fuelled by their on-side media contacts, became 
increasingly framed in the simplified binary of ‘tradition’ against ‘democracy’.  As a 
result, it became decreasingly likely that the differentiated knowledge and nuanced 
understanding of tenure of many within civil society would be heard. 
In the Portfolio Committee hearings, the government, which had supposedly been 
driving the policy processes through prior consultation exercises and workshops, rather 
fell out of the picture, to be replaced by those in the political field.  More closely 
connected with the wider field of power than those in the bureaucratic field, many of 
the members of the Portfolio Committee had in fact been involved in driving CLARA all 
along.  Others on the Committee, who may have been sympathetic to the critics of the 
Bill, would only have lost political capital by not aligning themselves with those who 
were positioned higher up the hierarchy of the field and, given the proportional 
representation system in place, may even have lost their positions as MPs had they not 
adhered to the party line (see Hassim 2005).  So the Portfolio Committee process 
became yet another strategy of legitimation for CLARA, a spectacle of participation, for 
members of the public to vent their criticisms or grievances with the Bill that was going 
to be passed whatever issues or complaints were raised by them.  Even if double the 
number of submissions had been inspired by the PLAAS/NLC Project, those who made 
them lacked the symbolic capital to ‘impose a universally recognized principle of 
knowledge of the social world’ (Bourdieu 1987: 837).  Many of those organising the 
submissions would claim that their knowledge instead should have been that which was 
accepted and embodied into law to become universally recognised.  But, as argued in 
previous chapters, their framings of ‘the problem’ pushed out other more nuanced, 
negotiated understandings of tenure, as did in turn ‘the solution’ that was its corollary.  
‘Symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1990: 126), however, was committed by those in the 
wider field of power who pushed the Bill through Parliament, in denying the power to 
particular individuals or groups to define figuratively and practically that social space – 
even if they failed to impose a ‘universally recognised’ principle of knowledge of the 
social world. 
 
 
 
 
 224 
CONCLUSION 
 
The conclusion of the previous chapter was disheartening: that the new formal 
participatory space of South Africa’s new democracy, the Portfolio Committee hearings, 
that held so much promise for inclusivity, actually became nothing more than a 
spectacle of participation, here for the legitimation of CLARA.  But this does not really go 
far enough.  As indicated in the Introduction, the purpose of the thesis was to go 
beyond answering the political question, Why was CLARA introduced and passed by 
Parliament?  It was not simply to hold up an alternative, more ‘correct’ reading of tenure 
in the former homelands with which to criticise other representations of tenure – 
although it is important that the contested and negotiated understandings of tenure in 
the former homelands were often pushed out in the debates over its reform.    It is 
important because the purpose of the thesis has been to explore how and why the 
issues were constructed and represented so differently by different groupings.  In doing 
so, further questions were raised: What assumptions was their knowledge based upon? 
How did the different groupings legitimise, or try to legitimise their positions? How were 
the political spaces within which they were trying to achieve this, shaped? and these 
questions lead to the ultimate question, which the previous two chapters have 
responded to: What knowledge was excluded in these constructions?  In responding to 
these questions, multiple stories have been told in the different chapters of this thesis, 
about all of those participating in such debates, the different ways they framed their 
knowledge of the former homelands in the political contestations over CLARA, the 
various attempts to position themselves in relation to others in the debates and the 
strategies they adopted to legitimise their knowledge. 
Between 1994-2004 the South African state was no longer in crisis, but it was still very 
much in a state of construction and change, with people from very different 
backgrounds coming together, sometimes for the first time, but competing for 
legitimacy in order to influence the transition.  It was a time of excitement and 
dynamism, but also of turbulence, as new networks of power were forged and new 
spaces of power and change were opened up.  And with every change introduced over 
that period – changes in political appointments, or to decision-making procedures, for 
example – the recognition, formerly granted to and taken for granted by people in 
particular positions of power, was challenged.  With many reacting against such change 
in order to maintain the relations of power that they had previously enjoyed, the formal 
changes on paper could not be read as corresponding to the personally negotiated 
changes in practice.  This was seen in the former homelands, where there was often a 
huge gap between the ideals of change introduced at a national level, and the 
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negotiated local political reality, on the one hand, and a sobering financial reality, on the 
other, conspiring together to produce a much messier, contested practice.  But it was 
also seen even in the bureaucracy, that is defined by formal and regulated decision-
making procedures, but is also a field, like any other, containing within it, or rather 
constructed by contestation and negotiation.  
In responding to the questions posed above, the thesis has held as central that the 
processes and practices of policy and law-making are constituted through interactions 
between people, constituted as social beings, their knowledge shaped as much by 
background and education, as by emotions.  Many people have been passionate about 
CLARA, about their knowledge of the areas to be reformed by that legislation and the 
changes that they see it to be introducing.  Previous research and theorisation of policy 
processes, however, with its focus on rather disembodied ‘actors’, albeit positioned 
within particular networks or coalitions, has somewhat eclipsed the implications of ‘real 
people’ participating in such processes.  This is relevant when considering the extent to 
which policies actually relate to their ‘subjects’, but also when considering policy-making 
and the growth in complexity changing the context in which such policies are being 
formulated.  In drawing upon Bourdieu, who recognised the importance of such 
different backgrounds and shared historical subjectivities, or habitus, in shaping the 
objective relations and potential relations between people, shaped in turn by their 
perceptions, this thesis has brought to the fore the importance of agency and of taking 
seriously the social identities people invoke in negotiating their positionality. 
The stories in this thesis have told of how people with very different social backgrounds 
have participated in the policy and law-making processes of CLARA, invoking through 
their arguments, through the discourses that shaped them, their habitus, practices and 
meanings invested in them, in order to influence the policies that were to change the 
property relations of people living in the former homelands.  For example, Chapter 5 
indicated the extent to which, for the legal grouping, their professional standing and 
personal repute was inseparable from the legitimacy of the law, a legitimacy that was, in 
turn, bound up with the ‘rights based approach’ to reforming tenure.  For them, and 
those involved in such processes, participating in the debates often involved challenging 
the representations others invoked and, in turn, many were challenged in doing so.  At 
times such challenges went to the heart of their identities, as reputable and legitimate 
lawyers, as women, or as activists, and in turn caused upset and hurt.  In attempts to 
counter and deflect such challenges, accusations and recriminations were made, often 
resulting in damaged relations and bitterness.  As Moore recognises, ‘social identities are 
fully engaged in the processes of bargaining and negotiation’ (Moore 1994: 104).  She 
argues that this has implications for where actors are positioned advantageously or 
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disadvantageously in such processes, for example ‘as black people, women, or workers’ 
(ibid: 97).   
The stories in this thesis indicate the extent to which that positionality, or locality, 
cannot be taken for granted.  Indeed, individuals may be positioned and repositioned65, 
responding accordingly, sometimes inconsistently and always partially, depending on 
who is capable of influencing that positionality, who may challenge it, what is being 
challenged, how, even where.  For such challenges will often draw upon discursive 
resources that were hierarchically constructed, linked as they are to change taking place 
in wider politics.  For example, the thesis has drawn attention to contestations amongst 
activists over the meaning of activism, the extent of radicalism, the implications of race 
in such conflicts, its linkage to discourses of the African Renaissance playing out at a 
national level, and the ‘superiority’ of ‘race’ over discourses of ‘gender’.  In the different 
stories told here, a conjuncture of political factors came to bear in multiple ways on how 
people in those stories managed to position themselves, and were positioned, in their 
struggles to achieve legitimacy for their version of land and property relations in the 
former homelands.  That is, all of the conjunctural political factors coming together at 
the time CLARA was being debated, discussed in Chapter 3, shaped the weight and 
legitimacy of the discursive resources brought to bear in those debates.  Such 
legitimacy, however, was also shaped by those who participated in those debates, the 
extent of symbolic capital that they held as lawyers, as activists, as bureaucrats, as 
women, as ‘whites’, as ‘blacks’, as ‘lefties’, as fieldworkers or as people living in the 
former homelands – with all their indefinability and their multiple and category-defying 
intersections – that always depended on their positionality. 
Individuals, through their work or lived experiences shaping their day-to-day reality, 
have often shared a particular understanding of the terms according to which the 
legitimacy of their knowledge would be contested and accepted.  Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘field’ has been useful in understanding difference, in relation to individuals’ and 
groupings of individuals’ differential understandings of such terms, or ‘rules of the game’ 
in which they were participating.  People were often competing for the power to define 
legitimate knowledge, but, positioned within different fields of struggle, they can be 
seen to have been competing according to the terms of debate understood by them.  
On one level, they were coming together in the policy processes relating to CLARA, but 
on another, because the rules of the game were defined differently by others, there was 
often a failure of understanding, with people speaking across each other, and becoming 
increasingly disillusioned.  In the contestations over CLARA, people within different fields 
came together all competing to name, represent and create the official version of the 
social world, or at least the world in the rural areas of South Africa.  But whether or not 
the terms of the games being played within such different fields were understood, 
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whether or not attempts were made to understand the deeply different habitus of the 
different individuals, or players, contestations arose between them.  All of them were 
competing to position themselves within a hierarchy, at least the hierarchy that they 
understood – that of the field in which they were positioned – so that their version 
would be accepted as legitimate.  And that is where the faultlines came to the surface.  
For example, knowledge based upon ‘reason’ was pitted against that based upon 
‘understanding’, ‘rights’ against ‘culture’, ‘gender’ against ‘tradition’.  So, while the actors 
in these stories, the players in the games, have all come together in and through those 
processes, all the stories have been discouragingly separate. 
In the contestations over CLARA, what was being negotiated, as well as a piece of 
legislation, was a struggle for symbolic power, that is legitimacy for a particular version 
of the social world to be embodied in that legislation.  During the first ten years of South 
Africa’s transition, the extent of legitimacy garnered by different individuals and 
groupings was in a state of flux with actors moving across and within different fields, so 
that the autonomy of the different fields, that of the legal field in particular, could not be 
taken for granted.  The law, however, continued to hold the convincing promise, 
certainly to all those within the legal grouping, as well as to many outside it, that it: 
embrace[d..] heterogeneity within the language of universal rights – dissolving 
groups of people with distinctive identities into aggregates of person who may 
enjoy the same entitlements and enact their difference under the sovereignty of 
a shared Bill of Rights (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 32). 
Chapter 5 discussed the extent to which, in this context of change, the discursive legal 
resources brought to bear in the debates were accepted as providing the medium that 
would be granted the symbolic power to resolve them.  Certainly, the dissolution of 
‘groups of people with distinctive identities into aggregates of person’ was contested by 
traditional leaders having constructed a space for themselves to participate in national 
politics, speaking of ‘tradition’ instead of ‘rights’ and thereby ignoring, or defying, the 
law’s promise of universality, and refusing its mediation.  And this indicates the extent 
to which, in relation to the politics of CLARA, the limited autonomy of the legal field 
became important in dissolving this promise; as Chanock warned us, politics had indeed 
trumped law (Chanock 1996).  The jury is out, however, as to the outcome of the 
Constitutional Court case contesting both CLARA and the TLGFA that has been instituted 
against the government and the Minister of Land and Agriculture by the LRC on behalf 
of a number of different of ‘its communities’.  In that context, however, it will be the law 
and rights that will mediate the terms on which the case is heard. 
The stories told in this thesis, make the contested nature of power unavoidable.  
Moreover, they underline why its recognition is essential.  The reason for such 
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contestations lies in the diversity in views, responses and knowledge depending upon 
the variety of different actors participating in policy processes relating to CLARA, and 
the habitus that each brought to the table.  In processes that are supposed to bring 
together such diversity in the formulation of policy – diversity in experiences, wealth of 
knowledge, experiential, academic, legal and bureaucratic – recognising and taking into 
account what that diversity really means, in terms of the habitus of different individuals, 
is crucial.  In any country, but certainly in a country with such obvious diversity as South 
Africa, it is the wealth of that diversity that should enrich the policy process.  Instead, 
here, in relation to CLARA, it simply contributed to confusion as to why one’s voice was 
not being heard, or the delusion that it was, and bitterness. 
Having said that the purpose of the thesis has not been to hold up a more ‘correct’ 
reading of tenure in the former homelands with which to criticise other representations 
of tenure, the purpose of revealing a messy and negotiated understanding of tenure in 
one such ‘rural area’ was to highlight the extent to which those with the power to 
represent ‘the problem’ existing in the former homelands have done so in ways that 
have displaced identities of people and knowledge that lies outside their framings of ‘the 
truth’.  The exclusion that has come about through the contestations that took place 
over CLARA, and through the strategies of legitimation different groupings invoked to 
influence their outcome, has been crucial.  While of course no one was physically 
excluded, indeed many were included in all kinds of consultation exercises, and some 
were even included in the Portfolio Committee hearings, those who were included, were 
included as ‘representatives’ speaking for a community.  While I am not arguing that 
any of them were pawns in such processes, the knowledge that they were brought 
there to represent, and seen to represent, excluded a more contested, messier, 
understanding of the issues.  And so I have questioned whether it may actually be 
impossible for one such ‘representative’ to invoke such an understanding.   
In colonial times, chiefs became the favoured spokesmen.  Post-development critics, in 
well-meaning attempts to take seriously Foucault’s espousal of the ‘insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault 1980: 81 - his italics), tend to favour representatives 
from amongst ‘the poor’ and ‘women’.  The search for ‘representatives’ assumes a unity 
that does not exist in and of itself (Waldman 2007) and ignores the contested, 
negotiated and relational construction of knowledge.  Moreover, such representatives 
may not even speak as ‘the poor’ or as ‘women’, or at least not ‘the poor’ or ‘women’ 
constructed within the framings delineated in opposition to that ‘tradition’ constructed in 
relation to CLARA.  And they too invoke through their arguments, constructed in 
response to, by and through their positioning, through the discourses that shape them, 
their habitus and thereby meanings invested within them.  The problem is that such 
discourses, meanings and knowledge may have very little authority, even recognition, in 
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arenas that are instead defined by other discourses of power.  And that is presumably 
why so many others were claiming to speak for them and/or were framing the terms 
within which they were supposed to be speaking ‘as women’.  But, as recognised in this 
thesis, the discursive space into which they were entering and the terms on which it was 
debated were defined by elite actors: politicians, lawyers, those in the bureaucracy, in 
NGOs.  A strategy to enable representation in a political space such as the Portfolio 
Committee, defined by the elite, is in line with a history of ‘liberal/inclusionary feminism 
[that] emphasises upward linkages to power brokers’ in South Africa (Hassim 2005: 
178).  As Hassim recognises, however, such strategies are likely to ‘reinforce the elite 
bias of this level of politics’ (ibid: 186).  The key challenge is that recognised by Stuart 
Hall in 1989 writing about black politics in Britain: 
 to conceive of how a politics can be constructed which works with and through 
difference, which is able to build those forms of solidarity and identification 
which make common struggle and resistance possible but without suppressing 
the real heterogeneity of interests and identities, and which can effectively draw 
the political boundary lines without which political contestation is impossible, 
without fixing those boundaries for eternity. (Hall 1989, reprinted in 2003: 92) 
If the goal is to take seriously the aspirations of real participatory democracy, even if it 
is merely to pass legislation that will have any chance of making a real impact, a 
positive impact, on the lives of people living in such areas, it is crucial first, to recognise 
and second, to take into account not only their different habitus, but also the diversity in 
views and opinions and the contested nature of local knowledge.  In South Africa, a 
country that lives with the ongoing effects of apartheid categorisations defining the 
minutiae of everyday life, this is not necessarily an easy thing to do, for government 
officials or for anyone else (Waldman 2007). 
Taking seriously the diversity in the habitus of different actors, shaping in turn their 
views, responses and knowledge brought to bear in shaping policy, raises questions 
about democracy and citizenship, governance and activism.  While it raises more 
questions than can be answered here, in South Africa, formal participatory spaces in 
Parliamentary procedures have been designed to enable the participation of people from 
different backgrounds in politics.  And so it would be necessary to ask what those 
spaces might look like if they were going to take seriously that diversity and fulfil those 
ideals.  For example, questions can be raised as to the appropriate forum in which 
procedures for democratic decision-making, such as the Portfolio Committee hearings, 
might take place – probably not the wood-panelled rooms in the Parliamentary buildings 
in Cape Town.  And for that matter, probably not even in Cape Town.  Decentralised 
decision-making is presumably preferable, but it also comes with its own dangers of lack 
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of accountability and representativity, undemocratic rules of engagement – the list goes 
on (Ribot 2004; Swyngedouw 2005).  And there are other issues that immediately relate 
to policy-making in the South African context.  Morris has held the spotlight up to the 
seemingly innocuous issue of language in a country with such diversity as South Africa 
(2006).  She argues that ‘when political subjectivity is contingent upon one’s ability to 
speak and to be understood’ (Morris 2006: 88), there is a democratic deficit in a country 
in which ‘true multilingualism’ has not been attained (ibid: 90).  Just as important, 
perhaps more so, the same can be said of the current lack of countenance given within 
such fora to the inequality of life-chances brought to bear in contestations over, and the 
ongoing construction of, knowledge.  In privileging legal and textual contestations over 
knowledge in the critique of a piece of legislation, such Parliamentary processes assume 
the habitus of the elite constitutes the only proper criterion of suitable knowledge, and 
thereby continues to privilege the knowledge of the elite. 
The questions raised about making more democratic the formal participatory spaces in 
Parliament, were not premised on an ideal of ‘deliberative democracy’ whereby 
‘processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal 
individuals’ will arrive at agreed conceptions of ‘the common good’ (Mouffe 1999: 747).  
As recognised by Mouffe, such an ideal denies ‘the dimension of power and antagonism’ 
and ‘the central role in politics of the conflictual dimension and its crucial role in the 
formation of collective identities’ (ibid: 752).  Swyngedouw similarly celebrates ‘real 
politics’ that recognises and accepts conflict, as opposed to ‘consensual postpolitics … 
that either eliminates fundamental conflict … or elevates it to antithetical ultrapolitics’ 
(2007: 25).  As discussed in the Introduction, others have brought to light the limits of 
liberal democracy at the same time as recognising difference and pluralism (e.g. 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2005) and Von Lieres (2005) has theorised how such challenges 
may be met in constructing a new model of democratic politics.  As recognised by 
Mouffe, ‘social objectivity is constituted through acts of power’ (1999: 752).  Similarly to 
Bourdieu, she sees ‘the link between legitimacy and power’ to be crucial, and ‘precisely 
what the deliberative model is unable to recognise’ (ibid: 753).  This view corresponds 
with Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic capital’ that is held by those with legitimacy to 
represent, not necessarily the ‘correct’, but the accepted, version of the social world, 
that is the doxic version.  Mouffe, however, sees the democratic society as existing 
when ‘no limited social actor can attribute to herself the representation of the totality [… 
and] that any social objectivity … has to show the traces of exclusion that governs its 
constitution’ (ibid – my italics).  In debates over CLARA, everyone who participated in 
them was claiming to represent a ‘correct’ version of the social world.  And, if the 
politics of CLARA were to happen again, it would be worth bearing in mind Mouffe’s 
proposal that:  
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the “other” is no longer seen as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an 
“adversary”, i.e., somebody with whose ideas we are going to struggle but 
whose right to defend those ideas we will not put into question (ibid: 755). 
This involves ‘distinguishing between two types of political relations: one of antagonism 
between enemies, and one of agonism between adversaries’ (ibid: 755).  Making room 
for dissent in a pluralist democracy, is not to say that ‘pluralism’ should become ‘an end 
in itself’, whereby ‘[e]verything is politicised, can be discussed, but only in a non-
committal way and as a non-conflict’ (Swyngedouw 2007: 25, quoting Diken and 
Laustsen 2004).  Such ‘non-conflict’ may happen when ‘the problems’, ‘the questions’, 
are already agreed upon (see Ashforth 1990) and the politicised discussions centre 
instead around various technical solutions to those problems.  Instead, Swyngedouw 
(ibid: 36) argues that what it requires is:  
foregrounding and naming different … futures, making the new and impossible 
enter the realm of politics and democracy, and recognizing conflict, difference, 
and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. 
Of course, this thesis has demonstrated quite how far South African democracy is to 
annulling ‘dissensus’ (ibid: 26), but nevertheless there were many moves and 
endeavours by different groupings to frame ‘the problem’ in such a way as to attempt to 
exclude conflict from their framing.  While this may be seen as a desperate appeal to 
have their voices heard, it is a far cry from meeting the ‘urgent need for different stories 
and fictions [to …] be mobilized for realization’ (ibid: 36).  Before we will be able to 
bring forth or even imagine different stories and futures, however, it is worth 
remembering the call by Wacquant, one of Bourdieu’s translators and authority on 
Bourdieu, for ‘critical thought … that which gives us the means to think the world as it is 
and as it could be’ (Wacquant 2004: 97), arguing: 
 the primary historical mission of critical thought, which is to serve as a solvent 
of doxa, to perpetually question the obviousness and the very frames of civic 
debate so as to give ourselves a chance to think the world, rather than being 
thought by it, to take apart and understand its mechanisms, and thus to 
reappropriate it intellectually and materially. (ibid: 101). 
This is what I have tried to do in undertaking the research for, and then in writing, this 
thesis. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Inverted commas have been used in this thesis for four reasons: 1) to refer to defined terms including South 
African specific terms e.g. ‘homeland’, the ‘rural field’; 2) to refer to frequently used terms, slang, or terms 
that do not require definition e.g. ‘task team’; 3) to refer to terms to highlight contested discourses e.g. 
‘tradition’, ‘custom’ etc.; and 4) where I specifically question the appropriateness of using the term e.g. 
‘participatory’ Portfolio Committee hearings, or as a way of acknowledging that such questions have been 
raised by others e.g. ‘civil society’, ‘race’.  In the first instance, I have only used inverted commas for its first 
usage which has been explained either within the body of the text or in a footnote.  In the other instances, I 
have continued to use inverted commas throughout the thesis.  Here, ‘homeland’ is discussed subsequently 
but has been put into inverted commas to highlight its South African specific nature, and the historical and 
racialised connotations that it has. 
2 The word ‘community’ is widely used in South Africa by academics, DLA officials, NGO workers and people 
living in such areas; Nauta (2004) recognises its centrality amongst the land sector during what he dubbed as 
the ‘freedom and consultation era’ – the first half of the 1990s.  Although it becomes in its use a euphemism, 
it has repercussions – as seen in the definitions in CLARA.  See also, (Berry 1992; Kepe 1998). 
3 At the time of writing, the first hearings of the Constitutional Court case were scheduled to take place in 
October 2008. 
4 All terms in double inverted commas relating to CLARA are those defined by the Act, set out in Appendix 1 of 
the thesis. 
5 See the previous version of the CLRB dated 26.6.03, section 30. 
6 This “must” was changed to “may” in the final Bill approved by Parliament, now CLARA. 
7 The words ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’ are considered pejorative for their pre-modern connotations – ‘traditional 
community’ and ‘traditional’ are considered more appropriate, hence ‘traditional leader’ rather than ‘chief’, 
‘traditional authority’ etc. 
8 This term is in inverted commas in acknowledgement of its academically contested nature.  Such 
contestations are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
9 This euphemistically describes the former ‘homeland’ areas in South Africa (Oomen 2005)), even though 
many of them have been described more accurately as encompassing a form of “displaced urbanisation” 
(Murray 1992)). 
10See (Ashforth 1990) for an excellent analysis of the ‘problematisation’ of social ‘questions’ in South Africa.  
11 The term ‘black spots’ was used to describe areas in white-designated farmland where black people were 
living. 
12 This has been estimated as being over 21 million people by the DLA – LRC: Press Statement (20.4.06) 
13 This figure includes areas outside the former homelands. 
14 See also (de Wet 1989; McAllister 1989). 
15 Due to the limitations of space, I have been unable to discuss a huge body of work looking at land reform 
more generally - see e.g. (Bernstein 2002) (Borras 2003), and in relation to South Africa – see e.g. (Hall 2004) 
(Lahiff 2003) (Ntsebeza and Hall 2007) and (Cousins 2000).  Recently, one important study that my work 
complements has brought together the voices and perceptions of different groups of actors interacting in 
relation to specific land reform projects (James 2007).  In relation to tenure, see e.g. (Adams, Cousins et al. 
2000) and (Claassens 2000). 
16 These terms are in inverted commas here, to denote that they are terms chosen by me to describe the 
Bourdieu-ean fields that are the object of the research in this thesis.  Bourdieu also talks about the ‘political 
field’ and the wider ‘field of power’ – these are discussed further in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and elsewhere in the 
thesis. 
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17 In the field of education, Bourdieu argued that “The assumption that the habitus of the dominant or élite 
group constitutes the only proper criterion of scholastic success gives de facto sanction to initial cultural 
inequalities by ignoring them, and treating all pupils, however unequal they may be in reality, as equal in 
rights and duties” referred to in (Harker 1990: 92). 
18 The first hearings of the Constitutional Court case are scheduled to take place in October 2008. 
19 See FN. xvi above. 
20 Such orthodoxy within different fields, as long as it is externally imposed, may not amount to doxa, “that 
which appears self-evident, transparently normal” (Terdiman 1987: 812).  Whether it does is likely to depend 
upon where in the hierarchy of the wider field of power those who claim symbolic capital within any particular 
field are positioned. 
21  (Maré 2001). 
22  Society in the UK of course has its own contradictions with distinctions and splits based upon race, class 
and multiple other axes that are just as real, though perhaps less obvious to someone who has lived there 
most of her life. 
23  Weideman (2004: 229) quoted the Deputy Director of the NLC as saying “An indication of where things are 
at [in terms of the relationship between the NLC and the DLA], is that we are now getting visits from the 
[NIA]”. 
24 Within anthropology, however, many of these issues are well-discussed and I am grateful to Linda Waldman 
for discussions in relation to them.  See for instance, (Bell, Caplan et al. 1993) and (Wolf 1996) 
25 It was also at this conference that the ANC adopted a resolution on traditional leaders envisaging “a full and 
constructive role in consultative processes on local development matters” (Beall, Mkhize et al. 2005: 762)  
26 Based upon a liberal tradition, NGOs, by default, fall within the realm of ‘civil society’, to be protected and 
promoted.  The Gramscian tradition sees the sphere as being that where the hegemonic ideology is contested 
- following on from this comes the concern and focus on ‘social movements’.  Ferguson has argued that if ‘civil 
society’ is conceived as a “set of development NGOs, most of which are funded by bilateral or multilateral 
development donors or by international NGOs” some of which are taking over the state’s functions in areas 
such as health and education, the term ‘civil society’ clouds the fact that “these NGOs do not actually 
challenge the state ‘from below’ but are instead ‘horizontal contemporaries’ of wider institutions of 
transnational governmentality” (Lewis 2002: 577-8, referring to Ferguson 1990). 
27 The original Transvaal RWM has meanwhile changed its name to the ‘National Movement of Rural Women’. 
28 ERAF refers to me. 
29 Violence occurred in other areas in South Africa as well – the Thokoza and Katlehong townships on the East 
Rand near Johannesburg have been described as “urban killing fields” (Meintjes 1998: 102) 
30 The NP’s cynical ploys in supporting the IFP militarily and in supporting a ‘third force’ are now well known 
(Worden 1994). 
31 Local Government: Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill. B71-2000, quoted in (Oomen 2005: 68). 
32 Tribal Authorities in the northern Transvaal reserves were grouped administratively in Regional Authorities. 
33 X has been used so as to anonymise the person being talked about.  Elsewhere, in quotations, people have 
similarly been referred to as X, Y, Z etc. 
34 The “absolute privileging of experience as the sole arbiter of knowledge” (Hassim and Walker 1992: 82) had 
long been contested, as had the ability or the appropriateness of people “‘speaking for’ those who could and 
should speak for themselves” (ibid: 82, see also Meintjes 2003).  For example, even in the WNC’s 
engagements with the multi-party negotiating process of the early 1990s, “[t]he link with technical experts 
and academics was not always welcome” (Hassim 2002: 725). 
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35 Ironically, the other interest group that has similarly contended that custom has been corrupted by 
colonialism and apartheid are traditional leaders.  As recognised by Costa, “[a]rguments for equality share one 
important attribute with those for tradition: the corruption thesis.” (Costa 1998: 533). 
36 This reference to “the African land ethic” is a reference to the work of Catherine Cross, a researcher now at 
the HSRC, whose views on this were influential at this time amongst actors in the legal grouping (Cross 1992).  
See also, (Cousins and Claassens 2006: 6) who has similarly referred to Cross’s work in relation to an ‘African 
land ethic’. 
37 The word ‘strategy’ implies a manoeuvre to attain a particular goal.  However, particular manoeuvres 
shaped by practice are not adopted as a conscious ‘strategy’ but developed from a person’s dispositions 
deriving from habitus, shaping their beliefs, their ideology ( Mahar, Harker et al. 1990: 18).  So ‘strategy’ 
implies instead the use of their knowledge, shaped by habitus, in order to attain particular goals – but those 
goals could not have included the conscious goal to legitimate their unconscious practice. 
38 In another context in relation to the application of Foucault to sociolegal studies, Munro has argued that an 
“assumption of an assimilation between the legal and the juridical, and therefore between law and sovereign 
command” is “inappropriate” (Munro 2001: 558).  While I understand this distinction, it does not undermine 
the parallels drawn here between the operation of the legal field to that of the ‘juridical field’ discussed in 
(Bourdieu 1987).  
39 The ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ etc indicates different people speaking.   
40 As indicated in the Introduction, a court case and constitutional challenge has been launched against the 
Act – those spearheading the challenge fall squarely within the ‘legal grouping’. 
41 Obviously they cannot continue to deny this if they are challenged to its juridical resolution, as here, in the 
Constitutional Court. 
42 The dualistic nature of this Mamdani-inspired discourse is ironic, given Mamdani’s stated aims of overcoming 
analysis “by analogy” and “view[ing] social reality through a series of binary opposites” (1996: 9). 
43 See also (Mathis 2007). 
44 In an interesting cyclical twist, Derick Fay has traced this discourse to a critical report on the role of TAs in 
relation to tenure in the former Transkei by Andre Terblanche in 1991, which Mamdani then used as the basis 
for his analysis in the Transkei (personal communication, 4.07). 
45 See (Harris 2003) for a fascinating historical account of such institutionalisation of racial inequality in the US. 
46 There were, of course, exceptions - see e.g. (Cross 1991). 
47 The 1994 Act was amended in 1999 in the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 18 of 1999. 
48 The smart new green road sign erected presumably by the District Council during the course of my time 
undertaking research there, pointing to ‘Mashamba Tribal Authority’ belied the more politically correct version 
embodied in the TLGFA and references to ‘Traditional Authorities’ and Leaders in the Constitution.  Ironically, 
Robins noticed the same in the village of Makuleke in 1998 (Robins 2003). 
49 The fieldwork involved 31 semi-structured open-ended interviews, including four with Councillors within the 
Makhado Municipality constituency (one of whom represented Chavani and other villages falling under 
Nkhensani Traditional Authority), two with Municipality officials, four with local NGO employees (one of them 
an ex-employee) and four with individuals within the Traditional Authority governance structures of the village.  
In addition, seven group discussions were held with groups of individuals falling under Nkhensani Traditional 
Authority representing both the formal and informal structures in the village, men and women, and different 
age groups.  14 further in-depth interviews and seven further focus groups were held with individuals and 
groups, including four with traditional leaders from neighbouring villages.  The study also involved an 
unrecorded number of informal interviews and (participant) observation including attendance at community 
and administrative meetings.   
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50 The gendered nature of such struggles was under-researched and had received very little attention prior to 
the research undertaken for Meer’s 1997 edited volume ‘Women, Land and Authority’. 
51 See (Hofmeyr 1993) who tells of changes in village practices, such as the disappearance of the kgoro, 
resulting from a ‘betterment’ scheme in the Northern Transvaal. 
52 See (Comaroff 1975: 150) who similarly describes a distinction between ‘formal statements’ which “are 
adopted for the purposes of stating shared values and ideals”, while ‘evaluative statements’ are “employed to 
discuss actual people, their actions and events in the real world”. 
53 In the 1980s and 1990s, witch killings were prolific in the former Lebowa, also in the Northern Transvaal 
(now Limpopo Province) - (Delius 1996; Niehaus 2001; Oomen 2005) 
54 According to my informants in the area, Tokoloshi are little people who are bad; witches can turn people 
into tokoloshi and then use them as workers to carry out bad deeds.  These are, however, more analogous to 
what Niehaus (2001, 2005) describes as ‘Zombies’. 
55 At the time I undertook my research – although there were plans afoot to re-demarcate the wards in the 
area. 
56 Bokisi was a ward falling under Nkhensani TA.  Hosi Bokisi was officially an induna over his people, but 
claimed that he had been deposed as a hosi when they were moved from ‘Mashamba’.  People under him 
referred to him as the hosi and I also used that title when I was there, and am using it accordingly here. 
57 Housing built by the state both during apartheid was basic, often from kiln fired cement and mud bricks with 
a corrugated iron roof.  Many of them were just two rooms – hence the name ‘two room’, others were lucky 
enough to get a ‘four room’. 
58 They are registered in the Deeds Registry as being owned by the Suid-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingstrust, the 
South African Development Trust, the South African Native Trust and the Government of Gazankulu.  The 
situation is unclear as these entities are supposedly obsolete. 
59 Thanks to Peter Rutsch, a land lawyer, who explained to me what a Deed of Grant is: “In the urban areas, 
people had to qualify to stay there and were given Certificates of Occupation.  In the late 1980s things began 
to change and in the urban areas, Certificates of Occupation were slowly converted to Deeds of Grant or 
Rights of Leasehold, under neither of which did the holder own the land, but the rights held were 
progressively entrenched.” 
 
60 Nkuzi Development Association, Workshop – Area Based and Territorial Approaches to Land Reform, 8.11.05 
61 Even though substantial changes were made to the draft Bill between March and the end of June 2003, 
many of those involved in the Reference Group did not receive notice of such changes before the draft was 
circulated the day before their meeting on 1 July (LRC – Notes on Reference Group Meeting on CLRB, 1.7.03).   
62 I do not claim to know the details, but it appears that the workshop organised through AFRA, in tandem 
with the RWM, generated extensive controversy, accusations of misuse of funds and the subsequent dismissal 
of one of its organisers.  The timing of this controversy coincided with the furore at the NLC in relation to the 
dismissal of its director, each relating to and amplifying the storm surrounding the other. 
63 s. 22(4) CLARA – see appendix. 
64 Those institutions, such as the HRC and CGE, set up under Chapter 9 of the Constitution. 
65 This thesis once again demonstrates the difficulty of discussing Bourdieu’s theory apart from empirical work 
and counters Moore’s criticism of Bourdieu’s concept of positionality for being “devoid of any notion of a 
multiple subjectivity constituted through multiple positions” (Moore 1994): 79. 
66 Documents marked ‘LRC Archive’ can be found in the LRC library, Cape Town. 
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GENERAL  EXPLANATORY  NOTE: 
] Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from 
existing enactments. 
Words underlined with a solid  line  indicate  insertions in 
existing enactments. 
(English text  signed by the President.) 
(Assented  to 14 July 2004.) 
ACT. 
To provide  for legal security of tenure  by  transferring  communal  land,  including 
KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama land, to communities, or by awarding comparable 
redress; to provide for the conduct of a land rights enquiry to determine the 
transition  from old order  rights  to  new  order  rights;  to  provide  for  the  democratic 
administration of communal  land  by  communities;  to  provide  for  Land  Rights 
Boards;  to  provide  for  the  co-operative  performance of municipal  functions  on 
communal land; to amend or repeal certain laws; and to provide for matters 
incidental  thereto. 
B E IT ENACTED by  the Parliament of the  Republic of South Africa, as follows:- 
ARRANGEMENT  OF  ACT 
Sections 
CHAPTER 1 5 
DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATION  OF  ACT 
1. Definitions 
2. Application of Act 
CHAPTER 2 
JURISTIC  PERSONALITY AND LEGAL  SECURITY  OF  TENURE 10 
3. Juristic personality of community 
4. Security of tenure 
CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFER AND REGISTRATION  OF  COMMUNAL AND 
5. Registration of communal land and new order rights 
6. Transfer of communal land 
15 
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7. Functions of conveyancer 
8. Registration of subsequent  transactions 
9. Conversion of registered new order right into freehold ownership 
10. Transfer costs and stamp duties 
1 1.  Surveying and registration costs  5 
CHAPTER 4 
PROVISION OF COMPARABLE REDRESS WHERE TENURE CANNOT BE 
LEGALLY SECURED 
12. Award of comparable redress 
13. Cancellation of old order right 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CONDUCT OF LAND RIGHTS ENQUIRY 
14. Land  rights  enquiry 
15. Designation or appointment of land rights enquirer 
15. N o 1  ice of land rights enquiry 
17 .  Powers and duties of land rights enquirer 
18. Determination by Minister 
CHAPTER 6 
CONTENT, MAKING AND REGISTRATION OF COMMUNITY RULES 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
3 1. 
32. 
33. 
Content,  making  and registration of community  rules 
Amendment of community  rules 
CHAPTER 7 
LAND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
Establishment of land  administration  committee 
Composition 
Term of office 
Powers and duties 
CHAPTER 8 
LAND RIGHTS BOARD 
Establishment of Land Rights Board 
Composition 
Disqualificaticn as Ecxd member 
Powers and duties of Board 
Resources of Board 
Service  conditions of Board members 
CHAPTER 9 
KWAZULU-NATAL  INGONYAMA TRUST LAND 
Laws  governing  KwaZulu-Natal  Ingonyama Trust Land 
Ingonyama  Land  Rights Board for  KwaZulu-Natal 
Reconstitution of KwaZulu-Natal  Land  Rights  Board 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
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34. Powers and duties in relation to Ingonyama land 
35. Inconsistency in laws 
CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
Provision of assistance to community 5 
Provision of municipal services and development infrastructure on communal 
land 
Acquisition of land by Minister 
Application of Act to other land reform beneficiaries 
Extension of access to courts 10 
Offences 
Penalties 
Delegation of powers 
Regulations 
Act binds  State 
Amendment and repeal of laws 
Short title and commencement 
SCHEDULE 
CHAPTER 1 
DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATION OF ACT 
15 
20 
Definitions 
1. In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise- 
“beneficial occupation” means the occupation of land by a person for  a 
continuous period of not less than five years prior to 31 December 1997 as if that 
person was the owner, without force, openly and without the permission of the 25 
owner, and “beneficially occupied” has a  corresponding meaning; 
“Board” except  in Chapter 9, means a  Land  Rights Board established in terms of 
section 25; 
“communal land” means land contemplated in section 2 which is, or is to be, 
occupied or used by members of a community subject to the rules or custom of that 30 
community; 
“Community” means a  group of persons whose rights to land are derived from 
shared rules determining access to land  held in common by such group; 
“community rules” means the rules registered  in terms of section 19( 1); 
“comparable redress” means the redress contemplated in Chapter 4; 35 
“Constitution” means the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 
No. 108 of 1996); 
“Deed of Communal Land Right” means  a deed in terms of which a new order 
right is registered in the game of a person as contemplated i11 section 6 ;  
“Deeds Registries Act” means the Deeds Registries Act, 1937 (Act No. 47 of 40 
1937); 
“Department” means the Department of Land Affairs; 
“Director-General’’ means the Director-General of Land Affairs; 
“land administration committee” means a land administration committee 
established in terms of section 21; 45 
“land rights enquirer” means a land rights enquirer designated or appointed in 
terms of section 15; 
“Minister” means the Minister responsible for Land Affairs; 
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“new order  right” means  a  tenure  or  other right in communal  or  other  land which 
has  been  confirmed,  converted,  conferred  or  validated by the  Minister  in  terms of 
section 18; 
“old  order  right” means  a  tenure  or  other right in or  to  communal  land which- 
(a) is  formal  or  informal; 5 
(b) is registered or unregistered; 
(cj derives from or is recognised by law, including customary law, practice or 
usage;  and 
(dj exists  immediately prior to a determination by the Minister in terms of section 
18, but  does  not include-  10 
(i) any right or interest of a tenant, labour tenant, sharecropper  or  employee 
if such right or interest is purely of a  contractual nature; and 
(ii)  any right or interest based  purely  on  temporary  permission  granted by the 
owner  or  lawful  occupier of the  land in question,  on  the basis that such 
permission may at any time be withdrawn by such owner or lawful 15 
occupier; 
“prescribed” means  prescribed by regulation in terms of this Act; 
“this  Act” includes  any  regulations  made  under this Act;  and 
“traditional  council” means  a traditional council as defined in section 1 of the 
Traditional  Leadership and Governance  Framework  Act,  2003. 20 
Application of Act 
2. (1)  This  Act  applies to- 
(a) State land  which is beneficially occupied  and  State  land which- 
(i) at any time  vested in a  government  cohtemplated  in  the  Self-governing 
Territories Constitution  Act,  197 1 (Act No. 21 of 1971),  before  its  repeal  25 
or of the former Republics of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda or 
Ciskei, or in the South  African  Development  Trust  established by section 
4 of the Development Trust and L a d  Act,  1936  (Act No. 18 of 1936), but 
not land which vested  in the  formkr  South  African  Development  Trust 
and  which  has  been  disposed of in terns of the  State  Land  Disposal  Act, 30 
1961  (Act No. 48 of 1961); 
(ii) was listed in the schedules to the  Black  Land  Act,  1913  (Act No. 27 of 
1913),  before its repeal  or the schedule of released  areas in terms of the 
Development  Trust  and  Land  Act,  1936  (Act No. 18 of 1936); befort! its 
repeal; 35 
(b) land to which  the  KwaZulu-Natal  Ingonyama  Trust  Act,  1994  (Act No. 3 KZ 
(c) land  acquired by or for a  community  whether  registered  in  its  name or not; and 
(d) any other land, including land which provides equitable access to land to a 
(3) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, determine land contemplated in 
subsection ( l ) ( d )  and may  in such notice  specify  which  provisions of this Act apply to 
such  land. 
of 1994), applies, to the extent  provided for in Chapter 9 of this Act; 
community as contemplated  insection 25(5) of the  Constitution. 40 
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CHAPTER 2 
JURISTIC PERSONALITY AND LEGAL SECURITY OF TENURE 
Juristic personality of community 
3. Upon the registration of its rules in terms  of section 19(1), a  community acquires 
juristic personality with perpetual succession regardless of changes in its membership 5 
and it may, subject to such  rules, this Act and any  other law, in its own  name- 
(a)  acquire and hold  rights  and  incur  obligations; and 
(bj own,  encumber by mortgage,  servitude  or otherwise and  dispose of movable 
and immovable property and  otherwise  deal with  such  property subject  to  any 
title or  other  conditions. 10 
Security of tenure 
4. (1) A community  or person is  entitled to the extent and in the manner provided for 
in this Act and within the available resources of the State, either to tenure which is 
legally secure or to comparable redress if the tenure of land of such community or 
perjon is legally insecure as  a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices. 1.5 
(2) An old order  right held  by a  married  perscn is, despite any  law, practice,  usage  or 
registration to the contrary,  deemed  to be held  by all  spouses in a  marriage  in which such 
person is a  spouse,  jointly  in  undivided shares irrespective of the matrimonial property 
regime  applicable  to  such  marriage  and  must, on confirmation  or conversion  in terms of 
section 18(3), be registered in the  names of all such  spouses. 20 
(3) A woman  is  entitled  to the same legally secure tenure, rights in or  to land and 
benefits from  land as is a  man, and no law, community  or other rule,  practice  or  usage 
may discriminate  against  any person on the  ground  of  the gender of such person. 
CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFER AND REGISTRATION OF COMMUNAL LAND 25 
Registration of communal land and new order rights 
5. (1) Communal land and new order rights are capable of being and must be 
registered  in the name of the  community  or  person,  including  a  woman,  entitled o such 
land or  right in terms of this Act and  the relevant community rules. 
(2) Despite  any  other law- 30 
(a) on  the  making of a determination by the  Minister in terms of section 18, the 
ownership of communal land  which is not  State land but  which is registered in 
the  name of- 
(i) a person; 
(ii) a  traditional  leader  or traditional leadership whether recognised in terms 35 
(iii) a  communal  property association  contemplated in the Communal 
of  law or  not; 
Property Associations Act, I996 (Act No. 28 of 1996); or 
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(iv) a trust or other legal entity, 
vests  in  the community on whose behalf such  land is held or in  whose interest 
such registration was effected, and such land  remains subject to limitations 
and restrictions in relation to and rights or entitlements to such land; 
(b) the community referred to in paragraph (a) succeeds in all respects as the 5 
successor in title to such person, traditional leader or traditional leadership, 
communal property association, trust or other  legal  entity; 
(c) the title deed relating to land contemplated in  paragraph (a) and any mortgage 
bond or other deed registered in respect of such  land must, in the prescribed 
manner, be endorsed by the Registrar of Deeds to reflect the community as the  10 
registered owner of such land; and 
contemplated in paragraph (a). 
(d) the provisions of this Act must apply with the necessary changes to land 
(3) (a) A document evidencing an old order right which is cancelled or replaced by a 
new order right in terms of this Act, must be lodged  with  the Registrar of Deeds,  who 15 
must endorse such document as having been cancelled. 
(b)  If a  document contemplated in paragraph (a) cannot  be  lodged, the Registrar must 
accept an appropriate affidavit to that effect by the holder of such right or the Minister. 
'Ik.;-mfer of communal land 
6. After making  a determination in terms of section  18,  the Minister must- 20 
(a) transfer the  entire  communal land determined  by her or him to be the  land to 
which a community is entitled, to such community subject to the conditions 
contemplated in section 18(4) which are applicable to such land; 
(b)  despite any other law to the contrary, on behalf of such community and in 
respect of such land- 25 
(i) have a communal general plan prepared and approved in terms of the 
Land Survey Act, 1997 (Act No. 8 of 1997); 
(ii) have such plan registered and have  a  communal land register opened in 
terms of the Deeds Registries Act; 
(iii] transfer, by means of a  Deed of Communal Land Right or other 30 
appropriate deed, the new order rights to  the person or persons entitled to 
such rights; and 
(c) do any other things necessary to give effect to that determination and this 
section. 
Functions of conveyancer 35 
7. A suitably qualified official of the Department may perform  the functions of a 
conveyancer required in terms of the Deeds Registries Act. 
Registration of subsequent transactions 
8. Registrable transactions in respect of communal land,  including new allocations of 
rights in such land, arising after the opening of a communal land register, must be 40 
registered in terms or' t h i s  Act and the Seeds Registries Act. 
Conversion  of registered new order right into freehold ownership 
9. (1) The  holder of a registered new order right may apply to the community owning 
the land to which such right relates for the conversion of such right into freehold 
ownership. 45 
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(2) After considering an application referred to in subsection (l), such community 
must, subject to its community rules and any applicable title conditions, approve or 
reject such application. 
(3) If a community approves an application in terms of subsection (2), it may impose 
any condition or reserve any right in favour of the community. 5 
(4) On application by the holder referred to in subsection (l), the Registrar of Deeds 
must in  the prescribed manner record the conversion contemplated in this section. 
Transfer costs and  stamp  duties 
10. Transfer duty, value-added tax, stamp duty and deeds registration fees of office are 
not payable in respect of any registration required to give effect to sections 5 and 6. 10 
Surveying  and  registration costs 
11. The Minister may, from money appropriated by Parliament for this purpose, pay 
the costs of surveying and registration required to give effect to sections 5 and 6. 
CHAPTER 4 
PROVISION OF COMPARABLE REDRESS WHERE TENURE CANNOT BE 15 
LEGALLY SECURED 
Award  of comparable redress 
12. (1) The Minister may, on application by the holder of an old order right which is 
insecure as contemplated in section 25(6) of the Constitution and which cannot  be made 
legally secure,  determine an award of comparable redress to such holder. 20 
(a )  land  other than the land to which the applicable old order  right relates or a 
(b) compensation in money or in any other form; or 
(c) a combination of land or a right in land contemplated in paragraph (a) and 25 
compensation contemplated in paragraph (b). 
(2) An award in terms of subsection (1) may comprise- 
right  in such other land: 
(3) The provisions of section 18, read with the necessary changes, apply to a 
determination in  terms of this section. 
Cancellation of old order right 
13. For  the purposes of this Act the Minister may, with the written agreement of the  30 
holder of an old order  right and  on such conditions as may be agreed to, cancel such 
right. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CONDUCT OF LAND RIGHTS ENQUIRY 
Land rights enquiry 35 
14. (1) Prior to securing an old order right in terms of section 4 or transferring 
communal land to a community or person in terms of section 6 or determining 
comparable redress in terms of section 12, the Minister must institute a land rights 
enquiry. 
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(2) A land rights enquiry must enquire into- 
(i) constitutional and human; 
(ii) old order and other  land and tenure; and 
(iii) competing or conflicting, 5 
(a) the  nature and extent of all- 
rights, interests and tenure of land, whether legally secure or not which are or may be 
affected by such enquiry; 
(b) the interests of the State; 
(c) the options  available  for legally securing any legally insecure rights; 
(d) the provision of access to land on an equitable basis; 10 
( e )  spatial planning and land use management, land development, and the 
necessity for  conducting  a  development or a de-densification or other land 
reform  programme, and the nature of such programme; 
(f) the need for  comparable redress and the nature and extent of such redress; 
(g) the measures required to ensure compliance with section 4 and to promote 15 
gender equality in the  allocation, registration and exercise of new order rights; 
(h) any matter relevant to a  determination to be made by the Minister in terms of 
section 18; 
( i )  any other matter as prescribed or as instructed by the Minister, 
2nd must endeavour to resolve any dispute relating to land and rights in, or to, land and 20 
a report on such matters must be  submitted to the Minister. 
Designation or appointment of ladd rights enquirer 
15. (1) The Minister may in the prescribed manner designate an officer of the 
Department or appoint  a suitable person who is not such an  officer to conduct a land 
rights enquiry. 25 
(2) The Minister may, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, remunerate 
and pay allowances to a land rights enquirer who is not a State official. 
Notice of land rights enquiry 
16. The Minister must, in the appropriate national, regional and local media and in the 
prescribed manner, publish- 30 
(a) a notice of an enquiry inviting interested parties to participate in such enquiry; 
(b)  a notice regarding the  determinations made consequent upon a completed land 
and 
rights enquiry. 
Powers and duties of land rights enquirer 35 
17. (1) A land rights enquirer must conduct  a land rights enquiry in the prescribed 
manner, which must be open and transparent and must afford the communities and 
persons who may be affected by such enquiry an opportunity to participate in such 
enquiry. 
cemmmity are in genera! the inferme:! md demscratic decisi~ns f the rnzjsrity ~f the 
members of such community who are 18 years of age or older and are present or 
represented by a proxy at a community meeting of which adequate notice of not less than 
21 days was given. 
(2) A land rights enquirer must adopt measures to ensure that decisions made by a  40 
(3) A land rights enquiry report contemplated in section 14(2) must- 45 
(a )  include recommendations in respect of the matters which require  detennina- 
tions to be made by the  Minister; 
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( b )  prior to  being  submitted to the Minister,  be made  available on adequate notice 
for inspection by any interested community or person  who  must be  afforded 
an  opportunity to make  representations in relation  to any matter relevant to 
such enquiry; and 
(cj  be  submitted to  the  Minister  together with any  such  representations and 5 
supporting  documents for his or  her  consideration. 
(4) Whenever relevant  to an  enquiry, a land rights enquirer and any  person assisting 
such enquirer, may in the prescribed  manner and having  regard  to  the  constitutional 
rights of affected  persons- 
(a) compel  the provision of written  and  ve bal evidence; 10 
(b)  enter  and  search premises and take possession  of documents and articles; and 
(c) convene  and  attend meetings of interested persons. 
( 5 )  A land rights enquirer has all other powers and duties which the Minister 
determines are  necessary for the effective conduct of such enquiry. 
Determination by Minister 15 
18. (1) If the Minister,  having received a report  by a  land  rights  enquirer, is satisfied 
that the  requirements of this Act  have been  met, he or  she  must, subject to subsections 
(4) and ( 5 )  and having regard to- 
( a )  such report; 
(bj all relevant law, including  customary law and law governing spatial planning, 20 
(c) the  old order  rights of all affected right  holders; 
(d}  the  need to  provide access to  land  on an equitable  basis;  and 
( e )  the  need to  promote gender equality in respect of land, 
local government  and  agriculture; 
make   determination as contemplated  in subsections (2) and (3). 25 
(2) The  Minister must, where  applicable,  determine  the  location  and  extent of  the  land 
to  be transferred to a  community or person. 
(3) The  Minister  must,  subject to subsections (4) and ( 3 ,  determine that- 
(a) the whole of  an area of communal land  which is,  or  is  to  be,  surveyed must be 
registered or  remain registered in the  name  of a specified community: 30 
(b) the whole of an area  contemplated in paragraph (a )  is  to  be subdivided into 
portions  of land,  each of which  must  be registered  in the name of a person  and 
not  a  community; 
(i) must be registered or remain registered in the name of a specified 35 
community, and part of such land  must be  subdivided  and registered as 
contemplated  in paragraph (6); and 
(c) a part of an area contemplated  in paragraph (a)- 
(ii) is reserved to the State; and 
(i) confirmed: 40 
(ii) converted  into  ownership or into  a  comparable  new  order  right, and the 
(iii) cancelled in accordance with Chapter 4 and- 
(d) an old order  right  is  to be- 
Minister  must  determine the  nature  and extent of such right; or 
(aa) the land  to  which such right relates  must be incorporated  into 
land held or to be held by a  community; and 45 
(bbj the holder of such right must be  awarded specified comparable 
redress as contemplated in Chapter 4. 
(4) In  making a determination in terms of this section,  the  Minister must  take into 
account the Integrated  Development  Plan of each  municipality  having  jurisdiction  and, 
after consultation  with  the Minister  responsible  for  local  government,  each municipality 50 
and other  land-use  regulator  having  jurisdiction may- 
(a) reserve a  right to the  State,  including  a  municipality, and stipulate any 
land-use  or other condition which in her  or his  opinion  is necessary- 
(i) for a public purpose or  which is in  the public  interest; 
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(ii) to protect  the affected land, rights in such land, an owner of such land and 
(iii) to give effect to this Act; 
a  holder of such rights; or 
(b) confer a  new order right on a woman- 
(i) who is  a spouse of a male holder of an old order  right, to be held jointly 5 
(ii) who is the widow of a  male holder of an old order right, or who otherwise 
(iii) in her own right; and 
(c) validate a putative old order right which was acquired in good faith and 10 
declare invalid such a right which was not acquired in good faith, and must 
determine the holder or holders of a new order right. 
( 5 )  The  Minister may not make a determination in terms of this section which relates 
to land and a  right in,  or to, land which is directly affected by a  dispute until such dispute 
is resolved by mediation, other alternative traditional or non-traditional dispute 15 
resolution mechanism or by a court, and must adopt measures to ensure that such dispute 
is resolved. 
with her spouse; 
succeeds to such right, to be held solely by such woman; or 
CHAPTER 6 
CONTENT, MAKING ANT) HEGISTRATION OF COMMUNITY R!'LES 
Content, making and registration of community rules 20 
19. (1) A  community  whose communal land is, or is to be, registered in its name must 
in the prescribed manner, to which the provisions of section 17( 1) and (2) read with the 
necessary changes apply, make and adopt its community rules and have them registered. 
(2) Community  rules must, subject to any other applicable  laws, regulate- 
(a)  the  administration and use of communal land  by  the community as land owner 25 
within the framework of law governing spatial planning and local govern- 
ment; 
(b) such matters as may be prescribed; and 
(c) any matter  considered by the community to be necessary. 
(3) Community rules are binding on the community and its members and must be 30 
accessible to the public and are on registration deemed to be a matter of public 
knowledge. 
(4) (a )  A  community  must apply to the Director-General for  the registration of its 
adopted rules and he  or she must refer such application to the Board having jusisdiction 
in the area for   report on the suitability of such rules. 35 
(b) The Director-General must consider the adopted community rules, any informa- 
tion submitted and the report of the Land Rights Board having jurisdiction in the area. 
(c)  If the Director-General  is satisfied that the adopted community rules comply with 
the requirements of the Constitution and this Act,  a Registration Officer in the 
Department designated by her or him for that purpose must, in the prescribed manner, 40 
register such rules. 
(d) If the Director-General is not satisfied that community rules comply with the 
requirements and intention of the Constitution and this Act, she or he must notify the 
community of the steps to be taken to make such rules so comply. 
standard rules prescribed by regulation as adapted by the  Minister to such community, 
are  deemed to be the rules of such community and must be registered as the rules of such 
community. 
( 5 )  Should a community fail to adopt and have community rules registered, the 45 
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Amendment of community rules 
20. ( l j  A community may, in a general meeting and in  the manner applicable to the 
(2) An amendment or revocation contemplated in subsection (1) must he registered 
adoption of community rules, amend or revoke any community rule. 
and only becomes effective on registration. 
CHAPTER 7 
LAND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
Establishment of land administration committee 
21. (1) A community must establish a  land administration committee which may only 
be disestablished if its existence is no longer required in terms of this Act. 
(2) If a community has a recognised traditional council, the powers and duties of the 
land administration committee of such community may be exercised and performed by 
such council. 
(3) In the exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties of a land 
admjnistratim~ committee as contemplated in subsection \2), a tradition21  pouncil must 
ensure t h  i t  i h c  ::omposition of its membership saiisfies th: rcyuirements of section '22(4) 
and (5). 
(4) When a traditional council acts as a land administration committee as 
contemplated in this section, its functional area of competence is  the administration of 
land affairs and not traditional leadership as contemplated in Schedule 4 to the 
Constitution. 
( 5 )  Any provision in this Act'which  refers, or is applicable, to a traditional council is 
intended to establish norms and standards and a national policy with regard to 
communal land rights, to effect uniformity across the nation. 
Composition 
22. (1) A land administration committee  must consist of a total number of members as 
determined by the applicable community rules and must comply with this section. 
(2) Subject to section 21 (2) ,  the members of a land administration committee  must be 
persons not holding any traditional leadership position and must be elected by the 
community in the prescribed manner. 
(3) At least one third of the total membership of a land administration committee must 
be women. 
(4) One member of a land administration committee must represent the interests of 
vulnerable community members,  including  women,  children and the youth, the elderly 
and the  disabled. 
( 5 )  Each of- 
(a)  the Minister, in respect of the Department: 
(b) the chairperson of the relevant Land Rights Board; 
(c) the relevant provincial Member of the Executive Council responsible for 
(a') the relevant provincial Member of the Executive Council responsible for local 
(e) every municipality in whose area of jurisdiction a land administration 
may designate  a person to be a non-voting member of a land administration committee. 
Term of office 
agriculture; 
government matters: and 
committee functions, 
23. The term of office of the members of a land administration committee is 
detemincd by community rdes  but may not exceed a period of five years. 
5 
10 
IS 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
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Powers  and  duties 
24. (1) To the extent provided by this Act and subject to any other applicable law, a 
land  administration  committee represents a community owning communal land and has 
the  powers and duties conferred on it by this Act and the rules of such community. 
of communal  land or a  right in communal land to any person, including a  community 
member, does not have force and effect until ratified in writing by the Board having 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties a  land 
administration  committee must- 10 
(2) A decision by  a  land administration committee which has the effect of disposing 5 
take measures towards ensuring- 
(i) the allocation by such committee, after a determination by the Minister  in 
terms of section 18, of new order rights to persons, including women,  the 
disabled and the youth, in accordance with the law; and 
(ii) the registration of communal land and of new order rights; 15 
establish and maintain registers and records of all new order rights and 
transactions affecting such rights as may be prescribed or as may be required 
by the rules; 
promote and safeguard the interests of the ccmmunity and its members in t k i r  
land; ~~ 20 
endeavour to promote co-operation among community members and with any 
other person in dealing with matters pertaining to land; 
assist in the resolution of land disputes; 
continuously liaise with the relevant municipality, Board and any other 
institution concerning the provision of services and the  planning and 25 
development of the communal land of the community; 
perform any other duty prescribed by or under this Act or any other  law;  and 
generally deal with all matters necessary for or incidental to the exercise of its 
powers and the performance of its duties. 
CHAPTER 8 
LAND RIGHTS BOARD 
30 
Establishment of Land Rights Board 
25. The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette- 
(a)  establish one or more Land Rights Boards having jurisdiction in such areas as 
(b) disestablish a Board or amend its area of jurisdiction. 
she or he may determine; and 35 
Composition 
26. (1) Members of a Board must be appointed by the Minister in accordance with the 
(2) A Eioard consists of- 40 
prescribed  nomination and selection processes. 
one representative from each of the organs of State determined by the 
Minister; 
two members nominated by each Provincial House of Traditional Leaders 
contemplated in section 212(2)(a) of the Constitution having jurisdiction in 
the  area of that Board; 45 
one member nominated by institutions or persons in the commercial or 
industrial sector; 
seven members from the affected communities, of whom at  least- 
(i) one must represent the interests of child-headed households; 
(ii) one must represent the interests of persons with disabilities; 50 
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(iii)  one must represent the interests of the  youth as defined in section 1 of the 
National Youth Commission  Act, 1996 (Act No. 19 of 1996); and 
(iv) one  must represent the interests of female-headed  households. 
(3) In  appointing  members of a  Board,  the Minister  must- 
(a )  have due regard to the required knowledge of land, land tenure, old and new 5 
order  rights and  the required  capabilities, including relevant  skills,  expertise 
and experience; and 
(b)  ensure  that at least a third of the  Board members  are  women. 
(4) A member of a Board is  appointed  for  a period  of five years but the Minister may 
in her or his  discretion  extend  such  term of office by a  further  period not exceeding six 10 
months until a  new Board member has been appointed. 
(5) (a )  The Minister must, after consultation with the appointed Board members, 
appoint a  chairperson and a  deputy  chairperson from among such members. 
(b) When  a  chairperson  is  unable  to  perform her  or his duties,  the deputy  chairperson 
must  perform such duties. 15 
(6) The Minister  must  publish  in the Gazette the  names of,  and position held by, each 
appointee  to  a  Board, the date  on  which  each appointment takes effect and such other 
information as may  be prescribed. 
(7) If a  member of a  Board  dies  or  vacates  her or his office before the expiry of her  or 
111s r e m  of office, the Minister may appoint a person to fill the vacancy for the remaining . X  
pcdion of such  term. 
Disqualification as Board member 
27. (1) The  Minister  must not appoint  as  a member  of a  Board  a  person w h o -  
is  not  a South African  citizen or a permanent resident and is not  ordinarilv 
resident  in the Republic; 25 
is an unrehabilitated  insolvent; 
is declared  by a  court of  law to  be mentally incompetent or is detained under 
the Mental  Health  Act,  1973  (Act No. 18 of 1973), or any  other  applicable 
law; 
has been removed from an office of trust on account of improper conduct; 30 
has  had his or her  name  removed  from any professional register on account of 
misconduct and who has  not been  reinstated; 
has been determined by a  court, tribunal or forum as contemplated by the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair  Discrimination Act, 2000 
(Act No. 4 of 2000), to have  contravened  section  7 or any  other provision of 35 
that Act;  or 
is an  elected political representative  in the national,  provincial  or local sphere 
of government. 
(2) A member of a  Board  must  vacate  her  or his office if she  or he- 
(a )  becomes disqualified in terms of subsection (1) from being appointed as a 40 
(b)  resigns by written notice addressed to the Minister; 
(c) is  removed  from office  by the Minister on  reasonable  grounds, after 
id) has, without  the leave of the Eoarci, been absent from two or more meetings of 45 
member of a  Board; 
consultation with the  Board;  or 
the Board during a  continuous  twelve-month period. 
Powers  and  duties of Board 
28. (1) A Board must, in the prescribed manner and in respect of any matter 
contemplated by or  incidental  to this Act- 
(a )  advise the Minister and advise and assist a community generally and in 50 
particular with regard to matters  concerning  sustainable land ownership and 
use, the development of land and the provision of access to land on an 
equitable  basis; 
( b )  liaise with all spheres of government, civil institutions and other  institutions; 
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(c) monitor compliance with the Constitution and this Act; and 
(d) exercise any other power and perform any other duty in  terms of this Act or 
(2) A Board and any Board member acting inL her or his official capacity may, in  the 
exercise of a power or in the performance of a (duty of a Board- 5 
assigned to such Board by the Minister. 
(a) at any time enter upon any communal  land; 
(b )  enquire into any relevant matter; 
(c)  inspect any document in the possession of any land administration committee 
or any rights holder concerning old and new order rights and make copies of 
such document; and 10 
(d) convene and attend meetings of E L  community or land administration 
committee. 
(3) A Board has all powers necessary or incidental to the  performance of its duties. 
Resources of Board 
29. The Department must, from monies appropriated by Parliament for this purpose, 15 
provide a Board with the staff, accommodation and financial and other resources 
required by such Board. 
Service conditions of Board members 
30. The Minister must, in terms of the Public  Finance  Management Act, 1999 (Act 
No. 1 of 1999), determine - 20 
(a) the conditions of service of Board members; and 
(h)  with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, the remuneration and 
allowances payable to Board members who are not employed by the  State 
from monies appropriated by  Parliamlznt for this purpose. 
CHAPTER 9 25 
KWAZULU-NATAL  INGONYAMA TRUST LAND 
Laws governing KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Land 
31. Communal land to which the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama  Trust Act, 1994 (Act 
No. 3 KZ of 1994), applies is,  from the date of commencement of this Act, governed by 
the provisions of that Act as amended by this Act and,  to the  extent provided for in this 30 
Chapter, by the provisions of this Act. 
Ingonyama Land Rights Board for KwaZulu-Natal 
32. From the date of commencement of this Act, the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust 
Board established by section 2A of the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama  Trust Act, 1994 (Act 
No.  3 KZ of  1994)- 35 
(a) is known as the Ingonyama Land Rights  Board for KwaZulu-Natal; 
(6) constitutes both the Board so established by that Act and, despite the 
provisions of sections 25, 26 and 27 of this Act, the Land Rights Board for 
KwaZulu-Natal as contemplated in Chapter 8, with all the powers and duties 
provided for in both the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act, 1994, and in 40 
this Act; 
(c) is headed in perpetuity by the Ingonyama referred to in section 13 of the 
KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, 1990 (Act No. 9 KZ of 1990), 
or its successors in title or nominee as the chairperson and member of the 
Ingonyama Land Rights Board; and 45 
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(d) continues to be constituted by the  Ingonyama and the members appointed by 
the Minister in terms of section 2A of the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama  Trust 
Act,  1994, until it is reconstituted in. terms of section 33 of this Act. 
Reconstitution of KwaZulu-Natal Land Rights Board 
33. (1) Upon  the termination of the term of office of the appointed members of the 5 
KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Land Rights Board immediately after the date of com- 
mencement of this Act, the Board must be reconstituted in terms of sections 26 and 27. 
(2) From the date of such termination all the provisions of Chapter 8, with the 
exception of section 25(a), apply to such Board. 
Powers and duties in relation to Ingonyama land 10 
34. From the  date of commencement of this; Act, the powers and duties provided  for 
in relation to land to which the  KwaZulu-Natal  Ingonyama Trust Act, 1994  (Act No. 3 
KZ of 1994),  applies, must be exercised or performed by- 
(a )  such  Board, when communal land is' transferred to a community or person in 
terms of section 6; 15 
(b)  the Minister, after consultation with :such Board, when cancelling an ola order 
right in terms of section 13; 
(c)  the Minister or such Board, when a  land rights enquiry is instituted In terms of 
section 14( 1); 
(d) the Minister, in relation to the designation of an officer of the  Department or 20 
such Board in relation to the appointment of a suitable person who is not such 
an officer, when a land rights enquirer  is designated or appointed in terms of 
section 15; and 
( e )  the Minister or such Board, when a notice of a land rights enquiry or a 
determination is published in terms of section 16. 25 
Inconsistency in  laws 
35. In the event of any inconsistency between this Act and the KwaZulu-Natal 
Ingonyama  Trust Act, 1994 (Act No. 3 KZ of 1994), this Act prevails. 
CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Provision of assistance to community 
36. The Minister may designate an officer of the Department to assist a  community or 
person to give effect to the implementation of this Act. 
Provision of municipal services and development infrastructure on communal land 
30 
37. Despite the other piGvisiGiis of this Act a-nd the provisions of a y  other law, no law 35 
must prohibit  a municipality from providing services and development infrastructure 
and from performing its constitutional functions on communal land however held or 
owned. 
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Acquisition of land by Minister 
38. (1) The Minister may, for the purposes of this Act, purchase, acquire in any other 
manner or, consistent with section 3 of the F’romotion of Administrative Justice Act, 
2000 (Act No. 3 of 2000), expropriate land, a portion of land or a right in land. 
changes, apply to an expropriation under this Act, and any reference to the Minister of 
Public Works in that Act must  be construed as a reference to the Minister for  the purpose 
of such expropriation. 
(3) Where the Minister  expropriates land, a portion of land or a  right in land under this 
Act, the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be 10 
determined  either by agreement or by a court in accordance with section 25(3) of the 
Constitution. 
(2) The Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act No. 63 of 1975), must, with the necessary 5 
Application of  Act  to other  land-reform beneficiaries 
39. This Act, read with the necessary changes, applies to beneficiaries of communal 
land or land tenure  rights  in terms of other land-reform laws. 15 
Extension of access to courts 
~ ~~~ 
40. The Minister and a Board, in their capacities as such and on behalf of any 
community or person, each has the legal capacity to institute or intervene in any legal 
proceedings arising from, or related to, this Act. 
Offences 20 
41. (1) A person who- 
(a)  hinders, obstructs or unduly influences any other person in the exercise of the 
powers or the  performance of the duties conferred on or vested in such other 
person in terms of this Act; 
(b) unlawfully requires any other person to refrain from exercising a right in 25 
terms of this Act; or 
(c)  in any manner prevents any other person from exercising such a right, 
is guilty of an offence. 
(2) Any person who grants or purports to grant to any other person, other than a 
member of a community, a new order  right  in communal lmd- 30 
(a)  in contravention of, or without complying with, a community rule; 
(bj without the prior  consent of the community or its land adrmnistration 
committee or, in the case of State  land, the consent of the Minister, 
is  guilty of an offence. 
(3) A person who, without good cause- 35 
(a)  having been subpoenaed to appear before a land rights enquirer, does not 
(b) having appeared in response to a subpoena by a land rights enquirer, fails to 
( e )  refuses to take an oath or a h a t i o n  as a witness when a land rights enquirer 40 
(d) refuses to answer any question fully and to the best of her or his knowledge 
( e )  fails to produce any book,  document or object when required to do so; or 
(’ does or says anything in relation to a land rights enquirer which if said or done  45 
attend at the time and place stated in the subpoena; 
remain in  attendance until excused; 
so requires; 
and belief; 
in relation to a court of law, would be contempt of court, 
is  guilty of an offence. 
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Penalties 
42. A  person  convicted of an  offence in temns  of this Act is liable on conviction- 
(a )  in the case of an offence referred to in section 41(1) or (2), to a fine or 
imprisonment for a  period not exceeding  two years, or  to both  a fine and  such 
imprisonment;  and 5 
(b) in the  case of  an offence  referred to i n  section  41(3), to the penalty  applicable 
to  a  similar offence  in a  magistrate’s court. 
Delegation of powers 
43. The  Minister  and the Director-General m.ay delegate  any  power,  except  the  power 
to  expropriate land, a  portion of land  or  a right in land, which  has  been  conferred  upon  10 
the  Minister  or  the  Director-General, respectively, in terms of this Act. 
Regulations 
44. (1) The  Minister may make any regulation  with  regard to any  matter  which is 
(2) Any regulations made ,111der this section must  be  tabled in Parliament. 15 
governed by or incidental to the  objects  or  implementation of this Act. 
Act binds State 
45. This Act binds the State. 
Amendment and repeal of laws 
46. (1) The  laws  mentioned in the Schedule are amended  or  repealed  to the extent set 
(2) Any law  which  regulates an  old order right and which- 
out in the third column of the Schedule. 20 
(a )  is not mentioned in the  Schedule;  and 
(b) is not in conflict with this Act, 
remains  in  force until repealed by a competent: authority. 
Short title and commencement 25 
47. This  Act is called the Communal  Land  Rights  Act, 2004, and  comes into operation 
on  a  date to be determined by the President by proclamation in the Gazette. 
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k t  No. 38 of 1927 
k t  No.  47 of 1937 
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Schedule 
Amendment or repeal of laws 
(Section 46) 
Part 1: Laws  enacted by Parliament 
lhort title 
3lack Administration Act, 
,927 
k e d s  Registries Act, 1937 
Eutent of amendment or repeal 
Repeal of sections 6 and 7 
1. Amendment of section 3 by the insertion in subsec- 
Lion ( I )  after paragraph (d)bis of the following para- 
yaphs: 
“(dlter register deeds of communal land rights as 
contemplated in the Communal  Land 
Rights Act,  2004; 
of old and new order rights as contem- 
plated in the CommuL?! LdEd Rights Act, 
2004: 
‘djter(1B) =er~the cancellzfion of old order rights 
as contemplated in the  Communal Land 
Rights Act, 2004;”. 
‘d)ter(lA) - register the conversion to full ownership 
- I_-_ 
l .  Insertion after section 16B of the following section: 
“Registration of new order rights 
16C. New order-rights shall be transferred by means 
, f a  Deed of Communal Land Right as contemplated 
n the Communal  Land Rights Act, 2004.”. 
TAmendment of section 102- 
a)  by the insertion after the definition of “court” of 
the following definition: 
“ ‘Deed of Communal Land Right’ means  a deed 
of communal land right as defined in section 1 of 
the  Communal Land Rights Act,  2004;”; 
plan” of the following definition: 
“ ‘general plan’ means a plan which represents 
the relative positions and dimensions of two or 
more pieces of land and has been signed by a per- 
son recognized by  law as  a land surveyor, and 
which has been approved, provisionally approved 
or certified as a general plan by a surveyor-gen- 
era1 or other officer empowered under any law so 
to approve, provisionally approve or certify a  gen- 
eral  plan, and includes a general plan or copy 
thereof prepared in  a surveyor-general’s office and 
approved, provisionally approved or certified as 
aforesaid, or a general plan which has at any time 
prior to the commencement of this Act, been ac- 
cepted for registration in a deeds regism or sur- 
bi by the substitution for the definition of “general 
veyor-general’s office, and includes; communal 
general plan as contemplated in the Communal 
Land Rights Act,  2004;”; 
‘cJ by the addition to the definition of “immovable 
property” of the following paragraph: 
“(e) new order rights as contemplated in the 
Communal Land Rights Act,  2004;”; and 
‘d, bv the substitution for the definition of “oerson” 
of the following definition: 
“ ‘person’, for the purpose of [the registration of 
immovable trust property only] any registration 
in terms of this Act, includes a trust and,  for the 
purpose of the Communal Land Rights Act, 2004, 
includes a  community;”. 
5 
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$0. and  year of law 
k t  No. 112 of 1991 
lct No. 31 of 1996 
lct No. 8 of 1997 
COMMUNAL  LAND  RIGHTS  ACT, 2004 
Short  title 
Lipgrading of Land Tenure 
Rights .4ct, 1991 
Interim Protection of In- 
Formal Land Rights Act, 
1996 
Land Survey Act, 1997 
3xtent of amendment or repeal 
. Repeal of section 20. 
!. Substitution  for section 25.4  of the following sec- 
ion: 
“25A. As from the coming into operation of the 
Communal Land Rights Act, 2004, this Act shall 
apply throughout the Republic.”. 
I .  Amendment of Schedule 1 by the insertion of the 
‘cdlowing items before item 1, items 1 to 6 becoming 
tems 3 to 8: 
“ 1 .  Any quitrent title referred to in Proclamation 
196 of 1920. 
2. Any quitrent title referred to in Proclamation 
170 of 1922.”. 
imendment of section 5 by the deletion of subsection 
2). 
4mendment of section 1 by the substitution for the 
iefinition of “general plan” of the following defini- 
ion: 
‘‘ ‘general  plan’ means a pian which, reprewnting 
the relative positions and. dimensions of twfi or 
more pieces of land, has i-en signed by a person 
recognised under any law then !n t ime as a land 
surveyor, or which has been approved or certified 
as  a general plan by a Surveyor-General and in- 
cludes  a general plan or  a copy thereof prepared in 
a Surveyor-General’s office and approved or  certi- 
fied as such or a general plan which has, prior to 
the commencement of this Act, been lodged for 
registration in a deeds registry or Surveyor-Gen- 
eral’s office in the Republic or any area which be- 
came part of the Republic at the commencement of 
the Constitution, 1993 and, for the purposes of the 
Communal Land Rights Act, 2004, includes a com- 
munal general plan contemplated in that Act;”. 
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Part 2 : Laws  of  the  former  KwaZulu 
io. and  year of law 1 Short title 
ict No. 3 KZ of 1994 1 KwaZulu-Natal 
Ingonyama Trust Act, 
1994 
i 
3xtent of amendment  or  repeal 
. . Amendment of section 2 - 
a) by the substitution for  subsection (2) of the folloa- 
ng subsection: 
“(2)  The Trust shall,  in  a  manner not inconsis- 
tent with the provisions of this Act,  be adminis- 
tered for the benefit, material welfare and social 
well-being of the members of the tribes and com- 
munities as contemplated in the KwaZulu 
Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, 1990  (Act 
No. 9 KZ of 1990), referred to in the second col- 
umn of the Scheduie,  established in a district re- 
ferred to in the first column of the Schedule, and 
the residents of such a  district to whom the land 
referred to in section 3 and the  real rights and 
other rights in such land  must, subject to this Act 
and any other law, be transferred.”. 
‘bj by the substitution for subsection (5) of the follow- 
sng subsection: 
“(5) The  Ingonyama shall not encumber, 
pledge, lease, alien,& or ottlerwise dispose of any 
of the said land or any interest or real right in the 
land, unless he has id t m e d  the prior written con- 
sent of the [traditional  authority or community 
authority,] community concerned, and otherwise 
than in accordance wlth the provisions of any 
applicable law.”. 
Part 3: Laws  of the  former Bophuthatswana 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
I No. and  year of law I Short  title 1 Extent of amendment or repeal I 
Act No. 39 of 1979 Bophuthatswana  Land 
Control Act, 1979 
Repeal of the whole 35 
No. and  year of law 
Act No. 16 of 1986 
Proclamation 45 of 1990 
Part 4: Laws of the former Venda 
Short  title 
Venda Land Control  Act, 
1986 
Venda Land Affairs Proc- 
lamation, 1990 
Extent of amendment or repeal I 
Repeal of the whole 
Repeal of sections 1 to 5, 8 to 13, 20 to 43 and so 
much of sections 6 ,7  and 14 to 19 as has not been 
assigned to the government of Limpopo province un- 
der section 235(8) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993). 
40 
45 
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Act No. 11,2004 
No. and year of law 
Act No. 14 of 1982 
No. and year of law 
Act No. 15 of 1989 
COMMUNAL  LAND RIGHTS ACT,  2004 
Part 5: Laws of the former Ciskei 
Short title 
Ciskei Land Regulation 
Act, 1982 
Extent of amendment or repeal 
liepeal of the whole with effect from the date of regis- 
tration of a  community‘s community Ivies under sec- 
tion 19(1) of “this  Act”, but only within the area com- 
prised of that community‘s communal land and with 
effect from  the  date on whlch Proclamation No. R. 188 
of 1969 is repealed in that area. 
Part 6: Laws of  the former Qwaqwa 
Short title I Extent of amendment or repeal 
Qwaqwa Land Act, 1989 Repeal of the whole with effect from the date of regis- 
lratioo of a  community’s community rules under sec- 
tion 19(1) of “this  Act”, but only within the area com- 
prised of that community’s communal land. 
5 
10 
15 
Part 7: Laws of  the former KwaNdebele 
c - -~ No. and scar uf law- ~~ Extent of amendment or repeal Short title ---.___.- . 30 I I 
Act No. I I of 1992 KwaNdebele Land Tenure So much as has not been repealed 
Act, 1992 
Proclamation 26 of 1936 
Part 8: Other laws 
Short title or description 
Administrative Area Regu- 
lations - Unsurveyed 
Districts: Transkeian Terri- 
tories 
Extent of amendment or repeal 
Repeal of the whole with effect from  the date of regis- 
tration of a  community’s community rules under sec- 
tion 19(1) of “this  Act”, but only within the area com- 
prised of that community’s communal land. 
25 
30 
 
 
 
 
